1. **Date:** Wednesday, 1 July 2020 (via video teleconference)
   - Opened: 10 a.m.
   - Suspended: 1 p.m.
   - Resumed: 3 p.m.
   - Closed: 3.50 p.m.

2. **Chairperson:** Ambassador Y. Tsymbaliuk

   Point of order: Russian Federation, Chairperson, United Kingdom

   Prior to taking up the agenda, the Chairperson reminded the FSC of the technical modalities for the conduct of meetings via video teleconferencing technology during the COVID-19 pandemic (FSC.GAL/37/20 OSCE+).

3. **Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:**

   **Agenda item 1:** SECURITY DIALOGUE ON THE VIENNA DOCUMENT 2011

   - *Presentation by Lieutenant General L. Holopatiuk, Chief of Main Department of Military Co-operation and Verification of the Armed Forces of Ukraine*

   - *Presentation by Mr. J. Huovinen, FSC Co-ordinator for the Vienna Document*

   Chairperson, Lieutenant General L. Holopatiuk, FSC Co-ordinator for the Vienna Document (Sweden), United States of America (Annex 1) (FSC.DEL/145/20), Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (Annex 2), Georgia (FSC.DEL/143/20 OSCE+), United Kingdom (FSC.DEL/146/20 OSCE+), Canada, Armenia, Switzerland,
Turkey (FSC.DEL/150/20 OSCE+), Hungary, Russian Federation (Annex 3), Ukraine

Point of order: Russian Federation, Chairperson

Agenda item 2: DECISION ON THE SECOND BIENNIAL MEETING TO ASSESS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OSCE DOCUMENTS ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS AND STOCKPILES OF CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION

Chairperson

Decision: The FSC adopted Decision No. 3/20 (FSC.DEC/3/20) on the second Biennial Meeting to Assess the Implementation of the OSCE Documents on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, the text of which is appended to this journal.

Agenda item 3: GENERAL STATEMENTS

(a) On the subject of Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine and illegal occupation of Crimea: Ukraine (FSC.DEL/153/20) (FSC.DEL/153/20/Add.1), Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment (FSC.DEL/149/20), United States of America, United Kingdom (FSC.DEL/147/20 OSCE+), Canada

(b) On the subject of the situation in and around Ukraine: Russian Federation, United States of America, Ukraine

Agenda item 4: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

(a) Matters of protocol: Poland, Chairperson

(b) Briefing on the 87th Meeting of the OSCE Communications Group, held on 24 June 2020 (FSC.GAL/69/20): Representative of the Conflict Prevention Centre

(c) 2020 OSCE report to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) on the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and its International Tracing Instrument for the period 2018–2019 (SEC.GAL/88/20): Representative of the Conflict Prevention Centre (Annex 4)
(d) Postponement of the regional seminar on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, scheduled to be held in Tirana from 31 August to 2 September 2020: FSC Co-ordinator for the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (Romania)

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 8 July 2020, at 10 a.m., via video teleconference
Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

Thank you for organizing today’s discussion, and thanks to our distinguished speakers who have given very important and material information, and have set down the reasoning and grounding of this discussion on the Vienna Document; there is a military foundation necessitating this document.

It’s unfortunate that, due in part to the COVID-19 pandemic, we have not had a focused discussion in the FSC on Vienna Document modernization since the joint Vienna Document modernization proposal was introduced last fall. This meeting today can begin to fill that gap.

Of course, not that we’ve all been idle – the co-sponsors of the proposal have conducted a series of chapter-by-chapter presentations in Working Group A for months, explaining this initiative in detail, and inviting our colleagues to engage on the broad range of substantial propositions for transparency and risk reduction that it encompasses. I don’t think there’s any mystery here about what the document is intended to do and the goals it is intended to achieve. The Hungarian delegation recently circulated a non-paper providing a detailed overview of the proposed updates to the Vienna Document.

The presentation today that the Russian Federation interrupted stating, “let’s stay on the subject of the Vienna Document” – this presentation is the reason for the Vienna Document. The history of Europe has demonstrated that it is impossible for a conflict to remain limited if it breaks out in any one country. The reason for the Vienna Document is to prevent a generalized conflict in Europe once again.

Our forum has arguably made no greater contribution to confidence- and security-building than the Vienna Document. We count it chief among the OSCE’s contributions in the military-political sphere. However, the Vienna Document was never intended to be unchangeable. From its inception, this confidence-building measure was intended to be an evolving document, updated regularly to keep pace with changes in the security environment and our evolving military force structures. The fact that we are still implementing Vienna Document 2011 – which is very little different from Vienna Document 1999 – is an abdication of our collective responsibility. This is not a reflection on our
implementers – they continue to execute the provisions of the Vienna Document, as directed. It’s a reflection on ourselves, and the demonstrated lack of political will to rebuild military transparency in Europe.

Now this is particularly worrisome since all governments represented here regularly decry the marked deterioration in the European security environment since 2011. We all acknowledge that there is a crisis of confidence in Europe today. Most of us recognize the need for greater reciprocal military transparency and risk reduction to achieve greater stability and predictability. These are tall words – the same words that we often hear in the Structured Dialogue format. It’s high time that we put words into action, and this is what the comprehensive joint proposal endeavours to do. None of the measures therein are new – we’ve been talking about them now for years and what are they:

– Lowering thresholds for advance notification and observation of large military activities;
– A modest increase in the number of inspectors and evaluations;
– A modest increase in team size, as proposed earlier by the Russian Federation;
– Steps to facilitate information gathering in response to unusual military activities; and
– Providing greater transparency with respect to large-scale military activities conducted without prior notice to the forces involved.

Taken together, the joint proposal outlines a balanced way forward and a starting point for negotiations if negotiations are required.

So why are negotiations not active right now? At the Bratislava Ministerial Council meeting, the overwhelming majority of participating States subscribed to a statement voicing our determination to support constructively the process of Vienna Document modernization with a view to achieving substantial progress by the Tirana Ministerial Council meeting in 2020. Most participating States have repeated the call for Vienna Document modernization in the Structured Dialogue and the Annual Security Review Conference; regarding this as a critical first step for rebuilding trust and promoting transparency.

So, what’s the cause of the delay? What’s preventing us from working our way through the document, painstakingly identifying some areas we want to improve, and finding ways to get there? The basis of the Vienna Document is that States want to reassure each other that there are not aggressive intentions in the European theatre toward a general conflict. Failure to engage sends the message of an intent to, in fact, destabilize. The result is logically defensive measures that raise concerns in the Russian Federation. The Vienna Document is intended to calm all this down, while we can.

Some point to lax adherence to existing Vienna Document commitments by States as a reason for not engaging in modernization. There is no question the Vienna Document should be fully implemented in letter and spirit. Indeed, modernization and better implementation are two sides of the same coin – updating the Vienna Document will fill gaps or eliminate exceptions found in the current version. For example, if a State is not notifying
military measures and exercises above the current threshold or is conducting so-called “snap” exercises, updates to the Vienna Document such as lowering notification thresholds and ensuring greater transparency of no-notice exercises would raise the bar for implementation.

Others claim the joint proposal is not comprehensive enough and should include other proposals. Alternatively, some argue that it’s too comprehensive and that they can subscribe to certain elements but not others. As we’ve noted previously, the joint proposal should serve as the baseline for negotiations, encompassing the elements that have the most support; this is not to exclude other ideas which can be addressed in the course of negotiations – if lowering the threshold of anxiety in the European continent is indeed the goal. Similarly, elements of the joint proposal may be amended or adjusted in the course of negotiations – but only once negotiations begin. The joint proposal is a starting point, not an ending point, for negotiations.

Now we have heard that elements of the proposal should be implemented on a purely voluntary basis, or that we should focus on other transparency measures and best practices in the interim. We don’t oppose such voluntary transparency, but it’s no substitute for what’s lacking – reciprocal confidence-building measures based on firm commitments – this is at the core of our security concerns. Non-reciprocated transparency only builds confidence among those in whom we already have confidence and those that are willing to hold themselves to the higher standard.

Some raise more “political” reservations. This is the political discussion we’re having today, not just a military discussion. Some raise political reservations arguing that while they support modernization in principle, they are reluctant to isolate any participating State. Let’s be clear: we are not seeking to isolate anyone, we are seeking to engage everyone. If you believe that we need to increase military transparency so as to reduce risk and rebuild confidence, engagement is the only path to get there. Vienna Document modernization represents an open door to engagement of all the countries of Europe.

Most disturbing is this “principled” opposition to Vienna Document modernization predicated on arguments that certain external steps need to happen first. Such preconditions have been advanced over a long period of time. The current form of this argument is that before we can discuss Vienna Document modernization, NATO needs to change its political and deterrence postures vis-à-vis Russia. The fact is that NATO would welcome a more constructive relationship with Russia; in fact, one is necessary. But NATO will not condone, accept, or validate attempts to redraw Europe’s borders by force. Concerns about exercises and posture – including NATO’s and Russia’s – could be addressed through modernization of the Vienna Document. If, in fact, those concerns are intended to be addressed. Reciprocal confidence-building by lowering notification thresholds, increasing inspection opportunities, and other proposals applies to NATO forces and non-NATO forces alike. That’s the point of reciprocity.

If Russia is concerned about NATO activities, Vienna Document modernization is a way of allaying those concerns. The question is, is the Russian Federation committed to reciprocal transparency or not? If so, we invite Russia to engage with us on updating the Vienna Document. If that commitment is unreciprocated, then are we to surmise that Russia views less transparency and confidence-building as being in its national interest? Is this part of Russia’s strategy of seeking asymmetric advantage (as with disinformation or hybrid
measures)? Maybe Russia seeks to retain the ability to conduct destabilizing military operations under the guise of massive “snap exercises”?

I hope leaders in Moscow hear this message today. Failure to engage sends a message of intent, that is probably not intended to be sent, but it is certainly a matter of concern, and we are speaking frankly today about it.

Speaking frankly, we’ve wasted enough time arguing positions of principle rather than engaging in the substantive work of this forum: updating the Vienna Document. We all know that full implementation and modernization of the Vienna Document is one of the most effective steps we can take to increase security and transparency across the entire OSCE region. We all know that it is the particular responsibility of this forum to engage in substantive negotiations on updating the Vienna Document. Let us not abdicate that responsibility in the months that remain before the Tirana Ministerial Council meeting.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. Please attach this statement to the journal of the day.
950th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 956, Agenda item 1

STATEMENT BY
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The delegation of Germany, in its capacity as EU Presidency, passed the floor to the representative of the European Union, who delivered the following statement:

The European Union and its Member States would like to thank the Chairmanship, as well as the co-ordinator and keynote speakers, for this useful opportunity to discuss and assess the implementation and modernization of the Vienna Document 2011.

We regret that this Security Dialogue takes place against the background of the ongoing conflicts in the OSCE area. For the seventh consecutive year, Russia’s acts of aggression against Ukraine and its illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol continue to challenge European security and raise serious concerns. We reiterate our full support to the international diplomatic efforts within the Normandy format and the Trilateral Contact Group to address these concerns. This reminds us of, and underscores, the crucial value of the confidence- and security-building measures, particularly those enshrined in the Vienna Document 2011. These need to be implemented fully and in good faith, and appropriately modernized, so that challenges to the current European security environment are better met by increased transparency and predictability.

The OSCE’s comprehensive and co-operative concept of security with emphasis on conventional arms control, confidence- and security-building measures, disarmament and non-proliferation, constitutes an important element of our common security. These fundamental and enduring commitments provide systemic and preventive means to enhance predictability and transparency. In so doing, they can contribute to reducing military risks and misperceptions, lead to a better understanding of threat perceptions and build trust among participating States.

Important agreements in this area, including the Vienna Document, the Treaty on Open Skies and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe have provided us with important security gains for many years. Conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures remain crucial instruments. We support adherence to these instruments as well as efforts to solve outstanding issues pertaining to compliance with and implementation of these instruments, which are complementary.
We remain committed to the full implementation in letter and spirit of existing commitments in the politico-military dimension and continue to support the substantial modernization of the Vienna Document. We are equally committed to the further development of conventional arms control, confidence- and security-building measures and other instruments in the politico-military toolbox. We stand ready to work towards creating an environment conducive to reinvigorating conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures in Europe.

We consider that there is an urgent need for the resumption of the Vienna Document activities in the near future. In the framework of the COVID-19 pandemic, we managed to co-ordinate the suspension of these activities and now need to further collaborate to resume their implementation.

We continue to believe that it is vital to modernize our OSCE politico-military toolbox, most notably the Vienna Document, in order to increase military stability, transparency and predictability. We are convinced that this would bring greater long-term security for all participating States. At relevant OSCE meetings, the European Union and its Member States have been clear and consistent in calling for a substantial modernization of the Vienna Document. We welcome and support all proposals on various Vienna Document chapters aimed at strengthening its provisions and adapting it to the current security environment. In this context, we see the joint proposal for a Vienna Document Plus draft decision as an opportunity to launch a constructive negotiation. We view this proposal in a positive light. It reflects common concerns about growing unpredictability and mistrust in the European security environment and the urgent need to reverse this trend. We understand that this proposal is intended to create a positive momentum for modernization of the Vienna Document and the confidence we place in the OSCE as the key platform for mutual dialogue on security issues. This new proposal together with other proposals will be a basis for negotiation that all participating States will be able to engage in, thereby rebuilding trust and confidence.

We urge all participating States to engage actively and constructively in these important discussions to increase military transparency and reduce risk by working with us to modernize the Vienna Document. In this respect, we strongly encourage Russia to reconsider its current position.

The candidate countries the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, and the EFTA countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Andorra and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

1 The Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.
Mr. Chairperson,

We are grateful to you for preparing and holding a plenary meeting on the theme that is at the heart of the mandate of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), namely the Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. We thank Colonel Johan Huovinen for his detailed presentation. We should like to point out to General Leonid Holopatiuk that his report has been repeated many times in different versions by the Ukrainian delegation at the FSC. Evidently, he was not warned about this and was provided with an old text, which has been commented on many times by us. As a professional military man, the General presumably understands that the vast majority of the points made do not stand up to criticism, either from a military or a factual point of view.

Today’s meeting provides an opportunity to continue discussion of the situation in the OSCE’s politico-military dimension. It was started at the Annual Security Review Conference and we therefore see no need to repeat what was said during that event. The discussion reaffirmed the wide range of views that continue to exist regarding the prospects for updating confidence-building measures. At the same time, OSCE participating States draw attention to the need for full implementation in good faith of the existing commitments under the Vienna Document 2011. We believe that in the current difficult situation implementation issues have particular priority, both for military specialists and verification experts and for delegations in Vienna.

The wide range of measures provided for by the Vienna Document ensure the openness and predictability of military activities, strengthen trust and security among the participating States and help to prevent hazardous incidents of a military nature. The transparency and control mechanism set out in the Document makes it possible in general to obtain fairly complete information on the armed forces of the OSCE participating States.

Russia is committed to fulfilling its obligations in the field of confidence- and security-building in good faith. Last year, within the framework of the Vienna Document, Russia accepted 3 inspections of a specified area and conducted 23 such inspections, and also accepted 3 evaluation visits. Furthermore, 29 observation flights were conducted over our
territory under the Treaty on Open Skies. These data show that Russia is the most scrutinized OSCE participating State in terms of the number of verification measures accepted.

Obviously, the opinions expressed today about the alleged “inadequacy” of the existing measures are to some extent groundless and incorrect. It is particularly strange to hear such statements from participating States on another continent notable for the fact that in the entire 30-year history of the Vienna Document they have not accepted a single inspection or evaluation visit on their territory. Nevertheless, they consider themselves entitled to exploit any opportunity to make comments or recommendations to other countries.

We should like to remind the distinguished representative of the United States of America that in the first decade of this century the United States was among the countries that stubbornly objected to the development of a new version of the Vienna Document. As a result, it was not until one year after the OSCE Astana Summit, which was held in 2010, that agreement could be reached on a new version. During that period, Russia, together with other participating States, was consistently endeavouring to persuade its partners of the need to modernize the Vienna Document, employing exclusively diplomatic arguments, and what is more without levelling accusations of “disinformation” and “blocking” the negotiations, which we have heard today from our US colleagues. We hope that they will also abide by diplomatic ethics and OSCE vocabulary.

Now, as for the Vienna Document’s modernization – our approach is well known to our esteemed partners; it remains unchanged and unequivocal. During the current session, our delegation has repeatedly outlined its position of principle that the strategy for the military “containment” of Russia, which is being implemented by the NATO countries and is set out in the Alliance’s documents, makes it impossible to reach agreements on the modernization of the Vienna Document. We believe that sanctions, accusations and the curtailment of military co-operation are deeply at odds with a policy of confidence-building in the military sphere.

With regard to the initiative of 34 countries on the modernization of the Vienna Document, we should like to recall that in the tradition of the OSCE there have always been such proposals, which have had a unifying potential, rather than creating additional dividing lines and did not become a source of tension and reproaches. The assertiveness with which our partners promote their “package” of proposals at every single OSCE event suggests that it is being used precisely as a tool for exerting pressure. Such an approach is counter-productive.

In order to enable a discussion on confidence-building measures to get under way, the United States and its allies should put a stop to military activities and the deployment of forces and infrastructure near Russia’s borders and return, at the very least, to the lines they occupied at the start of 2014. It is time for our partners to make a choice: either they continue strengthening their security through the build-up of military capacity and posing a threat to Russia, or they start moving towards greater security by developing arms control instruments. These two processes are incompatible.

Currently, a different question arises: how can the NATO countries talk about the modernization of the Vienna Document, the purpose of which is to ensure the transparency of military activities, given that the United States – the “main shareholder” in the Alliance – is
withdrawing from the Treaty on Open Skies, the original purpose of which was precisely to ensure this transparency.

We should like to point out that a number of the States that co-sponsored the aforementioned “package” do not care enough about full implementation of the key provisions of the Vienna Document 2011 concerning notifications regarding an increase in the personnel strength of units and formations, including “non-active” ones, and also notifications of major military activities below the thresholds. In preparation for the exercise “DEFENDER-Europe 20” there were also attempts to circumvent the provisions of the Vienna Document 2011 by splitting a large exercise into smaller ones and involving neutral States in the manoeuvres.

Mr. Chairperson,

We note the contemptuous approach to fulfilment of commitments in the field of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) by some countries. Thus, Ukraine has been conducting military activities on its territory for over six years now, with the participation of up to 70,000 troops and large quantities of heavy equipment, without having provided the notifications required by the Vienna Document and without having invited observers to the area. In effect, we are talking about Ukraine’s non-compliance with the following provisions of the Vienna Document 2011:

– Paragraphs 10.3 to 10.3.3, whereby notification should be provided of increases in personnel strength of units and formations or the temporary activation of “non-active” units and formations;

– Paragraphs 38 to 46.2, whereby a military activity is subject to notification whenever it involves at least 9,000 troops, 250 battle tanks, 500 armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) or 250 artillery pieces (100 mm calibre and above);

– Paragraphs 47 to 60, whereby participating States are obliged to invite observers to various types of notifiable military activities in which the number of participating troops exceeds 13,000, the number of battle tanks equals or exceeds 300, the number of ACVs equals or exceeds 500, and the number of artillery pieces, including mortars and multiple rocket launchers, equals or exceeds 250.

In addition, Ukraine is not complying with paragraph 68, whereby the Ukrainian Government is obliged to provide in writing by 15 November each year information concerning military activities involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks or 2,000 ACVs or 900 artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above). In accordance with paragraph 70, Ukraine undertook not to carry out such military activity unless notification was provided in a timely manner.

We emphasize that the voluntary transparency measures being taken by the Ukrainian Government cannot replace the implementation of mandatory Vienna Document provisions.
Mr. Chairperson,

Since the Forum periodically hears about the “concerns” of certain delegations regarding snap inspections of the combat readiness of our troops, we should like to point out that the Russian Federation has voluntarily sent notifications to the OSCE participating States on numerous occasions detailing the parameters of such inspections and has also informed them of major military exercises below the Vienna Document thresholds. I could mention, for example, the joint Russian-Belarusian “Zapad-2018” exercise, the naval exercise “Ocean Shield” in July 2019, which did not fall under the provisions of the Vienna Document at all, and also the recent snap inspection of the readiness of the armed forces to respond to risks posed by the spread of viral diseases. In spite of the fact that we have demonstrated unprecedented transparency, a number of participating States have declared it to be insufficient. Representatives of some countries have even tried to claim that no information was provided at all (this was heard in particular at the session on the Structured Dialogue during the Annual Security Review Conference). This begs the reasonable question: if these participating States chose not to pay attention to the objective information provided, would the additional transparency measures that they are insisting on and modern technology really be able to help in such cases?

Mr. Chairperson,

In conclusion, we should like to confirm the intention of the Russian Federation to continue the practice of holding voluntary additional events to inform our partners about the day-to-day activities of the Russian armed forces and the conduct of exercises on its territory that are below the parameters of notifiable military activities, and also the practice of inviting representatives of military attachés accredited in Moscow to observe these exercises. We will hold the relevant briefings in the Forum as and when required. We expect our partners to do likewise

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.
STATEMENT BY
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE

Mr. Chairperson,
Dear ambassadors,
Dear colleagues,

I am pleased to inform you that the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) has drafted and circulated the 2020 OSCE report to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) on the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and its International Tracing Instrument, with the reference number SEC.GAL/88/20 and dated 25 June 2020.

The report provides an overview of the OSCE’s work in the field of SALW and SCA in the years 2018 and 2019. Since this is the first time that the regional organizations have been asked to submit the report by filling out a template, it also includes responses on the Organization’s mandates and regional instruments relevant to its implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action.

Finally, I should like to mention that the CPC intends to submit the report to UNODA on 3 July 2020. The OSCE report will contribute to the preparations for the Seventh Biennial Meeting of States to be held in 2021. The UN will publish the report on the UNODA website.

I kindly ask for my statement to be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.
DECISION No. 3/20
SECOND BIENNIAL MEETING TO ASSESS THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OSCE DOCUMENTS ON SMALL ARMS
AND LIGHT WEAPONS AND STOCKPILES OF
CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION

The Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC),

Reaffirming its commitment to strengthening efforts aimed at ensuring the full implementation of the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) (FSC.DOC/1/00/Rev.1, 20 June 2012), the OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (SCA) (FSC.DOC/1/03/Rev.1, 23 March 2011), and related FSC decisions, including Decision No. 2/10 on the OSCE Plan of Action on SALW (FSC.DEC/2/10, 26 May 2010),

Recalling Section VI of the OSCE Document on SALW, in which the participating States agreed that the FSC would review regularly, including, as appropriate, through annual review meetings, the implementation of the norms, principles and measures in the document, and agreed to keep its scope and content under regular review and to work on the further development of the document in the light of its implementation and of the work of the United Nations and of other international organizations and institutions,

Recalling Ministerial Council Decision No. 10/17 on SALW and SCA (MC.DEC/10/17), the 2016 Ministerial Council Declaration on OSCE Assistance Projects in the Field of SALW and SCA (MC.DOC/3/16), and the 2018 Ministerial Declaration on OSCE Efforts in the Field of Norms and Best Practices on SALW and SCA (MC.DOC/5/18),

Recalling the first Biennial Meeting to Assess the Implementation of the OSCE Documents on SALW and SCA, which took place in Vienna on 2 and 3 October 2018,

Decides:

1. To organize the second Biennial Meeting to Assess the Implementation of the OSCE Documents on SALW and SCA, to be held in Vienna on 13 and 14 October 2020, in accordance with the indicative timetable and organizational modalities annexed to this decision;
2. To request the OSCE Secretariat to support the organization of this meeting;

3. To invite the OSCE participating States to consider providing extrabudgetary contributions for the above-mentioned event.
SECOND BIENNIAL MEETING TO ASSESS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OSCE DOCUMENTS ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS AND STOCKPILES OF CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION

Vienna, 13 and 14 October 2020

I. Agenda and indicative timetable

Tuesday, 13 October 2020

10–11 a.m. Opening session (including a coffee break)
  – Opening statement by the FSC Chairperson
  – Opening address by the OSCE Secretary General (tbc)

11 a.m.–1 p.m. Global developments and trends in preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and implications for the OSCE area
  – Introduction by the moderator
  – Keynote speakers
  – Discussions

1–3 p.m. Lunch

3–6 p.m. Working session I: Assessment of the implementation of OSCE commitments on SALW and SCA and options for improvement; progress in the review and update of the OSCE Best Practice Guides on SALW and SCA (including a coffee break)
  – Introduction by the working session moderator
  – Presentations
  – Discussions
Wednesday, 14 October 2020

10 a.m.–1 p.m. Working session II: The assistance mechanism under the OSCE Documents on SALW and SCA and donors’ perspectives

– Introduction by the working session moderator
– Presentations
– Discussions

1–3 p.m. Lunch

3–5.45 p.m. Working session III: Application of the OSCE Best Practice Guides on SALW and SCA and other international standards to the assistance projects (including a coffee break)

– Introduction by the working session moderator
– Presentations
– Discussions

5.45–6 p.m. Closing session

– FSC Chairperson’s closing remarks

II. Organizational modalities

Background

Ministerial Council Decision No. 10/17 tasked the FSC with, inter alia, continuing to discuss the outcomes of the Review Conferences and Biennial Meetings of States; continuing further steps to improve the efficiency and outcome of SALW and SCA projects to ensure the maximum possible value in dealing with the challenges associated with SALW and SCA in line with the OSCE assistance mechanisms as outlined in the OSCE Documents on SALW and SCA and relevant FSC decisions; and exploring ways to complement the existing OSCE measures aimed at addressing the illicit trafficking of SALW.

The 2018 Ministerial Declaration on OSCE Efforts in the Field of Norms and Best Practices on SALW and SCA (MC.DOC/5/18) acknowledged the need for the OSCE to continue to enhance its SALW- and SCA-related norms and best practices and their implementation. The Declaration welcomed the conduct of the first OSCE Biennial Meeting to Assess the Implementation of the OSCE Documents on SALW and SCA, held in Vienna on 2 and 3 October 2018. The meeting served as a platform to take stock of the existing OSCE norms and best practices and to identify areas for their improvement and for co-operation.
Organization

The FSC Chairmanship will chair the opening and closing sessions. Each session will have one designated moderator and one rapporteur throughout. The task of the moderators will be to facilitate and follow the discussion, while the immediate task of the rapporteurs will be to present brief written summary reports for use by the Chairperson of the closing session, and a written summary report, which will become a part of the Chairperson’s consolidated report. The rapporteurs will assist the moderators in the preparation of their respective sessions.

Each session will be introduced by the moderator, after which several presentations will be given on specific aspects of the topic, either by the moderator, by keynote speakers or by other experts. The introduction and the presentations are to be in line with point papers to be distributed via the moderator prior to the meeting. The introductions and the presentations at the sessions are to be brief, so as to allow maximum time for discussion, and should therefore highlight only the most important elements of the point papers so as to provide information and set the scene for the discussion.

The Rules of Procedure of the OSCE will be followed, *mutatis mutandis*, at the meeting. Also, the guidelines for organizing OSCE meetings (PC.DEC/762) will be taken into account.

Interpretation from and into all six working languages of the OSCE will be provided at all sessions. The FSC Chairperson will provide a report on the meeting not later than 14 December 2020, including a summary of suggestions and recommendations made during the meeting. The OSCE Secretariat will assist the FSC Chairperson in all matters concerning the organizational modalities of the meeting.

Participation

The participating States are encouraged to ensure the participation of senior officials, including officials from capitals, in the meeting. The Partners for Co-operation will also be invited to participate.

Other international and regional organizations that are involved in relevant SALW and SCA activities will also be invited by the FSC Chairperson.

The deadline for online registrations will be 21 September 2020.

General guidelines for participants

Prior circulation of briefings, overviews or statements is encouraged. To promote interactive discussion, delegations are requested to provide formal statements in writing only. Delegations are requested to limit the length of their oral statements to five minutes.
Guidelines for keynote speakers and panellists

To facilitate discussion within the time constraints, the keynote presentations will be limited to 15–20 minutes, introductions and presentations in the sessions to 20–25 minutes, and interventions/questions from the floor to five minutes.

In their contributions, the speakers at the opening and working sessions should set the scene for the discussion and stimulate debate among delegations by raising appropriate questions and suggesting potential recommendations, and should concentrate on highlights in their contributions. Speakers should remain present during the entire session they are addressing and should be ready to engage in the debate following their presentation. In order to promote interactive discussion, formal statements and interventions at the sessions should be as concise as possible and should not exceed five minutes. The speakers should also contribute to the further substance of the meeting as it evolves and as time permits. Prior circulation of statements and interventions will enhance the possibility of engaging in discussion.

Guidelines for moderators and rapporteurs

The moderator will chair the session and should facilitate and focus dialogue among the participants. The moderator should stimulate the debate by introducing items related to the subjects of the sessions, as appropriate, in order to broaden or refine the scope of the discussion. The moderators may provide input to the Chairperson for the FSC Chairperson’s report.

The rapporteurs are to provide written reports subsequent to the meeting. These summary reports should give an account of issues raised during the relevant sessions; personal views are not to be advanced.

Guidelines for submitting and distributing written contributions

Speakers should submit their written contributions to the moderators no later than 5 October 2020. Participating States and other participants in the meeting are also encouraged to submit any written contributions they may have before that date.