



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

REF.FSC/127/96

14 March 1996

ENGLISH only

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**Department for Conference Services**

Please find attached the Chairman's Report and Summaries of the Working Group  
Co-ordinators of the 1996 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.



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1996 ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION  
ASSESSMENT MEETING

Vienna, 4-6 March 1996

SUMMARY

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Chairman's Report	1
 <u>Summaries of the Working Group Co-ordinators:</u>	
Working Group I:	Agenda item 2(a) 5
Working Group II:	Agenda item 2(b) 7
Working Group III:	Agenda item 2(c) 10
Agenda item 2(d)	12
Working Group IV:	Agenda item 2(e) 15
Agenda item 2(f)	16
Working Group V:	Agenda item 2(g) 17
Working Group VI:	Agenda items 3 and 4 19

## ON THE 1996 ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING

Vienna, 4-6 March 1996

Dear Colleagues,

As Chairman of the closing session of the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting I have the honour, in accordance with the established modalities, to inform the Forum for Security Co-operation of the proceedings and results of the aforementioned meeting, which took place from 4 to 6 March in this very room.

Like previous meetings, the 1996 AIAM brought together many experts from different capitals and once again provided an opportunity for in-depth discussion of all the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994 as well as other documents adopted by the Forum, such as the Code of Conduct, on the one hand, and the principles governing conventional arms transfers, particularly with regard to the relevant questionnaire, on the other.

As was noted during the closing session of the AIAM, the meeting's debates covered both the broad principles underlying confidence-building measures, as well as matters relating to their daily application and the lessons to be learned with regard to their operation and possible improvement.

As you know, the work of the experts was divided by subject into nine different sections, and eight co-ordinators were involved. Therefore, my speech today is, to a large extent, based on the reports they have submitted, which are to be formally transmitted to the Forum for Security Co-operation as annexes to my statement.

This formal transmission of the co-ordinators' excellent written summaries enables me to skim over the main issues discussed, yet without committing a sin of omission by leaving out this or that vital point of detail.

The discussions of the working groups indicated the following:

With regard to the provisions on the annual exchange of military information (ch. I, 1-14), it was emphasized that the provision of information on organization, manpower and equipment forms the basis of CSBMs. The failure of a number of participating States to transmit information and delays in transmitting such information were causes for concern. Several methods of issuing reminders were discussed. Furthermore the group considered the advantages and disadvantages of providing, on a more frequent basis, accompanying information relating to the Vienna Document and the document on the Global Exchange of Military Information.

The discussions on defence planning (ch. I, 15) focused on the deadlines for providing information following the adoption of military budgets and on the related issue of time limits for answering requests for clarification. Another suggestion was to devise a notification form providing information on either the adoption of the budget or the anticipated date by which, in the event of a delay, such information could be provided.

Military activities were discussed on the basis of chapters IV to VII. With regard to prior notification (ch. IV) and observation of certain military activities (ch. V), the main focus of the discussions was stimulated by a presentation on the observation of American

military forces deployed under IFOR. It was felt that notification, and observation of activities not expressly anticipated in the Vienna Document 1994 but carried out on a voluntary basis in the spirit of that Document, indicated the right way forward. The application of the Vienna Document 1994 to "real-life situations" was emphasized.

No suggestions were made on the annual calendars (ch. VI).

With regard to paragraph 67 of the constraining provisions (ch. VIII), it was recalled that negative notification is required in the event of non-applicability. The suggestion was made to increase the time span specified in paragraph 65.1 from two to three years and to include an additional parameter (bearing a number) for ACVs.

Examination of the provisions on compliance and verification (ch. VIII) led to several observations on issues primarily concerning quotas and the size of inspection teams. Some suggestions which might be followed up by Working Group A of the Forum for Security Co-operation were identified. It was noted that Hungary and Slovakia are to bring their annual quotas for evaluation visits to 5 and 3 respectively. The Swedish paper on the use of inspections and evaluations was seen as a means of furthering the discussion in Working Group A.

The discussions on risk reduction (ch. II) led to the conclusion that the clarification mechanisms had not been widely employed. Their use in 1991 and 1992 had helped to reduce tensions. The lack of use was welcomed, but it was emphasized that the provisions of chapter II remained potential instruments.

All the delegations emphasized the importance of military contacts and co-operation (ch. III) as a means of strengthening confidence and security. Improved visibility of contacts, on a voluntary basis, was put forward as a possibility. A lengthy discussion on a proposal by the United States to reissue in a uniform format the calendar for visits to air bases led to a broad consensus and ought to be followed up within Working Group A of the Forum.

The working group on communications (ch. IX), which deals with issues that have a bearing on several other areas investigated under other sections, should be given more time in subsequent meetings of the AIAM. The respective roles of the Netherlands and the CPC in the area of communications were highlighted. It was suggested that the CPC should transmit a copy of the information circulated on the network to those States which were not yet connected. By now 43 States and 5 institutions have been linked to the network, and those which are not are encouraged to install terminals and make full use of them if possible. With regard to decision-making in the area of communications, suggestions seemed to favour greater co-ordination between the technical and political levels and between the different forums using the network. Finally, it should be noted that a proposal concerning the creation of a "Configuration Control Board" under the communications group is to be presented to the Forum for Security Co-operation by the group in accordance with the established modalities.

The inclusion this year in the AIAM's agenda of questions bearing on the implications of CSBMs, both regional and subregional, for confidence- and security-building issues as well as early warning and conflict prevention, and also on the consequences of any

information provided on the basis of implementation, was judged useful and well founded. The discussions enabled us to deal with questions associated with the Vienna Document, and indeed questions going beyond it. Many delegations offered their views on the implementation of the Code of Conduct. Furthermore, bilateral, subregional and regional initiatives related to CSBMs have been brought to the fore - voluntary initiatives on the one hand, and initiatives which serve to complement broad commitments on the other.

I should also like to make the point that, in addition to the discussions generated within the working groups, a majority of delegations expressed their views during the opening plenary sessions and at the closing session of the Annual Meeting.

\* \* \* \* \*

On the conceptual plane, I should like to make a number of observations which I had the occasion to put forward to participants in my closing statement before the AIAM. I would ask you, therefore, to allow me a certain right of repetition with respect to my statement of last week - repetition which seems to me justified by the message which I have to pass on to the Forum for Security Co-operation.

At the present stage, given the degree of maturity which the arrangements linking our States have reached, specific or indeed sectorial refinement of existing measures may, to be sure, still be worth pursuing, but should not become an end in itself. It is this, an understanding which we broadly share, that leads me to stress the notion of voluntarism which was brought to the fore so frequently during the Annual Meeting.

With regard to the application of CSBMs in all circumstances, that is "in fair weather and in foul", I may note that the discussions evoked this same notion of voluntarism, on the one hand, but also the idea of implementation at the very least in keeping with the spirit of the documents which unite our countries.

The growth of bilateral measures, and also subregional and regional arrangements in the matter of confidence- and security-building was welcomed with the greatest satisfaction. It will be noted that the effects of transparency and co-operation are making possible voluntary approaches, in situations where participation is more limited, which are complementary to the pan-European commitments and reinforce them in such a way as to guarantee the stability and security of States both nationally and collectively.

One final thing. I am pleased to be able to report that participation in the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting improves every year. More and more experts take the trouble to come to Vienna. This is a good sign: let us hope that those who for one reason or another were absent this year will take an active part in the meeting in 1997.

Dear colleagues,

This has been a survey of the questions dealt with at the sixth Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting. I make no claim to have treated the proceedings of the Meeting exhaustively, nor did I wish to go beyond my mandate, which was to be impartial and so I

refrained from any attempt to identify follow-up priorities.

Before concluding I would like to inform the Heads of Delegation of the participating States about the understanding reached last Wednesday at the closing session, namely that we should anticipate a three-day meeting in 1997 at the same time of the year, early in March, and with an agenda based largely on the 1996 agenda.

I would ask the Forum for Security Co-operation to bear this agreement in mind when it comes to take a decision on the modalities and the precise agenda of next year's meeting.

I hope that I have duly honoured my commitment to report to the Forum for Security Co-operation and I will now pass on to the Forum the formal request to give the work done by the AIAM the appropriate follow-up in accordance with the prescribed modalities. The text of this statement, together with the co-ordinators' reports, will be distributed in the pigeonholes for such purposes as they may serve. Along with the summary provided by the Conflict Prevention Centre they could serve as a basis for the proceedings of Working Group A with regard to the follow-up to be given to the suggestions that have been made.

Dear colleagues,

It remains for me only to express my gratitude to all who have taken part in the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting, in particular to the co-ordinators and the Conflict Prevention Centre, and to thank you all for your attention.

WORKING GROUP I  
Monday, 4 March 1996

Report of the Working Group Co-ordinator

- Agenda item 2: Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the calendar year 1995 - assessment, clarification and conclusions:
- (a): Provisions relating to annual exchange of military information
- 

The delegation of Latvia gave an explanation, in accordance with paragraph 147.3 of the Vienna Document 1994, of the reasons for its non-compliance with paragraph 9 of that document. The required information would be provided as soon as possible.

During the discussion, there seemed to be agreement that the provisions of chapter I of the Vienna Document 1994 are of the highest importance. The information on organization, manpower and equipment constitutes a basis for all other CSBMs.

There was a general feeling that, in quantitative terms, the implementation of the provisions had not improved. A number of States continued not to give the required information and, among those that did, many provided their information too late. Several delegations pointed out that late information caused considerable problems regarding analysis and the planning of verification.

In qualitative terms, however, some delegations perceived that there had been a certain improvement.

Some concrete actions to improve the situation were discussed:

- States that, for one reason or another, could not give information in time should explain the reason why and provide an expected date for compliance.
- A letter, possibly from the CPC, could be sent during the autumn reminding participating States of their obligations and offering technical assistance.
- A letter could be sent in, say, January to those participating States that had not given required information in time, urging them to comply.
- A letter could be sent after the AIAM, possibly from the CPC or the Chairman of the FAC, to participating States that had neither provided information nor complied with paragraph 147.3, urging them to do so.

The different timetables of the provisions of the Vienna Document 1992 and the Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI) were seen by some delegations as causing problems. Basically there were three different suggestions:



- There should be a fixed date for the exchange of information according to the GEMI.
- Information required under the Vienna Document 1994 and the GEMI should be exchanged on the same day (or at least in the same month).
- The provisions of the Vienna Document 1994 and the GEMI could to some extent be merged.

There were quite different views on these suggestions, in particular the last two of them. In simple terms it seemed to be thought that different dates should be set for compiling the information required under the two documents. On the other hand, analysis would be facilitated by a single exchange.

## WORKING GROUP II

Monday, 4 March 1996

### Report of the Working Group Co-ordinator

Agenda item 2: Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the calendar year 1995 - assessment, clarification and conclusions:

(b): Defence planning

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#### I. ASSESSMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION

Assessment of the second implementation year for the annual exchange of Defence Planning information, pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Vienna Document 1994, showed a modest improvement over the previous (and first) implementation year. However, there is room for further progress with regard to the quality and completeness of defence planning submissions provided by participating States.

The detailed statistical analysis of submissions distributed beforehand by Sweden provided a clear focus for dialogue in Working Group II on such matters as the record of compliance, the methodology of defence planning, and suggestions for improvement. On the other hand, there was little discussion by Working Group II of the "implications originating from the information provided", as provided for in paragraph 15.6 of the Vienna Document 1994.

On the positive side of the ledger, it was noted that:

1. The number of States exchanging defence planning information is increasing (three States participated for the first time in 1995);
2. States are providing their best estimates of defence expenditures for longer, multi-year planning periods, up to and including the last two years of the forthcoming five fiscal years (ten States exchanged information for fiscal years up to 1999); and
3. The quality and completeness of submissions has improved to the point that there are fewer mathematical errors or inconsistencies in dates as compared with submissions provided in 1994.

Notwithstanding this progress, there is still considerable room for improvement during the implementation years ahead:

1. A significant number of States failed to exchange defence planning information in 1995;

2. Submissions that have been provided are often incomplete or deficient (that is, lacking explanatory data for multi-year defence expenditure estimates or for any omitted items) in respect of the requirements set out in paragraph 15 of the Vienna Document 1994; and

3. States continue to provide submissions that refer to previously exchanged documents or to other official documents. It is noted that only paragraph 15.1 on defence policy and doctrine permits cross-referencing to previous documents.

During the discussion the following observations were made on individual State practice or broader methodological questions:

- Several delegations advised that, owing to national procedures, it was not possible to provide defence expenditure estimates for a multi-year planning time-frame of five years; one delegation informed the others that its Government undertook no long-term planning beyond one year;
- One delegation advised that it would exchange defence expenditure information in two parts, in line with the domestic budgetary process;
- One delegation provided a detailed explanation of its national procedures for defence planning, including the stages of defence planning and the institutions involved in the decision-making process;
- One delegation encouraged States to submit information on paramilitary forces on a voluntary basis and as appropriate, according to paragraph 15.2.1;
- Many delegations provided information on notifications distributed beforehand regarding the status of their defence planning submissions;
- Two delegations drew attention to the distinction between voluntary and obligatory notifications, particularly regarding the anticipated date of submission;
- One delegation cautioned against confusing the year of submission with the time-frame covered by the submission as indicated on the cover of defence planning submissions (e.g., 1995 not 1995-1999);
- One delegation welcomed the Swedish initiative to organize a course on budgetary/planning in the PFP context, which might also include information on Vienna Document 1994 commitments.

## II. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

The following suggestions for improvement were advanced:

1. Many delegations favoured extending the time-frame for the exchange of defence

planning submissions to three months following the date of military budget approval (from the two-month deadline now specified in paragraph 15);

2. Three delegations favoured the establishment of a fixed date for a formal annual exchange of defence planning submissions, while one delegation pointed out that differences in national practice might preclude a single date;

3. Three delegations favoured the elaboration of standard formats for notification and explanation of the anticipated date of submission and possibly also the communication of the actual date of military budget approval via the OSCE communications network;

4. One delegation favoured replacing the current annual exchange with provision of a complete defence planning submission once every three years (or when major changes occurred), with Notes Verbales and interim reports to be exchanged in the intervening years;

5. One delegation suggested that the two-month limit for requests for clarification in paragraph 15.5 be re-examined with a view to its possible extension.

### III. CONCLUSIONS BY THE CO-ORDINATOR

1. The annual exchange of defence planning information has significantly enhanced transparency among participating States at this relatively early stage of implementation.

2. Progress to date in meeting the commitments set out in paragraph 15 of the Vienna Document 1994 continues to be encouraging, with the trend in the direction of further progress towards full and satisfactory implementation.

3. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement in compliance by participating States, particularly with respect to standardization of quality.

4. The suggestions for improvement emerging from the discussions in Working Group II (outlined above) should be taken up by Working Group A for necessary follow-up action. It is expected that the AIAM 1997 will review the action taken by Working Group A and re-examine any issue as required.

## WORKING GROUP III

Tuesday, 5 March 1996

### Report of the Working Group Co-ordinator

Agenda item 2: Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the calendar year 1995 - assessment, clarification and conclusions:

(c): Provisions relating to military activities

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Working Group III, part 1, was given the task of reviewing four chapters of the Vienna Document 1994: prior notification of certain military activities, observation of certain military activities, annual calendars, and constraining provisions.

The deliberations began with a report to the delegates on the observation of U.S. forces assigned to the Implementation Force (IFOR), as a basis for discussion of prior notification and observation of certain military activities. This report, presented by the U.S. delegation, noted with gratitude the outstanding co-operation of the Hungarian Government. The report was followed by a statement by the Hungarian delegation on the significance to their country of the observation, details on co-ordination, and the historic nature of the observation. The Co-ordinator then solicited comments from the floor.

- One delegation noted the co-ordination difficulties encountered in communicating a "real world" event of this kind, and stressed the need for flexibility in responding to invitations.
- Some delegations noted that they had issued notifications of troop participation in the IFOR, even though their participating troop levels did not exceed specified thresholds. These notifications, however, had been issued in a spirit of openness. Their actions were well received by delegates.
- One delegation noted that this example of openness has not always been followed in the past. It pointed out that as a result of a recent military activity conducted by a nation represented in this Working Group, a notification should have been issued in accordance with the provisions of the Document.
- In response, that nation's delegation stated that, in its view, the military activity referred to had not reached the levels required for notification as specified in the Vienna Document; therefore, no notification had been issued.
- In the ensuing discussion there was general agreement among the delegates that notification should always be given whenever thresholds are surpassed, regardless of whether the activity is an exercise or a "real world" event.

- Delegates also discussed the possible expansion of Vienna Document provisions to include peacekeeping operations and to add clarity in dealing with "real world" situations.
- One delegation proposed adding language to the Document to include paramilitary forces, in addition to traditional land forces.
- In summary, on the topics of prior notification and observation of certain military activities, delegates stressed the significance of the observation in highlighting the "all weather" nature of the Vienna Document, the Document's applicability to complex, "real world" situations, and the high degree of openness such an observation provides.

The discussion then turned to annual calendars. On this subject, one delegation suggested not including voluntary observations in annual calendar submissions; instead, such observations could be dealt with under the chapter on military contact provisions.

Working Group III, part 1, concluded with a discussion of constraining provisions.

- One delegation noted that it would be submitting information required under this provision "this week".
- Another delegation noted that although paragraph 67 requires negative responses, some delegations had not made the required notifications.
- Lastly, one delegation suggested modifying the Vienna Document to allow a large military activity (paragraph 65.1) once every three years, instead of once every two years. This delegation also suggested adding 2,000 armoured combat vehicles as a new parameter to this same paragraph; exceeding that parameter would require a notification.

The general discussion in this working group was positive and highly constructive and will provide an excellent basis for further investigation by Working Group A. The Co-ordinator wishes to express his thanks to the members of the participating delegations for their valuable contributions to the success of this year's Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.

## WORKING GROUP III

Tuesday, 5 March 1996

### Report of the Working Group Co-ordinator

Agenda item 2: Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the calendar year 1995 - assessment, clarification and conclusions:

(d): Provisions relating to compliance and verification

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1. The discussion was based on the experiences drawn from evaluation visits and inspections conducted according to the Vienna Document. Numerous countries pointed out the mainly positive experiences gained in the field of verification, but mentioned the weaknesses as well.

The principal topic of discussion was the fact that evaluation visit quotas are used up very quickly, indeed at the beginning of the year.

The following points were identified as problems:

- Too few States participate actively in verifications;
- The selection of States where verifications are to be conducted still partly reflects the cold war situation;
- The evaluation visit quotas are used up early in the year and the way they are calculated still reflects the situation in 1989.

Several countries put forward concrete proposals on how to eliminate these weaknesses:

- A doubling of the minimum quotas together with an adjustment of the formula for the calculation of quotas;
- Acceptance of additional evaluation visits conducted by neighbouring States independently of quota limitations;
- A change in the basis for the calculation of quotas;
- The limitation of a country's active quotas to the level of its passive quotas;
- An increase in (or doubling of) the number of members of an evaluation group, and the acceptance of this measure as a multinational one;

- A doubling of the number of members and the carrying out of the evaluation visit by two participating States;
- A combining of the quotas for evaluation visits and inspections (i.e. a minimum of 3 plus 1 by every 60 units) i.e., allowance of the use of passive inspection quotas for evaluation visits and vice versa);
- Notification of additional voluntary quotas;
- Limitation of the obligation to accept verification to no more than one a month.

These proposals were assessed differently by the participants in the discussion.

Many countries expressed general support for the idea of raising the quotas for evaluation visits, while some suggested further discussion in Working Group A.

The following proposals in particular were endorsed:

- An increase in the number of evaluation group members;
- The combining of evaluation and inspection quotas.

All the other proposals were likewise regarded as worthy of further discussion. It was pointed out that costs could rise, making implementation a problem. It was also suggested that higher quotas be linked to the calendar year in a way permitting verification throughout the year.

Two countries described an increase in the number of evaluation group members as unnecessary.

A few countries pointed out that the difference in the purposes of evaluation visits and inspections should be preserved.

2. During the discussion Hungary and Slovakia declared that they were voluntarily raising their annual quotas for evaluation visits to five and three respectively.

The Russian Federation stated that it had exhausted its passive quota.

3. Additional proposals made by participating States:

- To use CSBMs as a programme for military contacts instead of raising the quotas;
- To define the size of a specified area more clearly during an inspection;
- To establish an OSCE arms control authority;



- To comply with the agreed time periods during inspections (not earlier than necessary);
- To call upon the participating States to submit, as agreed, a list of national holidays.

In summary, it must be said, on the basis of a satisfactory implementation of verification measures, that the quota issue, which leaves something to be desired, requires a solution.

Numerous countries referred to the proposals made in the "talking points" paper circulated by Sweden as a good basis for detailed discussions in Working Group A.

## WORKING GROUP IV

Tuesday, 5 March 1996

### Report of the Working Group Co-ordinator

Agenda item 2: Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the calendar year 1995 - assessment, clarification and conclusions:

(e): Provisions relating to risk reduction

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The working group on risk reduction emphasized the importance of the provisions contained in chapter II of the Vienna Document 1994. The use of the established mechanisms in 1991 helped to reduce tension and strengthened confidence between the States which used those mechanisms.

The fact that these mechanisms have not been employed since then is seen as a good sign. This observation has led some delegations to wonder whether clarification of the procedures provided for would be desirable.

Consultation on unusual military activities, co-operation in the event of hazardous incidents and voluntary arrangement of visits to dispel concerns about military activities remain, more than ever, potential tools which would be irreplaceable in the event of a crisis and which are likely to be used on the initiative of States.

## WORKING GROUP IV

Tuesday, 5 March 1996

### Report of the Working Group Co-ordinator

Agenda item 2: Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the calendar year 1995 - assessment, clarification and conclusions:

(f): Provisions relating to contacts

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The working group on military contacts emphasized the significance of such contacts as an important means of strengthening confidence and security. The group thought it desirable to increase the visibility of these exchanges, and all States should work towards this goal.

The American proposal to rationalize the calendars, particularly with regard to visits to air bases, takes account of the concern for appropriate synchronization and met with broad consensus.

The description of various actual experiences provided yet another opportunity to emphasize the special value of military contacts.

## WORKING GROUP V

Tuesday, 5 March 1996

### Report of the Working Group Co-ordinators

Agenda item 2: Operation and implementation of CSBMs with focus on the calendar year 1995 - assessment, clarification and conclusions:

(g): Provisions relating to communications

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#### ISSUES FOR FUTURE IMPROVEMENT:

Many delegations spoke in favour of the four recommendations presented in the Co-ordinator's discussion paper (REF.FSC/81/96 Restr.). Several delegations expressed reservations concerning the recommendation on budgetary discretion for the Communications Group (CG). Therefore, the Co-ordinators would like to request that the CPC survey of suggestions reflect consensus on recommendations 1, 3 and 4 as follows:

1. To encourage the connection of all participating States, and to address long-term maintenance of the connections (this is both a political and a cost issue);

Recommendation: That OSCE participating States formalize the suggested use of the CPC services to relay messages to countries not yet connected to the network.

2. To seek a common understanding on the scope of the mandate for the CG, in particular, the ability of the working group to take certain decisions on its own, and on which type of decisions requires full FSC, JCG or OSCC consideration;

Proposed recommendation: The OSCE participating States should consider broadening the CG's mandate under paragraphs 144.1 and 144.3 to include approval of proposals for the "viability and effectiveness" of network products within a certain budgeted amount, i.e., less than USD 25,000.

3. To recognize the links and cost implications for implementation of political decisions on various agreements, and the requirement to co-ordinate those decisions between the political and technical representatives (i.e., format changes);

Recommendation: That OSCE participating States undertake to strengthen co-ordination between their delegations, and their national experts in the CG, with the goal of maximizing the political benefits of the agreements with minimal implementation costs, especially where commonality between software applications would facilitate smoother operation of the network end-user stations.

4. To establish a mechanism enabling the technical representatives to the CG to agree on

the development and updating of the various software products for the agreements;

**Recommendation:** That OSCE participating States sanction the establishment of a CCB, to report to the CG, in order to better apply technical standards for maximizing interconnectivity between current systems and any future systems.

In addition to the points raised in the discussion paper, the Co-ordinators would like to summarize the other comments as follows:

1. The delegation of the Netherlands provided a report on the number of States connected to the network (43) and their willingness to provide communications assistance to those OSCE States participating in the Dayton Article IV negotiations. They also expressed gratitude to the CPC for its efforts in compiling the data regarding the implementation of the Vienna Document 1994, via the information transmitted over the OSCE network. Lastly, in response to this delegation's question regarding the utility of the weekly and monthly overview of CSBM messages, many States spoke in favour of retaining this practice.
2. The Bulgarian delegation provided a statement on its development of a software product for exchanging CSBM notifications (Vienna Document 1994 NOFES). This product proposal has been presented to the CG and has been refined in accordance with technical comments received. In accordance with the recommendation regarding the Configuration Control Board, the Bulgarian delegation would like to forward the proposal for CSBM NOFES to the FSC for consideration in the spring session.
3. Several States commented on the need for greater operational discipline by those States already connected to the network, in particular, compliance with the 24-hour provisions of the Vienna Document 1994. It was recognized that, owing to organizational and financial reasons, ensuring 24-hour operations could be difficult. In this context, reference was made to the usefulness and importance of "the gentlemen's agreement" to transmit, whenever possible, urgent notifications during regular office hours.
4. States also noted the importance of training and of the consistent use of agreed software products and standard operating procedures. The question of the costs of maintaining end-user station connection to the network over the long term, especially for FSU States, was also raised.

## WORKING GROUP VI

Wednesday, 6 March 1996

### Report of the Working Group Co-ordinator

- Agenda item 3: Implications of the implementation of CSBMs, including those stemming from regional and subregional arrangements, for the process of confidence- and security-building, early warning and conflict prevention
- Agenda item 4: Discussion of the implications of all information originating from the implementation of any agreed measures for the process of confidence- and security-building in the framework of the OSCE
- 

Working Group VI was given the task of discussing the implications of the implementation of CSBMs, including those stemming from regional and subregional arrangements, and in addition of discussing the implications of all information originating from the implementation of any agreed measures for the process of confidence- and security-building. The discussion was very constructive and covered a wide range of issues.

An issue that was new this year to the AIAM agenda, but not to the OSCE, concerned regional and subregional measures. Several delegations reported on regional arrangements on a bilateral and multilateral basis and many welcomed the addition of this item. In general, these arrangements are all patterned on the Vienna Document, with the addition or enhancement of lower thresholds, mandatory annual observations, and special provisions for border areas. Several delegations stressed the complementarity of these measures and the web of interlocking security arrangements providing stability to all participating States.

Regional measures and measures of voluntary character continue to be pre-eminent.

A few delegations referred favourably to the proposal by one delegation to develop a catalogue or general menu of CSBM measures, including possibly both military and non-military CSBMs.

The need to make existing CSBMs more effective and to adopt new measures, above all those of a stabilizing type, was raised.

One delegation asked that participating States that have not been provided with data be offered assistance before they were criticized. Two delegations stated their offer of assistance and reminded the first State of the provisions of paragraphs 147.2 and 147.3 of the Vienna Document.

The co-operative spirit should be reinforced by assisting, on request, those countries which need help in implementation.

One delegation reminded all delegations of the need for regional arrangements to complement, not replace, the Vienna Document and the need for regional arrangements not to interfere with compliance with other Vienna Document commitments.

The need to send letters to countries that have not complied with their obligations and have not explained the reasons for this failure in the AIAM was raised.

One delegation mentioned that failure to comply with Vienna Document commitments could be interpreted as a worrisome early warning signal and reaffirmed the need to comply with all provisions, most importantly those regarding defence planning.

Towards the end of the session, the Global Exchange of Military Information and the implementation of the Code of Conduct were discussed. One delegation called for more practical implementation of the Code, while another mentioned that one delegation had stated last year that the Code was being fully implemented in Chechnya, although it appeared that the Code had not been fully complied with. An update on the Code of Conduct implementation in Chechnya was provided.

As in several other working groups, there was a general understanding that the Vienna Document applies in both fair and foul weather.

The Co-ordinator wishes to express his thanks to the members of the participating delegations for their valuable contributions to the success of this year's AIAM.