

3.1. “CSCE Capabilities for Contributing to Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management”

Speech at the NATO Seminar on Crisis Management

Brussels, 7 March 1994

I.

New Tasks for the new CSCE

New and serious risks to European security have appeared on the international agenda in the post-Cold War era. There have been outbreaks of ethnic and nationalistic conflicts. Massive violations of human rights, including minority rights, are giving rise to tension. Local conflicts are escalating and regional wars have led to tens of thousands of dead, and millions of refugees, say nothing of the destruction and complete absence of development in the war-torn regions.

Uncontrolled inter-ethnic conflicts were an almost unknown phenomenon in the period of East-West confrontation. With their abrupt re-emergence, the international institutions were completely unprepared, without experience and basically without instruments, to deal with this challenge.

New approaches and new methods for fighting the fire had to be developed whilst the flames were rapidly expanding.

Against this background the CSCE too was challenged to make a contribution to conflict prevention and crisis management. This has become an integral part of the process of CSCE's functional redefinition and institutional development. With the landmark decision of the 1990 Charter of Paris and the 1992 Helsinki Document the new CSCE took up the challenge of managing the historic, revolutionary changes occurring in the CSCE area. The CSCE had to embark on a transition from its role as a forum for negotiation and dialogue to an active operational structure. Early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management have become main features of the new CSCE. They are based on, and directly linked to, the tasks of the CSCE in the human dimension field and its efforts to contribute to the development of co-operative security. Thus the new CSCE wishes to serve as an agent of stability in the whole Vancouver-to-Vladivostok area and to ensure that security in this area becomes truly indivisible.

The catalogue of CSCE measures and instruments for coping with the new challenges has been developed in an evolutionary manner by devising a pragmatic response to emerging challenges. In the face of rapidly proliferating and escalating conflicts, the tools available have had to be flexibly adjusted to take into account experience and the specific requirements of different trouble spots. Obviously, the CSCE has built and is building on the experience of others, particularly the UN. But, as in the case of other

international organizations, for the CSCE too innovative and imaginative thinking is the order of the day.

The map of potential and open conflicts in the CSCE area is densely filled in. Some of these conflicts have developed into bloody and tragic wars. There are similarities in some cases, but each is essentially different from the others. The question of whether, when and how the CSCE should get involved is very complex. One of the overriding needs in this respect is to assess realistically the CSCE's possibilities and its limitations. Asking too much of the CSCE is in its own way as bad as asking too little.

I am convinced, and the experience of the new CSCE proves, that the CSCE is a suitable framework for seeking solutions to conflicts through peaceful means. The CSCE, as one of several mutually supporting institutions, can and must contribute to overall efforts to defuse new tensions.

II.

Early Warning

In dealing with conflict situations at different stages of escalation, the activities of the CSCE range in principle from early warning to crisis management and post-conflict measures. But the CSCE is giving increasing emphasis to early warning and conflict prevention. This is the politically easiest and the economically cheapest approach. It is certainly the most promising way of dealing with problems. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. We cannot afford additional open conflicts that are in danger of becoming unmanageable and uncontrollable.

The aim of early warning must be to allow for early action. Fact-finding activities may be necessary for the right diagnosis and can help to determine how and when the CSCE should take further action. Gathering, processing and circulating accurate and reliable information is the basis for an assessment of the situation. This information function can be combined with the elaboration of an action plan reflecting, inter alia, the selection of instruments and methods as well as specific recommendations for CSCE decisions. Early warning should provide the CSCE bodies with information at a time when preventive diplomacy still has a chance of success.

One readily available instrument of early warning is the "intensive use of regular, in-depth political consultations, within the structures and institutions of the CSCE" (Helsinki 92, Decisions, III. (3)). Political dialogue is a valuable source of information and, at the same time, a method of determining action. Through consultation the "intelligence" of all participating States can be activated. The possibilities for consultation and dialogue within the CSCE were significantly expanded with the establishment, as of December 1993, of a new body in Vienna – the Permanent Committee. This is the first really permanent body of the CSCE for political consultation and decision-making. Discussions in the Permanent Committee, which meets in formal session at least once a week, are becoming increasingly candid, direct and straightforward. Delegations feel more and more encouraged to raise problems and concerns and discuss them in a co-operative spirit. This kind of open dialogue,

which involves the CSCE community beyond the States directly concerned, can help to ease emerging tensions, clarify misperceptions and prompt more forthcoming approaches.

An example of a regular exchange of views within the CSCE framework are questions related with the Baltic States. The Helsinki Document 1992 asked for the early, orderly and complete withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of the Baltic States. That provision is the basis for the conduct of regular reviews of progress towards the withdrawal of these troops. At the same time, the meetings of the Permanent Committee have been used as a forum for articulating concerns regarding the situation of large minority population groups in Estonia and Latvia.

Another early warning instrument are the regular implementation debates within the CSCE framework. The participating States collectively examine how agreed principles, norms and commitments are being implemented in daily practice. Ongoing violations of commitments can be signs of the beginning of a conflict. The CSCE conducts this kind of comprehensive examination once every two years at a review conference. The next such conference will be convened in Budapest on 10 October this year. In addition, sectoral reviews of the military and the human dimensions are regularly conducted.

The CSCE has developed confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), which can also serve as an early warning indicator. The failure of Yugoslavia to submit its military data in December 1991 was a signal suggesting a serious regrouping of forces for potentially aggressive purposes. Furthermore the annual reviews of the implementation of CSBMs can provide a propitious opportunity for discussing potential crisis implications of military developments in the participating States.

The CSBMs are subject to constant improvement in order to increase their early warning quality and, in particular, their applicability to inter-State aspects of conflicts. In November last year the Forum for Security Co-operation adopted a proposal calling for an exchange of information and dialogue on defence planning. It commits the participating States to share in advance their long-term plans and intentions as regards the size, structure, deployment and training of their armed forces, changes in infrastructure, and planned allocation of resources, and above all, defence budgets.

The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities has a specific and explicit early warning function. According to his Mandate he “will provide early warning at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues that have not yet developed beyond an early warning stage, but, in the judgment of the High Commissioner, have the potential to develop into conflict within the CSCE area , affecting peace, stability or relation between participating States” (Helsinki 92, Decisions, II(3)).

The Warsaw Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) collects and processes information from wide-ranging sources on human dimension issues . There is a clear need to strengthen this instrument of early warning concerning the human dimension, and for this reason the Rome Council Meeting last December decided to enhance the role of ODIHR.

The CSCE receives early warning signals from several sources. In particular non-governmental organizations provide various CSCE bodies and institutions with information on potential and existing conflicts. This can be a source of early, possibly eye-witness reports supplementing other available information or leading to further inquiries.

III.

Early Action and Conflict Prevention

The crucial point in any conflict management strategy is the step from early warning to early action. Individual States and the international community have developed a high “look-away” or “let-others-do-it” capacity.

To be effective, preventive action must come at the right time. The earlier action is undertaken, the better the chances for peaceful solutions. Intervening too late is often equivalent to failure. Of course, the best approach of all is to use such preventive measures as will prevent slipping into the internal logic of escalation.

Bitter, curative medicine is more easily accepted in small doses. Therefore, the response to emerging conflict must be gradual. The action taken should at every stage be commensurate with the magnitude of the problem and adequate to the nature of the risks. Low-key, advisory and fully co-operative instruments should in general precede more intensive political pressure. Discreet diplomacy or public condemnation, delicate persuasion or clear-cut ultimate, co-operation or confrontation can present very delicate choices when it comes to finding the right means for preventing existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and for containing conflicts before they spread.

There are several ways of initiating CSCE action and getting the CSCE actively seized with a conflict situation. Among the instruments that can be used to mobilize concerted CSCE action are the so-called mechanisms.

The existing mechanisms relate to :

- military developments (“Vienna mechanism on unusual military activities”);
- human dimension issues (“Moscow mechanism”);
- serious emergency situations (“Berlin mechanism”).

The mechanisms are built on a phased approach. Starting from clarification of situations through consultation with States involved, they can lead to CSCE meetings at which fact-finding measures are decided on. The initiative of a limited number of States is enough to trigger these mechanisms. They have on several occasions been amended and developed with the result that some have become rather unwieldy. CSCE bodies are now discussing how to streamline and harmonize the mechanisms and how to ensure that they are regarded and used as co-operative and not confrontational tools.

One of the operational advantages of the mechanisms is comprehensive, impartial, on-the-spot fact-finding. This leads relatively easily to concrete recommendations for specific CSCE involvement, including the application of other CSCE instruments. The fact-finding mission to Kosovo in 1992, undertaken in the context of the unusual-military-activities mechanism, prepared the ground for a further CSCE involvement, which resulted in the decision to establish CSCE missions of long-duration in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sanjak. Other examples are the fact-finding missions against the background of the minority and human rights situations in Estonia and Moldova, in both cases invoked by the countries concerned themselves. The relevant reports led to decisions to establish permanent missions in these countries.

Particularly since the Helsinki 92 decisions, the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE has assumed considerable operational initiative. In fact, in most cases the first steps leading up to CSCE involvement in conflict prevention (and crisis management) has been the appointment of a personal representative of the Chairman-in-Office. Their recommendations have constituted the point of departure for discussing the forms of the CSCE's involvement in the conflict situations in Georgia, Moldova and, more recently, Tajikistan. The decisions to establish long-term CSCE missions were, in a sense, a natural consequence of the reports of the Chairman's personal representatives.

A successful record in CSCE conflict prevention has been achieved by the High Commissioner on National Minorities, Mr. Max van der Stoep. Appointed in December 1992, he has had to deal with such difficult situations as the problems of large parts of the populations in Estonia and Latvia, the minorities in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania, or the situation of the respective national minorities in Slovakia and Hungary. In the latter case, following a recommendation of the HCNM, an expert group has been appointed to work on a two-year programme. The HCNM has also undertaken a study on the situation of the Roma population.

The discreet, impartial and subtle diplomacy pursued by the High Commissioner, coupled with the necessary expertise, has shown that preventive diplomacy can be instrumental in defusing tensions. Although the HCNM enjoys a high degree of autonomy, he consults closely on his activities with the CIO and regularly informs the participating States. Continued endorsement of his actions by the CSCE community and the active support of a large number of influential participating States is crucial to his success.

Another CSCE instrument of conflict prevention is the long term mission.

The first long-term missions were dispatched in 1992 to counter the imminent danger of spill-over within the former Yugoslavia. In September 1992, the CSCE established a CSCE mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This eight-member mission is typical of those intended primarily to prevent the spread of an existing conflict. Such missions monitor developments, provide advice and foster grass-root processes to guard against the country's being dragged into a conflict.

A very clear conflict-prevention task was assigned to the CSCE missions of long duration to Kosovo, Sanjak and Vojvodina. The missions started their work in

September 1992, focusing on promoting dialogue between the authorities and local communities and building confidence at the local level. Regrettably the missions were expelled by the Belgrade authorities last August, to the detriment of the situation in the entire region.

The CSCE missions in Estonia and Latvia also have a preventive function. In addition to encouraging dialogue, providing advice, and promoting local confidence-building, these missions monitor developments that may have potentially dangerous implications. Their close co-operation with the HCNM, combining permanent presence with high level advice, has proven particularly useful.

In addition to mechanisms, joint political decisions and independent action by officials in the context of conflict-prevention, the CSCE has developed several instruments for peaceful settlement of disputes.

The Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration signed by 33 States and ratified by six (12 being necessary for its entry into force) establishes an obligatory conciliation procedure leading to non-binding proposals for settlement. Arbitration procedures based on the agreement of the States Parties end with a decision that is binding upon the Parties.

The CSCE also has at its disposal "Directed Conciliation" procedures under which the Council or the CSO may direct two participating States to seek conciliation. However, to date none of the CSCE's procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes has been used by the participating States. In my view, consideration might be given to the incorporation of some of these procedures, perhaps in a more obligatory way, among the provisions of the European Union's stability pact draft.

IV.

Crisis Management

In a number of situations the CSCE has been faced with a seriously advanced conflict, where it was too late for preventive diplomacy. On these occasions, the CSCE has had to apply crisis management instruments.

The overall responsibility for management rests with the CSCE's political bodies – the Committee of Senior Officials or the Permanent Committee: they assess the situation and impart the impulse and direction for action. At present the CSCE is seized with several crises: in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan and Moldova. Sometimes the CSCE sets up ad hoc steering groups specifically assigned to deal with conflicts. The 11-member Minsk Group charged with mediation and settlement of the conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh is one such example.

Good offices on the ground are provided by the CSCE missions dispatched directly to the trouble spots. Thus at present there are CSCE teams operating in Moldova, Georgia and, recently, Tajikistan.

The Moldova mission, consisting of six members, was dispatched in April 1993 with the task of contributing to the settlement of the conflict in the Trans-Dniestr region.

The CSCE presence in Georgia, established in December 1992, is focused on the South Ossetian conflict but also performs an auxiliary function in the peace process around Abkhazia, where the leading role is played by the UN. The latest mission in Tajikistan is endeavouring to facilitate the dialogue between regionalist and political forces in the country.

Simply stated, the task of all these missions is to facilitate dialogue, encourage conciliation, advise on necessary legal and political arrangements, follow developments and, when necessary, investigate incidents. Owing to their nature, they are of mixed composition – political, civilian and military. Within the scope of their mandate they operate with a certain degree of autonomy, but receive constant political guidance from the Chairman-in-Office. Informal and formal consultations involving the participation of the heads of missions and usually held in the Permanent Committee in Vienna provide information for, and guidance and support by, the CSCE participating States.

The CSCE has not yet launched a major peacekeeping operation to ensure stability on the ground. Such a possibility is, however, provided for in the CSCE documents. Preparations are at an advanced stage for a relatively large-scale deployment in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. A special Initial Operations Planning Group composed of officers delegated by the participating States has been formed for this purpose.

At all stages of conflict management the pivotal point is the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE. This function is always performed by the Foreign Minister of the country that hosted the last Council of Ministers Meeting. This political executive office, with its extensive prerogatives, is one of the original and distinctive features of the CSCE. It provides for the direct involvement of the organization and ensures a constant input of political impulses, something that is particularly important for overcoming difficulties and obstacles in conflict management.

The Chairman-in-Office ensures co-ordination of efforts and a productive division of labour. He issues guidance to the missions in the field. He takes initiative on the agenda of the political bodies. He is directly requested to implement their decisions.

The Chairman-in-Office often acts with the preceding and the succeeding Chairman, who together form the Troika. In all his activities aimed at fulfilling the goals of the CSCE he is supported by the Secretary General.

One possibility for the CSCE to contribute to conflict management is to provide for political legitimization or additional political support for actions undertaken by other international organizations. In August 1992 the CSCE endorsed the deployment of the European Community Monitoring Mission in regions of the former Yugoslavia. This decision ensured acceptance of this mission by all the CSCE participating States, including the Russian Federation, and prepared the ground for non-EC States to join the mission (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Sweden).

Beginning in October 1992 seven Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs) were deployed in the countries neighbouring the FR of Yugoslavia (Albania, Bulgaria,

Croatia, Hungary, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania and Ukraine) under the aegis of, and financed by, the CSCE . The customs officers on the SAM teams, totalling more than 150 members, advise the authorities of the host countries on the implementation of sanctions and thus support these authorities in enforcing the sanctions imposed by the UN-Security Council. In February 1993 the CSO appointed a joint CSCE - EU Sanctions Co-ordinator whose task is to oversee the implementation of the sanctions imposed on Serbia/Montenegro.

In April 1993 the CSCE “welcomed” the patrolling operation by the WEU implementing the sanctions on the Danube. This was a precondition for some Danube riparian States to accept the WEU operation.

The CSCE is considering the possibility of establishing common rules for co-operative arrangements concerning third-party military deployment in conflict situations within other CSCE States. The issue is complex and sensitive. On the one hand, some have expressed concerns about the danger of so-called Russian “neo-imperialism” particularly after the last election in Russia. On the other hand, developments in Tajikistan or Georgia have demonstrated that Russia is willing and able to provide the forces required to ensure a minimum of stability on the ground. At its meeting in Rome last December, the CSCE Council of Ministers agreed that “exceptionally, on a case-by-case basis and under specific conditions, the CSCE may consider the setting up of a CSCE co-operative arrangement in order, inter alia, to ensure that the role and functions of a third-party military force in a conflict area are consistent with CSCE principles and objectives.” The Ministers were unanimous in affirming that if the CSCE were to agree to establish such co-operative arrangements, certain criteria and principles must be observed: respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; consent of the parties; impartiality; multinational character; clear mandate; transparency; integral link to a political process for conflict resolution; plan for orderly withdrawal. A final result of the discussion of this difficult subject has not yet been achieved.

A new element was added to the CSCE inventory of crisis management instruments last November. The Forum for Security Co-operation adopted a document on stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations. It contains a list and detailed description of possible military measures designed to complement a process of political settlement and comprising, among other things, various forms of military information exchange, local demilitarization, constraining measures, and on-site verification and monitoring.

The chances for successful crisis management by non-military measures – and incidentally by military ones as well – must be realistically assessed. In any conflict situation, potential or real, the primary responsibility for finding a lasting solution lies with the parties directly involved. The CSCE sees its role as one of assisting the parties in solving these problems. Increasingly parties to a conflict are holding the international community responsible for solving their conflicts. This concept is particularly unhelpful since it is often coupled with the absence of any readiness for compromise.

Post-Conflict Measures

Crisis management as a comprehensive concept must go beyond the open conflict phase. It is not enough to respond to a conflict with ad hoc measures. Finding a lasting solution is a long-term process. It takes time and requires constant attention. The "Agenda for Peace" has introduced the notion of "post-conflict peace-building".

The CSCE's efforts to build civil societies, consolidate human rights and strengthen democratic control over the military should also be seen as a specific endeavour, to develop structures countering the re-emergence of conflicts and consolidating peace. This is another area where we need innovative thinking.

The CSCE has started to discuss specifically its possible contribution to the post-war reconciliation and peace-building in the region of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Former Republic of Yugoslavia. One of the concrete projects under consideration is the establishment of a regional security table that would elaborate possible arms limitations and parameters establishing a stable and effective regional balance of forces in the South-Eastern part of Europe. The effort to strengthen norms of behaviour and compliance, which can be seen in the work under way to prepare in time for the Budapest meeting a Code of Conduct guiding relations among the States in the field of security, is also part of this preventive and post-conflict peace-building strategy.

VI.

Mutually Reinforcing Co-operation

Conflict prevention and crisis management should be based on a concept providing for a continuum of action from early warning to possible enforcement and post-conflict peace-building. The response to an emerging conflict must be credible from the very outset. In particular, the possibility of applying enforcement through military measures if non-military measures fail should be an option even at the initial, persuasion stage of emerging conflicts. This option will clearly improve the chances of a peaceful settlement.

For the CSCE, a body without enforcement powers and capabilities, this means maintaining close links with other organizations, first and foremost the UN. In this context it is of particular importance that the CSCE was established by the Heads of State or Government at their Summit in Helsinki in 1992 as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. Practical co-operation was arranged under a framework agreement between the UN and the CSCE in 1993. Furthermore, the CSCE now has observer status at the UN General Assembly.

Co-operation with the UN takes place in a variety of forms. In a political sense, CSCE operations benefit from support accorded them by UN bodies. As an example: Several UN Security Council resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh have made it clear that the CSCE is acting in this crisis with the full confidence and support of the Security Council. To allow for co-ordination and co-operation, the CSCE informs the UN about all its activities, in particular its missions. UN officials are often present at

CSCE meetings at which conflict situations are discussed. The Permanent Mission of the Chairman-in-Office in New York is in constant contact with the Secretary General of the UN and the UN Security Council. As for practical co-operation in the field, the CSCE has taken a number of initiatives to allow for mutual support and avoiding overlap e.g., in Tajikistan, Georgia and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The CSCE takes a particular interest in mutually reinforcing co-operation with other international organizations in the field of peacekeeping. The reason is that the CSCE has no military structure of its own that could be used for major peacekeeping tasks. The CSCE Summit in Helsinki stated that “the CSCE may benefit from the resources and possible experience and expertise of existing organizations such as the EC, NATO and the WEU, and could therefore request them to make their resources available in order to support it in carrying out peacekeeping activities”.

A very practical and often practised form of co-operation is “cross-participation” in missions, especially in those of a fact-finding nature, and mutual participation in meetings and seminars on conceptual and practical aspects of conflict management. This is one possibility that has been used between the CSCE and NATO as well as between the CSCE and the Council of Europe.

Better organized and more effective co-ordination and co-operation between international organizations is essential if the credibility of international action is to be re-established. The public has little understanding for institutional imperialism.

Mutual co-operation should allow each of the international organizations to preserve its own area of action and responsibility; but co-operation and co-ordination will prevent duplication of work, save resources and ensure better cost-effectiveness. We must look for a constructive division of labour on the basis of comparative advantages. Since our means are not sufficient to enable us to meet all the challenges, we cannot allow for duplication of effort. Particularly in crisis management, we must fully eliminate the danger that, in competing for roles, international organizations find themselves being played off against each other by the parties.

Since a fundamental transformation of all international organization requires some time, a certain overlapping of tasks and responsibilities may be unavoidable. These problems can and must be solved in a pragmatic manner. One case that certainly needs further thought is the division of labour between the CSCE and the North Atlantic Co-operation Council. The similarity in terms both of membership and of tasks is growing. If CSCE’s area is to be operational conflict prevention, what then should be the focus of the NACC in the overall area of crisis management?

VII.

Comparative Advantages of the CSCE

CSCE experience in conflict prevention and crisis management is still limited. But certain comparative advantages have begun to build a specific CSCE profile in conflict management.

One element of that profile is that CSCE can legitimize in a political sense international measures and actions. This CSCE capacity is based mainly on its comprehensive membership. The CSCE is an “all-inclusive” framework. All States in the Vancouver-to-Vladivostok area are CSCE participating States on a basis of equality. The political value of a CSCE decision is strengthened by the consensus rule. It legitimizes the decision and it makes it more difficult for States to dissociate themselves from a decision once it has been taken.

Basing itself on a comprehensive concept of security, explicitly linking the maintenance of security and stability to the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the CSCE can get to the root causes of tension and apply “comprehensive treatment” at an early stage. Furthermore, the CSCE has a clear mandate to deal with crises within States as well. CSCE involvement easily transcends the walls of national sovereignty. As long ago as 1991, immediately after the abortive Moscow coup, the CSCE participating States declared categorically and irrevocably that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension “are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned”.

Early warning and preventive diplomacy require utmost care and delicacy. Of particular importance here are open channels of easy communication and an effective and permanent framework for political dialogue. The possibility of holding frank and co-operative discussions among a large number of participating States in several CSCE bodies, particularly the newly created Permanent Committee, is an asset at early stages of a conflict.

VIII.

Conclusions

CSCE involvement in preventive diplomacy and crisis management over the past two to three years has been driven by the effort, in a kind of emergency situation, to find peaceful settlements to new potential and open conflicts. We are often asked: Where are CSCE’s tangible, concrete results? I believe the CSCE has made a real contribution to calming down situations in places where its missions are active and that it has certainly played a part in defusing tensions in the Baltic region. It is true, there have been no final solutions, but conflict management needs time and patience. It is a process requiring a constant focus and long-term persistence. It requires endurance to overcome frustration and hopelessness caused by deadlocks and setbacks.

Although conflict management is criticized these days very severely and sometimes unconstructively, it is a field in which public support for international activities has a solid basis. The organizations involved in conflict management should build on this capital.

The CSCE is determined to develop its conflict prevention potential. Ministers at the CSCE Council Meeting in Rome decided to further invest in the CSCE.

The support for the CSCE by the Heads of State or Government at the recent NATO Summit provides a fresh political impulse for the dynamic development of the CSCE's capabilities. As stated in their declaration, the NATO allies "remain deeply committed to further strengthening of the CSCE, which is the only organization comprising all European and North American countries as an instrument of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, co-operative security, and the advancement of democracy and human rights". They "support the efforts to enhance the operational capabilities of the CSCE for early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management".

As part of its preparation for the review conference and 53-Nation Summit scheduled for December this year in Budapest, the CSCE is considering its future tasks and responsibilities. An important part of the preparations will be devoted to the consideration of how to improve the functioning of existing CSCE mechanisms, how to streamline decision-making in emergency situations, how to promote the co-operative approach to conflict prevention, how to enhance the implementation of, and compliance with, CSCE decisions, how to tap the resources and experience of non-governmental organizations, and how to deepen links with international bodies.

The CSCE is ready to face responsibilities in the post-confrontation era. The instruments available to it, combined with the political will of the participating States, can make an important contribution to stability and security in the CSCE area. This area is indeed an entity composed of interdependent States. It is a common security area. The CSCE States declared at the Rome meeting that their security is indivisible. This was at this time a very important declaration, strengthened by a similar proclamation by NATO leaders. It entails the commitment to deal collectively with problems and conflicts and to actively project stability. The CSCE stands ready to make its contribution.