



SUPPORT OF THE OSCE MISSION TO  
SERBIA TO SMALL-SCALE PROJECTS OF  
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS IN THE  
FIELD OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM  
FROM 2010 TO 2015: LESSONS LEARNED



Support of the OSCE Mission to Serbia to small-scale projects of civil society organisations in the field of security sector reform from 2010 to 2015: lessons learned



Jelena Radoman

# Support of the OSCE Mission to Serbia to small-scale projects of civil society organisations in the field of security sector reform from 2010 to 2015: lessons learned<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Report from the conference "Support to civil society organisations in participation in security sector reform: lessons learned", 8–10 October 2015, Niš.

**Title**

Support of the OSCE Mission to Serbia to small-scale projects of civil society organizations in the field of security sector reform from 2010 to 2015: lessons learned

**Author**

Jelena Radoman

**Publisher**

Organization for security and co-operation in Europe  
Mission to Serbia

**Translation to English**

Tatjana Cosovic

**Design and prepress**

comma | communications design

**Print**

Fiducia 011 Print

**Copies**

300

ISBN 978-86-6383-033-2

The printing of this publication was made possible through the financial support of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), within the project Consolidating the democratisation process in the security sector in Serbia.

The views herein expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the OSCE Mission to Serbia and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency.

# Content

---

Abbreviations	7
Summary	9
Introduction	11
Overview of supported projects in the 2010–2015 period	13
Challenges in CSO work in the field of security sector reform	19
Attitude of sector institutions to CSO activities	23
Scope of work of CSOs	27
Lessons learned	33
Conclusion	37
Recommendations	39
Annex 1	43





# Abbreviations

---

BCSP – Belgrade Centre for Security Policy

BFPE – Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence

CeSID – Centre for Free Elections and Democracy

MoD – Ministry of Defence

MoI – Ministry of Interior

CSO – civil society organisation



# Summary

---

The overview of 28 small-scale CSO projects supported by the OSCE Mission to Serbia in the 2010–2015 period explains what activities of CSOs in Serbia influence security policies at the national and local level, and what are the contributions of CSOs to security sector reform. The greatest obstacles to the work of CSOs arise from cooperation with institutions with a hierarchical and centralised system of decision-making, which still foster mistrust towards CSO initiatives. On the other hand, CSOs must invest additional effort in order to familiarise themselves better with the sector that their activities are targeted at and to ensure that their advocacy of reform processes produces better effects. Those organisations that have gained credibility as independent actors of the security sector, owing to their continuous research, educational work and advocacy, are able to point out to problems in operation of the sector and propose necessary changes. Institutions embrace CSO activities with varying openness. The most acceptable are CSO activities that concern victims of gender-based violence and can partly compensate for the sluggishness and ineffectiveness of the system. On the other hand, the access of research organisations interested in institutions' internal procedures and policies in the field of human rights is still strained, partly due to the resistance of institutions and partly because such researches entail good knowledge of the security sector. In addition to security sector state institutions facing, since 2000, reforms relating to the organisational structure, strategic and legislative framework, including changes in the internal and foreign policy context, CSOs are undergoing their own reform process as well. Such reform sets before these organisations the requirements of professionalisation of their resources, adaptation to changed donor policies, and maintaining the continuation and credibility of their activities which should not start and end with project cycles. Donor policy, however, should take into account the variety of

needs of renowned and large CSOs (according to the criteria of human resources and the size of annual budgets) and smaller, local CSOs that still need more modest and flexible resources to respond to immediate challenges from their local environments and open up new issues relating to operation of security sector institutions. Furthermore, linking among institutions and CSOs is necessary to narrow the gap between mutual misunderstanding and partial (inherited) mistrust between the two sectors, which often use different narratives.

# Introduction

---

During the implementation of the project “Consolidating the democratisation process in the security sector in the Republic of Serbia”, in the 2010–2015 period the Democratisation Department of the OSCE Mission to Serbia provided support to CSOs to implement 28 small-scale projects in the field of security sector reform in Serbia. The OSCE’s project is funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). Support to civil society is only one of the four key project elements. The remaining three elements focus on capacity development of Serbia’s National Assembly for efficient and informed oversight of the security sector, support to good governance in the security sector, and support to the development of academic programmes of security studies at the level of MA and PhD studies and academic networking of participants in these programmes from security sector institutions, CSOs, the media and other sectors. The total budget for the two phases of project implementation equals around EUR 1,950,000.

The provision of support to CSO projects in Serbia, within the above larger project aimed at improvement of security sector governance, began in the period of consolidation of the so-called “first generation of reforms”, which implied the rounding up of the strategic and legislative framework defining the mandate, tasks and competences of security sector institutions, and institutions of the legislative, executive and judicial power which exercise oversight of the security sector. By aiding CSOs that were recognised as a security sector actor, ignored and marginalised up to then, support was given to the implementation of reforms that conceptually belong to the so-called “second generation of reforms”. This meant compliance with standards of good governance in the security sector and democratic civilian oversight of sector institutions, including the sector operation in accordance with democratic political

culture. Recognising CSOs as a relevant factor of the security sector, which through their research, education and advocacy activities act as a corrective factor of security sector institutions, the OSCE Mission acted within the framework of a holistic approach to security and gave its contribution to building the expert security community in Serbia, with CSOs being its indispensable part. Though direct capacity building of CSOs was not the primary objective of the OSCE Mission's project, the building of individual CSOs as relevant actors of the security sector in Serbia was supported, including the networking and creation of the community of CSOs dealing with security in Serbia.

This document contains critical evaluation of projects supported by the Democratisation Department of the OSCE Mission from 2010 to 2015. Instead of evaluating each of 28 individual projects supported within the project "Consolidating the democratisation process in the security sector in the Republic of Serbia", we intend to assess the overall effect of implemented activities, trends in cooperation between security sector institutions and CSOs during their implementation, and indicate the lessons learned for the needs of future donor help to security sector reform in Serbia in general, including activities of CSOs as a relevant actor of that sector.

# Overview of supported projects in the 2010–2015 period<sup>1</sup>

---

Supporting small projects of CSOs in the 2010–2015 period, the OSCE Mission helped in the implementation of diverse activities which may be generally classified into three large groups:

- research projects, aimed at examining the so-far insufficiently known or neglected problems in the process of security sector reform (e.g. the impact of reforms on human security of particularly vulnerable groups, the issue of security vetting, work of private security companies, etc);
- educational projects, aimed at increasing capacities of a wider range of CSOs for participation and monitoring security sector reform and dealing with a particular aspect of work of security sector institutions (raising the number of women in security sector institutions and improving their position, gender aspects of reforms), or aimed at increasing capacities and training of employees in security sector institutions to create and lead processes, such as, for instance, implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security;

---

<sup>1</sup> Information on individual projects is contained in the Annex to this report.

- advocacy projects, such as the introduction of strategic and normative regulations (e.g. adoption of local youth security strategies), changes in practice of security sector institutions (introduction of a special protocol for dealing with victims of domestic violence), pointing out to ignored or unexamined problems in operation of security sector institutions, and/or networking of different actors relevant for a particular security issue, such as cooperation between the police and specialised CSOs and networking of local security actors.

This is only a general division based on prevalent elements in implemented CSO activities as all supported projects contain an advocacy component, either in direct addressing of sector institutions (e.g. educational activities relating to the importance of creating an encouraging environment for admission of women and the development of their careers in the security sector) or in the form of indirect advocacy by informing the interested and widest public about neglected issues regarding the operation of sector institutions, such as the attitude of institutions towards vulnerable groups.

In the above period, the OSCE Mission provided support both to organisations to which the security sector reform is the main or among the main fields of action, such as the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) and Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence (BFPE), and to organisations – service providers, which deal with gender policies and the protection of women victims of violence (the Autonomous Women's Centre, Impuls). Support was also provided to other CSOs which developed and implemented projects, while focusing on the security aspect of their core activity (e.g. processing of cases of violence against women, response to emergency situations, youth security and activism of youth groups). It is assumed that annual calls of the OSCE Mission to Serbia for small-scale project proposals motivated some organisations to examine their activities from the aspect of security policies and find a security aspect in the concrete fields of their operation. Furthermore, support for project implementation was given both to reputable institutions – bearing in mind the criteria of available human resources and the annual budget of over EUR 100,000, and to relatively young and, judging by the level of engaged staff, smaller CSOs, with modest annual budgets.

Although all of the supported activities pertained to security sector reform in Serbia, the implemented projects were significantly different in terms of issues covered. For instance, support was given to organisations whose projects focused on security policies at the central government level, i.e. issues of national security. Those were projects aimed at developing the platform for tackling the issues of cybersecurity, normative non-conformity or the lack of regulation of processes important for the work of security sector institutions, such as the relationship between legal norms on data security and the right to access data of public importance, including the lack of



normative regulation of security vetting. There were also projects aimed at shedding light on and drawing attention to the pervading processes in the security sector, such as the introduction of gender equality policies in operation of sector institutions. Another group of organisations focused on local security issues and priorities of smaller communities that they belong to, including the work of security sector institutions at the local level (youth security at the local level, police handling of victims of violence in local communities, increasing capacities of local CSOs to influence security policies in their local communities). The Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID) ascertained the need to change the focus from broader topics and national security issues to narrower, local issues through its public opinion researches indicating that “big” foreign policy and security issues appear on the list of priority issues of citizens of the capital, while local communities outside Belgrade face entirely different issues and challenges.

The supported projects also differ by the criterion of the ambition of defined objectives. The most ambitious initiatives were those envisaging the adoption of new strategic documents at the local level, as was the case with projects in Niš and Zaječar. Within these projects, a problem was first defined (youth security in local communities), whose scope and intensity were substantiated by the earlier relevant research into the same issue. Actors were then mapped, who should, within their scope of activity, participate in suppressing the issue. Finally, the strategic framework for activities of local institutions aimed at suppression was proposed. The project of the Media and Reform Centre in Niš resulted in the adoption of the Youth Security Strategy in Niš. In Zaječar, the draft Strategy is being developed. Considered highly ambitious are also CSO projects aimed at advocating changes to procedures of security sector institutions – the police in concrete cases, and the adoption of the protocol changing the procedures of dealing with testimonies of women – victims of domestic violence. An example of one of these projects are activities of the Autonomous Women’s Centre from Belgrade, whose advocacy of the adoption of the Protocol for dealing with cases of family violence in 2011 did not bring about the expected result in the envisaged period, as the Protocol was adopted later that year. Also, projects dealing with implementation of the UN Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security focused on thorough and significant changes in practices of institutions – namely, the introduction of gender perspective in different fields of institutional action, such as education and recruitment of the new staff, the policy of awards and promotion within institutions and professional training.

Particularly significant were activities through which individual CSOs intended to transfer the resources, information and skills that they acquired over years to other organisations since they recognised the values of accumulated information and the experience of working with institutions. This group of projects includes activities of the CeSID, which organised training for local CSOs in the field of methods and

techniques of the collection and analysis of data and the use of databases so that other CSOs could competently and efficiently seek information and process relevant data, and impact with such resources on local security policies. In addition, activities of the BCSP were aimed at CSO training, based on years-long experience in dealing with security sector reform and work with institutions.

Projects with a lower level of ambition of the defined objectives focused on opening and exploring new topics relating to the work of security sector institutions, such as the perceptions of minority groups about security sector reform, gathering relevant actors of security policies and their linking (work of local safety councils) and/or highlighting the existing, neglected problems within the normative framework and practices of security sector institutions (a potential conflict between norms regulating free access to information of public importance and data secrecy). It is noteworthy that the inventiveness and originality of an opened issue is not necessarily an indicator of importance of CSO activity. Judging by the example of abolishment of the Gender Equality Directorate in 2014, earlier achievements in the gender equality field are not irreversible and processes bringing them into question are possible. It is therefore necessary to maintain the achieved standards of transparency and responsibility of security sector institutions and to continuously address and point at key problems in operation of the sector.

All supported projects entailed the involvement, to a lesser or higher degree, of representatives of security sector institutions, primarily the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Ministry of Defence (MoD) – the projects were implemented in cooperation with these institutions. Such cooperation included the participation of representatives of institutions in public debates and educational activities organised by CSOs, as well as granting approval to CSOs to gain access, through interviews and focus groups, to employees in institutions for research purposes. Examples of projects requiring more active engagement of the MoI and MoD include: the project of the Women's Entrepreneurship Academy relating to experiences of women students of the Basic Police Training Centre, including the participation and careers of women in the police; and the project of the Public Policy Research Centre concerning the attitude of institutions towards the LGBT population and Roma minority in Serbia. None of the CSO projects implemented in the 2010–2015 period was directly related to the work of security services – the Security Information Agency, Military Intelligence Agency and Military Security Agency. Representatives of these services were involved in projects aimed at linking actors involved in cybersecurity and raising the inclusion of women in sector institutions. However, the fact that the supported projects did not deal with the work of security services indicates that CSOs generally focus on those security sector institutions which have a direct contact with citizens, including primarily the MoI, as well as the National Assembly and the MoD. Security services are still partly perceived as the actor to which it is the most difficult to

apply the transparency and accountability requirements. In terms of the accountability and powers of other security sector actors, CSOs have recognised through their activities the connection among actors and the need to network a larger number of institutions – examples include the work on the cybersecurity platform in Serbia and implementation of legal norms regulating the sector transparency.



# Challenges in CSO work in the field of security sector reform

---

Although significant reforms have been implemented in the security sector of Serbia since 2000, primarily in terms of its normative and institutional framework, which was followed by enhanced norms of its transparent and accountable functioning, the CSO projects relating to the sector have pointed out to obstacles in the availability of information on the work of sector institutions for the interested and informed public. The **key challenges** in the implementation of projects relating to internal organisation of institutions – in concrete cases, those were MoI and MoD, including their operation and relations with extra-institutional actors, include: a) dependence of the approach and research of CSOs on the approval of a competent institution; and b) CSOs are insufficiently knowledgeable about the organisation, work and procedures of security sector institutions. The implementation of projects requiring access to information on the work of institutions and/or participation of representatives of an institution in public debates and educational activities of CSOs largely depended on the approval of a competent institution (for a CSO to gain access to the requested data). In regard to the implemented projects, CSOs required access to data belonging to the group of publically available data, but could not be found in a systematised and unique way for the needs of concrete researches. For instance, organisations requested data on the gender and ethnic structure of attendants of the Military Academy, the gender structure of attendants of the Basic Police Training Centre, including data on dealing with victims of domestic violence in police districts. Furthermore, for research needs, CSOs addressed institutions with requests for interviewing employees in institutions so as to obtain the requested data through direct interviews, i.e. by using interviews as a research data collection

technique. There are two groups of challenges which arise from the need for direct addressing of institutions and seeking adequate information. The first group concerns the ***prolonged and uncertain timeframe for institutions to respond*** to CSO requests. At the same time, CSOs often – in the absence of written guidelines and clearly presented policies of these institutions concerning the methods and procedures of their cooperation with CSOs, do not know which organisational units within these institutions to address. Still, the practice of cooperation between CSOs and institutions shows that the two competent ministries – the MoI and MoD, function according to the rigid ***hierarchical system of decision-making***, as all requests for accessing information, interviewing or participation of a representative of institutions in CSO activities depend on the approval of cabinets of these ministers. Such practice may take significant time for organisations, particularly those without significant experience in work with these institutions, which particularly influences the plan and pace of work when it comes to short-term projects lasting up to a year. Another type of limitation arises from situations when competent ministries give the necessary consent to access requested information, but to a limited extent or they give a consent implying a change in the research technique (a written response to questions asked instead of requested interviews). For instance, the research project of the Women’s Entrepreneurship Academy of 2012 underwent a significant intervention by the MoI, whose consent was necessary for access to women students of the Basic Police Training Centre in Sremska Kamenica. The MoI’s consent thus contained the requirement for research coverage of a significantly larger number of police districts compared to the number envisaged by the project team. High centralisation of decision-making in security sector institutions and the impression that in the absence of a clear policy of their cooperation with CSOs, such cooperation depends on the good will of competent persons in institutions – were recognised as the main obstacle to CSO cooperation with institutions far back in 2010, at the time of implementation of a number of training courses designed to enhance the participation of CSOs in the creation and implementation of security policies.<sup>2</sup> ***Strict centralisation of institutions*** of the system does not only determine the course and pace of cooperation with CSOs, but also disables institutions at the local level – when it comes to police work, to introduce quality changes in the method of work even when local institutions recognise such practice as desirable. For example, although the Kraljevo police district signed the Protocol on coordination in cases of domestic violence in 2008, together with other local institutions and specialised CSOs, this Protocol does not guarantee the implementation of concrete cooperation with other institutions, which would result in concrete novelties in operation

---

2 Training courses organised by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy in cooperation with the OSCE Mission in the November 2010 – February 2011 period.

of the local police. To make this happen, the MoI's approval would be necessary in each concrete case – as initiated by the CSO Fenomena from Kraljevo. The relevant decision need not necessarily be based on experiences of cooperation between the local police and CSOs, including the needs of coordinated work in the field.

However, on the other hand, the decades-long closeness and unavailability of armed forces to civil research teams still has the consequence of the ***insufficiently developed extra-institutional and independent research resources***, including knowledge of the sector. As CSO research teams consist of members without sufficient work experience in security sector institutions, their research work has the advantage of an impartial access to institutions – the same transparency and good governance requirements are stipulated as towards any other part of the public administration. At the same time, this approach may also bring about deficiencies due to their lack of knowledge of internal dynamics and procedures within institutions, and thus aggravate the implementation of research intentions regardless of their regularity in defining research questions and research objectives. The lack of expertise of civilian researchers and insufficient knowledge of the security sector is often the basis for representatives of sector institutions to diminish the relevance of the obtained research results and recommendations based on them. Besides, there is significant discrepancy in the discourse used by representatives of CSOs and security sector institutions. While the former generally use the ***human rights discourse*** – for instance, in regard to the representation of national minorities in sector institutions or rights of LGBT persons in the military and police, the representatives of institutions usually use the ***discourse of efficiency*** of their work and rigid compliance with internal procedures and rules of practice. Thus, the lack of data on internal reporting on cases of discrimination on any grounds in the military is indicated as evidence of the absence of discrimination on any grounds. At the same time, the discourse of CSOs is much broader than the compliance with internal norms and includes a number of measures for institutions to preclude discrimination on any grounds. Given the mutual mistrust and lack of knowledge, and impressions of participants in the event in Niš in October 2015, when representatives of CSOs and institutions had the chance to talk directly and exchange opinions, it is highly valuable that representatives of the two sectors had the chance to meet each other and present their activities. This was the case with training sessions for CSOs, with participation of representatives of the MoI and MoD, organised by the BCSP. There were also closed roundtables when initial research findings were presented and when representatives of the two sectors had the chance to make comments, as it was the case with the Public Policy Research Centre. There were also a number of other open roundtables organised by the OSCE Mission, with the aim of further exchange of experiences and attitudes among different actors.

An additional aggravating circumstance relating to the implementation of projects in the field of security sector reform is the prevailing *mistrust in relations* between CSOs and security sector institutions. This is the result of inherited social-political events of the 1990s when CSOs were perceived as opponents to the then political regime since they severely criticised the then political elites, espousing human rights, liberal values of democracy and responsible action of government institutions. Although CSOs in Serbia passed the path from activist engagement to setting the agenda for reforms in various fields of political work and numerous sectoral policies, we cannot neglect the remnants of such misconception which may affect the perception of work of current CSOs. This is all the more true because the CSO sector in Serbia is still one of the most serious corrective factors of the current political establishment. Therefore, their interest in functioning of the security system and respect of human rights, both of sector employees and citizens who may come under the scope of their competence, may be perceived as the basis for an attitude which is not necessarily constructive, but rather critical. Moreover, CSOs have been relatively recently recognised as the actor of the security sector. As such, they are sometimes disputed the legitimacy of dealing with security topics, especially in relation to the traditionally recognised actors of the security sector, i.e. institutions with the power to use force – the military, police and security services, including their direct civilian order issuers – the President, Prime Minister and the National Assembly (through competent committees). The fact that their activities faced mistrust and rigidity by institutions, i.e. their representatives, was also recognised by CSOs in their reports following the implemented projects. CSOs saw such mistrust as the cause of the lack of cooperation although CSO initiatives were aimed primarily at achieving greater predictability of the work of institutions and better cooperation between institutions and specialised CSOs.<sup>3</sup>

---

3 The project of the Autonomous Women's Centre of 2011/12 is an example of a CSO project aimed at establishing a standardised model of police dealing with victims of domestic violence in cooperation with specialised CSOs that provide support to these victims. The project did not result in the establishment of standardised procedures. The key reason specified by the CSO was the lack of readiness of the MoI to accept their initiative in good faith.



## Attitude of sector institutions to CSO activities

---

There are three possible groups of responses of institutions to CSO initiatives in the field of security sector reform. The **first** concerns the support to CSO initiatives that thematically and time-wise coincide with activities within institutions. This was the case with participation of CSOs in drafting the National Action Plan for Implementation of the UN Resolution 1325 and education on gender policies within the sector. Support was expressed through participation of representatives of institutions in discussions and educational activities organised by CSOs. The **second approach** relates to the marginalisation of issues that CSOs deal with, as it was the case of exploring the relationship between the MoD and vulnerable groups, the LGBT and Roma population. The **third approach** implies declarative support to CSO activities, such as cooperation between the police and specialised CSOs in the provision of services to victims of domestic violence at the local level, including the non-implementation of concrete measures to materialise such cooperation in practice.

Neither the MoI nor MoD, as two sector institutions that the majority of CSO activities were related to, have defined guidelines of cooperation with CSOs or special institutional mechanisms for such cooperation. MoD representatives emphasise the Ministry's openness and high involvement of its representatives in cooperation with CSOs, which is quantitatively expressed as participation in "350 activities with CSOs over the past several years". However, the numbers expressed in such way do not reflect the type of cooperation and outcomes, or the quality of cooperation between the MoD and CSOs. Among projects supported by the MoD in the form of grants for co-financing of citizen associations' projects, there are no research or

advocacy projects, or activities of CSOs dealing with the achievements and course of security sector reform. Instead, support was given to scouting and sports associations.<sup>4</sup> The proof that the MoD, according to their representatives, recognises CSOs as a relevant factor of the security sector is also reflected in the fact that cooperation with CSOs is specified as one of activities in the draft Action Plan for Implementation of the National Security Strategy. The Ministry also indicates its readiness to respond to CSO queries relating to its activities, but emphasises occasional excess requests that CSOs submit using the mechanisms available to them pursuant to the Law on Free Access to Information of Public Importance.

The beginnings of more significant cooperation between the MoD and CSOs date back to the period of adoption of the National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy of 2009. The problem is the fact that the one and the same process, such as the adoption of strategic documents, is observed differently. From the MoD's viewpoint, this is an example of an inclusive and transparent process as CSOs were then active in giving comments on and suggestions for draft strategies, some of which were adopted and some rejected. On the other hand, *CSOs expect a far greater level of openness and a stronger proactive approach of institutions* in the process of cooperation with them, so as to assess a particular process as transparent and inclusive. For instance, mere publication of draft strategic documents and action plans for their implementation on the website of an institution is not observed as enabling high involvement of CSOs. What they consider desirable is greater predictability of these processes, when CSOs would be informed and involved in phases of preparation of drafts. One of the most inclusive modern processes of defence system reform that CSOs showed great interest in is the implementation of the National Action Plan for UN Resolution 1325, when CSOs addressed the Ministry with several hundreds of queries.

The implemented activities of CSOs also show examples of *cooperation with the MoI and police districts*. However, that is ad hoc cooperation without a clear framework and institutionalisation of such cooperation when CSOs would be familiarised with the strategic frameworks in which cooperation with the Ministry is possible, including possible forms of cooperation. The fact that the institutionalisation of such cooperation is necessary and desirable was also recognised in the draft Strategy for creating a stimulating environment for civil society development, which is currently in the phase of public debate. The Office for Cooperation with Civil Soci-

---

4 More about the choice of projects funded by the MoD: [http://www.mod.gov.rs/multimedia/file/staticki\\_sadrzaj/tradicija/izvestaj\\_komisije\\_05122014.pdf](http://www.mod.gov.rs/multimedia/file/staticki_sadrzaj/tradicija/izvestaj_komisije_05122014.pdf) (for 2014) and [http://www.mod.gov.rs/multimedia/file/staticki\\_sadrzaj/tradicija/obavestjenja\\_o\\_projektima/obavestjenje\\_o\\_odobrenim\\_projektima\\_2015.pdf](http://www.mod.gov.rs/multimedia/file/staticki_sadrzaj/tradicija/obavestjenja_o_projektima/obavestjenje_o_odobrenim_projektima_2015.pdf) (for 2015).

ety of the Serbian Government which leads the process of developing the Strategy is proposing the institutionalisation of cooperation with CSOs by establishing sectors or responsible persons in charge of cooperation with CSOs within institutions and by explicitly specifying such tasks in institutions' documents on job classification. It is paradoxical, however, that documents on job classification of the MoI and MoD are designated as confidential and are not available to the public, although this not the practice in countries with similar political-social contexts such as countries in the Western Balkan region. The paradox is reflected in the fact that these documents may serve for making an insight into the organisation of activities within these institutions, and mirror the processes that their operations are focused on. Based on them, CSOs could predict the key activities of the security sector, better examine and adapt their role, which is the role of the actor which contributes to reform processes and oversees the work of government actors.

In regard to police districts, there are different examples of good and bad practice of cooperation between the police and CSOs. Thus, the *police district in Niš* is commended for its openness and cooperation with CSOs. It was emphasised at the conference in Niš in October 2015 that CSOs dealing with vulnerable and minority groups are very useful in terms of establishing contact between the police and these groups, and the education of police officers for work with victims of violence. As cooperation with CSOs is carried out by police officers engaged in community policing, which entails preventive work and cooperation with the local community, there is the impression that cooperation with CSOs has spontaneously moved to the domain of work of police officers dealing with *“soft” issues in police work*, such as prevention. This is substantiated also by the fact that a woman police officer of the Niš police district, who is engaged in community policing, is at the same time the contact person for cooperation with CSOs and the liaison officer for the LGBT population.

*Military and police education* is an area of security sector reform which is, as the entire sector, subject to reform processes, but its achievements are insufficiently known both to CSOs and the entire public. Apart from rather sporadic activities of CSOs that had the chance to deal with this area<sup>5</sup>, the contents presented to students of the Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies, Military Grammar School and Military Academy, changes in admission quotas and other parts of the process of learning and training in these institutions, remain unknown for CSO representatives. As in the case of access to information on other parts of internal processes taking place under the auspices of the MoI and MoD, independent security sector

---

5 For instance, see the research of the Public Policy Research Centre: [http://publicpolicy.rs/projekti/3\\_Mapiranje-\(ne\)diskriminacije-u-sistemu-vojnog-%C5%A1kolstva#.VjJTaUfF9ic](http://publicpolicy.rs/projekti/3_Mapiranje-(ne)diskriminacije-u-sistemu-vojnog-%C5%A1kolstva#.VjJTaUfF9ic).

actors may access information on processes relating to education of future military and police members only with the approval of competent institutions. Whether such approvals will be given depends on the assessment of competent persons in these institutions. Without an insight into the contents of curricula of these institutions and the process of selection of candidates, CSOs are not able to examine processes that partially create professional and value standards of future members of security institutions that CSOs should control and correct.

# Scope of work of CSOs

---

There are several basic criteria assessing the success of CSO work in the field of security sector reform. In regard to **research projects**, the criterion relates to whether CSOs active in the area managed to: a) open up and shed light on a new problem, unexamined up to then, in regard to operation of sector institutions; b) conduct research into an already opened topic and give contribution to the debate in professional circles or inform the interested public about an already existing dilemma/problem in the sector; and c) over a particular period, continuously research the activity of particular actors or evolution of a problem, educate and point out to insufficient institutional capacities, and thus maintain the relevance of the topic and ensure reliable data for problem resolution. An example of a successful research project under these criteria is the BCSP project on private security companies carried out in 2014. With this project, the BCSP continued its earlier work on the private security sector in Serbia and its advocacy of the need for normative regulation of the practice of private security companies, by the adoption of the law regulating their activity. Within this project, this sector was first mapped and the database was set up on active companies providing private security services. Thereafter, adapted research products of an appropriate format were offered on the network of relevant institutions so that actors get informed of various problems relating to operation of these companies. This is a good example of a successful research project which was, above all, a part of a wider agenda of the organisation with a long-lasting experience with the security sector. It is also an issue that the organisation deals with over a longer period – the project implemented is not an *ad hoc* activity, ungrounded in previous work, with minimum prospects of use in the future. What is also very important for assessing the success of this project is that the research was accompanied with well-linked activities and advocacy products tailored for a particular

target group, i.e. MPs – members of the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee of the National Assembly and decision makers at the MoI. It is noteworthy that results of research projects belong to *policy proposals*, and are not academic texts. Certainly, when conducting research and writing policy proposals, the main rules of an appropriate methodology were complied with, including the definition of the research sample and research techniques. It should be noted that all researches were implemented by applying the *qualitative methods* of data collection, such as interviews, focus groups, questionnaires, searching public databases. These methods are adapted to research in social sciences.

Of 28 implemented projects supported by the OSCE Mission in the 2010–2015 period, ten projects had a solid educational component. Of this number, six projects focused on *increasing capacities of other CSOs* or groups of young activists (two projects) so that they participate in the creation, implementation and oversight of security policies at the national and local level. This included training in basics of security policies, mapping of security sector actors at the national and local level, and transfer of knowledge and skills concerning methods and tools available to CSOs as actors of the sector. The remaining four projects pertained to *education for employees in institutions*, either about new processes within institutions, such as the implementation of the UN Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, or about the implementation of the protocol at the local level. One of the key problems during the implementation of educational projects intended for employees in institutions is that, regardless of how they designed the educational programme and accordingly defined the profile of participants, CSOs cannot influence the response and profile of employees in institutions, who will eventually participate in such activities. This is the consequence of centralised decision-making in two key sector institutions – the MoI and MoD, where decisions on granting approval to individual employees and referring them to participate in activities proposed by CSOs are adopted at the hierarchically high level, while CSOs in their invitations designate those employees who are desirable participants, according to their fields of activity and tasks within the institution. Three CSOs specified in their reports the problem of the inadequate level of participants who are not, under their estimate, in the position in their institutions to influence the implementation of measures – for instance, those relating to policies of increasing the representation of women in sector institutions. Thus, the Fenomena organisation from Kraljevo stated that the Prosecutor's Office – one of the key institutions and planned beneficiary of the project activity of training on partner and coordinated approach to cases of domestic violence at the local level, referred to training generally interns and not judges. Examples of successfully designed and implemented educational projects are BCSP projects aiming at increasing CSO capacities in the field of security sector reform. Another such project was the BFPE project, consisting of a series of training activities tailored for middle-level decision makers in security sector institutions – the aim was to enable

these institutions to recognise the importance of introduction of gender perspective and to respond to processes relating to implementation of the Resolution 1325 with their enhanced capacities. What singles out the BFPE project as an example of a well-designed and implemented educational project is that the CSO responded to the current process in the security sector, recognised the lack of resources in institutions and responded to such lack by a designed and tailored programme which corresponds to current processes. This project saw high involvement of MoI and MoD representatives. There were no decision makers among seminar participants, who very highly assessed its contents and implementation. One of very important accompanying gains of educational activities implemented by CSOs is meeting with each other and networking of representatives of institutions, who – everyone in his own domain and various sectors, work on mutually linked processes. This is also a frequent comment presented by seminar participants as a gain from their own participation in these activities. In this way, partly unexpectedly, **CSOs act as the initiator of coordination** and linking of different institutions that should work simultaneously on related processes. Employees in institutions who, due to bureaucratic rigidity, are not able to establish such kind of direct coordination at the middle level of decision-making or at the operational level emphasised this possibility as one of the gains of educational activities that they participated in. Furthermore, there are examples of educational activities implemented by CSOs and intended for representatives of institutions in which these CSOs first recognised and then remedied the existing institutional weaknesses in resolving problems. For instance, the Impuls organisation from Tutin gathered relevant domestic institutions, the social welfare centre, police, prosecutor's office, schools, and offered to them training on handling cases of gender and domestic violence whose victims were women and children. On that occasion, some representatives of institutions stated it was the first time that they had the chance to participate in training on such issues. This CSO received a very good response among representatives of institutions, which is ascribed to the fact that institutions also recognised the importance of the topic that they are insufficiently familiar with, as well as the fact that institutions and the public showed interest in a small local community, owing to the promotion of CSO work in the local media.

Judging by their highly set objectives, the third group of projects – primarily aimed at **advocating** changes in the normative framework, adoption of new procedures or recognising the neglected problems in the work of security sector institutions, belongs to ambitious projects that should introduce a novelty in functioning of a sector or institution. Their measure of success is whether they managed to achieve the self-defined objective of adopting a novelty or changing the existing situation in relation to the scope of work of sector institutions. Along these lines, an example of a successful project is the work of the Media and Reform Centre from Niš, which proposed the adoption of and drafted the local Strategy of Youth Security in Niš

in 2012. The proposal of the document and advocacy of its adoption before local authorities were preceded by the research into youth security and attitudes of young people in Niš about how they perceive their own security, local security issues etc. The development of the draft entailed coordination with institutions of the town and continuous maintaining of contacts with their representatives, including constant insistence on the necessity of cooperation between the town and CSOs. The organisation followed and actively participated in the overall process of consultations about the text of the Strategy and its consequent adoption as part of the City of Niš Security Strategy, owing to the fact that its representative was appointed a member of the local safety council. The example of this successful advocacy project indicates that several factors are needed for these CSO activities to be successful. The first is the **continuous and long-lasting work** on a concrete proposal whose adoption is advocated, which includes the **networking with other relevant actors** (national or local institutions, particularly active and interested representatives of institutions, other CSOs), building the network of involved actors, **high awareness** of the problem whose resolution is advocated, and **participation in the work of formal bodies and working groups**. In addition, for CSOs to be successful in advocacy, they need to have credibility in dealing with a particular topic in order to present a proposal for its solution. **Credibility** may rely on years-long dealing with a particular policy area – in the case concerned, this is the problem of the young and activism of youth groups, including the gathering of relevant individuals and the authority of the professional and recognised earlier work. What is also very important for the success of advocacy is the **correspondence of CSO activities with political and social events**, which may contribute to recognising the topicality of a particular problem and the necessity of its solution. In the case described, the social-political local context in Niš, which accelerated the adoption of the proposed document, was created with the escalation of peer violence. This led to the murder of a young man and caused public concern and revolt of the local population. In addition, efforts of the Diplo Centre aimed at gathering institutions, corporations and CSOs for the purpose of developing the cybersecurity platform in Serbia coincided with the formation of the working group tasked with developing the draft Law on Information Security, which is why a large number of working group members were involved in the expert workshop organised by the CSO. Besides the well-timed initiation of direct advocacy, underpinned by a conducted research and earlier dealing with the topic, the factor that contributed to the success of the Niš project was the excellent use of various advocacy means, tailored for different target groups. Some of these means include direct lobbying with representatives of city institutions, an appealing and interesting video clip addressing the young and the broadest public, use of social networks to garner support of the local public etc.

In regard to projects whereby CSOs intended to make the effect of a multisectoral approach to security issues, either through educational activities or advocacy (best



examples include institutions' dealing with cases of domestic and gender violence), what came to the fore were problems in institutions' work which were not related to their cooperation with CSOs, but concerned general intersectoral cooperation (poor or *ad hoc* coordination). Other problems pertained to internal, horizontal and vertical communication and cooperation within institutions. This needs to be underlined so as to make a difference between difficulties in cooperation between CSOs and security sector institutions, on the one hand, and problems of inter-institutional cooperation which emerge once a CSO requires participation and joint approach of several different institutions.

In their project proposals, CSOs specify an almost identical list of indicators based on which it is possible to assess the effect and success of implemented activities. Standard indicators for research projects include the assumption and use of research results, specifying research results in academic and other reference publications etc. Owing to the appearance and wide usage of **social networks**, the range of advocacy tools was broadened – these tools now inevitably include social networks and mechanisms, such as special pages, online petitions etc. The interest of the professional and wider public expressed in social networks is easily measurable and is included in the list of indicators used by CSOs as an indicator of success of their advocacy activities (number of followers on networks, number of followers supporting activities etc). However, although these indicators are an indubitable indicator of interest of a particular part of the public that actively uses social networks, it is impossible to predict and measure the pass-through of such support and interest in CSO work into real effects in the area of practical policy. One of the difficulties in measuring the performance of CSOs, particularly in regard to educational activities, are **expectations of long-term effects** of these activities, which therefore cannot be measurable in the short run. Besides, it is unreasonable to expect that an individual project, regardless of how well-designed and well-implemented it is, may make radical progress in relation to institutions and within the sector. What is therefore important in assessing the performance of individual CSOs is the assessment of the context in which they are active and the overall performance of CSOs active in security sector reform.

Given the necessity to improve the skills of long-term planning and determine indicators of success of activities and risk management, the support to capacity building of CSOs is still needed. Projects aimed at training of other CSOs and helping them grow into independent security sector actors that contribute to the formulation of security policy priorities at the national and local level and oversee their implementation, focused on transferring basic knowledge about the sector (such as the area of introducing gender policies in the security sector) and sharing experiences of CSOs in relation with cooperation with sector institutions. These are also projects with immeasurable short-term effects and expectations of long-term effects, which

requires additional support and extended mentorship. The aim is to produce results as a network of independent and sustainable CSOs which, competently and independently, on their own or in coalition with others, operate as actors of security policies at the local and national level.

# Lessons learned

---

The greatest challenges arising from the implementation of projects supported by the OSCE Mission over the past five years concerned the ***dependence of implementation of activities on cooperation with sector institutions***. In some cases, such cooperation was lacking or was limited in its volume and quality. This was a notable challenge as support was given to small-scale projects limited in duration – they lasted from four to 12 months. Therefore, the lack of cooperation with institutions – the MoI and MoD in concrete cases, or long waiting for responses about the participation of representatives of these institutions in CSO activities (either research or educational activities), impacted the deadlines and timeframe of activities. This is also an indicator of ***bad planning*** of the implementation of projects, but also the indicator that CSOs should, while drafting proposals of their activities, envisage a list of possible risks and develop a more detailed and effective risk management plan. Risk management skills and knowledge are an indispensable part of a strategic approach to project implementation, assessment of the environment and factors that CSOs cannot impact, but which may significantly influence the course of activities. At the same time, it is expected that only those CSOs with greater human capacities and long-lasting experience in work with institutions have such skills and approach. Based on their reputation, in cases when institutions are not ready to cooperate, these organisations may use a direct approach to decision-makers in institutions or exert public pressures through networks that they belong to (PrEUgovor coalition, Sectorial Civil Society Organisations (SEKO) for negotiation chapters) and in cooperation with other CSOs. These are possible techniques of the mitigation of risks caused by the lack of readiness of sector institutions to cooperate. These techniques are generally available to larger CSOs which have already been recognised as sector actors. However, judging by their experiences, smaller and insufficiently recognised

CSOs value direct and indirect assistance of the OSCE Mission, often also at the symbolic level of the use of the Mission's logo. As assessed by CSO representatives, this enhances their credibility in local environments and indirectly facilitates access to institutions. Besides, smaller CSOs engaged in local communities often avail of personal acquaintances among representatives of institutions and thus approach these institutions and ensure cooperation, which is more feasible in smaller communities. These experiences show that careful **analysis of the context in which cooperation is requested** (e.g. whether processes are underway in the sector, which make the proposed thematic framework of research or training entirely irrelevant or, on the contrary, such research or training is aligned with processes initiated by institutions; whether the relationship between institutions and CSOs is burdened by current political events etc.) is necessary before developing the plan of activity, particularly when cooperation with institutions is key to their implementation. Based on this, it is possible to envisage a possible scale of risks and potential responses to them, and accordingly adjust the project duration. At the same time, the **need to institutionalise cooperation** of state actors of the security sector and CSOs is a topic to be insisted on during cooperation with institutions. Such cooperation should in no way depend on personal contacts and sporadic and insufficiently predictable readiness of representatives of institutions to foster cooperation.

Aiming to develop the thematic scope of their activity in a competent and comprehensive way, a number of organisations tend to implement an **excessive number of diverse activities** in a short period. The first ambition is thus to develop a research to offer the basis for informed advocacy, while at the same time aiming to organise a training programme to inform representatives of institutions and other stakeholders (the media and other CSOs) about the examined problem. The analysis of implemented projects shows that the most successful projects are those with the clearest focus on one of the activities – research, advocacy or educational activity, while other activities are only accompanying ones, facilitating communication of results. The focus placed on a large number of diverse activities depletes the limited capacities of an organisation which cannot be equally successful, for instance, in conducting research and communicating with the widest public. To narrow the focus of activities so as to obtain quality and reliable results in any of the selected fields, it is necessary to **clearly define the objective and target groups**. In line with this, the method, activities and advocacy technique and communication of the achieved results should be developed. It is particularly important to adjust the strategy and methods of advocacy, depending on the type of project results and whom an organisation wishes to address or whose support to obtain in order to initiate changes or indicate problems within the security sector. Thus, for instance, advocating the introduction of gender dimension in the work of local security bodies does not necessarily require addressing the broadest local public so as to obtain support for CSO

activities. Instead, it requires well-conceived and clear address to local institutions whose remit includes the adoption and implementation of relevant local policies.

The CSOs achievements in initiating the adoption of new norms relating to the work of security sector institutions or a change in practices remain limited to the opening of topics, indicating problems and initiating changes. The majority of implemented CSOs activities remained at the very entrance into the process of adoption of new norms or changes in the current trends in the work of security sector institutions. ***Coordinated action with institutions*** is necessary in order to exert influence on continuation of the process – this is achieved through participation in working groups, inclusion in networks of CSOs and other actors etc, because institutions remain an unambiguous “owner” of the process of changes in the sector. If they wish to actively participate in further process after the initiation of changes and opening of topics, CSOs must keep these topics in their agendas and deal with them regardless of donor aid and length of projects. In this way, they will gain credibility among the constantly present and informed actors that follow processes, and be able to monitor the implementation of recommendations presented as research results or at whose adoption advocacy activities were targeted. At the same time, as shown by examples of CSOs dealing with security sector reform at the national level and examples of local organisations, it is necessary to have ***consistency*** in dealing with issues and in contacts with institutions. This is particularly important bearing in mind human security as the reference framework, long-term processes and the fact that the achieved standards of transparency and responsibility of government institutions should be subject to continuous monitoring of these standards and advocacy of their improvement.

Within the range of advocacy tools, a number of implemented projects envisaged ***work with media houses*** and particularly interested journalists, primarily as a way of spreading project results and increasing the project impact, but also as a form of education of journalists about topics relating to the security sector. Media training was envisaged also as a means of advocacy and informing the wider public, and as long-term investment in those who produce contents so as to deal with topics important for national, local and human security, as well as the security sector, in an informed, analytical and more in-depth way. As in the case of expecting unambiguous cooperation with institutions, CSOs – in cooperation with the media, had insufficient knowledge about whether, when and in what media the contents on, for instance, the issue of youth security in the local community, would be attractive and to what extent. This resulted in the absence of expected media attention and support, and the non-establishment of long-term expected partnership between CSOs and the media. As in the case of cooperation with security sector institutions, the cooperation between CSOs and the media and obtaining of expected media support require the knowledge about the context in which the media operate and the

knowledge about the local community (if activities are important for the city and community), including the general social and political context (for instance, security policy of the state), changes in the strategic and legislative framework important for the work of the security sector, and the assessment whether contents produced by CSOs are relevant for media reporting. The examples of projects that ensured great media attention and coverage were those of the BCSP on private security companies and of the Public Policy Research Centre about the LGBT population and security sector reform. They are the proof that media attention is given to fresh and insufficiently explored topics, which must be presented in attractive and media-friendly formats. Within its project, the BCSP developed several products of differing volume, length and format, which were intended for different target groups, which proved highly effective in communication with different target groups. This does not mean that CSOs dealing with complex and demanding topics should aim at populism and narrowing of complex problems to popular topics, acceptable by the media. Instead, their format should be tailored for their target group.

# Conclusion

---

The key reform processes in the security sector since 2000 have pertained to organisational changes in work and competences of traditional actors of the security sector – the military, police and security services, including changes to the strategic and legislative framework regulating their missions, tasks and objectives, and the process of facing the burdensome heritage of misuse of these institutions by political actors during the 1990s for internal and foreign policy purposes. In parallel with enhancing the requirements of transparency, responsibility and respect of human rights both of employees and citizens of Serbia in the operation of government security sector institutions, CSOs have also changed, being an independent and active actor of the security sector. This was first done by transforming CSOs from activist groups, which generally acted as the opposition to the 1990s regime, to associations facing the requirements to professionalise their capacities and respond to demands of participation in complex and long-term processes of security sector reform since 2000 to date. CSOs responded to reform processes in the security sector (which still occasionally resists to good governance standards applied to the public administration owing to its exclusivity gained through the monopoly of using force of a sovereign state) by adopting human security concepts and a widened list of security challenges, risks and threats that they should respond to, in addition to the so-called main actors of the sector – the military, police and security services, including a group of actors with competences and tasks of managing and overseeing these actors. Security sector actors include the three branches of government and independent government institutions, including CSOs as an actor participating in the creation and implementation of security policies at the national and local level, and controlling government security actors. In the meantime, significant progress was achieved in relations between government security sector institutions and CSOs recognised as one of the actors

of security policies to whose initiatives institutions respond, with a varying level of openness. However, there is still partial mistrust and lack of mutual understanding between representatives of institutions and CSOs which often deal with problems from different discursive starting points. A part of efforts to overcome occasional, but prevailing obstacles in communication and cooperation belongs both to institutions and CSOs. What CSOs can and should undertake is better and more comprehensive familiarisation with institutions, their organisational structure and procedures, so as to envisage priorities and cornerstones of future processes in the work of institutions, as well as respond to them and correct them if necessary. They also need to contribute to the creation and implementation of security policies at the national and local level.

Based on examination of achievements of small-scale CSOs projects supported by the OSCE Mission to Serbia, it is evident that sector institutions respond to CSOs initiatives with a varying degree of openness and readiness to cooperate. The cooperation that institutions consider the most acceptable is with those CSOs that provide services to victims of violence and vulnerable groups – these CSOs may be partners to institutions in the work with such groups. These CSOs may thus more flexibly and efficiently resolve problems that institutions, due to rigidity and bureaucracy in work, cannot solve or cannot solve in the short run. On the other hand, institutions embrace CSOs initiatives regarding the protection of human rights of sector employees with a much lower degree of openness, including initiatives aimed at explored policies and mechanisms of institutions' dealing with members of the LGBT population and the Roma minority.

CSOs themselves also propose and implement activities relating to the operation of security sector institutions, which significantly vary in objectives and methods of implementation, including resources available to CSOs. Among CSOs that the OSCE Mission supported in the past period, there are differences between those with greater human resources and expertise (based on which they can organise and implement training and otherwise support capacity building) and smaller, local CSOs. The first group of CSOs certainly includes organisations such as the BCSP, BFPE and Autonomous Women's Centre. These organisations apply methods of research and educational work and implement advocacy activities, based on which they are recognised as independent security sector actors which have sufficient resources to initiate a broader social debate about security policies. However, the needs of numerous other CSOs are still great when it comes to support to building of their resources. Therefore, in programming future support, the donor community should also take into account such important differences between these organisations. Such support should also enable CSOs to deal with issues of security sector reform in a continuous, professional and informed way. Such topics should not be presented on an *ad hoc* basis during project cycles, but should be a part of the programme of research, education and advocacy of CSOs.



# Recommendations

---

1. It is necessary to continue supporting CSOs dealing with the provision of services and support to victims of violence (gender-based and domestic violence, provision of legal aid etc.) and CSOs dealing with vulnerable groups (LGBT, Roma women) at the national and local level. These CSOs are a very important resource based on years-long tradition and built capacities (organisational, personnel, records and data, insights into the situation in the field). They still provide services and perform social functions that government institutions do not have the chance to perform or are unable to do so in a fast and efficient way.
2. CSOs directly dealing with vulnerable groups must be involved in processes of the adoption of new or changing of the existing strategic and normative documents in the domain in which they have or may have consequences for such vulnerable groups, because they have experience of direct work with beneficiaries of their services – based on such experience, they have good insight into the consequences of application of strategic and legislative norms in practice.
3. Based on expressed interest of local CSOs to participate in training activities organised by donors or other CSOs, and based on the evaluation of support of the OSCE Mission to small-scale projects in the 2010–2015 period, it is necessary to continue with capacity building, particularly of small and local CSOs. The aim is to improve the skills of long-term planning and designing of their activities, and to find support for their activities with the private sector or other actors that currently do not feature as important in CSO funding. This would also help improve their capacities to act in a long-term

and sustainable manner as independent actors in the creation and oversight of security policies at the national and local level.

4. Based on evaluation of implemented projects in the field of security sector reform and the results of training intended for CSOs (training was attended by representatives of the MoI and MoD, and other government institutions), it is necessary to organise events with the participation of CSOs and representatives of security sector institutions, so that CSOs could gain a better insight into the manner of functioning and scope of work of institutions. With better knowledge about the work of these institutions, CSOs would be able to draft proposals of projects which also relate to the work of institutions or require cooperation with them.
5. As support of the OSCE Mission was provided to CSOs that are mutually significantly different in terms of organisational capacities (human resources, experience, annual budgets), there are also different priorities of the type of support corresponding to the profile of different CSOs. Although there are CSOs capable of institutional implementation of higher-value grants (over EUR 50,000), in the consortium with other CSOs and institutions, there is a significant number of smaller CSOs that need more modest and flexible funds to respond to immediate needs in their local communities. Therefore, particularly bearing in mind the requirements and manner of accessing EU funds, it is necessary to preserve also smaller funds implemented within short periods.
6. Future donor support, at least its part, should be designed and directed at activities creating the frameworks of more durable communication and cooperation between government security sector institutions and CSOs dealing both with security sector reform and provision of services (to vulnerable and marginalised groups), human rights, transparency and accountability of institutions. This need arises from the still insufficient knowledge and communication between the two sectors. Ad hoc cooperation, in the form of project events, is not sufficient for the formation of institutional frameworks of cooperation. A wider circle of CSOs should certainly be involved in such cooperation.
7. CSOs should join and actively participate in institutional cooperation with government institutions, such as Sectorial Civil Society Organizations (SECO) groups. They will thus obtain timely information on key processes within government institutions and priorities in their work, and broaden the scope of their possibilities to exert influence and advocate desirable policies.

8. The efforts of mapping CSO needs and capacities should continue as needs and resources of CSOs are significantly different. In line with this, future donor assistance should be designed. Donor support programmes should be designed to enable monitoring of recommendations and trends in the work of security sector institutions.
9. CSOs should work on the professionalisation and increasing of their resources, particularly expertise in relation to the work of security sector institutions, by thorough familiarisation with the institutional organisation, internal procedures and rules.
10. As an actor of the security sector, CSOs should design the programme of their activities, which will contain the conceptual and thematic framework of their work, including the programme of methods and techniques of work. This should follow the assessment of CSO resources and future activities of building their capacities. The programme of their work in the field of security sector reform should ensure sustainability and continuity in dealing with topics regardless of project cycles.
11. CSOs should advocate and insist on the need of institutionalisation and predictability of cooperation with security sector institutions, ensuring that such cooperation does not depend on good will and free assessment of representatives of institutions. This would make progress in the profiling of CSOs as an independent security sector actor.



# Annex I

---

Projects supported by the OSCE  
Mission to Serbia in the 2010–2015 period

1.

**Organisation:** Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)  
**Project:** Capacity development of civil society organisations in Serbia for their increased participation in security sector reform  
**Duration:** 5 months (2010/2011)  
**Objectives:** Through training activities concerning security sector reform, enhance cooperation of CSOs in such processes, as a precondition for democratisation of the security sector.  
**Results:** Held four interactive courses for representatives of 61 CSOs from Serbia, with participation of representatives of the MoI and MD; the topics included participation and oversight of CSOs in implementation of security policies at the national and local level.

2.

**Organisation:** Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence (BFPE)  
**Project:** Raising awareness on gender issues among security sector policy makers  
**Duration:** 6 months (2010/2011)

**Objectives:** Better understanding of the importance of gender in security sector reform in regard to the middle level of decision makers in the security sector, which will also contribute to capacities of institutions to improve security needs of women and create a stimulating environment for the development of careers of women employed in the sector.

**Results:** Organised three seminars for the middle level of decision makers in security sector institutions, in the field of gender equality and gender policies in the security sector, and implementation of the National Action Plan for Implementation of the UN Resolution on Women Peace and Security.

3.

**Organisation:** Autonomous Women's Centre  
**Project:** Through cooperation to safety – Improving the quality of NGO and police services available for women survivors of violence against women

**Duration:** 7 months (2011/2012)

**Objectives:** Improve the security of women – victims of gender-based violence, by developing standardised procedures for the police, which also includes cooperation with specialised CSOs. The project envisaged the development of the model for cooperation between CSOs and the police, and development of counselling services and cooperation with the police, so that women – victims of violence, get encouraged to witness in court proceedings.

**Results:** Identified advantages and shortcomings in cooperation between the police and specialised CSOs in regard to prevention and suppression of domestic violence. Provided direct assistance and counselling to women – victims of domestic violence (900 cases), prepared brochure on police dealing with victims of domestic violence (2000 copies), prepared and distributed model of the Security Plan intended for women – victims of domestic violence (500 copies) and individual Security Plans (for 60 female users).

4.

**Organisation:** Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)  
**Project:** Database on security sector in Serbia as a valuable asset for informed and facts-supported oversight

**Duration:** 11 months (2011/2012)

**Objectives:** Ensure participation of different groups of non-governmental actors (other CSOs, the media, independent researchers, MPs, professional services of the National Assembly) in the security sector oversight by offering to them a single and searchable database as a means of overseeing the security sector. Their participation in oversight will lead to a more transparent and responsible security sector.

**Results:** The searchable database “Bezbednost na dlanu” was set up on the website [www.bezbednost.org](http://www.bezbednost.org), containing data on security sector actors, with an assessment of reform results according to the criteria developed in line with the methodology of the Yearbook of Security Sector Reform. Two public events were organised with different target groups for the purpose of promoting the database.

5.

**Organisation:** Impuls, Tutin  
**Project:** Countering violence together  
**Duration:** 7 months (2011/2012)  
**Objectives:** Establishment of an efficient mechanism of struggle against domestic violence at the local level through coordinated action of services in charge of its prevention and suppression.

**Results:** Organised special training courses on acting in cases of gender-based and domestic violence for representatives of relevant local institutions (the social welfare centre, police, public prosecutor’s office, school, local self-government, healthcare centres). Signed Protocol on Coordinated Action of Institutions in Cases of Domestic Violence.

6.

**Organisation:** Public Policy Research Centre  
**Project:** LGBT and security sector reform: what does the case of the LGBT population say about security sector reform in Serbia?  
**Duration:** 6 months (2011)  
**Objectives:** Implement and publish a research on an insufficiently explored topic – the relation between the LGBT population and the security sector in Serbia, which would serve as an indicator of achievement of the “second generation” of security sector reform and offer data as the basis for participation of this marginalised group (LGBT) in this process.

**Results:** Publication “LGBT and Security Sector Reform in the Republic of Serbia”, conducted interviews and focus groups, organised a closed roundtable and public presentation for the media.

7.

**Organisation:** Centre for Advanced of Legal Studies  
**Project:** Making a fair balance between data confidentiality and free access to information

**Duration:** 5 months (2012)

**Objectives:** Examine and give recommendations for adequate practical implementation of the Law on Free Access to Information of Public Importance (2004) and Law on Data Secrecy (2009) in the context of classification of confidential data in operation of security sector institutions.

**Results:** Collection of papers “Access to Information of Public Importance and Protection of Confidential Data”; organised public debate in the form of an international conference, offering recommendations and comparative experiences.

8.

**Organisation:** Media and Reform Centre Niš  
**Project:** Youth (in)security  
**Duration:** 6 months (2012)  
**Objectives:** Advocacy of recognising the problems of youth security at the local level through the research into youth security, increasing capacities of youth CSOs, and developing the Security Strategy of Niš and the action plan for its implementation.

**Results:** Implemented research into youth security on the sample of 415 persons, implemented focus groups, prepared draft Youth Security Strategy, which was later adopted, becoming a part of the Security Strategy of the City of Niš.

9.

**Organisation:** Women’s Entrepreneurship Academy  
**Project:** Women and their careers in the security sector  
**Duration:** 6 months (2012)  
**Objectives:** Development of recommendations for improvement of the position of women employed in the security sector in Serbia and their empowerment to assume more active roles, including the promotion of women employed in the sector as a model for young girls.



**Results:** Publication “Women and Their Careers in the Security Sector”, two empirical researches conducted in the Basic Police Training Centre and police districts, two promotional documentaries, and a roundtable.

#### 10.

**Organisation:** Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)  
**Project:** Handbook on Parliamentary Oversight and Control of Security Sector

**Duration:** 4 months (2012)

**Objectives:** Ensure resources for capacity building of Serbian MPs to exercise effective control and oversight of the security sector by offering to them the Manual for parliamentary control and oversight of the sector, with examples of good practice from countries with consolidated democracy, adapted for competences of Serbian MPs.

**Results:** Published manual “Parliamentary Control and Oversight of the Serbian Security Sector”.

#### 11.

**Organisation:** Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID)  
**Project:** Inclusion of Civil Society Organizations in Defence and Security Issues at Local Level in Kragujevac

**Duration:** 7 months (2013/2014)

**Objectives:** Conduct a research into capacities of local CSOs in Kragujevac, organise training in data collection methods and techniques in order to increase the capacities of local CSOs to be an active partner in the creation and oversight of security policies at the local level.

**Results:** Organised five training courses for local CSOs in Kragujevac, focusing on data collection and analysis, private security companies and corruption in the police.

#### 12.

**Organisation:** Centre for Advanced of Legal Studies  
**Project:** Implementation of data confidentiality legislation in Serbia – ten weakest points

**Duration:** 10 months (2013/2014)

**Objectives:** Prepare the analysis of cases of practical difficulties in implementation of the Law on Data Secrecy (2009) in work of the Ministry of Justice, MoI, MD, Security Committee of the Na-

tional Assembly, identify ten key problems in its implementation and propose recommendations to overcome these problems.

**Results:** Publication “Implementation of the Law on Data Secrecy – Ten Most Important Obstacles”, organised conference.

### 13.

**Organisation:** Autonomous Women’s Centre

**Project:** How safe I can be? – Mobile application for the improvement of the security of young women and girls in the community

**Duration:** 6 months (2014/2015)

**Objectives:** By developing the mobile application Bezbedna, improve the security of girls and women in the private and public space, and improve the access to services of girls and women – victims of violence

**Results:** Tested mobile application Bezbedna and prepared brochure “How Safe I Am? Security Recommendations for Women and Girls”, distributed in 11 cities and municipalities.

### 14.

**Organisation:** Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)

**Project:** Towards Effective Private Security Governance in Serbia

**Duration:** 5 months (2014)

**Objectives:** Contribute to democratic oversight of the private security sector in Serbia by mapping the key problems in the operation and oversight of the sector. These data will be offered to key actors performing oversight of private security companies (private security companies, MoI, Security Committee of the National Assembly, CSOs, the media), whose mutual coordination will also be enhanced.

**Results:** Created database on 300 private security companies, published four short proposals for practical training and the study “New – Old Challenges of the Private Security Sector in Serbia”.

### 15.

**Organisation:** Millennium, Kragujevac

**Project:** Systematic support to the “children of the street” in the region of Sumadija

**Duration:** 7 months (2014/2015)

**Objectives:** Improve youth security in the Šumadija region and promote the concept of human security by identifying risks and proposing systemic solutions to the issue of “street children”

**Results:** Field research and proposal of practical policy of “Street Children”

16.

- Organisation:** Serbian Association for Emergency Situations, Paraćin
- Project:** Safety for all
- Duration:** 5 months (2014)
- Objectives:** Train pupils of elementary and secondary schools and their teachers about the behaviour in extraordinary situations, raise awareness about the importance of appropriate behaviour in such situations and teach them appropriate skills.
- Results:** Organised training on behaviour in extraordinary situations and organised overseen fire simulations for pupils of elementary and secondary schools.

17.

- Organisation:** Women's Research Centre for Education and Communication
- Project:** Towards gender sensitive Security Strategy of the City of Niš
- Duration:** 6 months (2014)
- Objectives:** Conduct an independent research into security perceptions of men and women in Niš, inform relevant local institutions about the need to take into account the gender dimension when creating local security policies, and advocate the adoption of a new, gender sensitive Security Strategy of the City of Niš.
- Results:** Conducted research on the sample of 512 male and female citizens of Niš, focus groups and public events with representatives of local institutions, published results of the research "Towards Gender Sensitive Security Strategy of the City of Niš".

18.

- Organisation:** Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
- Project:** Increasing knowledge of civil society organisations to address interrelation between gender and security
- Duration:** 9 months (2014)
- Objectives:** Improving knowledge and understanding of CSOs of the relatedness between the problems of gender and security and their possible contribution to enhancing gender equality in the creation and implementation of security policies in Serbia, including the development of their skills to submit quality project proposals on gender and safety at the local level.
- Results:** Organised two training courses for 15 selected CSOs, with participation of representatives of the MoI and MD. Organised study travel to Sweden, relating to gender quality in the security sector, and ensured mentorship in writing project proposals.

**19.**

**Organisation:** Public Policy Research Centre  
**Project:** Vulnerable groups and security sector reform: Roma population and security sector in Serbia  
**Duration:** 10 months (2013/2014)  
**Objectives:** Conduct research into the non-examined issue of perception of security of the Roma population in Serbia, offering the indicator of success of the “second generation” of security sector reforms in Serbia, and encourage participation of marginalised vulnerable groups in security sector oversight.  
**Results:** Conducted field research in six cities and municipalities, organised a closed roundtable with representatives of institutions and the Roma community, three public presentations in Belgrade, Kragujevac and Niš, issued publication “The Female and Male Roma and Security Sector Reform in the Republic of Serbia”.

**20.**

**Organisation:** Standing Conference of Towns and Municipalities  
**Project:** Capacity Development of Local Level Actors in Gender and Security Issues  
**Duration:** 5 months (2014)  
**Objectives:** Improving gender equality and advancing compliance with international and national legal norms on gender equality, prohibition of sexual harassment and gender-based violence, by organising training for local security councils and local gender equality councils.  
**Results:** Organised six training courses for representatives of local security councils, local gender equality councils and other local institutions (61 female and male participants from 11 municipalities) in relation to basic concepts of gender and security, gender-based analysis, planning and evaluation.

**21.**

**Organisation:** Impuls, Tutin  
**Project:** In action against Violence  
**Duration:** 4 months (2015)  
**Objectives:** Establishing sustainable practice of preventive and partnership work on the protection of women and children against domestic violence in the municipality of Tutin, by developing professional capacities in relevant institutions and improving their intersectoral cooperation.

**Results:** Organised four specialised training courses for employees in the police, social welfare centre and healthcare institutions about problems and coordinated action in cases of domestic violence, including an intersectoral evaluation meeting.

22.

**Organisation:** Media and Reform Centre Niš  
**Project:** Youth and security culture  
**Duration:** 4 months (2015)  
**Objectives:** Improve cooperation between local authorities and CSOs in Niš in relation to the Working Group for implementation of the Action Plan of the Youth Security Strategy in Niš by mapping groups dealing with youth security, organising public debates and overseeing implementation of the Action Plan.

**Results:** Mapped needs of CSOs dealing with problems of the young and youth activism, organised public debates about possibilities of their more active participation in implementation of the Youth Security Strategy in Niš.

23.

**Organisation:** Women's Association Peščanik, Kruševac  
**Project:** Safe women – safe community  
**Duration:** 4 months (2015)  
**Objectives:** Support to the development of gender sensitive policies at the local level in central Serbia and strengthening capacities of women's CSOs and female women's rights activists in central Serbia to exert influence on policies at the local level

**Results:** Signed European Charter for Equality of Women and Men (one municipality), established gender equality body (one municipality), development of the network of women's organisations and female activists, organised three training courses for representatives of local authorities about gender sensitive local policies.

24.

**Organisation:** Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies  
**Project:** Adoption of the Law on Security Vetting - Towards greater consistency with the Constitution

**Duration:** 4 months (2015)  
**Objectives:** Explore good practices and comparative experiences relating to security checks, in order to offer material for expert debate about the need to regulate this process in Serbia.

**Results:** Analysis “Security checks in Serbia”, organised roundtable which encouraged public debate, with comparative experiences and recommendations.

25.

**Organisation:** Diplo Centre  
**Project:** Towards a national cybersecurity framework in Serbia: Building a multistakeholder platform

**Duration:** 5 months (2015)

**Objectives:** Establishing the framework for the national cybersecurity platform, based on cooperation between government institutions, the corporate sector, academic institutions and CSOs, including the development of expertise in government institutions in order to respond to threats relating to cybersecurity in a coordinated way.

**Results:** Organised expert discussion, gathering representatives of government institutions, corporations and CSOs, in order to establish the frameworks of strategic approach to cybersecurity in Serbia. Published brochure “Towards the National Cybersecurity Framework in Serbia – Building the Multi-Partner Reform”.

26.

**Organisation:** Fenomena, Kraljevo  
**Project:** Fostering the cooperation among CSOs and institutions on the subject of protection and security in domestic violence cases

**Duration:** 4 months (2015)

**Objectives:** Advocating security and consistent approach to victims of gender-based violence in practice of competent institutions. The long-term objective is to increase the number of judgments of conviction and protective measures pronounced by the court.

**Results:** Organised training on the multi-sectoral approach to gender violence and acting in accordance with the Protocol on Cooperation in Prevention of Domestic Violence (2008). Prepared proposal of the checklist for the collection of documentation and evidence.

27.

**Organisation:** Public Policy Research Centre  
**Project:** Youth’s local security issues and democratic control of the security sector

**Duration:** 4 months (2015)

- Objectives:** Contribute to improvement of cooperation between government institutions and CSOs in determining the key problems of human security of the young at the local level, through research into issues of human security of the young in different local communities in Serbia and their potential to participate in democratic oversight of the sector.
- Results:** Conducted field research into perceptions of human security of the young in Zrenjanin, Čačak and Požarevac and prepared policy briefs based on obtained data. Organised three workshops and three roundtables in these cities, with the participation of local security sector actors and MPs of the National Assembly.
- 28.**
- Organisation:** Timok Youth Centre
- Project:** Youth security in Zaječar
- Duration:** 5 months (2015)
- Objectives:** Develop partnership of local authorities and the police with CSOs in regard to raising awareness about the importance of youth security in the local community – by conducting research into youth security in Zaječar, building capacities of media houses, and advocacy of the adoption of the Youth Security Strategy and the Action Plan for its implementation in Zaječar.
- Results:** Conducted research into youth security at the local level on the sample of 339 young persons in Zaječar. Prepared draft Youth Security Strategy in Zaječar.

