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addressing a panel discussion on  
“30 years of the Helsinki Process.

The contribution of the OSCE in a changing world”.

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## I

An appropriate evaluation of events and developments is possible only in the context of presumed goals and aims. What was the objective of the Soviet Union's policy when the Helsinki process started 30 years ago? The aim was not only and not just the recognition of a political and territorial status quo but also a legitimization of a single-party system within the countries under the Soviet domination and a formal recognition of the Soviet Union's position in Europe after the defeat of the Third Reich. Today, only few observers remember the fact that it was Andrei Gromyko, at that time the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union who insisted that principles of the CSCE Final Act should be adopted in the form of an international treaty. All the other rules and provisions, especially those of "the third basket" were supposed to be included in an appendix, a kind of a non-binding document consisting of supplementary recommendations.

The outcome was contrary to the expectation. The Helsinki Final Act did not provide legitimization to a totalitarian system. On the contrary, it was the beginning of its erosion and peaceful transformation. Within 15 years the Soviet

system collapsed. It may be explained by many different causes. There is no doubt, however, that the decisions taken in Helsinki played a role of a trigger.

## II

A few days ago a report by the Panel of Eminent Persons for OSCE reform set up by the December 2004 decision of the Ministerial Council in Sofia was published. The report puts forward specific proposals for change in the organization's structures and workings. In my view, the report's title, "Common purpose. Towards a more effective OSCE" encapsulates the essence of the situation the OSCE has found itself in today. What makes me say this? Well, I am a believer, as probably are the report's authors, in the fundamental importance and significance of establishing clear purpose before embarking on a search for new ways and solutions.

We all know well that resurrecting the past is not a good recipe for the future. While indulging in a reflection on the OSCE's future, however, one must not shy away from a broader analysis. Such a reflection must start with providing answers to two questions: whether there is a place and role for the OSCE at all in the proposed search for new solutions to the most important problems of the present-day world and in what fields the OSCE has attained advantage over other organizations?

## III

What sort of risks would our eroded will to look for common goals and a common vision carry for the OSCE, one may ask? Well, the list would probably include the OSCE's marginalization, with the organization cast adrift and in

endless discussion on the need for reform. We have been pondering on the OSCE's reform for several years now - and that goes for both politicians and experts. And what have we attained in the process?

In this context it is worth recalling key elements from a certain statement made by Andrei Kozyrev, then the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Ministerial Meeting in Stockholm in December 1992. Kozyrev declared: "The space of the former Soviet Union cannot be regarded as a zone of full application of CSCE norms. In essence, this is a post-imperial space, in which Russia has to defend its interests.(...)We are ready to play constructive part in the work of CSCE Council, although we shall be very cautious in our approach to ideas leading to interference in internal affairs." A few minutes after his presentation Kozyrev made an explanation that his brief intervention should be taken as a "rhetorical device" and not a political declaration. In fact it was a warning signal. I did not expect that 13 years after it will be quite an accurate description of the present Russian policy towards the OSCE.

Let me stress that nowadays the OSCE is first and foremost affected by the crisis of values. **Can we really depart from the present-day concept of an organization set on the bedrock of shared values** and return to the origins of the Helsinki process when our states were not yet bound by the commonality of values and the CSCE served as a platform for smoothing out discrepancies and defusing confrontations in a bipolar world? In my view, there is no return to such conditions. However, we must go back to the year 1990 and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe when, involved in laying the foundation for a new security system we spoke about the need for common values. Principles, such as respect for human rights and those of minorities, the rule of law standards set by the democratic state including electoral standards, the free media and civil

society - these represent values that are both universal and timeless. And that means that in this particular area the OSCE mandate has retained its validity.

The **decline of solidarity** lies at the root of the crisis of the European project. There are many reasons for that decline. Prominent among them are the absence of a common threat going back to the end of the cold war, tensions caused by the impact of globalization upon the economies of even the most advanced states and the weakening of the dialogue between élites and society. Citizens of Europe tend to blame the deterioration of the economic and social situation primarily on the enlargement of the European Union. This can bring the entire process to a halt, open up new divisions and exclude entire regions from integration.

In the context of global terrorism many security analysts are referring to the Samuel Huntington 'clash of civilization' concept. It seems to me that such an explanation is wrong for many reasons. First, **the civilization gap** is not just the consequence of a division into rich and poor states. It is rather an outcome of the internal weaknesses of states, of the deficit of democracy and the absence of the rule of law and social order. If we add to this internal ethnic, cultural and religious tensions, demographic pressure, growing intolerance, discrimination and instances of exclusion from society of entire groups of people we shall understand why those problems constitute the main source of threat to security.

Second, political leaders who intend to address present-day security threats need the partnership of society to succeed. And what kind of society can become eligible for such partnership? It has to be a society whose citizens are aware of their rights and who are capable of creating "from below" structures of civil society. It is a delusion to contend that only a strong government can

deliver better security levels to citizens. A state is strong with the strength of its democratic structures and civil freedoms. Both responsible society and government are needed to provide security and stability. That is precisely what we have been striving for throughout the consecutive stages of the Helsinki process when setting standards for the state ruled by law; when creating the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security and debating on the civilian control of the army; when stressing that the trafficking in human beings violated the basic human rights and freedoms; when asserting that intolerance and discrimination posed a threat to security.

#### IV

A few words about political philosophy of inclusiveness in the OSCE context. The OSCE great strength has always lain in the inclusive character of participation therein, and in its transatlantic dimension. The feature distinguishing the OSCE's from other organizations has been a holistic approach to the concept of security. Member-states have come round to accept that not only politico-military and economic aspects of security but also its human dimension with a focus on human rights, civil society and the rule of law are of a paramount importance. Not only principles guiding relations among the states but also provisions addressed to the rules and situations within them. As original was also the concept of security based on cooperation, and of allowing states on a reciprocal basis to look into each other internal affairs.

One could question whether key objectives pursued by the OSCE for the last decade lost their importance and value. I have in mind such goals like an intention:

- ◆ to consolidate the participating States' common values and help in building fully democratic civil societies, based on the rule of law;

- ◆ to prevent local conflicts, restore stability and bring peace to war torn areas; [and]
- ◆ to overcome real and perceived security deficits and avoid the creation of new political and economic or social divisions by promoting a co-operative system of security.

May I also ask at this point whether the organization's mandate have lost its validity? In my view, some of the OSCE tasks are no longer valid and the organization's mandate has been to a considerable extent implemented. However one more question remains. Namely - whether it is right to question the very sense of the OSCE's continuing existence? In other words, whether OSCE has the future? Whether we would be better advised to re-formulate its tasks to make it capable of meeting the expectations of participating states and of addressing new challenges? Or can the OSCE be a factor for change? How one can harness its strengths, and where one must admit it can no longer deliver? We must also be realistic in our expectations: the OSCE never was, is not and shall never be a leading security organization.

## V

What, then, should we do to redefine or define a new mandate for the OSCE?

First, we must restore **the sense of community and identity** to the entire area between Vancouver and Vladivostok, including the sense of shared responsibility for the organization of all those participating in the process.

Second, we must **overhaul the OSCE's relations with the outside world** and think seriously about opening up the organization to all those who are

ready to embrace its "acquis". This might be the only way for our closest neighbours, including Mediterranean nations, to develop a sense of partnership in the process investing them with powers of co-decision about its future course. The organization's enlargement to new countries should above all be the consequence of the interest displayed by the countries concerned, and not merely of Europe's desire for new adherents. Cooperation with 6 Mediterranean and 5 Asian countries so far, even if unspectacular, is essential for the promotion and dissemination of democratic values: it helps raise shared concerns for security and generate mutual trust in the spirit of norms and standards of the OSCE.

Third, we must **specify what kind of leadership we actually need**. There can be no efficient organization without strong leadership. The present leadership formula will not help strengthen the organization. On the other hand, we are not sure whether the General Secretary's new mandate can inject new momentum into the organization and stimulate its workings.

Fourth, we must **set our priorities**. In my view, we must soon focus upon Central Asia. What is now going on in that part of the world highlights the fiasco of our policies. And, significantly, frustration is conspicuous on both sides. Central Asian nations consider themselves cheated because a promised economic aid has never materialized. Europe, on its part, is surprised at the scale of non-observance of human rights there, at the decline of the rule of law and a deficit of democracy in Central Asian states who are to much greater extent dependant on the traditional clans and tribal structures than on the modern state of law institutions and requirements. And all this despite promises made and joint decisions concerning discharge of obligations.

Generally speaking, as a community we need to adopt a new strategy vis-a-vis those states, one that will enshrine both our expectations and tangible economic incentives. Short of substantial financial aid, all our endeavours will be nothing more than just pain killers which cannot cure a disease. The OSCE cannot solve these problems on its own. This can be achieved only in cooperation with the European Union and NATO.

Fifth, we must stop **thinking in terms of various OSCE dimensions**. This may sound too controversial, but I find quite pointless calls for re-balancing of the three OSCE dimensions currently advocated. Given the complexity and interdependence of present-day threats, all attempts at striking a balance between the dimensions look quite artificial. Practically none of the phenomena under discussion can be suppressed without committing each and every dimension to the task.

## VI

Two years ago at the First Annual Security Review Conference here in Vienna I have had an opportunity to note that the foundation of a Grand Strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> century already exists. It consists of two main elements: implementation of the post-1990 agreements that established a common security framework in Europe; and the extension or „globalization” of the framework to other regions. The Euro-Atlantic community faces three large tasks in turning this design into reality:

- (a) bringing Russia into Europe, rather than attempting to exclude it;
- (b) making the USA understand that staying engaged in Europe is in its own interest;

(c) transforming the European Union into a more accountable, democratically controlled and security oriented institution.

Those tasks are still valid and waiting for their full implementation. We shall also remember that the nineteen nineties marked the most fruitful period in the life of the OSCE when the organization made possible and then assisted in democratic changes in Central and Eastern Europe. Let us think what we can do together in support of similar processes unfolding today, to give them a chance of delivering such positive results.

## VII

The institutions should follow the problems. Change taking place in the security environment enforces adaptation process upon all organizations, the OSCE being no exception. We could, therefore, start looking for a new formula of cooperation of main European and transatlantic organizations responsible for security, as only by acting in concert can we stand up to contemporary threats. Let us then consider holding a series of high-level OSCE, NATO and EU meetings organized back to back and devoted to just one theme. And, after establishing common purpose, let us set in train common action. Let us start with hammering out a joint strategy *vis-a-vis* Central Asian states. Let's create a platform for action without rivalry, competition and bureaucratic allocation of tasks, but one serving better the application of the principle of subsidiarity.

The challenge the OSCE is facing now is more about its essence and goals than structural reforms. I, for one, get the impression that some people have succumbed to an illusion that the problems the OSCE is grappling with can be solved with no more than just structural changes, corrections made to operating methods and a re-positioning of institutions. By resorting to such moves we

could probably bring about some improvements to the functioning of the organization, but the solution of the real problem would continue to elude us. When correct answers to the problems I have just pointed out are found, it will be easier to assess the usefulness of specific OSCE institutions and define the range and scope of necessary change. Nowadays, like in the past, the role of the OSCE is determined to a greater extent by the capacity to think in a creative and an innovative way and by an unconventional approach to the new emerging reality rather than by sticking to stringent rules and conventional forms and ways of acting.

## VIII

Ten years ago, in my capacity as the Director of SIPRI, I have had an opportunity to lead the Independent Working Group on A Future Security Agenda for Europe. The results of our work were reflected in the Report with the following recommendations: “The search for comprehensive and cooperative security for the 21<sup>st</sup> century in Europe should:

- Go beyond existing frameworks and suggest directions in which multilateral efforts towards security should be aimed.
- Define a more systematic approach to preventing and resolving conflicts. This should be based on a review of the underlying goals and principles; on the study, discussion and consideration of the roles of states and organizations; and on the development of better techniques for conflict prevention; and it should provide stronger support by governments for institutions that are performing work in this field.
- Allow for the enlargement of Western institutions, including differentiated types of membership in order to meet the objectives of non-threatening and cooperative enlargement.

- Rebalance and reapportion security responsibilities in the OSCE area so that each player understands and accepts not only its own role but also the role of the other players.

Organizations and institutions should be prepared to consider new types of relationship with non-member states, including association, treaty relationship and other means of outreach to open a dialogue with countries from the regions which are adjacent to Europe.”

It seems to me that our suggestions are still relevant and might be used by the practitioners in their search for the new European security order.