



ՀԱՅԱՍՏԱՆԻ ՀԱՆՐԱՊԵՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՊԱՏՎԻՐԱԿՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ ENGLISH only
DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

Statement

Delivered by the Delegation of Armenia

**At the Working Session II of the Annual Security Review Conference
2 July, 2008**

Mr. Moderator,

Please allow us to start by saying that security issues are at the very heart of this organization enshrined in its birth certificate and fundamental documents which direct and regulate its proceedings and achievements. This gives an exceptional importance and value to the annual review of security related issues at the OSCE. The ASRC provides an opportunity to take stock of the wide range of issues and to look at them in their entirety. As for this particular session, we know, it concentrates exclusively on items related to arms control arrangements and CSBMs.

The careful analysis of the current state of affairs regarding arms control regimes in the OSCE area leaves only little ground for optimism. One of the main pillars of such arrangements - the CFE Treaty - by the admission of probably most of its State Parties is obsolescent, now remains handicapped, while the ratification of the Adapted Treaty is still under a cloud. The Forum for Security Cooperation on the other hand is trying to fulfill an important task of preserving what has been achieved so far, making the implementation of available instruments technically more effective, sometimes addressing already existing arrangements with focused attention on their specific needs, and reinforcing them with additional tasking and tracking compliance. All of those efforts are vital and commendable. However, comprehensive measures to react to rapidly changing security environment, to rising threats and challenges remain uncertain; something which is also true for the OSCE military political dimension as a whole.

The state of affairs around arms control structures in the OSCE directly affects participating States' individual security needs. The arms control mechanisms are based on the logic of cooperative security, the reduction of tension, among other things through the limitation of available equipments, predictability, verification regimes and transparency of actions: notions very much based on interdependence. Upsetting a balance based security framework, both on global and regional levels, should be and is of concern to all. In this regard we believe that parallel to the discussions on global state of affairs around arms control regimes a similar cooperative approach by participating states on careful examination of regional situations is imperative. Obviously shortcomings in one may adversely affect the other. However, most of our countries while addressing regional concerns mainly follow the established rule of not naming and shaming, usually avoiding contentious matters. This approach entails the danger of erosion of arms control arrangements from regional up to global levels threatening their implementation and integrity. Furthermore, it contradicts the very spirit of norms and principles enshrined in fundamental OSCE documents such as the Charter of European Security, the

Maastricht Strategy, and the Code of Conduct on Military-Political Aspects of Security. All of these unequivocally confirm the indivisible, interdependent and cooperative nature of security and the responsibility of pS to exercise restraint and refrain in their relations from actions which can potentially have a destabilizing effect.

In the same spirit, as a rule, the arms control arrangements while defining the role, responsibility and obligations of each pS toward the implementation of undertaken obligations on a national basis, also provide a set of arrangements to help prevent situations that threaten security and stability of the whole area of application. For instance as part of such regulations pS took upon themselves an obligation to refrain from shipments of armaments to those countries where their accumulation in extensive numbers can have a destabilizing effect or can contribute to tension. Of course most of us know very well which pS fall under this definition but still in many cases this seems not to be enough to halt the military build up.

At this stage let us be more concrete and draw the attention of distinguished delegates to the facts which stand in breach of our commitment for collective security. To start with the transfers of conventional weapons, it is a well known fact, though one of our key note speakers for whatever reason omit to mention it, that one pS for at least the last 3 years through the reported numbers disseminated by itself and other participating states, violates its maximum levels of holdings of Treaty limited equipment set by the CFE Treaty in two categories: for battle tanks by an excess of 161 units and for artillery by 119 units. Yet, that pS continues its military build up in the absence of any substantial criticism and admonition on the part of other State Parties, and incidentally importing excess conventional weapons from the very CFE State Parties who are more than any others well aware of the violations. In this regard we ask for ourselves and our partners: is this how the CFE State Parties respect their commitment to create a safe, stable and militarily balanced Europe?

Let us quote from related OSCE document - Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers – and to see whether the transfers held during the last 3 years from OSCE Participating States to the same pS to which we imply of 164 battle tanks, 151 artillery pieces, 21 combat aircrafts are consistent with that document's logic. The document stipulates: "Each participating State will, in considering proposed transfers, take into account the internal and regional situation in and around the recipient country, in the light of existing tensions or armed conflicts; the record of compliance of the recipient country with regard to international commitments, ...in areas of arms control and disarmament; Each participating State will avoid transfers which would be likely to endanger peace, introduce destabilizing military capabilities into a region, or otherwise contribute to regional instability"(Section II (a) and (b)).

Allow us to continue and call your attention on another OSCE document in the field under discussion - Document on Small arms and Light Weapons - which in the same vain as the previous document commit pS to follow almost the same criteria in their arms transfers to a pS (Section I, paragraph 3, subparagraph (iii) and Section III (A) paragraph 2(a) subparagraph ii and iii of the document on SALW).

We will leave to the distinguished delegations to consider the relevance to the above mentioned document transfer of 106800 sub-machine guns, 14000 Assault rifles, 2600

light machine guns and 1380 hand held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers during last three years to the pS under consideration by OSCE pS.

Let us state that at this stage our intention is not to deal with destabilizing effect of actions undertaken by the pS we imply to in violation of the CFE Treaty and relevant OSCE documents. We have deliberately not entered into their details. The facts and figures spoke for themselves. Those who are following closely discussions at the JCG and the FSC should be well aware of them. We tried by this statement to raise issues concerning our common responsibilities and obligations in the security sector. We will refrain from naming that country, however we think that for argumentation purposes the concerned pS may identify itself.

Allow us to conclude by saying, that our common commitments, one of which we have brought to your attention, are very well known to all of us: they have been elaborated, discussed and adopted by mutual agreement. Yet, it does not seem to be enough for effective implementation. Collective security implies shared responsibility for its maintenance. It is the conviction of our delegation that actions which potentially can bring to the deterioration of security environment should be of concern to all of us, and we –the OSCE Participating States – should not only promptly react to encounter them, but also refrain from the steps generating such challenges. We assume this was the core idea behind the provisions embedded in several OSCE documents on arms control arrangements to which we have referred today.

Thank you, Mr. Moderator.