

INTERIM REPORT
13 August – 10 September 2025

12 September 2025

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- The 28 September parliamentary elections are widely considered to be critical for Moldova's democratic future. They are marked by deep political divisions, driven by significant tensions over the country's geopolitical alignment. The electoral period has been marked by a series of hybrid threats, including overt disinformation campaigns, indications of illicit financing, and cyber security incidents.
- These are the first parliamentary elections to be organized under the new 2022 Electoral Code. One-hundred and one parliamentary mandates will be contested by proportional representation from closed party or bloc lists, or by independents. The legal framework has undergone frequent revisions, including substantial amendments to 13 laws shortly prior to these elections to address the phenomenon of electoral corruption and related issues. With extensive amendments, some ODIHR recommendations on the legal framework for elections have been implemented, but others remain unaddressed.
- The Central Election Commission (CEC) has so far met legal deadlines in preparation for the elections and 37 District Election Councils (DECs) have been established and are operational. All Precinct Electoral Bureaus (PEBs) are operational with at least the legally required minimum number of members. The CEC's decisions to open two PEBs in the Russian Federation and 12 PEBs for voters residing on the left bank of the Nistru river (Transnistria) have drawn some criticism. These decisions have been appealed and upheld by the courts. While many ODIHR EOM interlocutors expressed trust in the competence and professionalism of the higher-level election commissions, some opposition interlocutors voiced concerns about political influence in the CEC decision-making.
- Cybersecurity in elections is an increasing concern, and the authorities have been supported by international partners in their efforts to introduce a more robust, risk-based framework to identify and mitigate threats. This includes the establishment of a new Cybersecurity Agency (CSA), which is tasked with the risk management, and the transfer of security oversight from the CEC to the Information Technology and Cyber Security Service (STISC). Since some aspects of the electoral process are technology-based, these efforts will be critical to safeguard the process from cybersecurity threats.
- The State Voter Register, extracted from the population register and maintained and updated by the CEC, includes, as of 1 September, 2,759,169 citizens. Voters without domicile or residence, including those who emigrated abroad, and the 277,094 registered voters residing in Transnistria, are not included in the main voter lists and can be added to supplementary voter lists on the election day, following electronic verification of voter data against the centralised register to safeguard against multiple voting.
- By 19 August, the CEC had received applications from 5 electoral blocs, 23 from political parties and 20 independent candidates (only 7 returned the required support signature sheets). By 5 September, the CEC registered 4 blocs, 15 parties, and 4 independent candidates. Recent amendments to the Law on Political Parties bar the registration of parties considered successors to those declared unconstitutional. Fourteen CEC decisions on the registration of candidates were

challenged at the CCA; ten were rejected, four accepted—two later overturned by the SCJ. All the rest were upheld by the SCJ.

- The campaign officially began on 29 August. Thus far, in addition to online advertising and social media posts, the campaign has involved traditional activities like rallies, voter meetings, and door-to-door outreach. Messaging has focused on EU integration and geopolitical alignment, along with economic welfare and development issues. Vote-buying and the misuse of administrative resources is explicitly prohibited. Following widespread allegations of paid protests and vote buying, a series of high-profile investigations and raids were conducted in several regions, resulting in the detention of 21 individuals and the seizure of hard currencies, bank cards, vehicles, equipment, and documentation. There has been a concerted effort on the part of the authorities to inform the public about new measures in place to combat voter manipulation and the ramifications of selling their vote.
- Widespread disinformation has been a key feature of the campaign thus far, with the president and other heads of institutions making public statements on multiple and repeated false narratives being spread on the internet, including those originating from external sources. Social networking platforms are widely used in Moldova and by the diaspora, but their operations are based outside of the country, and they have been sporadically responsive to problems identified by the authorities. The mission has been conducting a qualitative assessment of the online campaign through the social media posts of competing parties and candidates since 26 August.
- Campaign finance rules provide for a mixed system that allows for both public and private financing. Competitors must submit weekly financial reports, including on online spending, to the CEC during the campaign period and the CEC may impose a variety of sanctions for infractions. While third-party financing is prohibited in the law, a detailed regulation is lacking. So far, all contestants who are required to file weekly financial reports have done so and they have all been published on the CEC website.
- While diverse and pluralistic, the media environment is constrained by a limited and shrinking advertising market. ODIHR EOM interlocutors reported increased instances of intimidation and harassment of journalists, both in person and online, mainly originating from non-state actors, while also pointing to gaps in legal protection and institutional follow-up. During the campaign, all media are to ensure fair, balanced, and impartial coverage of the contestants, while broadcast media all offer free and paid time to contestants, and are monitored by the media regulator.
- Voters and contestants have the right to challenge the actions, inactions and decisions of election bodies and other contestants. Observers and the election administration can file complaints related to violations of their rights. As of 10 September, the CEC received 62 complaints and notifications related mainly to the registration of candidates, alleged violation of campaign rules, misuse of administrative resources or electoral corruption. Patriotic Bloc lead candidate, Igor Dodon, announced protests for the day after the elections to contest the results, regardless of the outcome of the elections.
- The legal framework provides for observation by citizen and international observers, as well as representatives of contestants. As of 10 September, the CEC accredited 1,630 citizen and 145 international observers. According to a new CEC regulation, citizen and international observer organisations must submit additional information on their qualifications to undertake observation, and some interlocutors expressed concern that the new requirements are both onerous and vague and may be open to interpretation.

II. INTRODUCTION

Following an invitation from the Moldovan authorities, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) established an Election Observation Mission (EOM) on 13 August.¹ The ODIHR EOM, headed by Ambassador Jillian Stirk, consists of a 16-member core team based in Chişinău and 30 long-term observers deployed on 22 August across Moldova. Mission members are drawn from 27 OSCE participating States and 47 per cent of mission members are women. ODIHR has requested participating States to second 200 short-term observers to observe election-day proceedings.

III. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Parliamentary elections will take place on 28 September 2025, with 101 seats to be elected to the unicameral parliament. Moldova is a semi-presidential republic, with the president designating a prime minister in consultation with the parliament. The last early parliamentary elections were held in 2021, with the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) obtaining the majority with 63 mandates.

The elections are taking place in a polarised political environment, driven by significant tensions over the country's geopolitical alignment, and characterised by deep political divisions. The war caused by the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine has posed significant challenges to the security and economy of Moldova, resulting in inflation, and in particular increased energy prices. Moldova was granted the status of European Union (EU) candidate country status in 2022 and began accession talks in 2023. The objective of EU membership is enshrined in the Constitution.² Hybrid threats, including use of illicit funds, electoral corruption, and widespread disinformation, remain a serious concern for state institutions and security agencies ahead of the 2025 parliamentary elections.³ This has included blatant disinformation against the president and the Central Election Commission (CEC) chairperson and attempts to call into question the electoral process in advance of the results.⁴

Investigations into foreign interference and illegal campaign funding during the 2023 and 2024 elections, together with the November 2024 Constitutional Court's (CC) results ruling, highlighted the unprecedented scale of voter corruption in 2024 and underscored the need for more effective measures. This prompted amendments to the legislative framework and coordinated efforts by law enforcement agencies, which shaped the pre-election period.

Women make up 41 percent of the parliament. Many women serve in high-level decision-making positions, including the presidency, and as chairpersons of the CEC and the CC.

IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Parliamentary elections are primarily regulated by the 1994 Constitution (last amended in 2024), the 2022 Electoral Code and the 2007 Law on Political Parties (LPP). These are complemented by a set of

¹ See previous [ODIHR election observation reports on Moldova](#).

² Constitutional amendments on the irreversibility of Moldova's EU path were adopted following a referendum held in October 2024 concurrently with the presidential election.

³ At the Moldova-EU summit in July 2025, leaders from the EU and Moldova stated that "We strongly condemn the persistent and increasing hybrid threats posed by Russia aiming to undermine democratic elections in Moldova, including information manipulation and interference, and the use of large-scale electoral corruption through local proxies". See [Joint Declaration](#) following the first Republic of Moldova- EU Summit 4 July 2025.

⁴ See media [coverage](#) of disinformation against the president as well as [debunking](#) of disinformation featuring an AI-generated fake video targeting the CEC chairperson. See also [recent calls](#) questioning the process in advance of the results.

regulations issued by the CEC, covering a wide area of issues.⁵ Moldova is party to major international legal instruments related to democratic elections.⁶

These are the first parliamentary elections organized under the new Electoral Code of 2022. The legal framework has undergone frequent revisions by the parliament, with the Electoral Code amended 10 times since its adoption. There have been further changes resulting from two CC rulings declaring certain provisions unconstitutional.⁷

Shortly after the CC ruling confirming the presidential election and constitutional referendum results in December 2024, the PAS parliamentary majority initiated a comprehensive draft law aimed at addressing electoral corruption and related issues.⁸ Following a period of public consultation with ministries, state agencies, external experts, and civil society organizations (CSOs), the parliament adopted Law 100 on 13 June 2025, which introduced substantial amendments to 13 laws; in particular, the Electoral Code, LPP, the Criminal Code, and the Contravention Code.⁹ While the final version of the law incorporated several amendments proposed during consultations, including some to address recommendations from the ODIHR urgent opinion, other key recommendations such as clearer and more objective criteria for refusing party registration or restricting their activities, reconsideration of the mandatory Register of Party Members, and the removal of certain vague provisions related to the new definitions of extremist activities that could lead to misuse were not fully addressed.¹⁰

Several important changes were introduced by Law 100/2025, including a more comprehensive definition of both passive and active electoral corruption, along with significantly higher penalties for election-related crimes and administrative offenses.¹¹ New grounds for refusing registration of electoral contestants, including failure to submit executive member lists to the Public Service Agency (PSA) or

⁵ Other applicable legislation includes the 2002 Criminal Code and the 2008 Code on Contraventions, the 2018 Code on Audiovisual Media Services, the 2022 Law on Advertising, the 2011 Law on Personal Data Protection (which will be replaced starting 28.06.2026 by the new Law 195/2024), the 2000 Law on Citizenship, the 2001 Law on the Administrative-Territorial Organisation, the 2008 Law on Assemblies, and the 1994 Law on Special Legal Status of Găgăuzia. The CEC regulations of 2023 (some revised in 2025) cover most aspects of the electoral process, including candidate registration, voter lists, election campaigning, campaign financing, election disputes resolution.

⁶ Including the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1979 Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 2003 UN Convention Against Corruption, 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 1995 Framework Convention on National Minorities, 2004 UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). In 2022 Moldova signed the Second Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention, and in 2025 the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law. Moldova is a member of the Council of Europe's European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).

⁷ Constitutional Court decision from 2023 on amendments to the legislation that barred members of parties previously found unconstitutional from being elected, finding the ban too general, neglecting individual circumstances, and lacking effective remedies and guarantees against arbitrary decisions. Further to the 2023 decision, Parliament enacted Law no. 280 on October 4, amending again the Electoral Code, in an attempt to implement narrower restrictions aligned with the Court's reasoning, but the CC declared the [law unconstitutional on March 2024](#), citing disproportional limitations on electoral rights. In 2025, the Electoral Code was amended by Law 112 (22 May), Law 130 (29 May), and Law 100 (13 June), with the latter also amending the LPP. Law 109/2024 on postal voting was amended by Law 129 (29 May) to extend its application to the parliamentary elections and to include new countries.

⁸ Draft Law 381 was submitted to parliament on 17 December 2024. The final version, Law 100/2025, was adopted in a third reading with 55 PAS votes in favour and 21 votes against from the Bloc of Communist and Socialists.

⁹ Consultations concerning the Draft Law 381 took place on 23 December 2024 and on 21 March 2025. Law 130 modifying the Electoral Code and the LPP was adopted without public consultation.

¹⁰ The [urgent ODIHR Opinion on the draft law](#) was published on 29 April 2025.

¹¹ The new Article 181/1 of the Criminal Code expands the definition of active electoral corruption to include not only the offering or giving of money, goods, or services but also promising such benefits to influence voters. The administrative offence of passive electoral corruption (Art. 47/1 of the Contravention Code) now consists also in accepting such promises. Aggravating circumstances apply if multiple people are involved, multiple voters targeted, or public funds used, with harsher penalties if linked to criminal groups, foreign entities, or if the offender knew the illegal source of the benefits.

participation in ‘camouflaged blocs’.¹² A ban on the registration of political parties deemed successors of unconstitutional parties was also introduced (see *Candidate Registration*), as well new grounds and procedures for temporarily limiting the activity of political parties prior to their dissolution without any preliminary warning, based on decisions of the Chişinău Court of Appeal (CCA).¹³ The amendments tightened requirements for the registration of parties and their members and introduced the obligation of a party register to be submitted to the PSA and CEC. Several deadlines were modified, including the registration of candidates.

The 2025 amendments also concerned campaign rules, including a ban on pre-campaigning, paid participation, transport to unauthorized events, illegal signature collection, and the political use of charity organizations. Electoral campaigning by those not registered as electoral competitors was also prohibited and the sanctions for illegal campaigning were tightened. A definition of independent candidates was introduced, in line with a previous ODIHR recommendation. Stricter campaign financing rules were adopted: extending categories of donors, introducing new limits for donations, and additional sanctions.

Despite these broad amendments, certain ODIHR recommendations on the legal framework for elections, remain unaddressed, including those related to measures to address the accuracy of the voter register, removing the limitations of suffrage rights of persons with intellectual or psychosocial disabilities, clearer provisions on the misuse of administrative resources,¹⁴ the extension of campaign finance regulations to third parties and online, ensuring dispute resolution related to candidate registration is concluded before the start of the campaign, transparency of ownership of print media, and rules for contesting election results.

Parliament’s 101 seats are elected by proportional representation from closed party or bloc lists, or as independents. Thresholds of 5 and 7 percent of valid votes cast are in place for parties and electoral blocs, respectively. For independents, this threshold is 2 percent. There is an overall 40 percent gender quota for candidate lists, and a placement requirement that at least 4 out of every 10 candidates be of the opposite gender. A minimum turnout requirement of one-third of registered voters is mandated.

V. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

Parliamentary elections are administered by the CEC, 37 District Electoral Councils (DECs) and some 2,274 Precinct Electoral Bureaus (PEBs), including 301 polling stations in 41 countries for out-of-country and postal voting.¹⁵ To date, many ODIHR EOM interlocutors have conveyed a high degree of trust in the competence and professionalism of the CEC and DECs, but some opposition interlocutors voiced concerns about political influence in decision-making. On 30 July, the CEC chairperson reported it was targeted by a disinformation campaign featuring an AI-generated fake video, which the CEC attributed to attempts to undermine the process. On 5 September, one of the CEC members from the

¹² Political parties that fail to submit to the PSA the list of members subject to the obligation of assets declaration are barred from participating in the elections. The constitutionality of this provision was challenged to the CC by the Alternative and Salvation Force. The [CC decision 113/12.08.2025](#) dismissed the case as ungrounded. A camouflaged electoral bloc is defined by Art.1 of the Electoral Code as an informal association between two or more political parties that carry out joint electoral activities, but without officially registering as an electoral bloc with the CEC. This practice is considered illegal.

¹³ In May 2024, the CC repealed the restrictions on the right to stand for those associated with political parties declared unconstitutional, introduced shortly before the 2023 local elections. As the legal framework did not include provisions sanctioning the registration or the use of existing political parties that continue the activities of an unconstitutional party, Law 100/2025 introduced the prohibition of successors of such entities, to be determined by the CCA by evaluating substantial connections and similarities between them. On 2 September, the Alternative and Salvation Force of Moldova party challenged the constitutionality of certain new legal provisions related to the application of temporary measures limiting the activity of successor parties to the Constitutional Court; its decision is pending.

¹⁴ However, guidelines to prevent the misuse of administrative resources have been [developed](#) by the CEC.

¹⁵ Four PEBs will receive postal votes from 10 countries: Australia, Canada, Finland, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, and United States of America.

opposition stated that he has been subject to attempts to intimidate him by his CEC colleagues with the aim of influencing his position on certain topics.

The CEC is a permanent body with a five-year mandate and broad responsibilities for administering elections. Appointed in 2021, it has nine members: one nominated by the president and eight by parliament, according to party representation.¹⁶ Five CEC members, including the chairperson, are women. The DEC members are led by permanent chairpersons appointed by the CEC for five years. Other DEC members are appointed before elections, nominated by local councils, district courts, and parliamentary parties. PEBs are temporary bodies with members nominated by local councils and parliamentary parties. All election officials should be certified by the CEC. The Register of Electoral Officials maintained by the CEC includes some 25,000 people. Women make up 72 percent of DEC members and 59 percent of DEC chairpersons.

The CEC has decided to open 301 polling stations abroad. It bases its decision on a variety of information: the dynamics of past turnout, pre-registration, as well as information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its decision to open two PEBs in the Russian Federation, a reduction compared to the last parliamentary elections, has become a point of contention for opposition interlocutors.¹⁷ The CEC justifies this on citing that due to the Russian Federation's on-going war with Ukraine, it cannot ensure safety outside of its diplomatic representations. The same policy applies to the opening of polling stations in Ukraine and Israel due to security considerations.

The CEC has also decided to establish 12 PEBs for voters from the left bank of the Nistru river (Transnistria), compared to the most recent electoral cycle when 30 PEBs were established.¹⁸ This has drawn criticism from opposition parties and some stakeholders. According to the CEC, the decision was largely based on voter participation during the last three elections.¹⁹ Citizen observer CSOs such as Promo-LEX and Union of Lawyers have noted that more polling stations for voters from Transnistria might be needed and voiced concerns about the possible lack of ballots in the event of a significant turnout increase over previous years.²⁰ The Intelligence and Security Service (SIS) made public their rationale for only recommending 8 PEBs, which incorporates security considerations in addition to previous turn-out data.²¹ On 27 and 28 August, the Patriotic Bloc filed two cases at the CCA requesting the annulment of the two CEC decisions establishing polling stations abroad in the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Israel and for Transnistria. The CCA assessed both CEC decisions as well-founded and rejected the complaints as lacking objective legal substance. The SCJ upheld the decisions of the CCA.

The CEC has so far met legal deadlines in preparation for the elections. There has, however, been a challenge in appointing members at the PEB level due to lack of nominations from political parties and ongoing investigations of past PEB members and their alleged connections with vote-buying schemes. Some important regulations were adopted after the start of the electoral period (e.g., the regulation on

¹⁶ In line with a prior ODIHR recommendation, the 2022 Electoral Code introduced a new formula, to be applied from 2026, that comprises seven CEC members nominated one each by the President, the Ministry of Interior, the Superior Council of Magistrates, civil society and the parliamentary opposition, and two by the ruling party.

¹⁷ In the 2021 parliamentary elections, 17 were opened. In the 2024 presidential election and constitutional referendum this number was 2.

¹⁸ Transnistria has 277,094 possible voters, with only some 26,000 voting in the 2024 presidential election. In 2024, the CEC established 30 PEBs.

¹⁹ A CEC [Decision](#) establishing polling stations for Transnistria grounded its conclusion on previous participation dynamics as well as other considerations provided in the law (security, access routes, etc.) and information from relevant state authorities. Based on this, they calculated the relation between average turnout during last three national elections against the number of registered voters. The turnout for last three elections was 31,783 (2020), 28,791 (2021), 26,288 (2024).

²⁰ On 9 September, the CEC approved a total of 23,500 ballots for the 12 Transnistrian polling stations. This sparked criticism from CEC members nominated by the opposition, who considered the number as low and the decision discriminatory. The CEC chairperson explained that the determination of the number is based on past turnout. All three opposition CEC members issued a dissenting opinion on the decision.

²¹ The SIS provided a detailed [explanation as to the rationale behind limiting the number of PEBs in Transnistria](#). This report can be found here.

observer accreditation came two weeks after the start of the election period). Sessions have been open to observers and media, streamed live and available online. The agendas and adopted decisions have been published on the CEC website, mostly in a timely manner.

Cybersecurity in elections is an increasing concern, and the authorities have been supported in their efforts by the international partners to introduce a more robust, risk-based framework to identify and mitigate threats. This includes the establishment of a new Cybersecurity Agency (CSA), which is tasked with the risk management. Moreover, ahead of these elections, the CEC's State Automated Information System 'Elections' (SAISE), which is an integrated tool for managing election-related data and documentation, has been moved under the Information Technology & Cyber Security Service's (STISC) cyber-protection in order to provide a more cohesive security framework following the 2024 cyberattacks. According to the CEC and STISC, the latter has no access to the CEC data, only providing the security of the system.

From 2 August, the CEC through its Centre for Continuous Electoral Training (CICDE) has conducted extensive in-person seminars for all DEC members. It started PEB members training on 4 September. Additionally, trainings were conducted for PEB operators, State Register of Voters (SRV) registrars, law-enforcement, civil society and media. CICDE's voter information campaigns include podcasts, videos, and social media posts in Romanian and Russian, with subtitles and sign language interpretation.

VI. VOTER REGISTRATION

Voter registration is passive and based on data extracted from the population register. Every citizen 18 or older by election day is eligible to vote, except those deprived of the right to vote by a court decision.²² The centralized SRV is maintained and updated by the CEC.

As of 1 September, the SRV included 3,299,396 registrations, with 2,763,678 being of voting age and included in the voter lists. Voters without domicile and residence, including those who emigrated abroad, and the 277,094 registered voters residing in Transnistria, are not included in the main voter lists and can be added to supplementary voter lists on the election day.²³ The CEC has optional online pre-registration for voters from abroad and obligatory pre-registration for postal voting until 14 August.²⁴

The law ensures the transparency and accessibility of voter lists, with their public display at PEBs no later than 8 September and the possibility of checking the lists online. Voters, representatives of contestants, and observers have the right to verify whether the data on voter lists are accurate and submit requests for corrections to PEBs by 21 September.

VII. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION

Citizens eligible to vote can stand for office, with the exception of active military personnel, prisoners serving sentences in penitentiary institutions, those whose active criminal records include crimes committed intentionally, and those deprived of the right to hold positions of responsibility by a final court decision.

Citizens can stand as candidates on party or bloc lists, or independently. Through recent legal amendments, political parties must submit the information on the composition of their central executive bodies to the PSA by the beginning of the electoral period, i.e., on 14 July at the latest. By that same date, the CEC published the list of eligible competitors based on information from the PSA; out of 66

²² Under the Civil Procedure Code, a court may decide to deprive a person of the right to vote based on several grounds, in the context of guardianship proceedings. According to the CEC, 635 people in total cannot participate in the elections, based on a court decision, being under legal guardianship.

²³ The Electoral Code provides for electronic verification of voter data on election day against the centralised register to safeguard against multiple voting.

²⁴ A total of 16,145 requests has been sent for in-person voting at the PEBs abroad, and 2,606 for postal voting.

officially registered parties, 39 were considered as either fully eligible to compete or pending approval.²⁵ During the candidate nomination and registration period the list of eligible parties was reduced to 33 parties.²⁶

The recent amendments through Law 100/2025 introduced the concept of ‘successor parties’.²⁷ Based on this, the registration of the Victory Bloc was rejected by the CEC and the activities of the four parties forming it were temporarily limited by CCA decision dated 19 August, which was subsequently appealed. The decision followed a motion filed by the Ministry of Justice to dissolve the parties as alleged successors to the unconstitutional Șor Party. The SCJ rejected the parties’ appeal against this temporary restriction and the limitation remains in place until a final decision by the CCA. The eligibility of the Modern Democratic Party of Moldova was revoked by the PSA based on information provided by other state bodies. On this basis, the CEC did not register them.

Candidate nomination ran from 20 June to 19 August.²⁸ Independent candidates had to collect signatures from voters to support their nomination.²⁹ They cannot be members of any political party and should not have been within the 70 days prior to election day. In addition, they should not have publicly supported any party within the 70 days prior to election day.

By 19 August, the CEC received applications from 5 electoral blocs, 23 political parties and 20 independent candidates (only 7 returned their signature sheets), of which the CEC registered 4 blocs, 15 parties and 4 independent candidates.³⁰ Women make up 45 percent of all registered candidates; only 2 of the 17 political entities contesting are led by a woman. Delays in adjudicating certain cases related to candidate registration have had a knock-on effect, delaying certain processes, such as ballot design.

VIII. CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT

The campaign officially began on 29 August and will conclude at midnight on 26 September. Campaign activities may only be conducted by those officially registered to stand. The latest amendments to the Electoral Code regulate the pre-campaign period, with no direct calls to vote for a specific candidate, party or bloc allowed before the campaign starts.

²⁵ The PSA found 25 parties fully eligible, while participation of 14 parties was still subject to PSA’s clearance at the beginning of the electoral period.

²⁶ Alliance of MOLDOVANS, National Alternative Movement (MAN), Common Action Party – Civic Congress (PAC – Congresul Civic), Party for Development and Consolidation of Moldova (PDCM), Great Moldova (Moldova Mare), Republican Party "Heart of Moldova" („Inima Moldovei”), European Social Democratic Party (PSDE), National Moldovan Party (PNM), Our Party (Partidul Nostru), Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), National Reunification Party "Home" (PRN „Acasă”), Republican Party of Moldova (PRM), ‘We’ Party (Noi), National Liberal Party (PNL), Democracy at Home (Democrația Acasă), League of Cities and Communes (LOC), Christian-Social Union of Moldova (UCSM), Centrist Union of Moldova (UCM), People's Party of the Republic of Moldova (PPRM), Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), For People, Nature and Animals (PONA), Party for the Future of Moldova (PVM), Respect Movement Moldova (MRM), Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM), Liberal Party (LP), Coalition for Unity and Welfare (CUB), Movement of Professionals " Speranța Надежда", Ecologist Green Party (PVE), New Historical Option (NOI), "Dignity and Truth Platform" (PDA), Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), "Party of Change" (PS).

²⁷ The determination of the status of a successor political party of a political party declared unconstitutional shall be made by the court, taking into account the connections and substantial similarities between the respective political parties, if it is proven, through evidence, that the political party that was created and is to be registered or the registered political party aims to continue or resume the activity of a political party declared unconstitutional.

²⁸ Bloc nominations started on 20 June, while political parties could nominate lists from 20 July.

²⁹ Male candidates had to submit a minimum 2,000 and a maximum 2,500 signature while for female candidates, this number was 1,000 and 2,500, respectively.

³⁰ Three independent candidates were rejected due to an insufficient number of signatures. Political parties *Renăștere*, Centrist Union of Moldova, ‘For People, Nature and Animals’, *Moldova Mare*, “We” Party, New Historical Option, Modern Democratic Party of Moldova (PDMM), Professional Movement “*Speranța Надежда*” were rejected on the grounds of non-conformities with registration regulations, which resulted in a removal of some candidates from the list affecting the gender quota. New Historical Option was added on 4 September on the basis of the CEC’s reconsideration following a CCA decision.

To organise outdoor events of over 50 people, contestants must notify local authorities five days in advance. Launching infrastructure projects is prohibited and contestants holding high-level public positions must suspend their official activities for the duration of the campaign. Any misuse of state resources is prohibited. Vote-buying is not allowed, and this includes promising or providing voters with monetary or other benefits in exchange for their votes; this can lead to criminal charges.

Following widespread allegations of paid protests and vote buying by organisations affiliated with Ilan Șor,³¹ a series of high-profile investigations and raids were conducted in several regions between 2 to 8 September by the police (including the National Investigation Inspectorate and Fluger special forces), the Prosecutor's Office for Combating Organised Crime and Special Cases, the National Anti-Corruption Centre, and the State Tax Service, resulting in the detention of 21 individuals and the seizure of hard currencies, bank cards, vehicles, equipment, and documentation.³²

On 5 September, with the stated aim to ensure national security, Prime Minister Dorin Recean announced that the financial resources of Irina Vlah, leader of the Heart of Moldova Party, part of the Patriotic Bloc, will be frozen by decision of the Inter-institutional Supervisory Council, based on international sanctions for her role in the Russian Federation's interference in Moldova's elections. Since the beginning of the electoral period, there has been a concerted effort on the part of the authorities to inform the public about new measures in place against electoral corruption and followed up with media interviews concerning disinformation and online security.³³

Thus far, the campaign has involved online advertising and social media posts as well as traditional activities such as rallies, voter meetings, and door-to-door outreach. Messaging has focused on geopolitical alignment, along with economic welfare and development issues. The PAS campaigns on its governance record and on advancing EU integration. Opposition candidates have focused on development, traditional values, and criticism of the current government. Some parties expressed scepticism about the goal of EU membership in favour of closer ties with the Russian Federation. The diaspora vote has also been an issue of contention amongst political contestants.

The CEC invited contestants and media outlets to sign a voluntary Code of Conduct, committing them to adhere to the legal framework and good practice; 13 contestants and 6 media have signed to date.³⁴

Widespread disinformation has been a key feature of the campaign thus far, with the president and other heads of institutions making public statements on multiple and repeated false narratives being spread on the internet, often using AI generated videos by accounts that appear to be coordinated inauthentically. The Center for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation (StratCom) was placed under the authority of the presidency on 12 August, formally bringing it under the Supreme Security Council. StratCom has informed ODIHR EOM that de-bunking, pre-bunking and longer-term training of civil servants and teachers has been prioritized in a 'whole of society' approach, delegated to individual ministries and agencies.

³¹ This is in the context of Ilan Șor's public announcement promising to pay USD 3,000 per person for participation in protests (see the [statement](#) of Ilan Șor from 11 August on Telegram). The ODIHR EOM has also learned of widespread allegations of voter bribery through schemes involving cryptocurrency and electronic cards linked to accounts opened at Promsvyazbank (PSB) for more than one hundred thousand Moldovan citizens.

³² This is according to a [press release](#) of the National Anti-Corruption Centre (CNA) from 8 September and [statements](#) from the General Inspectorate of Police

³³ See police media release of [3 September](#).

³⁴ Together Bloc, National Unity Bloc, Alternative Bloc, Coalition for Unity and Prosperity, PAS, League of Cities and Communities, Patriotic Bloc, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, Christian-Social Union of Moldova, European Social Democratic Party, Moldovans Alliance, Olesea Stamate, Victoria Sanduta, 7TV, Cinema 1, Radio Poli Disk, Aquarelle FM, Realitatea Press Group, Radio Plai.

Social networking platforms are widely used in Moldova and by the diaspora.³⁵ The operations of these platforms are based outside of the country, and they have been sporadically responsive to problems identified by the authorities. No state institution has clearly defined regulatory powers over the platforms and different state bodies including the national police, SIS, StratCom, the CEC and the Audio-Visual Council (AVC) act as focal points for different platforms. Following notifications from state authorities and internal reviews, platforms have taken limited measures to restrict some content that breaches their community standards against using coordinated inauthentic behaviour and disinformation.³⁶ An informal mechanism for selected CSOs to notify platforms of possible breaches of standards for the electoral campaign was recently introduced, but the results are yet to be seen.³⁷

The mission has been conducting a qualitative assessment of the online campaign through the social media posts of competing parties and candidates since 26 August.³⁸

IX. CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Campaign finance rules provide for a mixed system that allows for both public and private financing. Public funding consists of monetary subsidies. New amendments in laws 130/2025 and 100/2025 strengthen political and campaign financing rules by expanding eligible donor categories and introducing stricter limits. Electoral competitors must prepay for all goods and services. A new sanction allows the CEC to suspend public funding for 6 months to 4 years based on electoral violations. While third-party financing is prohibited in the law, a detailed regulation is lacking.

Public funding consists of monetary subsidies, which only political parties are entitled to.³⁹ Annually, 0.1 percent of the state budget revenue is allocated to the funding of political parties,⁴⁰ and distributed according to previous election results and the number of elected women and youth.⁴¹ Parties, contesting individually or as part of a bloc, may use up to 70 percent of their state subvention for campaigning.

Private funding for campaigning consists primarily of donations, which may be either monetary or in-kind; the latter must be reported at average market values.⁴² Different limits on donations apply to different types of donors. Individuals can donate a maximum of 6 average monthly salaries not exceeding

³⁵ According to [public surveys](#), the most used platforms are Facebook, Instagram and TikTok. YouTube and the messaging app Telegram are also widely used for political communication.

³⁶ The most recent data from [TikTok](#) reveals that in June 2025 it removed a total of 314 inauthentic accounts with collectively 108,823 followers operated from the Russian Federation using location obfuscation services. According to TikTok, these accounts sought to undermine the government of Moldova and promote figures sympathetic to Russian policy objectives. On 13 August, the Police [announced](#) that they had contacted TikTok about disinformation accounts with a total of 1.2 million followers; according to the police, fewer than half were removed. TikTok established an [election centre](#) on 21 August. [Meta](#) removed a network of accounts in advance of the 2024 presidential election but has not reported on its threat detection for Moldova since.

³⁷ In addition to media outlets, several NGOs are working on identifying disinformation narratives, reporting influence operations and coordinated inauthentic behaviour. These include [StopFals!](#), run by the Association of Independent Press, [Rise](#), [Watchdog](#), [Mediacritica](#) and the Romanian NGOs [Expert Forum](#) and [Context](#).

³⁸ The social media posts of 30 key parties, blocs and candidates are being monitored systematically, as well as observing the posts of an additional 36 key state institutions, political figures, influencers and CSOs.

³⁹ Other types of state funding include interest-free loans and free airtime on broadcast media to contestants.

⁴⁰ For 2025, EUR 3,195,466 has been allocated as of January 2025 for the subvention of political parties.

⁴¹ The [Law on Political Parties No. 294/2007](#) and [CEC Decision 1102/2023](#) establish the following formula for the distribution among political parties: 30 percent in proportion to the performance obtained in parliamentary elections, 30 percent in local elections, and 15 percent in presidential elections; 7.5 percent in proportion to the women elected in parliamentary elections and 7.5 percent in local elections; 5 percent in proportion to the young people (under 35) elected in parliamentary elections, and 5 percent in local elections. [CEC Decision 3346/2025](#) sets the following allocations for 2025: PAS (EUR 1,497,853); PSRM (EUR 654,885); PCRM (EUR 156,207); PN (EUR 155,775); PSDE (EUR 129,890); MAN (EUR 89,261); PDCM (EUR 87,392); PPDA (EUR 74,035). Other political parties receive less than 2 percent of the total amount.

⁴² In addition, in accordance with Arts. 24-25 LPP, political parties may also collect membership fees and obtain other income by carrying out editorial activity, administering their property or carrying out “other activities that generate income”, if not prohibited by law and expressly provided for in their statutes.

30 percent of their annual income, with that percentage reduced to 10 percent in the case of public officials and civil servants. Stricter limits apply to individuals whose only income is scholarships or social benefits, who may donate a maximum of 1 average monthly salary, with a recent amendment to the law limiting this further to not exceed 30 per cent the amount received from these sources. Legal entities may donate a maximum of 12 average monthly salaries, with the amendments also limiting this further to not exceed 30 percent of the entities' annual income.⁴³ The law provides for a number of explicit funding prohibitions, including from public, foreign and anonymous sources.⁴⁴

Campaign expenditure is limited to 0.1 percent of the state budget revenues (EUR 3,912,764 as of July 2025) for each electoral competitor. All campaign-related transactions must be made to and from bank accounts specifically opened for this purpose with the mention of "electoral fund". Some ODIHR EOM interlocutors have opined that the expenditure limits may be excessive.

All competitors must submit weekly financial reports to the CEC during the electoral campaign as well as a final report no later than three days after election day.⁴⁵ The reporting requirements include the obligation to submit specific extracts on payments for sponsored electoral advertising on digital resources and online platforms. These reports have to be published by the CEC within 24 hours. Other actors, such as banks, also have reporting obligations and must submit daily reports during the campaign. Media and advertising companies must submit weekly reports on income from political advertising. So far all contestants who are required to file weekly financial reports have done so and they have all been published on the CEC website.

Oversight is exercised by the CEC, which conducts controls, including planned or extraordinary audits. Acting upon complaints or *ex officio*, it may impose a range of sanctions, varying from warnings to suspensions of state funding, to the possible cancellation of electoral registration, or requesting the PSA to remove a political party.⁴⁶ The CEC is obligated to publish reports on the results of campaign finance oversight within three days from the date of completion of control operations. Any conclusions reached and sanctions applied may be appealed.

X. MEDIA

While diverse and pluralistic, the media environment is constrained by a limited and shrinking advertising market, which causes dependence on owner or corporate interests and donor funding.⁴⁷ Broadcast media are legally required to disclose the ultimate beneficial owners. However, the ownership of print and online media outlets remains opaque. Many ODIHR EOM interlocutors reported increasing

⁴³ Maximum donations are set at EUR 5,000 for individuals and EUR 10,000 for legal entities.

⁴⁴ The Electoral Code (Art. 54.5) prohibits donations from the following entities: minors; foreign citizens; anonymous entities; legal entities with public procurement contracts, beneficiaries of state aid; non-commercial organizations, trade unions, associations, foundations, charities and religious organizations; public authorities, incl. state-owned enterprises; foreign legal entities; foreign states and international organizations, including international political organizations. An innovation of the new amendments is that legal entities with pending public debts are also prohibited from donating. Unlawful donations shall be transferred to the state budget.

⁴⁵ This is in addition to the monthly, semi-annual and annual financial reports that the political parties that receive monetary subsidies have to submit to the CEC and the Court of Accounts, in accordance with the [Law on Political Parties No. 294/2007](#) (Art. 27.1).

⁴⁶ The Electoral Code (Art. 102) allows the CEC to apply warnings, deprive contestants of free and/or paid airtime, limit state budget allocations, and issue other fines in accordance with the Contravention Code (Art. 48.1-6,48.2,48.3,51,51.1,53). The CEC may also cancel contestants' registration if they engaged in vote-buying, use foreign funds, exceed spending limits, participate in an electoral camouflage bloc or fail to declare causes for ineligibility, among other things. Finally, it may also request the PSA for an *ex officio* removal of political parties for failing to submit annual financial reports for two consecutive years.

⁴⁷ The market [research](#) on broadcast media, conducted by the Audiovisual Council (AVC), found a 9.5 percent decrease in broadcasters' advertising revenue in 2024 compared to 2023.

instances of intimidation and harassment of journalists, both in person and online, mainly originating from non-state actors, while also pointing to gaps in legal protection and institutional follow-up.⁴⁸

Social networks are perceived as the primary source of information, followed closely by television and, to a lesser extent, online news portals.⁴⁹ The media market underwent a significant changes since 2022-2023, when under State of Emergency provisions, 12 television stations were suspended on security and disinformation grounds.⁵⁰ Shortly before the end of the State of Emergency, to protect the information space, the Council for the Promotion of Investment Projects of National Importance (CPIPNI) was given the authority to suspend licenses without prior judicial oversight. This authority was most recently exercised in March, 2025 and was criticized by civil society as interference with the right to freedom of expression.⁵¹

Although the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and prohibits censorship, the Law on Countering Extremist Activity contains provisions that allow suspension and permanent closure of a media outlet for vaguely defined “extremist activity”. More than 100 websites, mainly Russian news portals many of which were reproducing the content of suspended tv stations, are currently blocked and the Intelligence and Security Service (SIS) has the authority to take these decisions without prior judicial oversight based on security and disinformation grounds.⁵²

Recent amendments to the Audiovisual Code, which entered into force on 21 August, addressed several ODIHR recommendations increasing civil society representation and decreasing parliamentary control over appointments and dismissals of the management of the national public TeleRadio-Moldova (TRM) and media regulator Audiovisual Council (AVC). They also removed one-term limits for members of the AVC and TRM supervisory council.

The Electoral Code, supplemented by the 2023 CEC Regulations, provides a detailed regulatory framework for the broadcast media, while print and online outlets are subject only to general requirements to ensure fair, balanced, and impartial coverage of the contestants.⁵³ All national broadcasters interested in covering the campaign are to submit an election editorial policy declaration to the AVC, committing to offer free airtime to each contestant (5 minutes on television, 10 minutes on radio), and to limit paid campaign advertisements to 2 minutes per contestant per day.⁵⁴ By the start of

⁴⁸ The Association of Independent Press (API) noted an increase in the number of attacks against journalists, from 43 in [2023](#) to 66 in [2024](#); and to 91 in the first eight months of 2025.

⁴⁹ The 2025 [Media Audience Study](#) by the Independent Journalism Center found that 80 percent of respondents use social media, 77 percent use television and 61 percent use online portals as sources of information.

⁵⁰ The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media [raised](#) the issue of the administrative mechanism used under the state of emergency, which bypassed regulatory oversight and prior judicial review, to suspend the licenses of 12 television stations, allegedly affiliated with Vladimir Plahotniuc and Ilan Shor, which also retransmitted content from Russian television channels.

⁵¹ On 27 March, 2025, the CPIPNI suspended the broadcasting license of TVC21 for 60 days due to incomplete documentation and insufficient transparency regarding its ownership structure. When issuing earlier suspension orders the CPIPNI cited insufficient ownership transparency and alleged affiliations with Vladimir Plahotniuc and Ilan Shor that threatened national security. In 2024, CPIPNI also suspended the licenses of TV Canal 5 and Radio Maestro FM on similar grounds.

⁵² During the State of Emergency, the SIS was authorized to block websites without prior judicial oversight on the grounds of combating disinformation, fake news, hate speech, and other content deemed a threat to national security and public order. In 2024, Parliament gave SIS the authority to block websites beyond the State of Emergency (Law No. 200/2024 on Preventing and Combating Cybercrime). Furthermore, the 2022 Audiovisual Media Services Code amendments prohibited retransmission of “news, information and analysis, military and political content” produced in states other than the EU, the US, Canada, and states that ratified the European Convention on Transfrontier Television.

⁵³ Art. 89.2 of the Electoral Code and Art. 4 of the CEC Regulation 1137 obliges all media to ensure ensure fair, balanced, and impartial coverage of the contestants, while Art. 5 of the same regulation establishes definitions of *fair, balanced and impartial* principles.

⁵⁴ Public broadcasters are also required to provide to each contestant one minute per day upon request.

the campaign, the AVC had approved the declarations of 22 television and 12 radio stations.⁵⁵ Furthermore, 21 television and 8 radio stations announced their intention to hold political debates. During the campaign, the AVC, with the support of a local CSO, monitors broadcasters' compliance with the electoral framework and publishes weekly reports.⁵⁶ With the official start of the campaign on 29 August, the ODIHR EOM commenced quantitative and qualitative monitoring of seven television channels and a qualitative assessment of four online news outlets.⁵⁷

XI. ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Voters and contestants have the right to challenge the actions, inactions and decisions of election bodies and other contestants. Observers and members of the election administration can file complaints related to violations of their rights. Appeals against decisions of election bodies can be lodged with the higher-level election body. For these elections, complaints related to candidate registration, violation of campaign rules and of the rules governing the financing of the political parties and the electoral campaigns must be filed with the CEC. In line with new legal amendments, the inadmissibility of a complaint is no longer decided by a plenary of the CEC but is notified through an act of the CEC chairperson; judicial appeal is possible.

The Chişinău Court of Appeals (CCA) is competent for complaints against all decisions of the CEC and of the AVC (related to election coverage). Further appeals can be filed with the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ), as a last instance of appeal.⁵⁸ The deadline for submitting complaints and appeals is three days, and decisions must be taken within three days. All complaints must be decided before election day.

The CC is the only institution competent to decide on the legality and integrity of election results and decides on potential recount requests. Within 10 days from receiving the results from the CEC, the CC confirms the final election results and validates the mandates of the members of the parliament. Decisions of the CC are final and binding. The CC is composed of six members, nominated for a six-year mandate, renewable once. On 17 August, five members whose mandates were expiring took an oath before the parliament, following their re-appointment by the relevant authorities.⁵⁹ Patriotic Bloc lead candidate, Igor Dodon, announced plans to hold protests on the day after the elections to contest the results, regardless of the outcome of the elections.

Since the start of the electoral period on 14 July and as of 10 September, the CEC received 62 complaints and notifications related mainly to the registration of candidates, alleged violation of campaign rules, misuse of administrative resources or electoral corruption.⁶⁰ Only one of the complaints decided so far was accepted while the others were rejected as ungrounded, and several were referred to the police for

⁵⁵ Initially the AVC [rejected](#) the editorial policy declarations of 21 broadcasters, however all except the Cimişlia-based *Radio Media* managed to remedy their documentation issues during the three-day resubmission period.

⁵⁶ The API [announced](#) it would support the AVC by monitoring 10 television stations during the electoral campaign, drafting monitoring reports and supporting the application of sanctions in case of violations.

⁵⁷ The monitoring of the broadcast media focused on the prime-time (18:00-00:00) coverage of the main channel of the national public broadcaster M1, the Gagauzian public broadcaster GRT (Romanian and Russian-language content), and private televisions *Cinema 1*, *Jurnal*, *ProTV Chişinău*, TV8 and TVC 21. The EOM also follows news portals *newsmaker.md*, *noi.md*, and *zdg.md*.

⁵⁸ On 10 July 2025, Law No. 192 on the mechanism for adjudicating corruption and corruption-related cases was adopted, following also the [Opinion](#) of the Venice Commission, which provides for the establishment of specialized Anti-Corruption Colleges within the Chişinău First District Court and, as an appellate instance, at the CCA. The specialized colleges will be competent for cases involving high-level officials, a certain amount of damages, electoral corruption, illegal financing, or those concerning national security. The colleges are not yet established but the nomination of judges by the Supreme Council of Magistracy is ongoing.

⁵⁹ Two were nominated by the parliament, two by the government, and one by the Superior Council of Magistracy (SCM). A new Law on the CC was adopted in April 2025. The sixth judge of the CC was appointed in 2023 by the SCM and her mandate will expire in 2029.

⁶⁰ The CEC tracks complaints, notifications and court cases in an [online registry](#), updated every few days.

further investigation.⁶¹ Fourteen CEC decisions related to the refusal of the registration of certain electoral contestants were challenged at the CCA. While 10 cases were rejected by the CCA, in four cases, the CCA accepted the appeal of the parties and ordered the CEC to review their registration. However, two of these decisions were reversed by the SCJ, while two were maintained.⁶² In seven other cases appealed to the SCJ, the court maintained the CCA decision, while some are still pending. Four appeals challenged the CEC's decision on the number of polling stations abroad and for voters in Transnistria, and one was filed against sanctions imposed on an independent candidate for campaign financing irregularities and signature collection. All were rejected by the CCA but upheld by the SCJ.

XII. CITIZEN AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS

The legal framework provides for observation of the electoral process by citizen and international observers, as well as representatives of contestants. Observers may be accredited to observe the election both in-country and abroad. As of 10 September, the CEC accredited 1,630 citizen and 145 international observers. Promo-LEX with 1007 observers and the Union of Lawyers with 585 are the largest citizen observer groups. Both have deployed long-term observers throughout the country and published several interim reports since the start of the electoral period.

According to a new CEC regulation, in order to be accredited, the citizen and international observer organisations should submit information on their technical and human capacity, experience in election observation, and funding sources, amongst other things. According to the CEC, this has been done with the intention of verifying credentials and preventing non-genuine observers. Some interlocutors expressed concern that the new requirements are onerous and vague and may be open to interpretation. On 24 August, a Promo-LEX observer in Orhei was harassed at an event by a politician from the unregistered Victory Bloc.

XIII. ODIHR EOM ACTIVITIES

The ODIHR EOM commenced its work on 13 August. The ODIHR EOM met with the Presidency, the Parliament, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Internal Affairs, and Economic Development and Digitalization, the CEC, the judiciary, the General Prosecutor, the PSA, the AVC, the National Anti-Corruption Center, the Center for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation, political parties and blocs, independent candidates, media, civil society organizations, and representatives of OSCE participating States. It has established working relations with relevant stakeholders involved in the election process. Long-term observers have met stakeholders at the local level since their deployment on 22 August.

***The English version of this report is the only official document.
An unofficial translation is available in Romanian.***

⁶¹ Following a complaint from PAS, CEC issued a warning to MAN candidate Ion Ceban for misuse of administrative resources.

⁶² On appeal by the CEC, the SCJ reversed the CCA decisions concerning the political parties Centrist Union of Moldova and Liberal Democratic Party thus maintaining the CEC decisions excluding them from the race. While in the case of the political party New Historical Option, the CEC appeal was rejected, and the CEC was requested to register the party. The fourth case is related to the political party *Moldova Mare*. The CCA upheld the appeal filed by the party against the CEC's decision to reject its registration. The CEC challenged this ruling, and on 30 September, the [SCJ accepted the appeal](#), overturning the CCA's decision and upholding the party's exclusion. Following this, *Moldova Mare* submitted a request for revision, primarily citing concerns over the impartiality of one of the SCJ panel judges. On 4 September, a newly constituted panel of the [SCJ reviewed](#) the case, accepted the revision request, overturned both the initial SCJ ruling and the CCA decision, and ordered the CEC to register the party.