



Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

LISBON SUMMIT

1996

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I.

LISBON DOCUMENT 1996

LISBON SUMMIT DECLARATION

1. We, the Heads of State or Government of the participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, have met in Lisbon to assess the situation in the OSCE region and to establish a co-operative foundation for our common security. As we approach the new century, it is more important than ever that we build together a peaceful OSCE region where all our nations and individuals feel secure.

2. We today adopt the Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the twenty-first century to strengthen security and stability throughout the OSCE region. We welcome the historic decision of OSCE participating States signatory to the CFE Treaty to begin negotiations in early 1997 with a view towards adapting the Treaty to the changing security environment in Europe. We intend to realize our full potential for consolidating peace and prosperity in the entire OSCE region, as demonstrated by our combined efforts - through the OSCE and other relevant institutions - to forge a sustainable peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3. We reaffirm the OSCE principles as set forth in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE commitments. We believe that observance of all these principles and implementation of all commitments need to be improved and constantly reviewed. We recognize that serious risks and challenges, such as those to our security and sovereignty, continue to be of major concern. We are committed to address them.

4. Respect for human rights remains fundamental to our concept of democracy and to the democratization process enshrined in the Charter of Paris. We are determined to consolidate the democratic gains of the changes that have occurred since 1989 and peacefully manage their further development in the OSCE region. We will co-operate in strengthening democratic institutions.

5. The OSCE has a key role to play in fostering security and stability in all their dimensions. We decide to continue our efforts to further enhance its efficiency as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation capabilities. We ask the Chairman-in-Office to report on progress achieved to the 1997 Ministerial Council.

6. The Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the twenty-first century is a comprehensive expression of our endeavour to strengthen security and stability in the OSCE region; as such, it complements the mutually reinforcing efforts of other European and transatlantic institutions and organizations in this field.

7. Arms control constitutes an important element of our common security. The CFE Treaty, in particular, is and will remain key to our security and stability. The Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), the work of which is also important to our security, has adopted two decisions defining new directions for further work, "A Framework for Arms Control" and "Development of the Agenda of the Forum for Security Co-operation". As an example of co-operative security, the Open Skies Treaty, covering the territory from Vancouver to Vladivostok, aims at increased transparency among all Parties. Recalling the Budapest Decision of 1994, we once again strongly emphasize the significance of the entry into force and implementation of this Treaty. In addition, ending illegal arms supplies, in particular to zones of conflict, would make a major contribution to not only regional, but also global security.

8. We welcome the fulfilment by Kazakstan, Ukraine and Belarus of their commitment to remove from their territory all nuclear warheads. This is an historic contribution to reducing the nuclear threat and to the creation of a common security space in Europe.

9. The OSCE's comprehensive approach to security requires improvement in the implementation of all commitments in the human dimension, in particular with respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms. This will further anchor the common values of a free and democratic society in all participating States, which is an essential foundation for our common security. Among the acute problems within the human dimension, the continuing violations of human rights, such as involuntary migration, and the lack of full democratization, threats to independent media, electoral fraud, manifestations of aggressive nationalism, racism, chauvinism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism, continue to endanger stability in the OSCE region. We are committed to continuing to address these problems.

10. Against the background of recent refugee tragedies in the OSCE region and taking into account the issue of forced migration, we again condemn and pledge to refrain from any policy of 'ethnic cleansing' or mass expulsion. Our States will facilitate the return, in safety and in dignity, of refugees and internally displaced persons, according to international standards. Their reintegration into their places of origin must be pursued without discrimination. We commend the work of the ODIHR Migration Advisor and express support for his continuing activities to follow up on the Programme of Action agreed at the May 1996 Regional Conference to address the problems of refugees, displaced persons, other forms of involuntary displacement and returnees in the relevant States.

11. Freedom of the press and media are among the basic prerequisites for truly democratic and civil societies. In the Helsinki Final Act, we have pledged ourselves to respect this principle. There is a need to strengthen the implementation of OSCE commitments in the field of the media, taking into account, as appropriate, the work of other international organizations. We therefore task the Permanent Council to consider ways to increase the focus on implementation of OSCE commitments in the field of the media, as well as to elaborate a mandate for the appointment of an OSCE representative on freedom of the media to be submitted not later than to the 1997 Ministerial Council.

12. The same comprehensive approach to security requires continued efforts in the implementation of OSCE commitments in the economic dimension and an adequate development of OSCE activities dealing with security-related economic, social and environmental issues. The OSCE should focus on identifying the risks to security arising from economic, social and environmental problems, discussing their causes and potential consequences, and draw the attention of relevant international institutions to the need to take appropriate measures to alleviate the difficulties stemming from those risks. With this aim, the OSCE should further enhance its ties to mutually-reinforcing international economic and financial institutions, including regular consultations at appropriate levels aimed at improving the ability to identify and assess at an early stage the security relevance of economic, social and environmental developments. Interaction with regional, subregional and transborder co-operative initiatives in the economic and environmental field should be enhanced, as they contribute to the promotion of good-neighbourly relations and security. We therefore task the Permanent Council to review the role of the OSCE Secretariat in the economic dimension, and to elaborate a mandate for a co-ordinator within the OSCE Secretariat on OSCE economic and environmental activities, to be submitted not later than the 1997 Ministerial Council.

13. We pay tribute to the achievements of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in helping to implement the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Pragmatic co-operation with international institutions and IFOR, as well as the role of the High Representative, have contributed greatly to this success, thus demonstrating in a tangible way the kinds of co-operative undertakings on which security can be built through the action of mutually reinforcing institutions.

14. We welcome the agreement by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the establishment of the Council of Ministers, which represents an important step in forming fully effective joint institutions. Reaffirming the need for the full implementation of the Peace Agreement, we welcome the guiding principles agreed at the Meeting of the Ministerial Steering Board and the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Paris on 14 November 1996, and the OSCE decision to extend its Mission's mandate to Bosnia and Herzegovina for 1997, noting its possible prolongation in the framework of the two-year consolidation period. We pledge ourselves to provide all necessary resources, financial and personnel, for the Mission to fulfil its mandate.

15. The OSCE will continue to play an important role in the promotion and consolidation of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina based on OSCE principles and commitments. We confirm that we will supervise the preparation and conduct of elections for the municipal governing authorities in 1997, and welcome the agreement of the Parties to Annex 3 of the Peace Agreement in this regard. We will fully support the Mission's work and its contribution to implementation of the election results. We will assist in democracy building through concrete programmes and be active in human rights promotion and monitoring. We will continue assisting in the implementation of subregional stabilization measures among the Parties to the Peace Agreement.

16. Recalling that the prime responsibility for implementing the Peace Agreement lies with the Parties themselves, we call upon them to co-operate in good faith with the OSCE and other institutions in implementing the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement. The role of the High Representative will remain of particular importance in this context. We call upon the Parties to co-operate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

17. The Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Sub-Regional Arms Control Agreement will continue to play an important role in promoting and consolidating military stability in and around Bosnia and Herzegovina. Favourable conditions for full implementation of these Agreements should be fostered. Failure to meet the commitments under these Agreements remains, however, a serious concern. We support the November 1996 reaffirmation in Paris by the Ministerial Steering Board and the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the necessity for full implementation and strict avoidance of circumvention of both Agreements. We call upon the Parties to fulfil their commitments through co-operation in good faith. With respect to regional arms control, and depending on satisfactory progress on the implementation of Articles II and IV, efforts undertaken to promote the implementation of Article V of Annex 1-B of the Peace Agreement will continue.

18. The implementation of the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina has opened the way for efforts at the regional and subregional levels aimed at the achievement of durable peace, stability and good neighbourliness in Southeastern Europe. We welcome the development of various initiatives fostering subregional dialogue and co-operation, such as the Stability Process initiated at Royaumont, the Southeastern European Co-operation Initiative, the Central European Initiative and the comprehensive process of stability, security and co-operation reactivated by the Sofia Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries of Southeastern Europe.

The OSCE could contribute to using fully the potential of the various regional co-operative efforts in a mutually supportive and reinforcing way.

19. We welcome the OSCE's continuing focus on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We express our expectation that the OSCE Mission of Long Duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina will be able to resume its work as soon as possible. In fulfilling its mandate, such a Mission should actively contribute, among other things, to following developments and fostering dialogue with a view to overcoming the existing difficulties. Other forms of OSCE involvement would also be desirable. They should include efforts to accelerate democratization, promote independent media and ensure free and fair elections. Recalling our previous declarations, we call for the development of a substantial dialogue between the Federal Authorities and the Albanian representatives of Kosovo in order to solve all pending problems there.

20. We reaffirm our utmost support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders. We condemn the 'ethnic cleansing' resulting in mass destruction and forcible expulsion of predominantly Georgian population in Abkhazia. Destructive acts of separatists, including obstruction of the return of refugees and displaced persons and the decision to hold elections in Abkhazia and in the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, undermine the positive efforts undertaken to promote political settlement of these conflicts. We are convinced that the international community, in particular the United Nations and the OSCE with participation of the Russian Federation as a facilitator, should continue to contribute actively to the search for a peaceful settlement.

21. We note that some progress has been made towards a political settlement in Moldova. Real political will is needed now to overcome the remaining difficulties in order to achieve a solution based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova. We call on all sides to increase their efforts to that end. Recalling the Budapest Summit Decision, we reiterate our concern over the lack of progress in bringing into force and implementing the Moldo-Russian Agreement of 21 October 1994 on the withdrawal of Russian troops. We expect an early, orderly and complete withdrawal of the Russian troops. In fulfilment of the mandate of the Mission and other relevant OSCE decisions, we confirm the commitment of the OSCE, including through its Mission, to follow closely the implementation of this process, as well as to assist in achieving a settlement in the eastern part of Moldova, in close co-operation with the Russian and Ukrainian mediators. The Chairman-in-Office will report on progress achieved to the next meeting of the Ministerial Council.

22. We welcome the recent steps towards a peaceful settlement in Chechnya, Russian Federation. We recognize the valuable role played by the OSCE Assistance Group in facilitating dialogue towards political resolution of the crisis. We believe that the Assistance Group should continue to play its role in the future, in particular with a view towards a lasting peaceful settlement, monitoring human rights and supporting humanitarian organizations.

23. We emphasize the importance of the Central Asian States in the OSCE. We are committed to increasing OSCE efforts aimed at developing democratic structures and the rule of law, maintaining stability and preventing conflicts in this area.

24. We are committed to further developing the dialogue with our Mediterranean partners for co-operation, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. In this context, strengthening security and co-operation in the Mediterranean is important for stability in the OSCE region. We welcome the continued interest displayed by the Mediterranean partners for co-operation, Japan, and the Republic of Korea in the OSCE, and the deepening of dialogue and co-operation with them. We invite them to participate in our activities, including meetings

as appropriate.

25. The next Ministerial Council will take place in Copenhagen in December 1997.
26. We take note of the invitation by Turkey to host the next OSCE Summit in Istanbul.
27. Poland will exercise the function of Chairman-in-Office in 1998.

**LISBON DECLARATION ON
A COMMON AND COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY MODEL FOR EUROPE
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**

1. We, the Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the OSCE and meeting in Lisbon, believe that history has offered us an unprecedented opportunity. Freedom, democracy and co-operation among our nations and peoples are now the foundation for our common security. We are determined to learn from the tragedies of the past and to translate our vision of a co-operative future into reality by creating a common security space free of dividing lines in which all States are equal partners.
2. We face serious challenges, but we face them together. They concern the security and sovereignty of States as well as the stability of our societies. Human rights are not fully respected in all OSCE States. Ethnic tension, aggressive nationalism, violations of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, as well as serious difficulties of economic transition, can threaten stability and may also spread to other States. Terrorism, organized crime, drug and arms trafficking, uncontrolled migration and environmental damage are of increasing concern to the entire OSCE community.
3. Drawing strength from our diversity, we shall meet these challenges together, through the OSCE and in partnership with other international organizations. Our approach is one of co-operative security based on democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, market economy and social justice. It excludes any quest for domination. It implies mutual confidence and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
4. The OSCE plays a central role in achieving our goal of a common security space. Its fundamental elements - the comprehensiveness and indivisibility of security and the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behaviour - inspire our vision of empowering governments and individuals to build a better and more secure future.
5. We recognize that, within the OSCE, States are accountable to their citizens and responsible to each other for their implementation of OSCE commitments.
6. We jointly commit ourselves:
 - to act in solidarity to promote full implementation of the principles and commitments of the OSCE enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and other CSCE/OSCE documents;
 - to consult promptly - in conformity with our OSCE responsibilities and making full use of the OSCE's procedures and instruments - with a participating State whose security is threatened and to consider jointly actions that may have to be undertaken in defence of our common values;
 - not to support participating States that threaten or use force in violation of international law against the territorial integrity or political independence of any participating State;
 - to attach importance to security concerns of all participating States irrespective of whether they belong to military structures or arrangements.

7. We reaffirm the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve. Each participating State will respect the rights of all others in this regard. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States. Within the OSCE, no State, organization or grouping can have any superior responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE region, or regard any part of the OSCE region as its sphere of influence.

8. We shall ensure that the presence of foreign troops on the territory of a participating State is in conformity with international law, the freely expressed consent of the host State, or a relevant decision of the United Nations Security Council.

9. We are committed to transparency in our actions and in our relations with one another. All our States participating in security arrangements will take into consideration that such arrangements should be of a public nature, predictable and open, and should correspond to the needs of individual and collective security. These arrangements must not infringe upon the sovereign rights of other States and will take into account their legitimate security concerns.

We may use the OSCE as a repository for declarations and agreements in regard to our security arrangements.

10. Based on these foundations, our task now is to enhance our co-operation for the future. To this end:

- We encourage bilateral or regional initiatives aimed at developing relations of good neighbourliness and co-operation. In this context, the OSCE could explore a menu of confidence- and security-building measures in support of regional security processes. We shall continue to follow the implementation of the Pact on Stability in Europe. Regional round tables can be a useful means of preventive diplomacy.
- As an important contribution to security we reaffirm our determination to fully respect and implement all our commitments relating to the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. We reaffirm our will to co-operate fully with the High Commissioner on National Minorities. We are ready to respond to a request by any participating State seeking solutions to minority issues on its territory.
- We value our co-operation with regions adjacent to the OSCE region, giving particular attention to the Mediterranean area.
- We commit ourselves to the continuation of the arms control process as a central security issue in the OSCE region.

The further strengthening of stability through conventional arms control will be decisive for future European security. We reaffirm the importance of the CFE Treaty and welcome the decision of the CFE States Parties to adapt it to a changing security environment in Europe so as to contribute to common and indivisible security.

We welcome the decisions on the “Framework for Arms Control” and on the “Development of the Agenda of the Forum for Security Co-operation” adopted by the Forum for Security Co-operation. We are determined to make further efforts in this Forum in order to jointly address common security concerns of participating States and to pursue the OSCE’s comprehensive and co-operative concept of indivisible security.

In this context, we reaffirm that we shall maintain only such military capabilities as are commensurate with individual or collective legitimate security needs, taking into account rights and obligations under international law. We shall determine our military capabilities on the basis of national democratic procedures, in a transparent manner, bearing in mind the legitimate security concerns of other States as well as the need to contribute to international security and stability.

- We reaffirm that European security requires the widest co-operation and co-ordination among participating States and European and transatlantic organizations. The OSCE is the inclusive and comprehensive organization for consultation, decision-making and co-operation in its region and a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. As such it is particularly well suited as a forum to enhance co-operation and complementarity among such organizations and institutions. The OSCE will act in partnership with them, in order to respond effectively to threats and challenges in its area.

In exceptional circumstances the participating States may jointly decide to refer a matter to the United Nations Security Council on behalf of the OSCE whenever, in their judgement, action by the Security Council may be required under the relevant provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

- The OSCE will strengthen co-operation with other security organizations which are transparent and predictable in their actions, whose members individually and collectively adhere to OSCE principles and commitments, and whose membership is based on open and voluntary commitments.

11. Our work on the Security Model is well under way and will actively continue. We instruct our representatives to work energetically on the Security Model and invite the Chairman-in-Office to report to the next Ministerial Council in Copenhagen. The agenda for their work will include the following:

- continuing review of the observance of OSCE principles and implementation of commitments to ensure progress toward the goals of the OSCE and towards the work outlined in this agenda;
- enhancing instruments of joint co-operative action within the OSCE framework in the event of non-compliance with the OSCE commitments by a participating State;
- defining in a Platform for Co-operative Security modalities for co-operation between the OSCE and other security organizations as set out above;
- based on the experience of OSCE instruments for preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention, refining the existing tools and developing additional ones in order to encourage participating States to make greater use of the OSCE in advancing their security;
- enhancing co-operation among participating States to develop further the concepts and principles included in this Declaration and to improve our ability to meet specific risks and challenges to security;
- recommending any new commitments, structures or arrangements within the OSCE framework which would reinforce security and stability in Europe.

Drawing on this work, remaining committed to the Helsinki Final Act and recalling the Charter of Paris, we will consider developing a Charter on European Security which can serve the needs of our peoples in the new century.

12. Our goal is to transform our search for greater security into a mutual effort to achieve the aspirations and improve the lives of all our citizens. This quest, grounded in pragmatic achievements as well as ideals, will draw on the flexible and dynamic nature of the OSCE and its central role in ensuring security and stability.

II.
ANNEXES

ANNEX 1

STATEMENT OF THE OSCE CHAIRMAN-IN-OFFICE

You all know that no progress has been achieved in the last two years to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the issue of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan. I regret that the efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Conference to reconcile the views of the parties on the principles for a settlement have been unsuccessful.

Three principles which should form part of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were recommended by the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group. These principles are supported by all member States of the Minsk Group. They are:

- territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic;
- legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh defined in an agreement based on self-determination which confers on Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan;
- guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its whole population, including mutual obligations to ensure compliance by all the Parties with the provisions of the settlement.

I regret that one participating State could not accept this. These principles have the support of all other participating States.

This statement will be included in the Lisbon Summit documents.

ANNEX 2

STATEMENT OF THE DELEGATION OF ARMENIA

With regard to the statement by the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, the Delegation of Armenia wishes to express its concern over the following issues:

1. The statement does not reflect either the spirit or the letter of the Minsk Group's mandate as established by the Budapest Summit 1994, which proposed negotiations with a view to reaching a political agreement. The problem of status has been a subject of discussion in direct negotiations which have yet to be concluded.
2. The statement predetermines the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, contradicting the decision of the OSCE Ministerial Council of 1992, which referred this issue to the competence of the OSCE Minsk Conference, to be convened after the conclusion of a political agreement.
3. The Armenian side is convinced that a solution of the problem can be found on the basis of international law and the principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act, above all on the basis of the principle of self-determination.
4. In the interests of reaching a compromise solution, the Armenian side is prepared to continue with the most intensive negotiations, both within the Minsk Group and on the basis of direct contacts co-ordinated by the Co-Chairmen of that Group.

I request that this statement be annexed to the Lisbon Summit Declaration.

III.

A FRAMEWORK FOR ARMS CONTROL

(FSC.DEC/8/96)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Arms control, including disarmament and confidence- and security-building, is integral to the OSCE's comprehensive and co-operative concept of security. The strong commitment of the OSCE participating States to full implementation and further development of arms control agreements is essential for enhancing military and political stability within the OSCE area. The positive trends of co-operation, transparency and predictability need to be strengthened.

2. Building on existing arms control measures, the OSCE will seek to develop new ways to deal with security concerns affecting all States in the OSCE area. Such security concerns include inter- or intra-State tensions and conflicts which might spread to affect the security of other States. The goal should be to develop a concept and structure that will support a range of arms control efforts, including on regional matters. At all times it will be important to ensure complementarity between OSCE-wide and regional approaches. Regional arms control efforts should be based *inter alia* on specific military security issues.

3. In order to provide this conceptual and structural coherence to the OSCE's efforts, the participating States have decided to establish a Framework for Arms Control, designed to create a web of interlocking and mutually reinforcing arms control obligations and commitments. The Framework will link current and future arms control efforts into a comprehensive structure. It will serve as a guide for future arms control negotiations amongst the participating States, and as a basis for the establishment of a flexible agenda for future work on arms control. The Framework will be an important contribution to wider OSCE efforts in the security field, and will complement ongoing work in the OSCE on a security model for the twenty-first century.

4. The basis for such a web already exists. The CFE Treaty establishes a core of military stability and predictability, which is fundamental to the security of all participating States of the OSCE. The Vienna Document has brought about increased transparency and mutual confidence as regards the military forces and military activities of all OSCE participating States. The Code of Conduct has defined important norms for politico-military aspects of security. These existing obligations and commitments lie at the heart of the OSCE's concept of co-operative security.

The Treaty on Open Skies, which should enter into force as soon as possible, can make a major contribution to transparency and openness.

The arms control process under OSCE auspices initiated by the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an important part of the OSCE's efforts to strengthen security and stability.

In addition to continued emphasis on the full implementation and appropriate further development of existing agreements, new negotiations and efforts are needed to complement their contribution in order to provide effective responses to the military challenges to the security of the OSCE participating States.

5. The lessons and achievements of past efforts, as well as the purposes, methods and negotiating principles set out in this document together form the basis for addressing the challenges and risks to military security in the OSCE area. Thus, subsequent negotiations and resulting agreements will be related conceptually to existing agreements within the Framework. The Forum for Security Co-operation has a key role to play in the way in which the OSCE links the many separate endeavours that individually and collectively contribute to the security and well-being of all participating States.

6. The purpose of the Framework is:

- to contribute to the further development of the OSCE area as an indivisible common security space by, *inter alia*, stimulating the elaboration of further arms control measures;
- to provide a basis for strengthening security and stability through tangible steps aimed at enhancing the security partnership among OSCE participating States;
- to enable OSCE participating States to deal with specific security problems in appropriate ways, not in isolation but as part of an overall OSCE undertaking to which all are committed;
- to create a web of interlocking and mutually reinforcing arms control obligations and commitments that will give expression to the principle that security is indivisible for all OSCE participating States;
- to provide structural coherence to the interrelationship between existing and future agreements;
- to provide a basis for the establishment of a flexible agenda for future arms control in the OSCE.

II. CHALLENGES AND RISKS

7. Challenges and risks in the field of military security still exist in the OSCE area and others may arise in the future. The Framework will help to promote co-operative responses to challenges and risks that may be dealt with through arms control measures. In doing so, the following issues, *inter alia*, should be addressed:

- military imbalances that may contribute to instabilities;
- inter-State tensions and conflicts, in particular in border areas, that affect military security;
- internal disputes with the potential to lead to military tensions or conflicts between States;
- enhancing transparency and predictability as regards the military intentions of States;
- helping to ensure democratic political control and guidance of military, paramilitary and security forces by constitutionally established authorities and the rule of law;

- ensuring that the evolution or establishment of multinational military and political organizations is fully compatible with the OSCE's comprehensive and co-operative concept of security, and is also fully consistent with arms control goals and objectives;
- ensuring that no participating State, organization or grouping strengthens its security at the expense of the security of others, or regards any part of the OSCE area as a particular sphere of influence;
- ensuring that the presence of foreign troops on the territory of a participating State is in conformity with international law, the freely expressed consent of the host State, or a relevant decision of the United Nations Security Council;
- ensuring full implementation of arms control agreements at all times, including times of crisis;
- ensuring through a process of regular review undertaken in the spirit of co-operative security, that arms control agreements continue to respond to security needs in the OSCE area;
- ensuring full co-operation, including co-operation in the implementation of existing commitments, in combating terrorism in all its forms and practices.

III. NEGOTIATING PRINCIPLES

8. Interlocking and mutually reinforcing arms control agreements are the logical consequence of the principle of the indivisibility of security. Accordingly, both negotiation of and implementation within the OSCE area of regional or other agreements not binding on all OSCE participating States are a matter of direct interest to all participating States. The OSCE participating States will continue efforts to build confidence and stability through freely negotiated arms control agreements. Arms control regimes will take into account the specific characteristics of the armed forces of individual participating States as well as already agreed commitments and obligations. Drawing on past experience, the OSCE participating States have developed the following principles, to serve as a guide for future negotiations. The applicability of each of these principles will depend on the particular security needs being addressed:

- Sufficiency. Arms control regimes should contain measures designed to ensure that each participating State will maintain only such military capabilities as are commensurate with legitimate individual or collective security needs, and will not attempt to impose military domination over any other participating State.
- Transparency through information exchange. A key element of an effective arms control regime is provision for complete, accurate and timely exchange of relevant information, including the size, structure, location and military doctrine of military forces as well as their activities.
- Verification. The measures adopted should be combined, as appropriate, with verification that is commensurate with their substance and significance. This should include verification sufficiently intrusive to permit an assessment of information exchanged and of the implementation of agreed measures subject to verification, thereby enhancing confidence.

- Limitations on forces. Limitations and, where necessary, reductions are an important element in the continuing search for security and stability at lower levels of forces. Other constraining provisions on armed forces and security-building measures continue to be significant elements in the quest for stability.

IV. GOALS AND METHODS FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF ARMS CONTROL

9. Among the goals of arms control and the methods to help strengthen stability and security and increase transparency, co-operation and confidence within the OSCE area should be the following:

- to strengthen the concept of the indivisibility of security;
- to improve existing OSCE-wide measures, based on a continuing evaluation of their effectiveness, and to develop as appropriate new ones, to deal with future and continuing security challenges;
- to move the discussion of regional security issues to a more practical and concrete plane, in order to devise measures aimed at reducing regional instability and military imbalances among OSCE participating States;
- to devise arms control measures for stabilizing specific crisis situations, including by making appropriate use of any relevant existing measures;
- to examine, as appropriate, the issue of limitations on armed forces and constraints on their activities;
- to take due account, in elaborating arms control measures, of the legitimate security interests of each participating State, irrespective of whether it belongs to a politico-military alliance;
- to develop transparency, consultation and co-operation in the evolution or establishment of multinational military and political organizations, recognizing in this context the inherent right of each participating State to choose or change its own security arrangements, including treaties of alliance;
- to ensure greater transparency by providing information to all participating States on the implementation within the OSCE area of regional or other agreements not binding on all OSCE participating States, as agreed by the signatories of such agreements;
- to improve existing verification provisions and to develop new ones, as necessary.

10. The participating States recognize that the full implementation, at all times, of the obligations and commitments they have agreed to makes an indispensable contribution to the achievement of these goals. They intend to continue to follow that implementation closely on a regular basis, and to seek more effective methods of reviewing implementation, including by making the best use of existing expertise and resources.

V. BUILDING A WEB OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

11. The participating States have undertaken a variety of obligations and commitments in the field of arms control. Such obligations and commitments are legally or politically binding, and

vary in their substance and geographical scope, being global, OSCE-wide, regional or bilateral. The agreements listed in the Annex to this document constitute a basis for a web of interlocking and mutually-reinforcing agreements. The full implementation of the agreements listed is essential for building the collective and individual security of the participating States, irrespective of whether or not they are a party or signatory to these agreements.

12. Building on the results achieved, future work on arms control will address emerging and new challenges as well as further developing transparency, openness and co-operation in the military field. Future arms control agreements may be negotiated separately but would be integral to the web.

ANNEX TO “A FRAMEWORK FOR ARMS CONTROL”

- Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
- Treaty on Open Skies
- Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
- Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations
- Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers
- Global Exchange of Military Information
- Vienna Document 1994
- Code of Conduct
- Principles Governing Non-Proliferation

IV.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGENDA OF THE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION

(FSC.DEC/9/96)

The participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE):

- recalling their decision to establish the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) to strengthen security and stability within the OSCE community of States, as laid down in Chapter V of the Helsinki Summit Declaration of 10 July 1992,
- having reviewed and assessed the results achieved in the negotiations within the FSC, in particular under the Programme for Immediate Action as agreed upon in Helsinki, and the further tasks set in Chapter V of the Budapest Summit Declaration of 6 December 1994,
- concluding that a new work programme is required for the FSC,
- building on the document entitled "A Framework for Arms Control",
- recalling their commitment to use this Framework as a basis for an agenda for arms control, with a view to strengthening the network of security commitments that the participating States undertake to each other, and
- taking account of existing agreements and of the particular security needs and the specific characteristics of the armed forces of individual participating States,

have decided that the FSC should, as a matter of priority, address the following issues:

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREED ARMS CONTROL MEASURES

The participating States agree to continue to pursue full implementation, in both letter and spirit, of all existing arms control measures and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) agreed upon by the OSCE, with a view to further strengthening confidence, security and stability in the OSCE area. Specific attention will be given to the implementation of the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security, including consideration of a follow-up conference. The FSC will continue its assessment of the implementation of agreed measures by using the established procedures.

The FSC will consider the possible provision of assistance requested by participating States with regard to implementation. This will draw upon the resources volunteered by the participating States and on the existing resources and experience of the Conflict Prevention Centre.

II. REGIONAL MEASURES

Recognizing the challenges presented as well as the opportunities offered by situations in specific regions, the participating States may, within the FSC and on an informal and open-ended

basis, address regional issues and explore possibilities for enhanced co-operation. This will be based on the initiative and interest of a participating State (or of States) in the region concerned. The participating States may also address regional issues in direct response to instability within, or threatening to expand into, a region of the OSCE area. In particular, the FSC may look at ways at making more effective use of its decision on "Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations".

Such initiatives may address measures tailored to the region and complementary to OSCE-wide efforts, if such efforts need enhancing in order to meet the specific needs of a region. The measures may be designed to consolidate or increase transparency and predictability, to promote good-neighbourly relations in the military field, or to reduce tension. They will be an integral part of OSCE-wide commitments.

The FSC will support regional agreements which have been or are to be negotiated, either with the direct involvement of the OSCE or under its auspices.

III. DEVELOPING A WEB OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

The participating States have undertaken, via the Framework for Arms Control, to establish a web of interlocking and mutually reinforcing agreements.

This may involve exploring ways participating States may develop, through negotiations freely entered into and on the basis of equality of rights, new arrangements to support co-operative approaches and to address security concerns and needs identified in the Framework for Arms Control. Such arrangements, which may vary in their substance and geographical scope, being OSCE-wide, regional or bilateral, will be an integral part of the web and will be consistent with each other as well as with the goals and methods set out in the Framework for Arms Control.

In accordance with its mandate, the FSC will develop its security dialogue function. The participating States will make full use of this body for regular and substantial exchanges of information on the work done and the progress made concerning separate arms control negotiations and processes (for example within the Joint Consultative Group). This procedure would allow views and concerns expressed in the FSC to be taken into consideration in the course of such negotiations and processes, bearing in mind the OSCE's comprehensive concept of indivisible security.

IV. ENHANCING AGREED MEASURES AND DEVELOPING NEW ONES

The participating States agree to seek ways of strengthening existing arms control agreements and CSBM regimes, in particular the Vienna Document 1994, in order to increase transparency and predictability in their security relations. The FSC will also look at the prospects for promoting co-operative forms of verification and at how best to use CSBMs and other arms control instruments in preventive diplomacy, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.

The FSC will consider further efforts to develop Norm- and Standard-Setting Measures (NSSMs), such as the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security, the Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers and the Principles Governing Non-Proliferation, as well as the possibility of the adoption of new NSSMs.

In conformity with the risks and challenges set out in the Framework for Arms Control, the FSC will study the possible development of new measures. A list of suggestions advanced to date by one or more of the participating States is contained in the Annex.

* * * * *

The participating States will consider:

- the introduction of greater efficiency into the working methods of the FSC;
- ways of achieving greater cohesion between the FSC and the Permanent Council in complementary fields of activity;
- extending, upon request and within existing resources, the FSC's experience to partner States in the adjacent Mediterranean area; and
- measures for complementing (but not duplicating) the international community's efforts in relation to an effective solution regarding anti-personnel landmines and in relation to the fight against terrorism.

* * * * *

The participating States of the OSCE have further decided that the FSC will report at the next meeting of the Ministerial Council on progress made and on which specific items the FSC has decided to take forward within the agenda.

ANNEX TO “DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGENDA OF THE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION”

Bearing in mind concerns expressed by certain participating States, the following non-consensual suggestions have been advanced by one or more participating States.

- Extension of CSBMs to naval activities
- Exchange of information on internal security forces
- Measures concerning the stationing of armed forces
- Co-operation in defence conversion
- Measures concerning the deployment of armed forces on foreign territories, including their transborder movements
- Regular seminars on military doctrine (to be held at a high military level)
- An “OSCE White Paper” on defence issues, based on existing OSCE information regimes and drawing on national experiences
- Studying the possibility of the creation of zones in Europe free of nuclear weapons
- Voluntary participation, on a national basis, in verification and information exchange of regional regimes
- Transparency with regard to structural, qualitative and operational aspects of armed forces
- Unilateral declaration of weapons ceilings

Any further suggestions to be made will be in line with the rules and procedures of the FSC.

APPENDIX

The following document was brought to the attention of the Summit by the Chairman, Prime Minister of Portugal H.E. Antonio Guterres, at the request of the Prime Minister of Belgium, H.E. Jean-Luc Dehaene, in his capacity as Chairman of the CFE Joint Consultative Group.

DOCUMENT ADOPTED BY THE STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE ON THE SCOPE AND PARAMETERS OF THE PROCESS COMMISSIONED IN PARAGRAPH 19 OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE FIRST CFE TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE

1 December 1996

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The States Parties have defined the following scope and parameters for the process commissioned in paragraph 19 of the Final Document of the First CFE Treaty Review Conference.

II. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

2. The States Parties intend to improve the operation of the Treaty in a changing environment and, through that, the security of each State Party, irrespective of whether it belongs to a politico-military alliance. The character of this process should be such as to permit the Treaty to sustain its key role in the European security architecture, in conditions existing and foreseen.

3. The process should strengthen the Treaty's system of limitations, verification and information exchange. It should promote the Treaty's objectives and enhance its viability and effectiveness as the cornerstone of European security, introducing such new elements and making such adaptations, revisions or adjustments to existing elements as may be agreed to be necessary.

4. The process should preserve and strengthen overall and zonal stability and continue to prevent destabilizing accumulations of forces anywhere within the Treaty's area of application.

5. The process should further develop and consolidate the emerging new co-operative pattern of relationships between States Parties, based on mutual confidence, transparency, stability and predictability. It will aim to promote equally the security of all CFE States Parties. Acting within the context of the Treaty, States Parties will address new security risks and challenges through binding mechanisms, while taking into account the legitimate security interests of each State Party.

III. PRINCIPLES

6. The following principles will guide the process:

- arms control obligations, freely entered into, must be fully met;
- the integrity of the Treaty and its associated Documents must be preserved, that is to say a common commitment to the Treaty's objectives, achievements and efficient functioning;
- the results of the process must be internally consistent, coherent and an integrated whole;
- the States Parties will avoid a wholesale renegotiation of the Treaty, adopting specific adaptations for specific purposes;
- the process must be consistent with the OSCE's concept of comprehensive, indivisible and co-operative security, while bearing in mind States Parties' other security arrangements and obligations, their inherent right to choose or change security arrangements, the legitimate security interests of other States Parties, and the fundamental right of each State Party to protect its national security individually;
- the existing Treaty and its associated Documents must remain fully in force and be implemented in good faith until such measures and adaptations as may be decided upon through this process have themselves come into operation;
- the States Parties will maintain, individually or in association with others, only such military capabilities as are commensurate with individual or collective legitimate security needs, taking into account their obligations under international law;
- the process should not result in any adverse effect on the legitimate security interests of any CFE State Party or other OSCE participating State;
- the process should recognize the importance of the CFE Treaty's adaptation for:
 - the broader OSCE security context, in particular the ongoing dialogue in the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC);
 - the work on a common and comprehensive security model for the twenty-first century;
- separate regional arms control arrangements and negotiations, both existing and as they occur, will be taken into account.

IV. SCOPE

7. To meet the aims and objectives set out in Section II, and committed to the Principles recorded in Section III of this Document, the States Parties will consider and elaborate, as appropriate, specific measures and adaptations to the Treaty.

8. The scope of this process will be consistent with the original CFE mandate, taking account of developments since Treaty signature, and with agreements reached at the First CFE Treaty Review Conference, and will retain:

- all existing categories of Treaty-Limited Equipment (TLE) established by the Treaty and will not result in an increase in total numbers of TLE within the Treaty's area of application;
 - all the scope and detail of the information and verification arrangements established by the Treaty;
 - the area of application established by the Treaty.
9. Specific aspects of this process will involve, *inter alia*, consideration of the following:
- evolution of the group structure of the Treaty, as well as elaboration of provisions addressing participation of States Parties in the Treaty other than as members of a group;
 - the functioning of the Treaty's system of limitations and its individual elements, that is:
 - development of the Treaty's system of maximum levels for holdings, including the possibility to establish a system of national limits for TLE;
 - in this context the development of the redistribution mechanisms in Article VII;
 - the zonal provisions in Article IV of the Treaty, preserving the principle of zonal limitations, so that no destabilizing accumulations of forces should occur;
 - the provisions in Article IV of the Treaty limiting aggregate numbers for a group of States Parties, preserving the principle that no destabilizing accumulations of forces should occur;
 - the Treaty's provisions in relation to stationing forces;
 - Article XIV and related provisions on Verification, the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information and the possibility of promoting further co-operation in the spheres of Information Exchange and Verification;
 - the Treaty's provisions on designated permanent storage sites (DPSS);
 - the possibility of accession to the Treaty by individual States who might request it, and related modalities;
 - means to assure the full functioning of the Treaty in cases of crisis and conflict;
 - the possibility of incorporating provisions designed to facilitate the involvement and co-operation of States Parties in peacekeeping operations conducted under the mandate of the United Nations or the OSCE;
 - the possibility of extending the Treaty's coverage so as to include new, or expanded, categories of conventional armaments and equipment;
 - provisions on temporary deployments.
10. Further measures and adaptations, additional to those listed in paragraph 9 above, may be taken under consideration as part of this process as it evolves.

V. TIMETABLE, MODALITIES AND MISCELLANEOUS

11. The States Parties have decided that:

- in order to permit the next phase of this process to commence promptly in 1997, in accordance with the scope and parameters defined in Sections II-IV above, the Joint Consultative Group (JCG), in Vienna, in parallel with its ongoing tasks, will take responsibility for these negotiations when it resumes work in January 1997;
- they will work in good faith with the aim of completing these negotiations as expeditiously as those conducted under the original Treaty mandate;
- they will consider a report on results achieved at the time of the OSCE Ministerial Meeting in Copenhagen;
- during these negotiations, the Chairman of the JCG should, on a frequent and regular basis, at the FSC inform all other OSCE participating States of the work done and progress made; and that States Parties should exchange views with other OSCE participating States and take into consideration the views expressed by the latter concerning their own security.

12. They also recall that:

- the JCG should, in parallel with these negotiations, intensively continue efforts directed at resolving the implementation issues contained in the Review Conference Final Document, recognizing that such efforts will contribute substantially to the success of the negotiating process;
- the existence of this negotiating process will not prevent the JCG from adopting concurrently additional measures for enhancing the operational functioning of the current Treaty;

VI. UNDERPINNING THE PROCESS

13. Building on the achievements of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, States Parties commit themselves to exercise restraint during the period of negotiations as foreseen in the document in relation to the current postures and capabilities of their conventional armed forces - in particular with respect to their levels of forces and deployments - in the Treaty's area of application, in order to avoid that developments in the security situation in Europe would diminish the security of any State Party. This commitment is without prejudice to the outcome of the negotiations, or to voluntary decisions by the individual States Parties to reduce their force levels or deployments, or to their legitimate security interests.