78th JOINT MEETING OF THE
FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION
AND THE PERMANENT COUNCIL

1. Date: Wednesday, 15 July 2020 (in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconferencing)

Opened: 10.05 a.m.
Closed: 12.40 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador Y. Tsymbaliuk (FSC) (Ukraine)
   Ambassador I. Hasani (PC) (Albania)

Prior to taking up the agenda, the Chairperson (PC) reminded the participants of the technical modalities for the conduct of meetings of the Permanent Council during the COVID-19 pandemic (CIO.GAL/73/20/Rev.1 OSCE+).

Chairperson (PC), Russian Federation (Annex 1), Latvia

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

   Agenda item 1: SECURITY DIALOGUE: HYBRID THREATS AND MODERN WARFARE

   – Presentation by Mr. O. Lytvynenko, Director of the National Institute for Strategic Studies, Ukraine

   – Presentation by Mr. M. Rühle, Head of the Hybrid Challenges and Energy Security Section, Emerging Security Challenges Division, NATO International Staff

   – Presentation by Ms. I. Žukauskienė, Counsellor, Cyber Security and Information Technology Policy Group, Ministry of National Defence, Lithuania

   Chairperson (PC), Chairperson (FSC), Mr. O. Lytvynenko (FSC-PC.DEL/33/20) (FSC-PC.DEL/33/20/Add.1), Mr. M. Rühle,
Ms. I. Žukauskienė, United States of America (Annex 2), Germany-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in alignment) (FSC-PC.DEL/30/20), Canada (Annex 3), Switzerland (FSC-PC.DEL/32/20 OSCE+), United Kingdom (Annex 4), Georgia (FSC-PC.DEL/31/20 OSCE+), Slovakia (FSC-PC.DEL/25/20 OSCE+), Turkey, Slovenia (FSC-PC.DEL/26/20), Ukraine (FSC-PC.DEL/34/20 OSCE+), Latvia (FSC-PC.DEL/27/20 OSCE+), Azerbaijan, Armenia

Point of order: Russian Federation, Chairperson (FSC)

Agenda item 2: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

Meeting of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (SCA), to be held on 21 July 2020 via video teleconferencing: Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on SALW and SCA (Latvia)

4. Next meeting:

To be announced
STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Mr. Chairperson,

Allow me to speak very briefly about the agenda of our meeting. It is with great regret that we noticed the inclusion in it, in violation of the Rules of Procedure of the OSCE and its traditions, of the confrontational issue of “hybrid” threats. We find this unacceptable. We believe that we need to focus on unifying issues and not belabour those that merely fuel dissension and cement mutual distrust.

It is well known that our refusal to discuss the so-called “hybrid” agenda stems from our unwillingness to participate in fruitless debates. You may take our word for it that we have something to say. The “collective West” has been waging combined “hybrid” wars against Russia for many years. I am referring, first of all, to attempts to “demonize” my country in the information space, the imposition of illegal restrictions, brazen interference in our internal affairs, and the exertion of military pressure by moving NATO infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders and by destroying international arms control regimes.

By the way, the United States of America is not above “hybrid” measures also when it comes to its European allies, not to mention China and a number of other countries. And yet no one is throwing hysterics or shouting from the rooftops. We leave such dirty practices to the conscience of their organizers and simply take it into account in our politico-military planning.

Distinguished colleagues, we need to ask ourselves a different question. Who will benefit if we continue to conduct our discussions at a level of mutual accusations? Will it bring us closer to finding compromises?

Maybe it would make sense to abandon the idle demagogy and political card-sharpening and return to the calm search for solutions to the problems that have accumulated?

It’s up to you.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you for your attention.
Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

Thank you very much for this very constructive and useful discussion. We commend the Ukrainian Chairmanship for hosting this joint Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) and Permanent Council (PC) meeting on hybrid warfare and thank our distinguished speakers who presented this morning forthrightly and directly. I note how central this issue is to the discussions at the OSCE. I noticed that my Russian colleague has departed this meeting. I would invite him to return to participate in the dialogue that will now go on after the panel presentations. Dialogue is the goal of the PC and the FSC.

Returning to the topic, hybrid activities are among the most immediate challenges to our security and to the integrity of our democratic institutions and are exactly the types of security challenges participating States are encountering in real time. The OSCE is an appropriate venue for discussion of these fundamental challenges – it just is.

We also thank the Spanish Chairperson of the Structured Dialogue for hosting a constructive informal working group with representatives from capitals last month, which included a session on hybrid. Many participating States have identified hybrid attacks as a major threat to their security, and several have called for institutionalizing the discussions of hybrid at the OSCE. Given its cross-dimensional nature, this is an appropriate forum to continue these discussions.

Hybrid methods, by their very nature, leverage all instruments of national power – they occur both in armed conflict and below the threshold of armed conflict in increasing so-called “grey-zone” competition. The use of hybrid tactics is not new – the use of propaganda and disinformation is as old as conflict itself. We have seen it throughout the 20th century and earlier. What is new is its emergence as a strategic threat in this “grey zone”, a process amplified by technological advancements that we have seen in the 21st century that have changed the nature of modern strategic competition. Now the Trojan Horse has taken on an entirely new meaning. Military doctrine is evolving to adapt to this new strategic environment that blurs the line between conflict and competition – for example, cyber, as was discussed, is an emerging military domain alongside air, sea, land, and space.
Hybrid actions may manifest themselves in a cyber or physical battlefield, as in the well-known case of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, a topic that my Russian colleague objects to discussing, where private military contractors (discussed earlier in the FSC under the Ukrainian Chairmanship), Russian proxy forces, and “little green men” attempted to mask Russia’s invasion and occupation of Crimea, a so-called Trojan Horse which later became quite obvious and apparent.

Hybrid attacks often blur the lines of the “battle space”, which may extend well beyond the military dimension to the human and economic dimensions as well. For instance, hybrid threats can take the shape of economic pressure, which is a topic within the OSCE’s second dimension, often not discussed, but it increasingly should be discussed. Hybrid threats also include cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure, or electoral interference that goes to the core of our democratic processes, among its many manifestations. The central point I would make here is that the application of hybrid attacks constitutes conflict. It is aggression. The peoples of the OSCE area should not be in conflict with each other, but hybrid warfare is a policy of belligerence. I noticed our NATO presenter played this down a bit and said that hybrid is a tactic that we can address. Hybrid is a tactic, but it reflects a strategy, a strategy of aggression, and that has to be understood if we are going to make any progress towards peace in the OSCE area.

We have seen Russia employ hybrid tactics time and again. Its intelligence services support attempted coups and assassinations, and there was an assassination just last week within 15 kilometres of this room. They pay corrupt politicians to do Moscow’s bidding, spread false information on issues that affect public safety and health, and run campaigns that attempt to impact the outcome of elections. For instance, in October 2019, Russia carried out a widespread disruptive cyber-attack against Georgia, which directly affected the Georgian population, disrupted operations of several thousand Georgian government and privately run websites and interrupted the broadcast of at least two major television stations. We have called on Russia to cease this behaviour, because it is aggression.

It was particularly enlightening to hear examples at the June Structured Dialogue of how some actors, notably Russia and China, have exploited the COVID-19 pandemic as a vector for hybrid actions – most notably through disinformation. It is unconscionable that anyone would take advantage of the global crisis that has stricken millions and cost the lives of more than 500,000 men, women, and children to cast doubt on the effectiveness of democratic governance and institutions and deflect attention from their own aggressive, non-democratic behaviour. You will recall the suggestion that a laboratory in the Republic of Georgia was actually the source of the COVID-19 pandemic, an assertion that I denounced at a previous meeting as weird. It is also disinformation and has a purpose. It is a tactic, and it is reflective of a strategy that should be concerning to the participating States of the OSCE. As the United States noted during our Structured Dialogue intervention, now is the time to come together through a systematic and determined effort to navigate the pandemic’s multifaceted challenges. We need to unite against attempts by bad actors to divide us in this post-COVID recovery.

We heard the suggestion from some participating States that hybrid threats should be broken down into sub-components and relegated to corresponding OSCE forums, such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the Security Committee, FSC and the Cyber Working Group. While additional dialogue on hybrid activities in these forums is
certainly welcome, they are no substitute for the wide-ranging strategic discussions we have had in the Structured Dialogue and now in the joint FSC-PC meeting. These discussions have also fostered a constructive dialogue on how these activities impact the overall security environment in the OSCE area, and what this community should do to address those impacts. We should continue to explore the nature of hybrid actions and the steps the OSCE and individual participating States can take in response; that might set the stage for further discussions. Hybrid actors do not confine themselves to one “battlefield” – their tools are pervasive across the battlefield of ideas and levers of economic and political power.

More troubling was the argument from one participating State, Russia, which I would address directly, that the discussion of hybrid threats simply should not occur in the Structured Dialogue, or any other OSCE forum. It was difficult to follow the tortured logic for why a top security concern for so many participating States should not be discussed frankly and openly among us. That is precisely what the OSCE was created to do. We hear often about how the Organization is supposed to be about dialogue. We heard it again today. Hybrid crosses over into kinetic war, and if we do not have a dialogue or a discussion, and these tactics continue to mount, it may cross over into a kinetic conflict before States understand the dangers.

The hybrid discussion responds to Russia’s actions against neighbours and frankly beyond – including in some cases on the conventional battlefield – to undermine States’ freely chosen alliances and partnerships, disrupt democratic governance, fuel societal intolerance, impugn international support for independent civil society, and foment military insecurity.

Boycotting discussions on challenges that impact the stability and security of so many participating States, and indeed the most fundamental and cherished of our OSCE principles, subverts our common goal of co-operative security. Whether in this FSC-PC meeting, the Structured Dialogue, or in any OSCE bodies, we must be prepared to address these challenges and discuss them openly and have a dialogue before it is too late.

We hope all participating States will come together to address and expose the pervasive challenge of hybrid threats openly and with a mind towards rebuilding transparency, trust, and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.
STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF CANADA

Mr. Chairperson,

Let me begin by thanking our esteemed panel today for their insightful presentations on the topic of modern warfare and in particular aspects of hybrid warfare within this context. I want to also thank the Albanian and Ukrainian Chairmanships for ensuring this challenging topic remains high on the agenda for dialogue here at the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC). Although the topic is quite complex, and not without its challenges, its obvious link to threat perceptions makes it a topic of great interest to the vast majority of participating States. We would strongly encourage future chairmanships to ensure that hybrid remains on our agenda for discussion, not only despite our clearly differing views, but rather, because of it.

Mr. Chairperson,

Canada deeply regrets the decision of the Russian Federation to withdraw from our dialogue today.

Rapidly developing technologies have dramatically increased the lethality of modern weapons and decreased the decision-making time available for defensive reaction. Concomitantly, we have also seen an increase in the use of cyber-tools in modern warfare and its potential to negatively affect all aspects of a civilian population, from infrastructure security to information access. These modern tools of warfare, in combination with the use of asymmetric force and a holistic approach to campaign planning, have resulted in the genesis of the hybrid or “total war” concept, with a consequent negative impact on threat perceptions.

We regret the unfortunate increased willingness of both States and non-State actors to effectively operate in the “grey zone” of armed conflict in pursuit of their national strategic and other interests.

Canada fully understands that as modern warfare evolves so must the instruments that we use to manage the threat it poses. We welcome proposals aimed at strengthening the FSC’s ability to act as a key forum for transparency and risk reduction in the OSCE area. We encourage dialogue on evolution of military doctrine caused by rapidly developing technologies, and stand ready to be active and engaged participants in events such as OSCE dialogues on military doctrine throughout this upcoming coming year.
Mr. Chairperson,

Faced with this evolving politico-military environment in which hybrid actions have significantly heightened threat perceptions in Canada and elsewhere, it is all the more important that our existing OSCE instruments aimed at reducing tensions and increasing transparency be modernized and fully implemented, both in letter and spirit. Canada continues to believe that the Vienna Document and other OSCE instruments can and should be modernized with a view to enhancing transparency and predictability.

The rising use of hybrid activities only reinforces our belief in the value of furthering the constructive proposal now supported by a majority of participating States. We believe that this proposal addresses many existing “risk-enhancing” behaviours, and if adopted and implemented, would go a long way to reducing the risk of escalation of incidents into conflict.

Mr. Chairperson,

In developing our defence policy, Canada has had to consider an evolving global security environment which, is defined by a never before seen complexity and unpredictability, transcending national borders. The fact is that the interrelated nature of global security challenges puts a premium on deep knowledge and understanding. Knowledge required to develop sophisticated awareness of the human dimension of conflict, as well as the information and operating environment in which we evolve. We need to be using a wide range of analytical tools to better predict and respond to crises. This is why, as part of our defence policy, Canada continues to focus on focusing on an agile, well-educated, flexible, diverse, and combat-ready military capable of conducting a wide range of operations at home and internationally. To keep pace, Canada will further develop advanced space and cyber-capabilities, and continue expanding our investment, most recently with a 0.5 billion Canadian dollar allocation for this purpose, aimed at supporting cutting edge research and development needed to protect and defend our people and society.

Mr. Chairperson,

Today as we are discussing the challenges associated with modern warfare, exploring dialogue on what the OSCE could do in response to these new threats in the pursuit of peace and security in the OSCE area. However, we should clearly point out the increased challenge of this task, given that one participating State is unwilling to abide by its commitments and obligations, including the core principles of the OSCE.

Specifically, Russia’s willingness to employ hybrid methods such as the use of cyber and information technologies for malicious purposes, and the employment of asymmetric, sometimes non-uniformed troops in its destabilizing actions and policies surrounding the ongoing illegal occupation of Crimea, the violation of internationally recognized sovereign borders by force, the deliberate destabilization of eastern Ukraine and provocative military activities near borders, including aggression in the Black Sea region, all in combination with increasingly aggressive rhetoric creates an atmosphere of mistrust.
Mr. Chairperson,

The use of hybrid methods and the threat they pose are a direct contributor to the heightened tensions in the OSCE. Accordingly, we must continue the dialogue on not only the individual actions which could be categorized as hybrid, but also the context in which these tactics/methods are employed, in pursuit of a broader strategic goals which frequently run contrary to OSCE principles, commitments and values.

This has never been more obvious than during this time of the global COVID-19 crisis.

The worldwide COVID-19 pandemic has provided a unique opportunity for nations to work together in pursuit of a common goal. However, like all crises, it also all provides a cynical opportunity for others to utilize the COVID-19 crisis as a conduit or mask for hybrid warfare activities such as malicious disinformation and cyber-attack campaigns.

Since the start of the COVID-19 crisis, Canadian troops stationed in Latvia, as a part of operation “Reassurance”, have found themselves subjected to malicious and targeted misinformation campaigns, suggesting that Canadian soldiers had a high number of COVID-19 cases. This blatant act of hybrid warfare was clearly intended to reduce public confidence in the presence of the Canadian-led battle group and was absolutely, and unequivocally untrue.

A swift and strong public messaging campaign both by Canadian commanders and their Latvian hosts refuted this deliberate attempt, and ensured that the local population was not duped by these efforts. However, it should be very clear, capitalizing on the COVID-19 crisis to action malign activities is an affront to all of us and completely unacceptable.

Mr. Chairperson,

In closing, we wish to reiterate that the principles, instruments, and tools that we have developed, modernized or no, to which we have committed ourselves for the sake of our common security, cannot fulfil their intended purpose if States ignore or undermine them. If we want to build trust, and reduce risk, in the face of the challenges modern warfare presents, this desire needs to be reflected through constant action in accordance with all the tenets of our international rules-based order. We remain committed to a constructive and informed dialogue on the subject of hybrid threats and their clear adverse impact on the overall European security environment. It is the broad brushed strategic objects which hybrid actors pursue which must be discussed as they lie at the root of the challenges we face.
STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

I would like to thank the Albanian and Ukrainian Chairmanships for dedicating today’s joint Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) and Permanent Council (PC) meeting Security Dialogue to hybrid and modern warfare. I would also like to extend my sincere gratitude to the distinguished speakers for their invaluable time and insights today. The United Kingdom supports the European Union’s statement and would like to make a few additional remarks.

As we discussed at the Structured Dialogue last month, the United Kingdom believes it is important to engage on the mitigation of hybrid threats, an area of common purpose for participating States and where OSCE fora such as today’s Security Dialogue, should be used to facilitate dialogue to build trust; deter and discourage potential hybrid actors; and reinforce international norms.

Mr. Chairperson,

The OSCE provides an essential platform to facilitate dialogue between participating States in areas of disagreement. The opportunity for that dialogue is at the core of what we do here in Vienna. That Russia has sought not to engage in constructive dialogue is, in itself, very telling.

We have seen that hybrid threats can span a broad range of malign activities. On repeated occasions, the United Kingdom has played a role – often in concert with like-minded partners – in identifying, countering and publicly attributing occasions of such activity. As threats evolve, so too must our ability to maintain this posture. We know that hybrid techniques can affect both military and civilian spheres, using a range of subtle or deniable means to harm our interests and undermine our cohesion.

Within the OSCE area, we are clear that the Russian Federation is responsible for a wide range of illegal and destabilizing actions. Russia has forcibly annexed territory from another sovereign nation in Europe, fomented conflict in the Donbas [region of Ukraine], violated the national airspace of several European countries, meddled in elections, hacked European government ministries, and mounted a sustained campaign of cyber-espionage and disruption.
We are addressing Russia’s cyber-threat more broadly, and have opened a new National Cyber Security Centre which is actively working with international partners, industry and civil society to tackle this threat. We are calling out Russia’s malign behaviour in cyberspace, attributing cyber-attacks such as “NotPetya”, which primarily targeted Ukraine but had impact much wider, and the brazen cyber-attacks against Georgia last year, to the Russian military. These attacks against sovereign and independent nations are totally unacceptable.

On the specific issue of malign activity during the current COVID-19 pandemic, we should be clear that attacks by State and non-State actors seeking to undermine the global response to this unprecedented global health crisis endangers lives. International law and the norms of responsible State behaviour must be respected and all States have an important role to play to help counter irresponsible activity being carried out by criminal groups in their countries.

From our National Security Council downwards, the UK approach to countering hybrid is rooted in a co-ordinated, cross-government effort. Following the completion of the National Security Capability Review and the Modernising Defence Programme, we are ensuring that our defence and security capabilities are optimized to address the threats we face. And we are working closely with relevant partners, including many of you, to mutually build resilience and more broadly counter hybrid threats across Europe.

The United Kingdom continues to play a proactive role in this space. We work with Ukrainian and Georgian partners to strengthen resilience to hybrid threats, including from cyber-attacks, disinformation, and other vectors, but also assisting in supporting reforms, building stronger institutions, and more. We provide support to OSCE participating States by calling out those responsible for hybrid attacks, and will continue to do so.

Our approach is guided by three core elements. First, understand: establishing a clearer picture of both threats and vulnerabilities. Second, protect: strengthening resilience and safeguarding information, people, institutions and infrastructure from hybrid threats and hostile State activity. And third, counter: developing and deploying the means to deter, manage, and reduce the hybrid and hostile State activity threat.

The OSCE provides an essential platform to facilitate dialogue between participating States in areas of disagreement over hybrid issues, using our forums to build trust and move towards deconfliction and, where necessary, de-escalation. It is beholden on us to deter and, if necessary, call out potential hostile actors, and encourage the development of international norms.

Rather than risk becoming wrapped up in overly strict definitions, we should take full advantage of the OSCE’s three dimensions. From a UK perspective, we have always been clear that hybrid can transcend these areas, and that joined-up thinking to face down threats and limit vulnerabilities is a cross-cutting endeavour if we are to succeed together in confronting these challenges.

Thank you. This concludes our statement and request that it be attached to the journal of the day.