


Daily Report 191/2020

12 August 2020¹

Summary

- The SMM recorded four ceasefire violations in Donetsk region (compared with one ٠ in the previous reporting period) and one in Luhansk region (compared with none in the previous reporting period).
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia • Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. Inside the latter two areas, SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicles observed people during evening and night hours.
- The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the ٠ contact line, including in training areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable the ٠ maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 . outbreak, including at an entry-exit checkpoint in Luhansk region.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*




¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 11 August 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

 $^{^{2}}$ For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.

³ Including explosions.

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations



In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded four ceasefire violations – shots from undetermined weapons in areas south-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) (see table below). In the <u>previous reporting period</u>, it recorded one ceasefire violation.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded one ceasefire violation – a shot of small-arms fire in an area north-west of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see text and table below). In the <u>previous reporting period</u>, it recorded no ceasefire violations.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 262 ceasefire violations, both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 46 explosions, two projectiles in flight, three illumination flares and 211 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

On 11 August, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (governmentcontrolled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) – two on the southern edge of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) and three near their checkpoint south of the bridge.

On the evening of 10 August, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote**, an SMM longrange unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted in total 13 people near former positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces – seven people about 1km south of the area's northern edge and about 1.2km east of its western edge and five people about 600m south of the area's northern edge and about 1km east of its western edge as well as one person near the area's north-eastern corner. Also inside the area, the same UAV spotted three people within a former position of the armed formations near the area's eastern edge and about 1.5km north of its south-eastern corner.

On 11 August, while positioned in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 2km south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

On the same day, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them), whom it also saw entering and walking about 350m north inside the disengagement area and then returning.

Also on 11 August, outside the disengagement area, about 150m south of its southern edge, the SMM saw eight workers with a truck, an excavator-loader and a bulldozer levelling and graveling both sides of road T-1316.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

On the night of 10-11 August, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (nongovernment-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted two people within former positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 550m east-north-east of the area's south-western corner. Also inside the area, the same UAV spotted two people within a former position of the armed formations near the area's south-eastern corner.

On 11 August, positioned at two locations close to the disengagement area near Petrivske, the SMM observed a calm situation. The Mission also noted that the <u>previously reported</u> cement blocks on the road leading from Petrivske to Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk) about 90m west of the SMM camera site were no longer present.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, including 17 seen in training areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.

It also saw weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in nongovernment-controlled areas of Donetsk region, including 55 seen in training areas (one of which is in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014) (for further details, see the tables below).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn⁶

At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

11 August

The SMM noted that four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-27 *Uragan*, 220mm) were present for the first time and that four other multiple launch rocket systems (BM-27 *Uragan*, 220mm) were missing for the first time.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region 11 August

The SMM noted that a tank (T-72) was again missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone⁷

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun in the security zone in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and an armoured combat vehicle in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region (for further details, see the table below).

⁶ The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the

criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

⁷ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SMM facilitation of maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure; and fund transfer

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable preparations of construction works south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above), and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

The Mission also continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to water infrastructure in Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 70km south of Donetsk), between government-controlled Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk) and Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk), between non-government-controlled Berezivske (53km north-west of Luhansk) and Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk), and near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk); and to enable maintenance and repairs to power lines near non-government-controlled Stukalova Balka (9km north of Luhansk), Metalist (7km north-west of Luhansk), Pryvitne (11km north of Luhansk), Obozne (18km north of Luhansk) and Vesela Hora.

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to localised ceasefires to enable vegetation clearance, inspection and maintenance of railway tracks near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), as well as demining activities near Shchastia, Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk) and Hirske (government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk).

The SMM monitored adherence to a localised ceasefire to enable a transfer of funds from non-government- to government-controlled areas across the bridge in Shchastia, reportedly related to water payments.

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation near the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter COVID-19 outbreak

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska was operational.

While at the EECP at 8:55 and 10:35, the Mission saw about 840 people queueing to enter government-controlled areas and about 245 people queuing in the opposite direction. The SMM also saw two golf carts transporting people between the EECP and the new section of the bridge.

Security situation along the Black Sea coast, Kherson region

On 10 and 11 August, the SMM observed a calm situation along the Black Sea coast, between Zaliznyi Port (62km south-west of Kherson) and Skadovsk (62km south of Kherson).

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see <u>SMM Daily</u> <u>Report 10 August 2020</u>). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- An SMM mid-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference assessed as caused by probable jamming while flying over areas near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk).⁸
- An SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference assessed as caused by probable jamming while flying over areas near Fedorivka (government-controlled, 71km south of Donetsk).
- On two occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference assessed as caused by probable jamming while flying over areas near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99km south of Donetsk).
- An SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk).

⁸ The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV's position.

Table of weapons

Weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation			
Government-controlled areas							
11/08/2020	1	Mortar (120mm, type undetermined)	Near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk)	Patrol			
Non-government-controlled areas							
09/08/2020	2	Probable multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 <i>Grad</i> , 122mm)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations in	Mid-range UAV			
	9	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)	the area, see <u>SMM Daily Report 11 August</u> 2020)	Mini-UAV			
10/08/2020	3	Towed howitzer (D-30 <i>Lyagushka</i> , 122mm)	In a training area near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk)				
	3 Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)		located in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.	pment UAV			
11/08/2020	4	Towed howitzer (D-30 <i>Lyagushka</i> , 122mm)	Near Bile (22km west of Lubanek)	Patrol			
	2	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm)	Near Bile (22km west of Luhansk)	Fattor			

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation		
Non-government-controlled areas						
09/08/2020	13	Surface-to-air missile systemIn a training area near Manuilivka (65km(9K35 Strela-10)east of Donetsk)		Mid-range		
	29	Tank (25 T-72 and four T-64)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east	UAV		
	10	Tank (probable T-64)	of Donetsk) (for previous observations in the area, see <u>SMM Daily Report 11 August</u>	N <i>d</i> ¹ • T 1 A 3 <i>T</i>		
	3	Self-propelled mortar (2S9 <i>Nona-</i> <i>S</i> , 120mm)		Mini-UAV		
10/08/2020	4	Tank (T-64)	Near Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, 90km south-east of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV		

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁹

Date	No.	Туре	Location	Source of observation		
Government-controlled areas						
06/08/2020	6	Infantry fighting vehicle (four BMP variant and two BMP-2)				
08/08/2020	2	Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM- 1K)	Near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV		
	3	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)				
10/08/2020	2	Probable infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)	Near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk)	÷		
	1 Combat engineering vehicle (BAT-2)		Lunansk)	Long-range UAV		
	1Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)1Armoured combat vehicle		Near Slavne (26km south-west of	UAV		
			Donetsk)			


⁹ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

	2	Infantry fighting vehicle (type undetermined)	Near Kodema (57km north-east of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV		
11/08/2020	1	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm)	In Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk)	Detrol		
	1 Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)		Near Verkhnotoretske (23km north- east of Donetsk)	Patrol		
Non-government-controlled areas						
10/08/2020	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)	In a compound in Bezimenne (100km south of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV		

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
Horlivka (non- government- controlled, 39km NE of Donetsk)	1-2km SW	Heard	4	Shot		N/K	11-Aug, 16:03-16:10
Zolote- 3/Stakhanovets (government- controlled, 61km W of Luhansk)	2km SW	Heard	1	Shot	Assessed as outside the disengagement area	Small arms	11-Aug, 11:54

Table of ceasefire violations as of 11 August 2020¹⁰

¹⁰ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an "N/K"), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.



Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹¹

¹¹ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned. in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well).