

OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

# Daily Report 27/2022

5 February 2022<sup>1</sup>

#### Summary

- In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 85 ceasefire violations, including one explosion. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 29 ceasefire violations in the region.
- In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded 73 ceasefire violations, including one explosion. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 31 ceasefire violations in the region.
- Armed formations denied the SMM passage near Stanytsia Luhanska, Luhansk region.\*
- The Mission followed up on reports of damage at the entry-exit checkpoint near Hnutove, Donetsk region.
- An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was lost due to signal interference near nongovernment-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske, Donetsk region.\*
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske.
- The SMM monitored the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at five entry-exit checkpoints and two corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission visited a border crossing point in Kharkiv region, where it saw no change in the security situation.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at a checkpoint of the armed formations in southern Donetsk region. Its UAVs again encountered multiple instances of GPS signal interference assessed as caused by probable jamming. Restrictions prevented the Mission from following up on reports of damage.\*



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 4 February 2022. All times are in Eastern European Time. During the reporting period, weather conditions limited the observational capabilities of some SMM cameras.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Including explosions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Including from unidentified weapons.

#### Map of recorded ceasefire violations



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In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 85 ceasefire violations, including one undetermined explosion. The majority of ceasefire violations occurred in areas north and north-north-east of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk). In the <u>previous reporting</u> period, the Mission recorded 29 ceasefire violations in the region.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded 73 ceasefire violations, including one undetermined explosion. The majority of ceasefire violations occurred in areas west-south-west of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the <u>previous reporting period</u>, the Mission recorded 31 ceasefire violations in the region, some of which also occurred near the aforementioned disengagement area.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding Measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has recorded at least 105,935 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 28,768 explosions, 25,457 projectiles in flight, 452 muzzle flashes, 484 illumination flares and at least 50,774 bursts and shots).

#### Armed formations denied the SMM passage near Stanytsia Luhanska, Luhansk region

On the morning of 4 February, the armed formations in Luhansk region denied the Mission passage to non-government-controlled areas. The SMM had pre-announced its passage – although not required to do so – as a COVID-19 related courtesy, in order to ensure such checkpoints are staffed.

The denial occurred at 11:03, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk). A member of the armed formations denied three mission members passage to non-government-controlled areas, citing a "lack of prior notice about the number of mission members crossing". The mission members returned back to base in government-controlled Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk).

These incremental but continuous restrictions imposed on the SMM degrade and condition the Mission's movements and operations. (See <u>SMM Spot Report 4/2022</u>.)\*

#### Damage at the entry-exit checkpoint near Hnutove, Donetsk region

On 3 February, the Mission followed up on reports of damage at the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk).

On the southern edge of the EECP, in the driveway between containers housing EECP facilities, the SMM observed a crater in the ground. It also observed holes and marks in the surrounding four containers and in a concrete wall: about 5m south of the crater, it saw three marks and two holes in a container's north-facing door and wall; about 5m south-east, two marks in a north-facing concrete wall; about 7m south-south-east, two marks in the north-facing wall of a second container; about 12m north-west, nine holes on the south-east facing wall of a third container and one hole on the same container's south-west facing wall; and, finally, about 19m north-north-east, two holes on the south-facing wall, and one hole on the south-west-facing wall of a fourth container.

The SMM assessed the crater and holes as recent and caused by a probable unidentified explosive device and fragmentation damage.

# Loss of spatial control over an SMM mini-UAV near Verkhnoshyrokivske, Donetsk region

On 4 February, the Mission was positioned about 2km east-north-east of Chernenko (government-controlled, 86km south of Donetsk) to conduct an announced mini-UAV flight. At 9:50, while the UAV was flying over areas near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk) and near positions of the armed formations, about 6km east of the SMM's position, the UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, after which the Mission lost spatial control over it. The SMM was not able to retrieve the UAV and subsequently left the area.\*

#### Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske<sup>5</sup>

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) south of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

SMM patrols heard one undetermined explosion and 57 shots of small-arms fire, assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Zolote** but within 5km of its periphery. (For details, see the table below.)

Near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area, the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing an armband with "JCCC" written on it). The SMM again saw the seven previously observed containers located south of the area's southern edge and inside the disengagement area. It also observed that the previously reported road barriers across road T-1316, on the area's southern edge, continued to be closed.

SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, on three occasions, while flying over the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk).\*

#### Weapons storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region 4 February

The SMM noted that all weapons observed at this site were present, compared with the previous visit on 11 January 2022.

# At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region 4 February

The Mission noted that three tanks (T-64) and 11 tanks (T-72) were missing, compared with the previous visit on 30 December 2021.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

At two heavy weapons permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

4 February

The SMM noted that all weapons observed at these sites were present, compared with the previous visits to these sites on 30 December 2021 and 21 January 2022.

#### Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, the Mission saw 22 multiple launch rocket systems and ten howitzers, including one multiple launch rocket system and four howitzers at an airfield near Peremozhne (19km south of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the SMM saw four tanks in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region. It also saw 61 tanks, 20 howitzers and six antitank guns in the training areas near Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk) and Kruhlyk (non-government-controlled, 31km south-west of Luhansk), and one tank at the above-mentioned airfield. (For further information, see the tables below.)

#### Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone

The Mission saw an armoured combat vehicle near a residential area in a governmentcontrolled area of Donetsk region. (For further information, see the table below.)

#### SMM facilitation of the operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk). While positioned at two locations near the DFS, the Mission heard five bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all assessed as within a 5km radius of the DFS.

#### Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Donetsk region, the SMM observed that the EECP near Novotroitske (governmentcontrolled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) was open, with people queuing to travel in both directions. It also observed that the EECP near Hnutove was open, but did not observe any traffic passing through.

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were open, with people queueing to travel in both directions.

The Mission noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were open, but that the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote was closed.

At the EECP near Zolote, the SMM observed ten workers (eight men, in their thirties and forties, and two women in their forties and fifties) nearby, unloading frames from a heavy truck assembling them into containers.

# The SMM visited a crossing point on the border with the Russian Federation in Kharkiv region

While at a border crossing point in Hoptivka (33km north of Kharkiv), Kharkiv region, the Mission saw that it was open with traffic entering and exiting Ukraine, and observed no change in the security situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv and observed no change in the security situation.

# \*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see <u>SMM Daily Report of 2 February 2022</u>). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

#### Denial:

- At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske, four members of the armed formations (one visibly armed) denied the SMM passage north into the settlement, citing "a lack of permission from superiors". The Mission was thus unable to conduct an impact site assessment in the settlement.

#### *Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:*

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

#### Other impediments:6

- SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during 13 flights: three times each while flying over the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) and near Bobrove (government-controlled, 56km north-west of Luhansk), twice each while flying over areas near Petrivske and Klynove (government-controlled, 68km north-east of Donetsk), and once each while flying over areas near Kapitanove (government-controlled, 49km north-west of Luhansk), Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), and Verkhnoshyrokivske. During the latter flight, the Mission lost spatial control over the UAV and was unable to retrieve it, thus preventing it from further following up on damage at the EECP near Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk). (See above.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of tens of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

### **Tables of weapons**

### Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No.	Туре	Location	Source of observation				
	Non-government-controlled areas							
	1	Multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 Grad, 122mm)		Patrol				
	1	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm)						
4/2/2022	1	Self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm)	At an airfield near Peremozhne (19km south of Luhansk)					
	1	Towed howitzer (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm)						
	1	Towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm)						
4/2/2022	21	Multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 Grad, 122mm)	Near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk)	Patrol				
4/2/2022	2	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm	Near Bile (22km west of Luhansk)					
	4	Towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm)	Inear Dife (22kill west of Luliansk)					

### Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No.	Туре	Location	Source of observation
		Government-con	ntrolled areas	
4/2/2022 4		Tank (T-64)	Near Pryvilne (government-controlled, 72km south of Donetsk)	Patrol
		Non-government-o	controlled areas	
	29	Tank (seven T-64, eight T-72B and 14 T-64B/T-64BM)	In a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk),	), Mini-UAV
2/2/2022	12	Towed howitzer (D-30A Lyagushka, 122mm)	where the Mission also observed the presence of 50	
	8	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm)	armoured combat vehicles, six armoured signals and	
	6	Anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm)	command vehicles, one trench digger and one anti-aircraft gun. <sup>7</sup>	
	32	Tank (13 T-64, 17 T-72 and two type undetermined)	In a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk)	
4/2/2022	1	Tank (T-64)	At an airfield near Peremozhne	Patrol

## Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>8</sup>

Date	ate No. Type		Location	Source of observation		
Government-controlled areas						
4/2/2022	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)	Near a residential area of Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk)	Patrol		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The armoured combat vehicles mentioned here are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera in Berezove (government-controlled, 31km SW of Donetsk)	0.5-1km ESE	Recorded	8	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	4-Feb, 18:34
SMM camera 1.5km NE of Hnutove	2-4km SE	Recorded	1	Projectile	SSW to NNE	N/K	4-Feb, 01:44
(government-controlled, 90km S of Donetsk)	2-4km SE	Recorded	1	Projectile	SSW to NNE	N/K	4-Feb, 01:45
SMM camera at entry-exit checkpoint in Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km S of Donetsk)	3-5km ENE	Recorded	1	Projectile	S to N	N/K	3-Feb, 23:43
SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne	2-4km NNE	Recorded	2	Projectile	ESE to WNW	N/K	3-Feb, 21:51
(government-controlled, 100km S of	2-4km N	Recorded	9	Projectile	In vertical flight	N/K	3-Feb, 22:25
Donetsk)	2-4km NNE	Recorded	17	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	3-Feb, 22:49
	2-4km NNE	Recorded	1	Projectile	E to W	N/K	4-Feb, 00:56
	2-4km N	Recorded	3	Projectile	W to E	N/K	4-Feb, 01:16
	3-5km N	Recorded	4	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	4-Feb, 03:49
	3-5km N	Recorded	12	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	4-Feb, 05:17
	3-5km N	Recorded	1	Burst	In vertical flight	N/K	4-Feb, 18:01
	3-5km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	4-Feb, 18:30
	3-5km N	Recorded	1	Projectile	In vertical flight	N/K	4-Feb, 18:48
	3-5km N	Recorded	4	Projectile	W to E	N/K	4-Feb, 18:56
SE part of Avdiivka (government- controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	1-2km SSW	Heard	4	Burst		HMG	4-Feb, 13:45
About 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government- controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	2km WSW	Heard	1	Burst		Small arms	4-Feb, 13:08
About 2km NE of Chernenko	2-3km NNE	Heard	6	Shot		Small arms	4-Feb, 12:16
(government-controlled, 86km S of	2-3km NNE	Heard	1	Shot		Small arms	4-Feb, 12:24
Donetsk)	2-3km NNE	Heard	4	Shot		Small arms	4-Feb, 12:45
	2-3km NNE	Heard	3	Shot		Small arms	4-Feb, 12:52-13:0
Pervomaisk (non-government	3-4km WSW	Heard	13	Burst		HMG	4-Feb, 09:35-09:3
controlled, 58km W of Luhansk)	3-4km WSW	Heard	2	Shot		HMG	4-Feb, 09:35-09:3
Popasna (government controlled, 69km W of Luhansk)	1-2km NNE	Heard	29	Shot	Assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote	Small arms	4-Feb, 13:33-13:3
Molodizhne (non-government controlled, 63km north-W of Luhansk)	1-2km NW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined, assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote	SPG	4-Feb, 13:32-13:3
	1-2km NW	Heard	28	Shot	Assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote	Small arms	4-Feb, 13:32-13:3

### Table of ceasefire violations as of 4 February 2022<sup>9</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an "N/K"), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.



Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions<sup>10</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).