


OSCCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

# **Daily Report 236/2021**

8 October 2021<sup>1</sup>

#### **Summary**

- In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded 96 ceasefire violations, including six explosions. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 101 ceasefire violations in the region.
- In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded 17 ceasefire violation, including eight explosions. In the previous reporting period, it recorded one ceasefire violation in the region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable the operation and repairs of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at three entry-exit checkpoints and the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The Mission monitored the security situation in south and south-east Kherson region.
- The SMM monitored a gathering in Kyiv.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and a checkpoint of the armed formations, and while approaching a border crossing point near Novoazovsk, all in Donetsk region. Its unmanned aerial vehicles again experienced instances of jamming.\*





Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 7 October 2021. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Including explosions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Including from unidentified weapons.





In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 96 ceasefire violations, including six explosions (one impact and five undetermined). Almost all ceasefire violations occurred in areas north of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk). In the <u>previous reporting</u> <u>period</u>, the Mission recorded 101 ceasefire violations in the region, some of which also occurred near Shyrokyne.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded 17 ceasefire violations, including eight undetermined explosions. Thirteen ceasefire violations occurred south west of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the <u>previous reporting</u> <u>period</u>, the SMM recorded one ceasefire violation in the region, which also occurred close to the disengagement area near Zolote.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding Measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the Mission has recorded at least 62,862 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 17,207 explosions, 12,513 projectiles in flight, 278 muzzle flashes, 247 illumination flares and at least 32,617 bursts and shots).

#### Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske<sup>5</sup>

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) south of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening of 6 October, while on the northern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and nine bursts and shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 4-10km east-south-east, assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Zolote**, but within 5km of its periphery.

On 7 October, inside the disengagement area, about 45m south of its northern edge and about 40m east of road T-1316, the Mission observed for the first time that part of a previously reported trench, stretching south-east, about two square metres in perimeter, had been covered with a wooden roof and a plastic camouflage net. About 5m further north, the SMM observed barbed wire (previously reported).

Near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area, the Mission saw five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them). The SMM again saw the seven previously observed containers located south of the disengagement area's southern edge and inside the area, and the previously reported underground structure inside the area.

During the day on 7 October, while positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-governmentcontrolled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km north-east, assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Petrivske**, but within 5km of its periphery.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

#### Withdrawal of we apons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, the SMM observed a howitzer, an anti-tank-gun and two multiple launch rocket systems in two residential areas, one in and the other near Luhansk city (non-government-controlled) (For further information, see the table below.)

### Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone

In Luhansk region, the Mission saw one armoured combat vehicle in a government-controlled area and one armoured combat vehicle in a residential area of Luhansk city. (For further information, see the table below.)

#### De-mining activities near Novoluhanske, Donetsk region

In fields about 2km north-north-west and 2.5km north of Novoluhanske (governmentcontrolled, 53km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 12 members (gender and age unknown) of an international de-mining organization wearing protective gear, including eight using mine detectors, in fields east and west of a local road.

#### SMM facilitation - the operation and repairs of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and monitored adherence to a localized ceasefire to enable repairs to the roofs of buildings at the DFS.

The Mission also monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable inspection and repairs to power lines in Taramchuk (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk).

#### Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Luhansk region, the SMM observed that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were open, with people queueing to travel in both directions. At 50m and 200m south of the EECP, the Mission saw three men (in their forties) conducting construction works. (For previous observations in the area, see <u>SMM Daily Report of 7 October 2021</u>.)

The SMM noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were open, but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were closed.

#### Security situation in south and south-east Kherson region

On 7 October, the SMM monitored areas in southern Kherson region and along the Black Sea coast in Skadovsk (62km south-east of Kherson) and Lazurne (62km south of Kherson) and observed no change in the security situation.

#### SMM monitored a gathering in Kyiv

In Kyiv, at the Memorial Complex to Heroes of Kyiv Who Died for the Integrity and Independence of Ukraine at 3 Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street, the Mission observed about 150 people (mostly men, in their forties and fifties), most of whom were wearing uniforms with insignias of the *Municipal Guard*, attending a commemorative event. The SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Chernivtsi.

#### \*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see below). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

#### Denials:

- At a checkpoint on the northern edge of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk), three members of the armed formations denied the Mission passage east towards a nearby border crossing point, citing "ongoing exercises in the area".

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

#### Delay:

- At a checkpoint on the north-eastern edge of Zhabunki (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations allowed the Mission

passage south-west towards Oktiabr mine only after about two hours of waiting, referring to a lack of prior notification.

- At a checkpoint north of Berdianske (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk), an armed soldier of the Ukrainian Armed Forces allowed the Mission passage eastwards only after about 35 minutes of waiting, citing "orders from his superiors".

#### Other impediments:6

- While conducting a test flight, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between Varvarivka (government-controlled, 81km north-west of Donetsk) and Myroliubivka (government-controlled, 46km north-west of Donetsk) and between Novoandriivka (government-controlled, 75km north-west of Donetsk) and Andriivka (government-controlled, 75km north-west of Donetsk) and Andriivka (government-controlled, 75km north-west of Donetsk) and Andriivka (government-controlled, 79km north-west of Donetsk). The same UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas between Myroliubivka and Novoandriivka.
- SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during two flights: once over areas near Kurdiumivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk), and once over areas near Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 77km west of Luhansk).
- The Mission cancelled a mid-range UAV flight due to GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, near Kurdiumivka.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of tens of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

## **Tables of weapons**

## Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No. of we apons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation						
Non-government-controlled are as										
7/10/2021	1	Towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm)		Patrol						
	1	Anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm)	In a residential area of Luhansk city							
	1	Multiple lowe of an elect system (DM 21 Curd								
	1	Multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 <i>Grad</i> , 122mm)	In a residential area of Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk)							

## Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>7</sup>


Date	No.	Туре	Location	Source of observation				
Government-controlled areas								
7/10/2021	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	Near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk)	Patrol				
Non-government-controlled areas								
7/10/2021	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)	In a residential area of Luhansk city	Patrol				

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
	2-5km SE	Recorded	1	Muzzle flash	Also recorded by the SMM camera in DFS	N/K	7-Oct, 01:23
SMM camera in Avdiivka (government- controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	2-5km SE	Recorded	1	Projectile	NW to SE (subsequent to previous event)	N/K	7-Oct, 01:23
controlled, 17km (vor Dolledsk)	2-5km ESE	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined (also recorded by the SMM camera in DFS)	N/K	7-Oct, 01:24
	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Projectile	W to E	N/K	6-Oct, 20:23
	4-6km N	Recorded	21	Projectile	E to W	N/K	6-Oct, 20:29
	4-6km N	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	6-Oct, 20:36
	4-6km N	Recorded	18	Projectile	E to W	N/K	6-Oct, 20:54
	4-6km N	Recorded	6	Projectile	ESE to WNW	N/K	6-Oct, 23:54
	3-5km N	Recorded	1	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	6-Oct, 23:57
	3-5km N	Recorded	1	Projectile	S to N	N/K	6-Oct, 23:57
SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne	4-6km N	Recorded	22	Projectile	ESE to WNW	N/K	6-Oct, 23:59
(government-controlled, 100km S of Donetsk)	4-6km N	Recorded	12	Projectile	ESE to WNW	N/K	7-Oct, 00:00
	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	7-Oct, 00:04
	3-5km N	Recorded	3	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	7-Oct, 00:05
	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Muzzle flash		N/K	7-Oct, 18:49
	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Projectile	W to E (subsequent to previous event)	N/K	7-Oct, 18:49
	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Impact (subsequent to previous event)	N/K	7-Oct, 18:49
About 2km N of Petrivske (non-government- controlled, 41km S of Donetsk)	2-3km NE	Heard	4	Shot	Assessed as outside the disengagement area	Small arms	7-Oct, 12:55- 13:00
About 2.5km E of Vesela Hora (non- government-controlled, 16km N of Luhansk)	5-10km W	Heard	4	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	5-Oct, 12:26- 12:27
	5-10km ESE	Heard	4	Explosions	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote)	N/K	6-Oct, 22:47- 23:05
N edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km W of Luhansk)	4-7km ESE	Heard	7	Bursts	SALW(assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote)	N/K	6-Oct, 22:47- 23:05
	4-7km ESE	Heard	2	Single Shots	SALW (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote)	N/K	6-Oct, 22:47- 23:05

#### Table of ceasefire violations as of 7 October 20218

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an "N/K"), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.



Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions<sup>9</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).