Summary

- In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded ten ceasefire violations, including seven explosions. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 30 ceasefire violations in the region.
- In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded two ceasefire violations, both explosions. In the previous reporting period, it recorded ten ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanitsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrovsk. It spotted a person inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable the operation and maintenance of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at three entry-exit checkpoints and three corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The SMM’s freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of recorded ceasefire violations</th>
<th>Number of recorded explosions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2020 daily average</td>
<td>2020 daily average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Report 10.06.2021</td>
<td>Daily Report 10.06.2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous 7 days average</td>
<td>previous 7 days average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous 30 days average</td>
<td>previous 30 days average</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ceasefire violations

1 Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 10 June 2021. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.
2 For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.
3 Including explosions.
4 Including from unidentified weapons.
Map of recorded ceasefire violations

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM
10 June 2021

Ceasefire violation concentration
- High
- Orange
- Yellow
- Low
- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - V.ILIZ (2005), IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 11/06/2021
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded ten ceasefire violations, including seven explosions (six undetermined and one impact). The majority of ceasefire violations occurred in an area north of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk). In the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded 30 ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded two ceasefire violations, both undetermined explosions, in an area north-east of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded ten ceasefire violations.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the TCG on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has recorded at least 33,908 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 10,729 explosions, 5,714 projectiles in flight, 230 muzzle flashes, 110 illumination flares and at least 17,125 bursts and shots).

**Disengagement areas near Stanysia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske**

While positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanysia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) south of the repaired span of the Stanysia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

During the day of 9 June, inside the disengagement area near Zolote an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted one person inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 1km east-south-east of the area’s north-western corner. On the northern edge of the area, near the north-eastern corner of the disengagement area, the UAV spotted two people in camouflage clothing walking on a dirt track near former positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 10 June, while positioned in Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk), the Mission heard two undetermined explosions, at an assessed range of 4-6km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery.

While positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them).

The SMM again saw the seven previously observed containers located south of the area’s southern edge and inside the area.

On 9 June, outside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), in a field near the area’s north-western corner, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted 30 anti-tank mines, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. (For previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 18 May 2021.)

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5 Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
On 10 June, while positioned at four locations near the area, the Mission observed a calm situation.

### Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

### Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn

*At two heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region*

10 June

The SMM noted that 15 weapons were present, including five tanks (T-72B), nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and one surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10). During the previous visit, the Mission saw 14 weapons present and none that were missing.

### Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone

The SMM saw ten armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including near a residential area. (For further information, see the table below.)

### SMM facilitation of maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitored the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable maintenance to water infrastructure in Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk) and maintenance to power infrastructure near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

### Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanitsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of Stanitsia Luhanska bridge were open, with people queueing to travel in both directions.

While at the EECP, the Mission saw a body of a woman (age unknown) placed in a wheelchair and covered with a black plastic bag. Two police officers told the SMM that the woman (in her eighties) had died, while crossing towards government-controlled areas.

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6 The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

7 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
While at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the Mission saw a man (in his forties) transferring a coffin from government- to non-government-controlled areas.

The Mission also noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were open, but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were closed.

**The SMM monitored a gathering in Pokrovsk**

In Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, government-controlled, 55km north-west of Donetsk), in front of the city council building on 11 Shybankova square, the SMM saw 25 people (mixed genders and ages) holding banners and signs with messages in support for the families who are missing members as a consequence of the conflict.

**Border areas outside government control**

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk) for about 40 minutes, the Mission observed a man (in his twenties) entering Ukraine. During the same time, it saw seven cars (including six with “DPR” plates) and 24 covered cargo trucks (23 with “DPR” plates and one with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

**Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 9 June 2021). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

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8 According to decisions in 2014 by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, operations are officially designated as suspended at these and other border crossing points located outside government control.
### Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/6/2021</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Probable infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)</td>
<td>Near Novoselivka (31km north of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Mini-UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/6/2021</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Probable armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/6/2021</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Probable infantry fighting vehicle (type undetermined)</td>
<td>Near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/6/2021</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (BTR-4)</td>
<td>Near a residential area in Zolote (60km west of Luhansk)</td>
<td>Aerial imagery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/6/2021</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/6/2021</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined)</td>
<td>Near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/6/2021</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/6/2021</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2)</td>
<td>Near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/6/2021</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)</td>
<td>Near Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
### Table of ceasefire violations as of 10 June 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMM position</th>
<th>Event location</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Date, time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km S of Donetsk)</td>
<td>3-5km N</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>9-Jun, 22:57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5km N</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>10-Jun, 00:31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5km N</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Muzzle flash</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>10-Jun, 00:31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5km N</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Projectile</td>
<td>S to N (subsequent to previous event)</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>10-Jun, 00:31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5km N</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Impact (subsequent to previous event)</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>10-Jun, 00:31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5km N</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>10-Jun, 02:05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5km N</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>10-Jun, 02:06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km NE of Donetsk)</td>
<td>3-7km SE</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>9-Jun, 20:38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pavlopil (government-controlled, 84km S of Donetsk)</td>
<td>1km SE</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td></td>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td>10-Jun, 13:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km NW of Luhansk)</td>
<td>4-6km S</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote)</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>10-Jun, 14:35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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10 The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.
The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).