


OSCCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Daily Report 132/2021

9 June 2021¹

Summary

- In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 104 ceasefire violations, including 79 explosions. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 53 ceasefire violations in the region.
- In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded 56 ceasefire violations, including three explosions. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 23 ceasefire violations in the region.
- The SMM followed up on reports of a man injured due to the detonation of an explosive object in Novohrodivka, Donetsk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. It again spotted people inside the disengagement area near Petrivske.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable the operation and maintenance of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at three entryexit checkpoints and two corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at a border crossing point and a railway station near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk), Luhansk region. Its unmanned aerial vehicles again experienced multiple instances of GPS signal interference.*



Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 8 June 2021. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

³ Including explosions.

 $^{^{2}}$ For a complete breakdown of cease fire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational and weather conditions limited the observational capabilities of some of the other cameras.


⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations



Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 8 June 2021



In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 104 ceasefire violations, including 79 undetermined explosions. The majority of ceasefire violations occurred in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk). In the <u>previous reporting period</u>, the Mission recorded 53 ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded 56 ceasefire violations, including three undetermined explosions. The majority of ceasefire violations occurred in an area south-west of Shymshynivka (non-government-controlled, 27km south-west of Luhansk), and were assessed as a live-fire exercise outside the security zone. In the <u>previous reporting period</u>, the Mission recorded 23 ceasefire violations.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has recorded at least 33,856 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 10,709 explosions, 5,714 projectiles in flight, 230 muzzle flashes, 110 illumination flares and at least 17,093 bursts and shots).

Man injured due to the detonation of an explosive object in Novohrodivka, Donetsk region

The Mission followed up on reports of a man who was injured due to the detonation of an explosive object in Novohrodivka (government-controlled, 42km north-west of Donetsk) on 15 February.

On 7 June, a representative (man, age unknown) of the police in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, government-controlled, 55km north-west of Donetsk) told the SMM over the phone that on 15 February, a man (in his forties) had been injured due to the detonation of an explosive object at the house of another man (in his forties) in Novohrodivka.

On the same day, medical staff of a hospital in Selidove (government-controlled, 41km northwest of Donetsk) told the Mission over the phone that on 15 February, a man had been admitted to the hospital with injuries to his chest, that he had lost his right eye, and that his left hand and right arm had to be amputated. According to the interlocutor, the injuries were consistent with the detonation of an explosive object.

On 3 June, a woman (age unknown), who introduced herself as the mother of the injured man, told the Mission over the phone that on 15 February, her son had sustained serious injuries and had been hospitalized for over a month.

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

While positioned inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

While positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the **disengagement** area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the Mission saw five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them). The

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

SMM again saw the seven previously observed containers located south of the disengagement area's southern edge and inside the area.

On the night of 7-8 June, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-governmentcontrolled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two people inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 1.5km eastnorth-east of the area's south-western corner.

On 8 June, while positioned at two locations near the disengagement area, the Mission recorded 11 shots of small-arms fire, assessed as outside the area but within 5km of its periphery.

Withdrawal of we apons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage areas, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system, 19 howitzers and 14 tanks in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including in a residential area and at a railway station. (For further information, see the table below.)

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

The SMM saw four armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region. (For further information, see the table below.)

On 7 June, about 3km north of Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted three men (age unknown) in military-style clothing, holding rifles assessed as aimed at the UAV. (On the same day, small-arms-fire was assessed as directed at an SMM mini-UAV in the area, see <u>SMM Daily Report of 8 June 2021</u>.)

SMM facilitation of maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable maintenance to water infrastructure in Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk) and near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska was open, with people queueing to travel in both directions.

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

The Mission also noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were open, but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were closed.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point⁷ near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the Mission observed four cars (with "LPR" plates) entering Ukraine, as well as eight cars (including seven with "LPR" plates), one covered cargo truck (with "LPR" plates) and one bus (with "LPR" plates) exiting Ukraine. After about ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the Mission to leave the area.*

While at the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, the SMM observed about 100 stationary railway cars. After about ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the Mission to leave the area.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see below). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Denials:

- At the Chervona Mohyla border railway station in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, citing "lack of permission from superiors".
- At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

⁷ According to decisions in 2014 by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, operations are officially designated as suspended at these and other border crossing points located outside government control.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:8

- On the evening of 7 June and night of 7-8 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between government-controlled Stepanivka (54km north of Donetsk) and Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) and between government-controlled Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk) and Stepanivka, as well as dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, during take-off and landing near Stepanivka, while flying over areas near Stepanivka, and between Kostiantynivka and Bakhmut.
- On 8 June, SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during one flight over areas near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), during three flights over areas near Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), during one flight over areas near Sarabash (formerly Komunarivka, non-government-controlled, 26km south of Donetsk), and during two flights over areas near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk).
- On the same day, four SMM mid-range UAV flights were cancelled due to GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, in the areas near Olenivka, Dokuchaievsk, and Sarabash.

⁸ For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interferences could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

Table of weapons

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation				
Government-controlled areas								
	1	Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10)		Mini-UAV				
7/6/2021	7	Self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm)	Near Manhush (111km south of Donetsk)					
	12	Self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm)	At a railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of					
8/6/2021	12	Tank (T-64)	Luhansk)	Patrol				
	2	Tank (T-64)	In a residential area of Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk)					

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁹


Date	No.	Туре	Location	Source of observation				
Government-controlled areas								
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (type undetermined)	Near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk)					
8/6/2021	2	Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM variant)	Near Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk)	Patrol				
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2)	Near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk)					

⁹ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration Station (15km N of Donetsk)	1-2km SSW	Recorded	1	Illumination flare	In vertical flight	N/K	8-Jun, 01:15
SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km S of Donetsk)	5-7km N	Recorded	1	Projectile	E to W	N/K	8-Jun, 02:20
	3-7km SE	Heard	63	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	7-Jun, 18:45- 19:15
	3-7km SE	Heard	8	Burst		HMG	7-Jun, 18:45- 19:15
Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km NE of Donetsk)	3-7km SE	Heard	8	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	7-Jun, 19:30- 19:40
	3-7km SE	Heard	4	Burst		HMG	7-Jun, 19:30- 19:40
	3-7km SE	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	7-Jun, 20:12
Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk)	5-6km W	Heard	4	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	7-Jun, 19:13- 19:14
About 21 m C of Olonishe (non-commune controlled 221 m CW of Doutel)	2-4km SSW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	8-Jun, 09:35
About 2km S of Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km SW of Donetsk)	2-4km SSW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	8-Jun, 09:48
W edge of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km S of Donetsk)	1km SE	Heard	4	Shot	Assessed as outside the disengagement area	Small arms	8-Jun, 10:49
About 2km N of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km S of Donetsk)	2-3km SE	Heard	7	Shot	Assessed as outside the disengagement area	Small arms	8-Jun, 11:08
	1-2km SW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	8-Jun, 11:16- 11:29
W edge of Shymshynivka (non-government-controlled, 27km SW of Luhansk)	1-2km SW	Heard	25	Shot		Small arms	8-Jun, 11:16- 11:29
	1-2km SW	Heard	28	Burst		Small arms	8-Jun, 11:16- 11:29
W edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 60km W of Luhansk)	9-10km NE	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	8-Jun, 12:11

Table of ceasefire violations as of 8 June 2021¹⁰

¹⁰ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an "N/K"), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.



Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹¹

¹¹ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).