

Daily Report 37/2021

16 February 2021¹


Summary

- The SMM recorded one ceasefire violation in Donetsk region. In the previous 24 hours, it recorded 12 ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission recorded 26 ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. In the previous 24 hours, it recorded 13 ceasefire violations in the region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and again saw containers inside and near the southern edge of the area near Zolote.
- The Mission observed four tanks in violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at four entry-exit checkpoints and three corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 15 February 2021. All times are in Eastern European Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.


³ Including explosions.

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.


Map of recorded ceasefire violations

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 15 February 2021



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded one ceasefire violation – an undetermined explosion in an area north of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk). In the [previous 24 hours](#), the Mission recorded 12 ceasefire violations, all but one in areas north of Shyrokyne.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded 26 ceasefire violations, including 14 undetermined explosions, one of which occurred south-west of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) while most others occurred at south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the [previous 24 hours](#), the Mission recorded 13 ceasefire violations, all at south-easterly directions of Popasna.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded at least 9,588 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 3,267 explosions, 1,118 projectiles in flight, 101 muzzle flashes, 60 illumination flares and at least 5,042 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

On 15 February, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) on the southern edge of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening of 14 February, the SMM camera in Popasna recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3–5km east-south-east, assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Zolote** but within 5km of its periphery.

On 15 February, while positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area, the SMM again saw five containers inside a fenced perimeter south of the area’s southern edge, on the southern edge of the road leading eastwards towards Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk). The Mission observed seven workers use a crane to erect a wall (about 1.2m tall and 55m long) out of about 25 concrete blocks around the north-eastern part of the aforementioned fenced perimeter, and pave the ground inside it with tiles.

Inside the area, it again saw a container about 60–70m north of the other containers, and another one about 350m north of the area’s southern edge, both on the western edge of road T-1316. About 10–30m north of the former container, the Mission again saw six concrete blocks placed in three rows across both lanes of the same road.

The SMM again saw a container, which was previously located about 30m north of the area’s southern edge, on the area’s southern edge.

The Mission also saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), two of whom walked inside the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

While positioned at three locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted four tanks (of which one probable) in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region. Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the Mission observed a self-propelled howitzer and ten tanks at a railway station in a residential area of Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, government-controlled, 55km north-west of Donetsk) (for further information, see the tables below).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

The SMM saw two probable armoured combat vehicles in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region and nine armoured combat vehicles (of which one probable) in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (for further information, see the table below).

SMM facilitation of maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to facilitate the maintenance and operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

It also facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable demining activities in agricultural fields near government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk).

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Donetsk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were open, with civilian traffic passing through in both directions.

In Luhansk region, at 9:20 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. at the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska, the Mission saw 150 and 100 people, respectively, queuing to enter government-controlled areas and people passing the EECP in the opposite direction. It observed a golf cart operating between the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and the EECP.

The SMM also noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were open but did not observe any people passing through, and that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were closed.

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report of 9 February 2021](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Table of weapons

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
14/2/2021	4	Tank (three T-64 and one probable T-64)	Near Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk)	Mini-UAV

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
15/2/2021	10	Tank (T-64)	At a railway station in a residential area of Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk)	Patrol
	1	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)		

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁷

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
13/2/2021	2	Probable armoured combat vehicle	Near Vesele (21km north of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV
Non-government-controlled areas				
12/2/2021	1	Armoured combat vehicle	Near Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV
14/2/2021	1	Probable infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)	Near Sukhodil (21km west of Luhansk)	
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)		
	6	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	Near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk)	


⁷ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 15 February 2021⁸

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne (government- controlled, 100km S of Donetsk)	3-5km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	15-Feb, 00:35
SMM camera on the N edge of Popasna (government- controlled, 69km W of Luhansk)	2-4km SE	Recorded	1	Projectile	N to S	N/K	14-Feb, 19:05
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	14-Feb, 19:07
	4-6km SE	Recorded	1	Projectile	WNW to ESE	N/K	14-Feb, 19:09
	2-4km SE	Recorded	1	Projectile	N to S	N/K	14-Feb, 19:11
	3-5km SE	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	14-Feb, 19:26
	3-5km SSE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	14-Feb, 19:45
	3-5km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote)	N/K	14-Feb, 19:49
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	14-Feb, 19:54
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	14-Feb, 19:58
	2-4km SE	Recorded	1	Muzzle flash		N/K	14-Feb, 20:13
	2-4km SSE	Recorded	1	Projectile	ENE to WSW (subsequent to previous event)	N/K	14-Feb, 20:13
	2-4km SSE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Airburst (subsequent to previous event)	N/K	14-Feb, 20:13
	3-5km SE	Recorded	1	Projectile	NE to SW	N/K	14-Feb, 20:14
	2-4km SE	Recorded	1	Muzzle flash		N/K	14-Feb, 20:24
	2-4km SSE	Recorded	1	Projectile	ENE to WSW (subsequent to previous event)	N/K	14-Feb, 20:24
	2-4km SSE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Airburst (subsequent to previous event)	N/K	14-Feb, 20:24
	2-4km SSE	Recorded	8	Projectile	NE to SW	N/K	14-Feb, 20:25
3-5km SE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	14-Feb, 20:25	
2-4km SSE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Airburst	N/K	14-Feb, 20:25	
4-6km SSE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	14-Feb, 20:32	
About 2.5km NNW of Pervomaisk (non- government- controlled, 58km W of Luhansk)	8-11km NNE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	15-Feb, 12:00

⁸ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions⁹



⁹ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).