

# Daily Report 34/2021


12 February 2021<sup>1</sup>

## Summary


- The SMM recorded 894 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, 848 of which were assessed as live-fire exercises in non-government-controlled areas near the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) and Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove). In the previous reporting period, it recorded 53 ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission recorded two ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded no ceasefire violations in the region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and again saw containers inside and near the southern edge of the area near Zolote.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable repairs and operation of critical civilian infrastructure. It heard 50 ceasefire violations close to the DFS, during and near the times when a bus with DFS workers was driving towards Yasynuvata.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at four entry-exit checkpoints and three corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.\*

## Ceasefire violations<sup>2</sup>

Number of recorded ceasefire violations<sup>3</sup>



Number of recorded explosions<sup>4</sup>




<sup>1</sup> Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 11 February 2021. All times are in Eastern European Time.

<sup>2</sup> For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational, and weather conditions limited the observational capabilities of some of the other SMM cameras.

<sup>3</sup> Including explosions.

<sup>4</sup> Including from unidentified weapons.

### Map of recorded ceasefire violations



In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 894 ceasefire violations, including 23 undetermined explosions. 848 of these ceasefire violations occurred in areas south-east of the DFS (15km north of Donetsk) and north and north-west of Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), and were assessed as live-fire training exercises in the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone. In [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded 53 ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded two ceasefire violations, both undetermined explosions which occurred in an area east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and in an area south-west of Orikhove-Donetske (government-controlled, 44km north-west of Luhansk). In the [previous reporting period](#), the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded at least 9,507 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 3,231 explosions, 1,082 projectiles in flight, 101 muzzle flashes, 60 illumination flares and at least 5,033 bursts and shots).

#### **Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske<sup>5</sup>**

On 11 February, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) on the southern edge of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On 11 February, while positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM again saw five containers inside a fenced perimeter south of the area’s southern edge, on the southern edge of the road leading eastward towards Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).<sup>6</sup>

Inside the area, it again saw a container about 60–70m north of the other containers and another one about 350m north of the area’s southern edge, both on the western edge of road T-1316. On the southern edge of the area, the Mission saw that the concrete blocks which were previously placed on the western edge of road T-1316 had been removed, and some of them had been placed around the abovementioned fenced perimeter.

On the same day, while positioned near the same checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area, the Mission saw five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), two of whom walked inside the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned, accompanied by a person in medical protective gear.

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<sup>5</sup> Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

<sup>6</sup> The SMM Daily Reports of 10 and 11 February 2021 should have read, “While positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM again saw five containers inside a fenced perimeter south of the area’s southern edge, on the southern edge of the road leading eastward towards Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk)”.

While positioned at two locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

### **Withdrawal of weapons**

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of respective withdrawal lines, the Mission observed a multiple launch rocket system, a self-propelled howitzer and three towed howitzers in a training area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the SMM spotted ten tanks at a railway station in a government-controlled area and 35 tanks in a training area in a non-government-controlled area, all in Donetsk region (for further information, see the tables below).

### **Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>7</sup>**

During the past weeks, the SMM continued to observe recent trenches and trench extensions on both sides of the contact line.

On 20 January, SMM unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) spotted trench extensions in areas near Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk) and Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk).

In a field about 1.2km east of the eastern edge of Vodiane, an SMM long-range UAV spotted for the first time a 30m-long trench extension, assessed as a forward movement of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (not visible in imagery from 17 October 2020), reducing the distance between their positions and those of the armed formations to about 30m.

In a field about 300m north-west of the north-western edge of Naberezhne, an SMM long-range UAV spotted for the first time a 130m-long trench extension (not seen in imagery from 6 October 2020). In a field about 3.8km south-south-west of the southern edge of Naberezhne, the same UAV spotted for the first time a 240m-long trench extension (not seen in imagery from 2 September 2020). Both of these extensions were assessed as forward movements of the armed formations, reducing the distance between their positions and those of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to about 680m and 470m, respectively.

The Mission also observed infantry fighting vehicles in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region (for further information, see the table below).

### **SMM facilitation of repairs and operation of critical civilian infrastructure and of demining**

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and repair works to the power station at the DFS. While positioned at three locations near the station, the SMM heard 782 ceasefire violations: 771 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire (of which

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<sup>7</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

736 were assessed as live-fire exercise in the security zone, see above) and 11 undetermined explosions, all assessed as within a 5km radius of the station. Forty-two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and eight undetermined explosions were recorded during and near the times when a bus with DFS workers was driving on road M-04 towards Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM also continued to monitor the security situation near the pumping station close to Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable demining activities in agricultural fields near government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk).

### **Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints**

In Donetsk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) was open but did not observe any civilian traffic. It also noted that the checkpoint of the armed formations near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk) was closed.

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska was open, with people passing through in both directions. The SMM also observed a golf cart operating between the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and the EECP.

The SMM also noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were open but did not observe any people passing through, and that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were closed.

### **Border areas outside government control**

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the Mission observed five cars (including two with "DPR" plates), a covered cargo truck and a woman (in her seventies) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM observed 11 cars (including five with "DPR" plates), a covered cargo truck (with "DPR" plates) and two women (mixed ages) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM also monitored border areas near Chervona Zoria (84km east of Donetsk) and Stepanivka (76km east of Donetsk), and observed a calm situation.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

### **\*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

*The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid*

*response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report of 9 February 2021](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.*

*Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:*

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:<sup>8</sup>

- On 11 February, an SMM mid-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk).

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<sup>8</sup> For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV's position.

## Table of weapons

### Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
<b>Non-government-controlled areas</b>				
11/2/2021	1	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)	Patrol
	3	Towed howitzer (D-30 <i>Lyagushka</i> , 122mm)		
	1	Multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 <i>Grad</i> , 122mm)		

### Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
<b>Government-controlled areas</b>				
11/2/2021	10	Tank (T-64)	At a railway station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk)	Patrol
<b>Non-government-controlled areas</b>				
11/2/2021	35	Tank (nine T-64 and 26 type undetermined)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)	Patrol

### **Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>9</sup>**

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
<b>Government-controlled areas</b>				
11/2/2021	3	Infantry fighting vehicle (one BMP variant and two BMP-1)	In Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BTR-4)	On the western edge of Pionerske (101km south of Donetsk)	Patrol

<sup>9</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

**Table of ceasefire violations as of 11 February 2021<sup>10</sup>**


SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
About 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	2-3km SE	Heard	6	Burst		HMG	11-Feb, 09:08-09:12
	2-3km SE	Heard	1	Burst		HMG	11-Feb, 09:20
	2-3km SE	Heard	350	Shot		Small arms	11-Feb, 09:48-09:58
	2-3km SE	Heard	27	Burst		Small arms	11-Feb, 09:48-09:58
	2-3km SE	Heard	54	Shot		Small arms	11-Feb, 09:58-10:03
	2-3km SE	Heard	68	Burst		Small arms	11-Feb, 10:08-10:15
	2-3km SE	Heard	110	Shot		Small arms	11-Feb, 10:08-10:15
	2-3km SE	Heard	6	Burst		HMG	11-Feb, 10:35-10:39
	2-3km SE	Heard	7	Shot		Small arms	11-Feb, 12:05-12:07
	2-3km SE	Heard	21	Shot		Small arms	11-Feb, 12:12-12:14
	2-3km SE	Heard	42	Shot		Small arms	11-Feb, 12:18-12:25
	2-3km SE	Heard	17	Shot		Small arms	11-Feb, 12:30-12:38
	2-3km SE	Heard	8	Shot		Small arms	11-Feb, 12:45-12:48
	4-6km NNW	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	11-Feb, 12:52
	4-6km NNW	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	11-Feb, 13:31
4-6km NNW	Heard	5	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	11-Feb, 13:39-13:40	
Railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	2-3km SE	Heard	6	Burst		Small arms	11-Feb, 10:35-10:39
	2-3km SE	Heard	13	Shot		Small arms	11-Feb, 10:35-10:39
About 2km SSE of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km N of Donetsk)	0.8-1km E	Heard	35	Burst		HMG	11-Feb, 09:10
About 2.5km S of Sofiiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, non-government-controlled, 40km NE of Donetsk)	2-3km N	Heard	40	Shot		HMG	11-Feb, 09:40-09:50
	2-3km N	Heard	60	Shot		HMG	11-Feb, 09:50-09:55
	2-3km NW	Heard	12	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	11-Feb, 09:50-09:55

<sup>10</sup> The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.



SE edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km W of Luhansk)	2-4km E	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	11-Feb, 10:50
About 2.5km E of Orikhove-Donetske (government-controlled, 44km NW of Luhansk)	5-10km SW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	11-Feb, 12:34

### Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions<sup>11</sup>



<sup>11</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).