

# Daily Report 27/2021


4 February 2021<sup>1</sup>

## Summary


- The SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded two ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission recorded nine ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded no ceasefire violations in the region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and again saw containers and construction works near the southern edge of the area near Zolote.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure and demining activities.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at four entry-exit checkpoints and three corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission visited two border crossing points outside government control in Donetsk region.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at checkpoints of the armed formations near Zaichenko and near Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske), southern Donetsk region.\*

## Ceasefire violations<sup>2</sup>

Number of recorded ceasefire violations<sup>3</sup>



Number of recorded explosions<sup>4</sup>




<sup>1</sup> Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 3 February 2021. All times are in Eastern European Time.

<sup>2</sup> For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational and weather conditions limited the observational capabilities of some of the other SMM cameras.


<sup>3</sup> Including explosions.

<sup>4</sup> Including from unidentified weapons.


### Map of recorded ceasefire violations



## Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 3 February 2021



#### Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- ..... Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 04/02/2021

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. In the [previous reporting period](#), it recorded two ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded nine ceasefire violations – five undetermined explosions and four bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire in areas north and south of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), it recorded no ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded at least 8,071 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 2,976 explosions, 1,040 projectiles in flight, 99 muzzle flashes, 60 illumination flares and at least 3,896 bursts and shots).

### Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske<sup>5</sup>

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) on the southern edge of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

While positioned in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and on the western edge of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), the Mission heard five undetermined explosions, assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Zolote** but within 5km of its periphery.

While positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area, the SMM again saw five containers on the southern edge of the road leading eastward towards Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), inside a fenced perimeter south of the area’s southern edge. The Mission also observed 12 workers with heavy equipment flattening the ground and cementing an area inside the perimeter (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 3 February 2021](#)).

While positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), all of whom walked inside the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and returned, accompanied by three people in protective medical gear.

While positioned at three locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

### Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

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<sup>5</sup> Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

In violation of withdrawal lines, near residential houses in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, the Mission observed a surface-to-air missile system. Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage areas in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, the SMM spotted five anti-tank guns and two anti-tank guided missile systems at a railway station (for further information, see the tables below).

### **SMM facilitation of operation and repairs of critical civilian infrastructure**

The Mission continued to facilitate the maintenance and operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable repairs to a gas pipeline between government-controlled Vodiane (15km north-west of Donetsk) and Pervomaiske (17km north-west of Donetsk) and demining activities in agricultural fields near government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk).

### **Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints**

In Donetsk region, the Mission saw that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) was operational but did not observe any civilian traffic. It also noted that the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Kremynets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk) remained closed.

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska was operational, with civilian traffic passing through in both directions.

The Mission also noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were operational but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were not.

### **Border areas outside government control**

While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 15 minutes, the SMM observed no vehicles or pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), for about 90 minutes, the SMM observed 31 cars (including 18 with “DPR” plates), a bus (with “DPR” plates and about 25 passengers, mixed genders and ages) and six pedestrians (three women in their sixties and three men in their fifties) entering Ukraine. During the same time, it also observed 22 cars (including six with “DPR” plates), 28 cargo trucks (including six with “DPR” plates; 24 of them covered and four carrying train wheels), five buses (with “DPR” plates and about 60 passengers, mixed genders and ages) and ten pedestrians (six women in their forties and four men in their thirties and forties) exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, the SMM monitored border areas near Vasylivka (65km south-east of Donetsk), Petropavlivka (68km south-east of Donetsk) and Stepne (72km south-east of Donetsk), and observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

### **\*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

*The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report of 2 February 2021](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.*

#### Denials:

- At a checkpoint near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 93km south of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations (visibly armed) denied the Mission passage towards Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 97km south of Donetsk), citing “the SMM's safety” and “engineering works”. The SMM observed about 15 members of the armed formations carrying out excavating works, assessed as to reinforce the checkpoint.
- At a checkpoint near Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 86km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the Mission passage towards Kulykove (non-government-controlled, 87km south of Donetsk), citing “demining activities in the area”. While at the checkpoint, the SMM observed civilian traffic passing through in both directions.

#### *Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:*

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

#### Other impediments:<sup>6</sup>

- On 3 February, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Hryhorivka (non-government-controlled, 68km south of Donetsk).

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<sup>6</sup> For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV's position.

## Table of weapons

### Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
<b>Government-controlled areas</b>				
3/2/2021	1	Surface-to-air missile system (9K33 <i>Osa</i> , 210mm)	In a residential area of Buhas (44km south-west of Donetsk)	Patrol

### Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
<b>Government-controlled areas</b>				
3/2/2021	5	Anti-tank gun (MT-12 <i>Rapira</i> , 100mm)	At a railway station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk)	Patrol
	2	Anti-tank guided missile system (9P149 <i>Shturm-S</i> , 130mm)		


**Table of ceasefire violations as of 3 February 2021<sup>7</sup>**

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
W edge of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km NW of Luhansk)	5-8km WNW	Heard	4	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote)	N/K	3-Feb, 11:50-12:15
	3-4km SE	Heard	4	Burst		HMG	3-Feb, 11:50-12:15
Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km W of Luhansk)	2-3km SW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote)	N/K	3-Feb, 13:16

<sup>7</sup> The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.



### Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions<sup>8</sup>



<sup>8</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).