


Daily Report 26/2021

3 February 2021¹

Summary

- The SMM recorded two ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 38 ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission recorded no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 72 ceasefire violations in the region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and again saw containers and construction works near the southern edge of the area near Zolote.
- The Mission spotted for the first time anti-tank mines near non-government-controlled Olenivka, Donetsk region.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable the maintenance and operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and demining of agricultural fields in Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at three entry-exit checkpoints and two corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The SMM visited a border crossing point outside government control in Donetsk region.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including again at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Staromykhailivka, Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations²



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 2 February 2021. All times are in Eastern European Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.

³ Including explosions.


⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 2 February 2021



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 03/02/2021

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded two ceasefire violations – an undetermined explosion in an area west of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) on the morning of 2 February (see below) and an undetermined explosion south-south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) on the evening of the same day. In the [previous reporting period](#), the SMM recorded 38 ceasefire violations in the region.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. In the [previous reporting period](#), it recorded 72 ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded at least 8,062 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 2,971 explosions, 1,040 projectiles in flight, 99 muzzle flashes, 60 illumination flares and at least 3,892 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) on the southern edge of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

While positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM again saw five containers on the southern edge of the road leading eastward towards Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), of which three were inside a fenced perimeter south of the disengagement area’s southern edge. The Mission also saw six workers with heavy equipment flattening the ground and cementing an area inside the fenced perimeter (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report of [2 February 2021](#)).

While positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), two of whom walked inside the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and returned.

While positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the Mission heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 4-5km west, assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** but within 5km of its periphery.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage areas in Donetsk region, the SMM spotted four towed howitzers and five probable surface-to-air missile in a government-controlled area, as well as nine tanks in a training area in a non-government-controlled area. (for further information, see the table below).

Weapons storage sites

At a weapons permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

2 February

The SMM noted that 25 tanks (T-64), two mortars (one 2B11 and one 2S12 *Sani*, 120mm) were again missing.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn⁶

At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

2 February

The SMM noted that five self-propelled howitzers (2S3 *Akatsiya*, 152mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 *Rapira*, 100mm) were present and that one self-propelled howitzer (2S3 *Akatsiya*, 152mm) was again missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone^{7, 8}

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region (for further information, see the table below).

Presence of mines near Olenivka, unexploded ordnance near DFS and mine warning signs near Pyshevyk and Kamianka, all in Donetsk region

On 1 February, about 100m west of three [previously seen](#) anti-tank mines laid across road C-051133, about 1km north-north-west of a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted for the first time 25 anti-tank mines laid on the same road and in a field south of it. All these mines were assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

On the same day, about 1.7km and 2.8km east-south-east of Pyshevyk (government-controlled, 84km south of Donetsk), on either side of road C-051232 leading to Verkhnohshyrokiyske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of

⁶ The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

⁷ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

⁸ In the SMM Daily Report [1 February 2021](#), on p. 5, the sentence “On 30 and 31 January, while positioned on the eastern edge of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a mini-UAV (dark quadcopter type) flying over a field about 150m from its position” should have read “On 30 and 31 January, while positioned on the eastern edge of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a mini-UAV (dark quadcopter type) flying over a field about 150m from its position, despite the ban on operation of any types of aerial vehicles included in the 22 July TCG decision regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire”.

Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time two and three mine hazard signs, respectively.

On 2 February, about 1km south of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), in a field about 50m west of the western edge of road H-20, the Mission saw for the first time two red square mine hazard signs with a white skull and letters, as well as five white pieces of cloth tied to bushes, forming a corridor of approximately 10m.

On the same day, near Kashtanove (non-government-controlled, 13km north of Donetsk), the SMM [again](#) saw a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as a rocket from a multiple launch rocket system (probable BM-21) embedded in road M-04, about 900m south-south-east of the DFS.

SMM facilitation of operation of critical civilian infrastructure and of demining

The Mission continued to facilitate the maintenance and operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable demining activities in agricultural fields near government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk).

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska was operational, with civilian traffic passing through in both directions.

The Mission also noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were operational but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were not. While positioned near the latter checkpoint, the Mission heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed distance of about 200m south-west, assessed as a controlled explosion.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM observed three cars (including one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine, as well as 27 cars (including nine with “DPR” plates) and a bus (with “DPR” plates and ten passengers, mixed genders and ages) exiting Ukraine.

Security situation in east Kherson region

On 1 February, the SMM continued to monitor the situation in east Kherson region and observed a calm situation in Kakhovka (70km east of Kherson) and Nova Kakhovka (59km east of Kherson).

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see below). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Delay:

- At a checkpoint near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), two visibly armed members of the armed formations [again](#) delayed the SMM passage towards the centre of the settlement for about 25 minutes. While at the checkpoint, the Mission saw civilian traffic passing through in both directions.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:⁹

- On 2 February, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 24km north of Donetsk).
- On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Pyshevyk (government-controlled, 84km south of Donetsk).

⁹ For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

Table of weapons

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

| Date | No. of weapons | Type of weapon | Location | Source of observation |
|--|----------------|---|---|-----------------------|
| Government-controlled areas | | | | |
| 1/2/2021 | 4 | Towed howitzer (D-44, 85mm) | In a compound near Manhush (111km south of Donetsk) | Mini-UAV |
| 2/2/2021 | 5 | Probable surface-to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela-10</i> , 120mm) mounted on five of seven armoured personnel carriers (MT-LB variant) | Parked at a railway station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk), | Patrol |
| Non-government-controlled areas | | | | |
| 2/2/2021 | 9 | Tank (type undetermined) | In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) | Patrol |

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone¹⁰

| Date | No. | Type | Location | Source of observation |
|------------------------------------|-----|---|--|-----------------------|
| Government-controlled areas | | | | |
| 1/2/2021 | 1 | Probable armoured personnel carrier (probable BTR-70) | Near Pyshevyk (84km south of Donetsk) | Mini-UAV |
| 2/2/2021 | 1 | Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) | In a residential area in Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) | Patrol |
| | 1 | Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) | Near a residential area in Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk) | |
| | 1 | Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60) | Near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) | |

¹⁰ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 2 February 2021¹¹

| SMM position | Event location | Means | No. | Observation | Description | Weapon | Date, time |
|---|----------------|----------|-----|-------------|--|--------|--------------|
| SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration Station (15km N of Donetsk) | 0.5-1km SSW | Recorded | 1 | Explosion | Undetermined | N/K | 2-Feb, 17:51 |
| About 2km N of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km S of Donetsk) | 4-5km W | Heard | 1 | Explosion | Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Petrivske) | N/K | 2-Feb, 09:57 |

¹¹ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹²



¹² The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).