

OSCCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Daily Report 22/2021

29 January 2021¹

Summary

- The SMM recorded 474 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, most of which were assessed as a live-fire exercise in non-government-controlled areas inside the security zone. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 335 ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission recorded no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. In the previous • reporting period, it recorded 13 ceasefire violations in the region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, • Zolote and Petrivske. It saw construction works on and close to road T-1316, near the Zolote disengagement area's southern edge.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable • repairs and operation of critical civilian infrastructure. It heard five ceasefire violations close to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), during the time when a bus with DFS workers was driving towards Yasynuvata.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at four entry-• exit checkpoints and three corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at checkpoints • of the armed formations near Staropetrivske and Petrivske, Donetsk region.*



Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 28 January 2021. All times are in Eastern European Time.

 $^{^{2}}$ For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and Zolote were not operational.

³ Including explosions.

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations



- 2 -

In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded 474 ceasefire violations, including 43 explosions (20 outgoing, 20 impacts of anti-tank guided missiles, as well as three undetermined). The majority of ceasefire violations, including all outgoing explosions and impacts, as well as 327 shots of small-arms fire, occurred in areas south of Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk) and were assessed as a live-fire training exercise in the security zone in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone. In the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded 335 ceasefire violations in the region.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. In the <u>previous reporting period</u>, the SMM recorded 13 ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded at least 7,853 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 2,883 explosions, 1,023 projectiles in flight, 97 muzzle flashes, 60 illumination flares and at least 3,790 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

The SMM saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), on the southern edge of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On 27 January, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted at least 79 anti-tank mines in a field south of the railway track, east of road T-1316, assessed as part of a larger minefield of about 500 mines belonging to the armed formations (for previous observations, see <u>SMM Daily Report of 6 November 2020</u>).

On the same day, inside area, the same UAV spotted three people assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel on road T-1316, about 200m south of the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the area's northern edge.

On 28 January, while positioned at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area, the SMM again observed three containers about 30m south of the road leading eastward towards Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk). The Mission noted that the fourth previously observed container had been placed inside a fenced area nearby. It also saw ten workers with heavy equipment paving the ground and laying concrete inside the fenced area. The SMM additionally saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on the them) enter the disengagement area on foot and accompany a truck carrying three other containers to a location about 350m north of the area's southern edge. The Mission then saw the truck offload one container on the western edge of road T-1316, return to the southern edge of the area and offload the remaining two containers next to the single container placed inside the fenced area.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

observed, for the first time, two posts, assessed as barrier holders, on the eastern and western edges of road T-1316, about 200m north of the area's southern edge.

While positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area, the SMM saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them), all of whom walked inside the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and returned.

During the day on 27 January, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (nongovernment-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted three people inside former positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: one person about 500m and two about 1.5km east-north-east of the area's south-western corner. The same UAV also spotted a person near a former position of the armed formations near the area's south-eastern corner.

On the evening of 27 January, the SMM camera about 2km east of Bohdanivka (governmentcontrolled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-4km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery.

During the day on 28 January, while positioned at three locations near the area, the SMM observed a calm situation.*

Withdrawal of we apons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of two multiple launch rocket systems in a training area in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.

The same imagery also revealed the presence of 62 tanks (of which 39 probable), 38 howitzers/mortars and four surface-to-air missile systems, and an SMM mini-UAV spotted 30 tanks, all beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in training areas in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region (for further information, see the tables below).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

The Mission observed an anti-aircraft gun in a government-controlled residential area of Luhansk region, as well as armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including in residential areas, and in a non-government-controlled residential area of Donetsk region (for further information, see the table below).

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SMM facilitation of repairs and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to monitor the security situation and facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk). While positioned at two locations near the DFS, the SMM heard 11 shots of small-arms fire, all assessed as within a 5km radius of the station, of which five were recorded during the time when a bus with DFS workers was driving on road M-04 towards Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable construction and repairs of power lines in Raihorodka (government-controlled, 34km north-west of Luhansk) and Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk); railway inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); and demining activities near government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk).

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Donetsk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) was operational but did not observe any civilian traffic. It also saw that the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk) remained closed.

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska was operational, with people queuing to travel in both directions.

The Mission noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were operational but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were not. At the latter checkpoint, it observed two workers install an overhead cable on its western edge.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see <u>SMM Daily Report of 26</u> January 2021). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Denial:

- At a checkpoint of the armed formations near Staropetrivske (non-governmentcontrolled, 35km north-east of Donetsk), a visibly armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage towards Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, nongovernment-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), citing an ongoing military-type exercise in the area and orders from superiors.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Delay:

- At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km north of Petrivske (nongovernment-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations allowed the Mission to proceed towards the disengagement area near Petrivske only after about 25 minutes, citing the need to seek permission from his superiors.

Other impediments:7

- On 28 January, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between government-controlled Illinivka (formerly Illicha, 56km north of Donetsk) and Opytne (12km northwest of Donetsk), as well as between Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk) and Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk). The same UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas between Opytne and Staromykhailivka.
- On 28 January, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Panteleimonivka (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Donetsk).

⁷ For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

Table of weapons

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation			
Non-government-controlled areas							
24/1/2021	2	Multiple launch rocket system (type undetermined)	In a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk)	Aerial imagery			

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation		
		Non-government-c	ontrolled areas			
	2	Tank (type undetermined)				
24/1/2021	10	Self-propelled howitzer/mortar (type undetermined)	In a training area near Miusynsk (62km			
	4	Surface-to-air missile system (type undetermined) south-west of Luhansk), where the same imagery also revealed the presence of 15 armoured combat vehicles ⁸				
	13	Towed howitzer/mortar (type undetermined)	annouled combat venicles	Aerial imagery		
	24	Probable tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk)			
	21	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Myrne (28km			
25/1/2021	15	Towed howitzer/mortar (type undetermined)	south-west of Luhansk), where the same imagery also revealed the presence of 55 armoured combat vehicles			
	15	Probable tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk), where the same imagery also revealed the presence of 37 armoured combat vehicles			
07/1/2021	20	Tank (T-64)	In a training area near Kruhlyk (31km	Mini-UAV		
27/1/2021	10	Tank (T-72)	south-west of Luhansk)			

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁹

Date	No.	Туре	Location	Source of observation					
Government-controlled areas									
	1	Probable armoured combat vehicle	In a compound near Dyliivka (49km						
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)	north of Donetsk)						
27/1/2021	1	Probable infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)	In a residential area near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV					
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2)	Near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk)						
	1	Probable armoured combat vehicle	Near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk)						

⁸ The armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft guns mentioned in this table are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

⁹ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

	1		Near Zolote (60km west of Luhansk)		
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BTR-4 Bucephalus)	Near residential area of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk)	Mini-UAV	
	1				
	1	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm)	In residential area of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk)		
	2	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)			
	3	Armoured combat vehicle	Near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV	
28/1/2020	1	Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2)	Near Halytsynivka (29km north-west of Donetsk)		
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	Near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk)	Patrol	
		Non-government-co	ntrolled are as		
27/1/2021	2	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)	In residential area of Nova Marivka (64km south of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV	

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	O bservation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera in Avdiivka (government- controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	3-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Illumination flare	WSW to ENE (also recorded by the SMM camera at the DFS)	N/K	27-Jan, 21:38
SMM camera 2km E of Bohdanivka (government- controlled, 41km SW of Donetsk)	3-4km SE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the Petrivske disengagement area)	N/K	27-Jan, 20:35
SMM camera at entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government- controlled, 23km SW of Donetsk)	2-4km NNE	Recorded	9	Projectile	W to E	N/K	27-Jan, 21:41
About 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non- government- controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	2km SSW	Heard	6	Shot		Small arms	28-Jan, 12:48
SE edge of Avdiivka (government- controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	1-2km E	Heard	5	Shot		Small arms	28-Jan, 13:42
About 4.5km NW of Zalizne (formerly Artemove,	2-3km SSE	Heard	22	Shot		Small arms	28-Jan, 10:08-10:12
	2-3km SSW	Heard	2	Shot		Small arms	28-Jan, 10:14
government- controlled, 42km	2-3km SSE	Heard	19	Shot		Small arms	28-Jan, 10:15-10:17
NE of Donetsk)	2-3km SSE	Heard	10	Shot		Small arms	28-Jan, 10:18-10:20
	2km NNW	Heard	5	Shot		Small arms	28-Jan, 10:21-10:23
	2-3km SSE	Heard	6	Shot		Small arms	28-Jan, 10:21-10:24
	2-3km SSE	Heard	12	Shot		Small arms	28-Jan, 10:25-10:27
	2-3km SSE	Heard	6	Shot		Small	28-Jan, 10:28-10:30
About 2km NW of Sofiivka	1.5-2km S	Heard	327	Shot		Small arms	28-Jan, 11:00-11:20
(formerly Karlo- Marksove, non-	1.5-2km S	Heard	20	Explosion	Outgoing	ATGM (type N/K)	28-Jan, 11:00-11:20

Table of ceasefire violations as of 28 January 2021¹⁰

¹⁰ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an "N/K"), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

government- controlled, 40km NE of Donetsk)	1.5-2km S	Heard	20	Explosion	Impact	ATGM (type N/K)	28-Jan, 11:00-11:20
About 2km NE of Chernenko (government- controlled, 86km S of Donetsk)	2-4km SE	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	28-Jan, 09:13
	2-3km SE	Heard	1	Burst		Small arms	28-Jan, 09:19



Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹¹

¹¹ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).