


Daily Report 21/2021

28 January 2021¹

Summary

- The SMM recorded 335 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 76 ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission recorded 13 ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 46 ceasefire violations in the region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and spotted people inside the area near Petrivske during daytime.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable repairs and operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at four entry-exit checkpoints and five corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations²



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 27 January 2021. All times are in Eastern European Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and Zolote were not operational.


³ Including explosions.

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.


Map of recorded ceasefire violations

OSCE Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 27 January 2021



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 28/01/2021

In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded 335 ceasefire violations, including seven undetermined explosions, the majority of which occurred in areas north-east of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and in areas north-east of Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 24km north of Donetsk) (about 12km north-west of the contact line), where the Mission heard 250 bursts and shots of small-arms fire on the morning of 27 January. In the [previous reporting period](#), the SMM recorded 76 ceasefire violations in the region.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded 13 ceasefire violations – 12 undetermined explosions and one burst of an undetermined weapon in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). In the [previous reporting period](#), the SMM recorded 46 ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded at least 7,379 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 2,840 explosions, 1,014 projectiles in flight, 97 muzzle flashes, 59 illumination flares and at least 3,369 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

The SMM saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), on the southern edge of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On 27 January, while positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the Mission saw two workers carrying out preparations, reportedly for installment of a traffic ramp on both sides of road T-1316 and again observed four containers about 30m south of the road leading eastward towards Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), as well as 14 workers with heavy equipment conducting flattening works on the ground nearby, reportedly in preparation for placement of the containers. A member of the armed formations told the Mission that these containers would be used as offices.

On the same day, while positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), all of whom walked inside the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned, accompanied by three people wearing medical protective suits.

During the day on 25 January, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a person in military-type clothing inside a former position of the armed formations near the area’s south-eastern corner.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

On the same day, outside the area, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted three anti-tank mines: one in a field about 800m east-north-east of the area and two about 130m west-north-west of the its north-eastern corner, beside the road between Petrivske and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk). All mines were assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for similar observations in the area, see SMM Daily Reports of [19 June 2020](#) and [7 February 2020](#)).

On 27 January, while positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the Mission observed at least six men in military-type clothing travelling in two vehicles on road C-051532 between Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk) and Petrivske: three in a car driving towards Petrivske and at least three others (visibly armed) in a mini-van driving towards Styla, which then returned.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the SMM observed five surface-to-air missile systems in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region (for further information, see the table below).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

In Donetsk region, the Mission observed an anti-aircraft gun in a government-controlled area and armoured combat vehicles on both sides of the contact line, including in residential area (for further information, see the table below).

SMM facilitation of repairs and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to monitor the security situation close to the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) (DFS). While positioned at two locations near the DFS, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions, all assessed as within a 5km radius of the station.

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable construction of a power line in Raihorodka (government-controlled, 34km north-west of Luhansk); repairs to the supply pipeline and distribution network in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk); railway inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); and demining activities near government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk).

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Donetsk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Marinka was operational but did not observe any civilian traffic. It also saw that the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Kremiets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk) and the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) remained closed.

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational, with people queuing to travel in both directions. It also observed a golf cart operating between the repaired span of the bridge and the EECP.

The Mission additionally noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were operational but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were not.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report of 26 January 2021](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:⁷

- On 26 January, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and Ivanivka (39km north-west of Donetsk).
- On 27 January, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 24km north of Donetsk)
- On the same day, two SMM mini-UAVs on separate occasions experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) and Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk).

⁷ For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

Table of weapons

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
27/1/2021	5	Surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 <i>Strela-10</i>)	At a railway station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk)	Patrol

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁸

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
26/1/2021	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2)	Near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
	3	Armoured personnel carrier (two MT-LB and one MT-LBM)	Near Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk)	
	1	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm)		
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)		
	1	Armoured combat vehicle		
27/1/2021	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	Near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk)	Patrol
	2	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	In a residential area of Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk)	
Non-government-controlled areas				
25/1/2021	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)	In Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV

⁸ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.


Table of ceasefire violations as of 27 January 2021⁹

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined (also recorded by the SMM camera at the DFS)	N/K	26-Jan, 21:58
SMM camera at entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km SW of Donetsk)	1-3km NNE	Recorded	1	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	26-Jan, 21:00
	1-3km NNE	Recorded	12	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	26-Jan, 21:01
	1-3km NNE	Recorded	3	Muzzle flash		N/K	26-Jan, 21:01
	1-3km NNE	Recorded	4	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	26-Jan, 21:02
	1-3km NNE	Recorded	70	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	26-Jan, 21:09
SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km S of Donetsk)	4-6km NNW	Recorded	1	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	26-Jan, 20:18
	2-4km N	Recorded	2	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	26-Jan, 20:46
	2-4km N	Recorded	2	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	26-Jan, 21:23
	5-7km NNE	Recorded	1	Illumination flare	In vertical flight	N/K	26-Jan, 22:44
	2-4km N	Recorded	1	Projectile	E to W	N/K	26-Jan, 22:54
	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Illumination flare	In vertical flight	N/K	27-Jan, 03:05
About 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	3-5km SSW	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	27-Jan, 12:45
About 2.5km SE of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	2-3km SE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	27-Jan, 10:35
About 1km E of Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km W of Donetsk)	5-7km SW	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	27-Jan, 11:10-11:20
About 2.5km ENE of Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 24km N of Donetsk)	2-4km NE	Heard	3	Burst		Small arms	27-Jan, 10:05-10:09
	2-4km NE	Heard	4	Shot		Small arms	27-Jan, 10:05-10:09
	2-4km NE	Heard	190	Shot and burst		Small arms	27-Jan, 10:10-10:25

⁹ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

	2-4km NE	Heard	22	Burst		Small arms	27-Jan, 10:26-10:36
	2-4km NE	Heard	31	Shot		Small arms	27-Jan, 10:26-10:36
N edge of Popasna (government- controlled, 69km W of Luhansk)	1-2km SSE	Heard	1	Burst		N/K	26-Jan, 20:02
	10-12km SSE	Heard	12	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	26-Jan, 20:02

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹⁰



¹⁰ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).