Summary

- Between the evenings of 11 and 13 December, the Mission recorded 36 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 13 ceasefire violations in the region.
- Between the evenings of 11 and 13 December, the SMM recorded nine ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded no ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and observed a calm situation inside all three areas.
- SMM unmanned aerial vehicles spotted new trenches and engineering works in a non-government-controlled area near the Donetsk Filtration Station.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable the construction and maintenance of and repairs to critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at entry-exit checkpoints and checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission’s freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at a border crossing point near and a railway station in Voznesenivka, Luhansk region, both outside government control.*

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1 Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 13 December 2020. All times are in Eastern European Time.
Ceasefire violations\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of recorded ceasefire violations(^3)</th>
<th>Number of recorded explosions(^4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>![Graph of ceasefire violations]</td>
<td>![Graph of recorded explosions]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Zolote and in Petrovskie were not operational.

\(^3\) Including explosions

\(^4\) Including from unidentified weapons
Map of recorded ceasefire violations

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM
12-13 December 2020

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA, Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap, Sea - VLIZ (2005), IHO Sea Areas, Other - OSCE

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 14/12/2020
In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 11 and 13 December, the SMM recorded 36 ceasefire violations, including 15 undetermined explosions at northerly directions of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and seven undetermined explosions in an area south-west of Pivdenne (formerly Leninske, government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk). In the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded 13 ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 11 and 13 December, the SMM recorded nine ceasefire violations, including two undetermined explosions in an area south-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). In the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 3,662 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 1,672 explosions, 118 projectiles in flight, 51 muzzle flashes, 41 illumination flares and 1,780 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske

On 12 and 13 December, the Mission observed a calm situation inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk).

During the day on 12 December, while positioned in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the Mission recorded six shots of small-arms-fire at an assessed range of 1-2km south, assessed as outside of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), but within 5km of its periphery.

On 12 and 13 December, the SMM saw members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area. On 13 December, it saw some of them walk inside the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and then return.

On both days, while positioned at three locations near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, the SMM spotted 24 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (of which three in a training area in Donetsk region) (for further details, see the table below).

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5 Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
**Weapons permanent storage sites**

*At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region*

13 December

The Mission noted that one MLRS (BM-21 *Grad*, 122mm) was again missing.

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**Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone**

In recent weeks, SMM unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have spotted new trenches and engineering works in a non-government-controlled area near the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

On 29 November, in a field about 1.4km south-east of the DFS, and about 300m south-east of road M-04, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time a 320m-long trench running north to south, connecting six D-shaped concrete structures, assessed as firing positions (about 50m apart from each other), all facing in a north-westerly direction towards positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. About 20m east of the above trench and 1.5km south-east of the DFS, the same UAV spotted for the first time an additional 50m-long trench, running north-west to south-east with a square pit, assessed as a mortar pit, at its south-eastern end. Both trenches were assessed as belonging to the armed formations and not seen in imagery from September 2020 (the concrete structures were previously seen in imagery from 25 October 2020).

On 11 December, the Mission observed a target and acquisition radar (1RL134, P-19, *Danube*) in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region (for further information, see the table below).

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**Mine hazard sign near Lozove, Donetsk region**

On 13 December, while positioned about 3km south of Lozove (non-government-controlled, 52km north-east of Donetsk), the Mission observed for the first time a red rectangular mine hazard sign, about 10-15m south-east of the nearest civilian property.

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**SMM facilitation of construction and maintenance of and repairs to critical civilian infrastructure**

On 12 and 13 December, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable the construction of a power line between government-controlled Lopaskyne (23km north-west of Luhansk) and Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk).

On 12 December, it facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable demining activities near Hirske (government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk) and; on 13 December to enable the inspection of and repair to a water conduit between government-controlled Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk) and Lopaskyne.

On both days, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

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6 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Donetsk region, on 12 December, the Mission observed that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) was operational but did not observe any civilian traffic, and that the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk) was closed. It also saw that the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) was closed.

In Luhansk region, on 12 and 13 December, the Mission noted that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska was operational, with pedestrians queueing to travel in both directions.

On both days, the Mission noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were operational but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia remained closed.

Border areas outside government control

In Donetsk region, on 13 December, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 20 minutes, the Mission observed a car with “DPR” plates and 15 women (in their forties to sixties) exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 15 minutes, the Mission did not observe any cars or pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine.

In Luhansk region, on 13 December, while at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) for about 15 minutes, the Mission observed two cars entering Ukraine and two cars with “LPR” plates exiting Ukraine.

After about ten minutes at the border crossing point near Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka for about 15 minutes, the Mission observed a stationary cargo train consisting of about 15 freight wagons.

After about 15 minutes at the aforementioned railway station in Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Dnipro, Lviv, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that
restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

- On 13 December, at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations asked the Mission to leave the area, saying that “all inquiries should be forwarded to [his] superiors in Luhansk”.
- On the same day, at the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations asked the Mission to leave the area, saying that “all inquiries should be forwarded to [his] superiors in Luhansk”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On 13 December, on two occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Lozove (non-government-controlled, 52km north-east of Donetsk). The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.
Table of weapons

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of weapons</th>
<th>Type of weapon</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/12/2020</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Multiple launch rocket system (9K51, BM-21 Grad, 122mm)</td>
<td>In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observation in the area <a href="#">SMM Daily Report 10 December 2020</a>).</td>
<td>Mini-UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Multiple launch rocket system (2B26, BM-21 Grad, 122mm)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/12/2020</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 Grad, 122mm)</td>
<td>Near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk)</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29/11/2020</td>
<td></td>
<td>A 320m-long trench (not seen in imagery from September 2020).</td>
<td>Near the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Mini-UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/12/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Target and acquisition radar (1RL134, P-19, Danube)</td>
<td>Near Verbova Balka (28km south-east of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Mini-UAV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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8 This is the first confirmed sighting by the SMM of the weapon listed under this section.
9 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
Table of ceasefire violations as of 13 December 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMM position</th>
<th>Event location</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Date, time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km S of Donetsk)</td>
<td>3-5km N</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>11-Dec, 18:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMM camera at entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km SW of Donetsk)</td>
<td>3-5km NNE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>12-Dec, 22:03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5km NNE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>12-Dec, 22:09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5km NE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>12-Dec, 22:33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5km NNE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>12-Dec, 22:33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5km NNE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>12-Dec, 22:51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5km NNE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Projectile</td>
<td>W to E</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>12-Dec, 22:51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5km NNE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>12-Dec, 23:08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5km NE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>12-Dec, 23:08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5km NNE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>12-Dec, 23:34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5km NNE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>12-Dec, 23:44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5km NNE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>12-Dec, 23:45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5km NNE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>12-Dec, 23:52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About 500m S of Lohvynove (non-government-controlled, 59km NE of Donetsk)</td>
<td>3-5km NW</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>13-Dec, 09:27-09:29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About 500m E of Pivdenne (formerly Leninse, government-controlled, 40km NE of Donetsk)</td>
<td>3-4km SW</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>13-Dec, 10:10-10:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About 600m NE of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99km S of Donetsk)</td>
<td>2-3km NE</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>13-Dec, 11:20-11:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-3km N</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>13-Dec, 12:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-3km N</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>13-Dec, 12:57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km W of Luhansk)</td>
<td>7-10km SSE</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>11-Dec, 22:24-22:27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km W of Luhansk)</td>
<td>1-2km S</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>Assessed as outside the disengagement area</td>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td>12-Dec, 12:45-12:55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMM camera on N edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km W of Luhansk)</td>
<td>3-5km ESE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>12-Dec, 22:32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.
The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).

11 The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).