

Daily Report 278/2020

21 November 2020¹


Summary

- The SMM recorded 32 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and two in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 23 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region.
- The Mission followed up on reports of three men killed on 30 October by the detonation of an explosive device in Horlivka, Donetsk region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and observed a calm situation in all three areas.
- SMM unmanned aerial vehicles spotted new trench extensions on both sides of the contact line near Pisky and Vesele, Donetsk region.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including near government-controlled Berdianske and a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka, Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 20 November 2020. All times are in Eastern European Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and in the parking lot south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were not operational.

³ Including explosions.


⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 20 November 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 21/11/2020

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 32 ceasefire violations, about 90 per cent of which occurred at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), some within a 5km radius of DFS (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded 23 ceasefire violations in the region.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded two ceasefire violations, both undetermined explosions, in an area north of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 2,491 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 987 explosions, 75 projectiles in flight, 33 muzzle flashes, 27 illumination flares and 1,369 bursts and shots).

Three men killed by the detonation of an explosive device in Horlivka, Donetsk region

The SMM followed up on reports of three men (father, son and a nephew; 60, 35 and 39 years old) who died on 30 October from injuries caused by the detonation of an explosive device, assessed as accidental, in Shakhta 6/7 area located on the north-western edge of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

On 17 November, a woman (in her twenties or thirties), who introduced herself as the daughter and sister of the two men (60 and 35 years old, respectively), told the Mission by phone that her father and brother had died in an accident on 30 October near the Shakhta 6/7 area in Horlivka. According to the death certificates shown to the SMM by her, the men had died in Horlivka on 30 October as a result of multiple shrapnel injuries from the explosion of an object.

On the same day, another woman (in her thirties), who introduced herself as the wife of the third man (39 years old), told the SMM by phone that her husband and two other relatives had died in an accident on 30 October, in Shakhta 6/7 area in Horlivka. According to the death certificate shown to the SMM by the woman, her husband had died on 30 October as a result of multiple shrapnel injuries due to explosive object, causing damages to the internal organs.

The SMM faced impediments when following-up with medical staff on aforesaid cases of civilian casualties (see [SMM Daily Report 16 November 2020](#)).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) south of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

While positioned near the western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of about 6-9km north, assessed as outside of the **disengagement area near Zolote** but within 5km of

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

its periphery. Near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the SMM saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), two of whom walked into the area to about 350m north of its southern edge, accompanied by three people wearing protective gear, and then returned.

While positioned in four locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The SMM observed a tank near a residential area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, in violation of withdrawal lines. Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the Mission observed 27 weapons in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and one in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region, all in or close to the residential areas (for further information, see the tables below).

Weapons storage sites

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

On 20 November, the SMM noted that one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 *Gvozdika*, 122mm) was again missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

In the past weeks, SMM unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) spotted extensions to existing trenches in areas between Pisky (government-controlled, 11km north-west of Donetsk) and Vesele (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk), near and on the territory of the destroyed Donetsk international airport.

On 22 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted for the first time three extensions to existing trenches: a 190m-long extension in a field about 3.2km north-east of Pisky and two extensions – a 20m- and a 150m-long – in fields about 1.7km north-east of Pisky. The 190m- and 150m-long extensions were assessed as consolidations of existing positions, whereas the 20m-long extension is assessed as a forward movement towards the line of contact, reducing the distance between the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations to 375m. All three extensions were assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and were not seen in imagery from 23 August 2020.

On the same day, on the airport’s southern edge, in a field about 800m north of Vesele, the same UAV spotted for the first time a 50m-long trench extension north assessed as a forward movement towards the line of contact, reducing the distance between the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations to 870m. These trenches were assessed as belonging to the armed formations and also not seen in imagery from 23 August 2020.

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles near residential areas in government-controlled area of Donetsk region and non-government-controlled areas of both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (for further information, see the table below).

Anti-tank mines near Pyshchevyk and mine hazard sign near Kruta Balka, Donetsk region

On 19 November, in a field about 300m south-south-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 84km south of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV again spotted at least 150 anti-tank mines (part of a larger minefield extending for about 900m) laid in four rows running north to south, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report 19 August 2020](#))

On 20 November, about 600m south-east of Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), and about 50m north-west of road M-04, the Mission observed for the first time a red square mine hazard sign with a white skull and crossbones and the word “Danger” written in Cyrillic.

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), repairs to water infrastructure near Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk), and demining of agricultural fields near Heivka (government-controlled, 27km north-west of Luhansk) and between government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned about 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the Mission recorded two ceasefire violations, both shots of small-arms fire, assessed as within a 5km radius of the station.

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Donetsk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit crossing point (EECP) near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were operational.

While at the EECP from 10:45 to 11:30 and from 12:10 to 12:30, the Mission observed in total 40 people (22 women, 11 men, mixed ages, three girls and four boys) and four cars with 14 people (nine women and five men, mixed ages) entering government-controlled areas and 26 people (16 women and ten men, mixed ages) and seven cars with 19 people inside (ten women and nine men, mixed ages) travelling in the opposite direction.

About 100m south of the southern entrance of the EECP, the SMM observed a group of workers with heavy equipment constructing a building, reportedly for an administrative service centre that will include a post office, bank, police station and a café.

While at the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka between 8:40 and 11:30, the SMM observed 15 people (seven women and six men, mixed ages, and two children) and nine

cars with 13 people (11 women and two men, mixed ages) travelling towards government-controlled areas and 11 people (six women and five men, mixed ages) and 15 cars with 32 people inside (22 women and ten men, mixed ages) travelling in the opposite direction.

The SMM also noted that the EECP near Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk) remained open but did not observe any civilian traffic. It also noted that the checkpoint of the armed formations near Kremynets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk) remained closed.

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational.

While at the EECP at about 9:00 and 14:10, the Mission observed in total 44 people (32 women and 12 men, mixed ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 142 people (68 women and 74 men, mixed ages) queuing to travel in the opposite direction. The SMM also saw containers, belonging to an international organization, being transferred between the EECP and the new section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge as well as in the opposite direction.

The Mission noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were operational, while the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia remained closed.

Near the checkpoint of the armed formations 3km south-east of the bridge, the Mission observed ten workers with heavy equipment, installing lamps and electrical systems and checking cables.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report 11 November 2020](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Denial:

- At a checkpoint near Berdianske (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk), a member of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (man, in his twenties) denied the SMM passage towards Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk), citing “the SMM’s safety”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Delay:

- At the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations (man, in his thirties) allowed the SMM passage only after about an hour, stating that he had not received information from his superiors about the SMM’s intention to cross the checkpoint.

Other impediments:

- An SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over the areas near Berdianske (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk).
- An SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming on two separate occasions, while flying over areas near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and near the DFS.⁷

⁷ The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

Table of weapons

Weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines

| Date | No. of weapons | Type | Location | Source of observation |
|--|----------------|----------------------|--|-----------------------|
| Non-government-controlled areas | | | | |
| 19/11/2020 | 1 | Tank (probable T-64) | Near a residential area of Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk) | Mini-UAV |

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

| Date | No. of weapons | Type | Location | Source of observation |
|--|----------------|---|--|-----------------------|
| Government-controlled areas | | | | |
| 20/11/2020 | 18 | Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm) | At the railway station in Druzhkivka (72km north of Donetsk) | Patrol |
| | 9 | Self-propelled howitzer (2S3 <i>Akatsiya</i> , 152mm) | | |
| Non-government-controlled areas | | | | |
| 20/11/2020 | 1 | Tank (T-64) | In a residential area of Lutuhyne (20km south-west of Luhansk) | Patrol |

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁸

| Date | No. | Type of weapons | Location | Source of observation |
|--|-----|---|---|-----------------------|
| Government-controlled areas | | | | |
| 19/11/2020 | 1 | Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) | Near a residential area of Novoselivka (31km north of Donetsk) | Mid-range UAV |
| Non-government-controlled areas | | | | |
| 19/11/2020 | 1 | Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) | Near residential areas of Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk) | Mini-UAV |
| | 2 | Armoured personnel carrier (probable MT-LB) | | |
| | 2 | Armoured combat vehicle | Near a residential area of Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk) | |


⁸ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 20 November 2020⁹

| SMM position | Event location | Means | No. | Observation | Description | Weapon | Date, time |
|---|-----------------------|--------------|------------|--------------------|---|---------------|-------------------|
| SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk) | 2-4km SE | Recorded | 10 | Projectile | SSW to NNE | N/K | 20-Nov, 05:06 |
| | 2-4km SE | Recorded | 3 | Projectile | SSW to NNE | N/K | 20-Nov, 05:12 |
| | 2-4km SE | Recorded | 10 | Projectile | SSW to NNE | N/K | 20-Nov, 05:13 |
| SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration Station (15km N of Donetsk) | 2-3km SSW | Recorded | 1 | Projectile | WNW to ESE | N/K | 20-Nov, 05:06 |
| | 2-3km SSW | Recorded | 1 | Illumination flare | In vertical flight | N/K | 20-Nov, 05:26 |
| SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km S of Donetsk) | 4-6km N | Recorded | 1 | Explosion | Undetermined | N/K | 20-Nov, 03:26 |
| | 4-6km NNE | Recorded | 1 | Explosion | Undetermined | N/K | 20-Nov, 04:43 |
| | 4-6km NNE | Recorded | 1 | Explosion | Undetermined | N/K | 20-Nov, 05:25 |
| SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration Station (15km N of Donetsk) | 0.5-1km S | Recorded | 1 | Muzzle flash | | N/K | 20-Nov, 17:27 |
| | 2-4km SSW | Recorded | 1 | Explosion | Undetermined | N/K | 20-Nov, 17:28 |
| About 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) | 1-2km S | Heard | 2 | Shot | | Small arms | 20-Nov, 09:45 |
| W edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km W of Luhansk) | 6-9km N | Heard | 2 | Explosion | Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area) | N/K | 20-Nov, 12:35 |

⁹ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹⁰



¹⁰ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).