

Daily Report 272/2020

14 November 2020¹


Summary

- The SMM recorded four ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and 20 in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded three ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and three in Luhansk region.
- Two men were injured on 10 November due to the detonation of an explosive object in Volnovakha, Donetsk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. Inside the disengagement area near Zolote, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle again spotted a stationary white container truck with a JCCC inscription.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 pandemic, including at three entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Luhansk region and at a checkpoint of the armed formations in Donetsk region.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 13 November 2020. All times are in Eastern European Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were not operational.

³ Including explosions.


⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 13 November 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 14/11/2020

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded four ceasefire violations, all undetermined explosions, three of which occurred in areas south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), it recorded three ceasefire violations in the region.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded 20 ceasefire violations, all undetermined explosions the majority of which in areas south-west of Verhulivka (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and in areas south-west of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). In the [previous reporting period](#), it recorded three ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 2,285 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 878 explosions, 45 projectiles in flight, 26 muzzle flashes, 26 illumination flares and 1,310 bursts and shots).

Two men injured by the detonation of an explosive object in Volnovakha, Donetsk region

The SMM followed up on reports of two men (in their thirties and fifties) injured by the detonation of an explosive device while at work at a scrap metal yard in the south-eastern part of Volnovakha (government-controlled, 53km south of Donetsk).

On 11 November, a man (in his thirties) told the Mission over the phone that on 10 November while at work at a scrap metal yard in Volnovakha with a colleague (in his fifties) he had picked up a metal bucket, containing an iron object, which triggered its detonation, causing injuries to his right hand and right knee. He added that as a result of the explosion his colleague had suffered an eye injury. On the same day, staff at a hospital in Volnovakha told the SMM that on 10 November two men (in their thirties and fifties) had been admitted with injuries consistent with the detonation of an explosive object, one of them suffering injuries to his eyes and the second to his right hand and knee. They added that the person with an eye injury had been transferred to a hospital in government-controlled Mariupol, whose staff, later in the day, stated to the Mission that the person had been further transferred to a hospital in Zaporizhzhia. Also on the same day, a representative of the local police in Volnovakha told the SMM over phone that two men had been injured in an explosion at a local scrap metal yard and had been taken to the city hospital.

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska**, the Mission saw five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), three near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) and two south of the new span of the bridge.

On 12 November, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), [again](#) spotted a stationary

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

white container truck with a JCCC inscription north of the railway bridge on road T-1316, about 920m south of the area's northern edge.

Near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them), two of whom it saw walk inside the disengagement area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then return.

On 13 November, while positioned about 2km north of the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 4-5km south-south-east, assessed as outside the area but within 5km of its periphery.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The SMM spotted six weapons in violation of withdrawal lines, all in non-government-controlled Luhansk city (for further information, see the table below).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone^{6, 7}

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles on both sides of the contact line in Luhansk region and in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region (for further information, see the table below).

Anti-tank mines near Krasnohorivka, Donetsk region, and near Vesela Hora, Luhansk region.

On 12 November, about 2.5km east-north-east of Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV, spotted for the first time about 80 anti-tank mines, laid in two rows running from north-east to south-west in a field, assessed as belonging to Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Mission assessed all aforementioned mines as not recent.

On the same day, about 1.5km east-north-east of Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) about 70m west of road H-21, the SMM spotted about 40 anti-tank mines, laid in four rows, two of which surface laid and two partially buried in the ground, assessed as belonging to the armed formations (for similar observations in the area, see SMM Daily Reports of [21 October 2020](#) and [28 October 2020](#)).

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above), north of

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

⁷ Following further assessment by the SMM, the hardware mentioned under this section in the [SMM Daily Report 10 November 2020](#) as an electronic warfare system (RB-341V *Leer-3*) should have been identified as a ground control station (UAV-unit) (*Navodchik-2*).

Shchastia, and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia.

At the checkpoint of the armed formations, about 3km south-east of the bridge, the Mission observed about 12 workers with heavy equipment carrying metal bars and welding a fence near a metallic structure, reportedly for a pedestrian crossing.

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); repairs to water infrastructure near non-government-controlled Pankivka (16km north of Luhansk); repairs to power lines near Donetskyyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk); and maintenance of road H-21 south of Shchastia.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS). During the day on 13 November, while positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata, the Mission heard three ceasefire violations, all undetermined explosions, assessed as within a 5km radius of the DFS.

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic

In Donetsk region, the SMM noted that the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) was operational.

While at the checkpoint between 08:20 and 11:10 and 12:18 and 13:46, the Mission saw in total 38 people (17 women and 18 men, mixed ages, one girl and two boys, all five years old), one empty bus and five vehicles queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas. It also saw 28 people (15 women and 13 men, mixed ages) and four vehicles travelling in the opposite direction.

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational. It also noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia were operational but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations near Zolote and Shchastia remained closed.

While at the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska at about 09:00, 11:00 and 15:00, the SMM observed in total 40 people (25 women and 15 men, mixed ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and in total 30 people (25 women and five men, mixed ages) queuing to travel in the opposite direction.

While at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge between 11:00 and 12:00, the Mission saw in total 12 people (seven women and three men, mixed ages, and two children) queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 18 people (nine women and nine men, mixed ages) queuing in the opposite direction.

During its presence, the SMM saw a golf cart operating between the EECP and the new section of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, and noted that there was no shuttle bus operating between the checkpoint of the armed formations and a bus stop 1.8km south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

While at the EECP in Zolote between 10:00 and 15:00 and at the EECP near Shchastia between 10:30 and 14:00, the Mission observed no pedestrians or vehicles travelling towards non-government-controlled areas.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report 11 November 2020](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Table of weapons

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapons	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
12/11/2020	1	Self-propelled mortar (2S9 <i>Nona-S</i> , 120mm)	In a compound in Luhansk city	Mini-UAV
	1	Anti-tank gun (BS-3, M1944, 100mm)		
	4	Tank (probable T-64) (two with missing barrels and one with turret displaced off chassis)		

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁸

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
12/11/2020	6	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)	In a compound near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk)	Mini-UAV
	3	Armoured personnel carriers (two BTR-60P and one MT-LB)		
	1	Armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined)		
13/11/2020	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60)	Near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk)	Patrol
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60)	Near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk)	
Non-government-controlled areas				
12/11/2020	2	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)	In a compound in Luhansk city	Mini-UAV
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2)		
	1	Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2)		
	2	Armoured recovery vehicle (one VT-55 and one BREM-1)		
	1	Combat engineering vehicle (BAT-2)		
	1	Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2)		


⁸ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 13 November 2020⁹

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
About 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	5-6km SW	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	13-Nov, 13:10-13:14
About 2km N of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km S of Donetsk)	4-5km ESE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	13-Nov, 10:51
Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km W of Luhansk)	4-5km WSW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	13-Nov, 09:08
About 3km N of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk)	10-15km SSW	Heard	4	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	13-Nov, 10:15-10:25
Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km W of Luhansk)	10-15km SSW	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	13-Nov, 11:35-11:37
About 3km NW of Verhulivka (non-government-controlled, 61km W of Luhansk)	10-15km SW	Heard	4	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	13-Nov, 12:56
	5-7km SW	Heard	8	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	13-Nov, 13:13

⁹ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹⁰



¹⁰ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).