

Daily Report 270/2020

12 November 2020¹


Summary

- The SMM recorded 90 ceasefire violations, including 89 undetermined explosions, in Donetsk region and seven ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded no ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and 14 in Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 pandemic.
- It saw that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska and its corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations were operational. It also saw that the EECPs near Zolote, Shchastia, Hnutove and Novotroitske were operational. It further saw that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations near Zolote and Schastia were closed.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 11 November 2020. All times are in Eastern European Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.

³ Including explosions.


⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 11 November 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 12/11/2020

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 90 ceasefire violations, 89 of which were undetermined explosions in areas north-east of Komuna (non-government-controlled, 56km north-east of Donetsk). In the [previous reporting period](#), it recorded no ceasefire violations in the region.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded seven ceasefire violations, including one undetermined explosion, in areas near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded 14 ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 2,255 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 850 explosions, 45 projectiles in flight, 26 muzzle flashes, 24 illumination flares and 1,310 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On 11 November, while positioned in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and on the western edge of Berezivske (non-government controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk) the Mission recorded an undetermined explosion and six shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Zolote** but within 5km of its periphery.

Near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the SMM saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), one of whom it saw enter the disengagement area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then return.

Outside the area, at the checkpoint of the armed formations about 500m south-southeast of the area’s southern edge, the SMM observed three workers conducting works at the checkpoint of the armed formations.

On 11 November, while positioned at three locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage areas, the SMM spotted a tank at a train station in Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) (for further information, see the table below).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, including near a residential area in Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk) (for further information, see the table below).

Presence of UXO in Spartak and near Kamianka, Donetsk region

On 10 November in Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk) the Mission again observed a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) from a multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 *Grad*, 122mm) embedded in the asphalt of a road near residential houses. The SMM noted that the UXO was not marked or fenced off (for previous observation see [SMM Daily Report 31 May 2019](#)).

On the same day, on road C051805 leading eastwards from Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), about 100m from residential houses, the SMM saw for the first time an unidentified piece of UXO. On 11 November, the Mission observed de-miners removing the object.

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above), north of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia.

At the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Shchastia, the SMM observed about five workers fencing the outer area of the pedestrian walkways. About 3km south-east of the bridge, at the checkpoint of the armed formations, the Mission saw about 15 workers finalizing metal structures, assessed as for use as a pedestrian corridor, a vehicle transit point and a document control booth, and constructing a total of twelve toilets on both sides of the road. The SMM also saw a total of 40 mine warning signs (with 'Stop Mines' written in Cyrillic on a red background) placed at a distance of about 10m between each other on both sides of the road H-21.

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); repairs to water infrastructure near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) and near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk); repairs to power lines near Donetskyyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk); maintenance of road H-21 south of Shchastia; and demining of agricultural fields near Hirske (government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk) and Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk).

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS).

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic

In Donetsk region, the SMM noted that the EECPs near Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk) and near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) were operational. The Mission observed no traffic passing through the EECPs in either direction. An Ukrainian State Border Guard Service guard told the SMM that the EECF was temporarily closed due to ongoing military drills, which he said would last about 30 minutes. The Mission also noted that the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) was closed.

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the EECF in Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational. It also noted that the EECFs in Zolote and Shchastia were operational; however, the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations near Zolote and Shchastia remained closed.

While at the EECF in Stanytsia Luhanska at 13:00 and 15:00, the SMM observed that the EECF was open but no people passing through it in either direction. During its presence, the Mission saw a golf cart operating between the EECF and the new section of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

While at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, from 11:00-13:00 and between 12:00-13:00, the SMM saw in total 34 people (23 women and ten men, mixed ages and a child) queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 57 people (24 men and 31 women, mixed ages and two children) queuing in the opposite direction.

While at the EECF in Zolote at 8:15 and at 8:45, the SMM saw a car with a man (in his fifties) passing through the EECF but later returning to government-controlled areas. He told the Mission that members of the armed formations at the checkpoint near Zolote had not allowed him to enter non-government-controlled areas.

While at the EECF in Shchastia at 8:00 and at 9:10, the SMM saw a man (in his twenties) passing through the EECF but later returning to government-controlled areas. He told the Mission that he had been stopped 100m before reaching the checkpoint of the armed formations and was not allowed to proceed further.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom

of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report 11 November 2020](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk).
- On two occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Pyshevyk (government-controlled, 84km south of Donetsk) and near Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk).
- On 10 November, in Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) while the SMM was following up on cases of civilian casualties, at the entrance of the village council office a representative of the local community (woman in her fifties) refused to speak with the Mission and said that the SMM should get authorization from members of the armed formations prior to its visit.

Tables of weapons

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
11/11/2020	1	Tank (T-64)	At the train station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk)	Patrol

Table of indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁷

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
11/11/2020	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60)	Near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk)	Patrol
	2	Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-1)	Near a residential area of Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk)	
	1	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm)	Near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk)	


⁷ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 11 November 2020⁸

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration Station (15km N of Donetsk)	1-3km SSW	Recorded	1	Illumination flare	In vertical flight		10-Nov, 19:01
About 1.7km NNE of Komuna (non-government-controlled, 56km NE of Donetsk)	8-10km NE	Heard	82	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	11-Nov, 10:30-11:00
	8-10km NE	Heard	7	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	11-Nov, 11:00-11:30
Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km W of Luhansk)	7-8km NNW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote)	N/K	11-Nov, 12:26
W edge of Berezivske (non-government controlled, 53km NW of Luhansk)	5km NNW	Heard	5	Shot	Assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote	Small arms	11-Nov, 14:28
	5km NNW	Heard	1	Burst	Assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote	Small arms	11-Nov, 14:28

⁸ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions⁹



⁹ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).