

Daily Report 263/2020

4 November 2020¹


Summary

- The SMM recorded 27 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and seven in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded seven ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. Inside the area near Zolote, it saw for the first time a white container placed next to road T-1316, about 200m north of the railway bridge.
- The SMM saw two weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and ten weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 pandemic, including at an entry-exit checkpoint and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 3 November 2020. All times are in Eastern European Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and Berezove were not operational.

³ Including explosions.


⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 3 November 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005), IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 04/11/2020

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 27 ceasefire violations, including 24 undetermined explosions, in areas south of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded seven ceasefire violations in the region, all in the same area.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded seven ceasefire violations, all undetermined explosions, in areas north-west of the disengagement area near Zolote (government controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,995 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 646 explosions, 39 projectiles in flight, 16 muzzle flashes, 23 illumination flares and 1,271 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) south of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

Near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the **disengagement area near Zolote**, the SMM saw six members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), three of whom walked inside the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned.

Inside the area, about 700m south of the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on its northern edge and about 200m north of the railway bridge, the Mission saw for the first time a white container on the side of road T-1316. A representative of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that the container had been placed there by the JCCC, and that the Ukrainian Armed Forces representatives of the JCCC would only be present in the disengagement area during daytime and would be unarmed.

Inside the area, about 330m north of its southern edge, the Mission saw three workers repairing a sign with “Pervomaisk” written on it in Cyrillic.

Outside the area, 150-400m south of its southern edge, the Mission saw about 50 workers with heavy equipment painting newly constructed fences and poles, and welding metal constructions, assessed as for use as a pedestrian corridor.

While positioned about 1km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-7km north-north-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery.

While positioned at four locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The SMM observed two towed howitzers in violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region, and nine self-propelled howitzers and a self-propelled anti-aircraft system beyond withdrawal lines, but outside of designated storage sites, in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region (for further information, see the tables below).

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above), north of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia.

At the intersection of roads H-21 and T-1309, at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the northern edge of the bridge, the Mission saw about 30 workers with heavy equipment carrying out road repair works, erecting metal constructions, assessed as for use as booths, and fencing and installing street lights.

About 3km south-east of the bridge, at the checkpoint of the armed formations, the SMM saw about 35 workers with heavy equipment laying asphalt, installing light poles and working on two metal structures, assessed as for use as a pedestrian corridor and a document control point.

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to water infrastructure near Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk), as well as demining near Shchastia, near Zolote, between government-controlled Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk) and Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk), and between government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk). In the area of Orikhove-Donetske, the SMM saw nine de-miners (five of whom Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and four representatives of an international organization) removing pieces of explosive remnants of ammunition.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned at two locations near the station, the Mission heard seven ceasefire violations – four undetermined explosions and three shots and bursts of small-arms fire – assessed as within a 5km radius of the DFS.

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter the COVID-19 pandemic

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations remained non-operational.⁶

⁶ Notice about the EECP's temporary closure from 15 October to 31 October 2020 was published on the website of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 13 October. On 28 October, the Ukrainian Armed Forces published on their official Facebook page that the temporary closure of the EECP had been extended until 15 November 2020.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report 30 October 2020](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilian movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Table of weapons

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
02/11/2020	2	Towed howitzer (D-30 <i>Lyagushka</i> , 122mm)	Near Krynychne (45km west of Luhansk)	Mini-UAV

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites


Date	No.	Type of weapons	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
03/11/2020	1	Self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 <i>Tunguska</i>)	At a railway station in Druzhkivka (72km north of Donetsk)	Patrol
	9	Self-propelled howitzer (2S3 <i>Akatsiya</i> , 152mm)		

Table of ceasefire violations as of 3 November 2020⁷

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
About 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	6-8km S	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Nov, 11:56
	6-8km S	Heard	4	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Nov, 11:59
	6-8km S	Heard	4	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Nov, 12:01-12:02
	6-8km S	Heard	10	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Nov, 12:10-12:21
About 500m NE of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km N of Donetsk)	3-4km S	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Nov, 11:23
E part of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	3-5km SE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Nov, 11:22
	2-4km SE	Heard	2	Burst		Small arms	3-Nov, 11:25
	2-4km SE	Heard	1	Shot		Small arms	3-Nov, 11:30
	3-5km SE	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Nov, 11:55
About 1km SW of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km NW of Luhansk)	4-7km NNE	Heard	7	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote)	N/K	3-Nov, 13:35-13:45

⁷ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions⁸



⁸ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).