

Daily Report 261/2020


2 November 2020¹


Summary

- Between the evenings of 30 October and 1 November, the SMM recorded nine ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded no ceasefire violations in the region.
- Between the evenings of 30 October and 1 November, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it also recorded no ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During night-time, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted people inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 pandemic, including at an entry-exit checkpoint in Luhansk region.
- The SMM observed a calm situation in south-east Kherson region.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 1 November 2020. All times are in Eastern European Time.

Ceasefire violations²






² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and Berezove were not operational on either day.

³ Including explosions

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons

Map of recorded ceasefire violations



In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 30 October and 1 November, the SMM recorded nine ceasefire violations, including an undetermined explosion, almost all of which in areas south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (see below). In the <u>previous reporting period</u>, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 30 October and 1 November, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. In the <u>previous reporting period</u>, the Mission also recorded no ceasefire violations. The last time it recorded ceasefire violations in the region was on 29 October (see <u>SMM Daily Report 30 October 2020</u>).

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,954 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 615 explosions, 39 projectiles in flight, 16 muzzle flashes, 23 illumination flares and 1,261 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske

On 31 October and 1 November, while positioned near the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) close to the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km northeast of Luhansk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

On the night of 30-31 October, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two people inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 1.5km southeast of the area's north-western corner. The same UAV spotted two people inside a former position of the armed formations near the area's eastern edge, about 1.4km north of its southeastern corner.

On 31 October and 1 November, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area, the SMM saw members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them), some of whom entered the area and walked to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned. On 31 October, members of the armed formations were accompanied by three people, some of whom wearing medical protective gear.

On both days, about 400m north of the area's northern edge, the SMM observed workers with heavy machinery and equipment. On 1 November, it observed the workers cleaning soil from the area and gravelling the shoulders of road T-1316.

Also on both days, about 200-400m south of the southern edge of the area, the Mission saw workers with heavy machinery and equipment welding a new fence, installing roofing over metal constructions, assessed as for use as a bus station and pedestrian corridors, and reinforcing the northern and southern edges of road T-1316. In addition, about 1km south of the area's southern edge, the Mission saw workers with heavy machinery and equipment asphalting road T-1316.

On both days, while positioned near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁵

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles on both sides of the contact line in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (for further information, see the table below).

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

On 31 October and 1 November, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above). On both days, it facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work north of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia.

On 31 October, at the intersection of roads H-21 and T-1309, at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the northern edge of the bridge, the Mission saw workers with heavy equipment repairing asphalt. About 500m further south, on road H-21, it observed workers fencing the road. At the same location, on 1 November, the SMM saw workers with heavy equipment installing booths, assessed as for use as document control points, installing street lights on the northern part of road H-21 and removing debris and unloading asphalt.

On both days, about 3km south-east of the bridge, at the checkpoint of the armed formation, the SMM saw workers with heavy equipment assembling and welding a metal structure, reportedly for use as support for roofing over the road.

On 31 October, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance in Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); maintenance of road T-1316 near Zolote – north of the disengagement area – and of road H-21 south of Shchastia; and demining of agricultural fields between government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk). On 1 November, the Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable maintenance of road T-1316 near Zolote, north of the disengagement area.

On both days, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter the COVID-19 pandemic

During the reporting period, the Mission noted that the EECP in Stanytsia Luhanska remained non-operational.⁶

⁵ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

⁶ Notice about the EECP's temporary closure from 15 October to 31 October 2020 was published on the website of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 13 October. On 28 October, Ukrainian Armed Forces published on their official Facebook page that the temporary closure of the EECP had been extended until 15 November 2020.

On 31 October, near the EECP, a woman (in her sixties) told the SMM she had not been allowed to enter government-controlled areas because of a lack of documents, adding that she had been waiting for more than four hours. Shortly thereafter, the SMM saw a representative of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS) interacting with the woman to obtain necessary personal data, reportedly to initiate a permit request for entry into government-controlled areas.

Security situation in south-east Kherson region

On 30 and 31 October, the SMM observed a calm situation in south-east Kherson region: at an SBGS security post in Valok (188km south-east of Kherson) and checkpoint near Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson), along the coast of the Sea of Azov and the shores of Sivash Lake, and in Henichesk (176km east of Kherson) and nearby villages.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 30 October 2020). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Table of military and military-type presence in the security $zone^7$

Date	No.	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation	
		Government-control	lled areas		
30/10/2020	1	Armoured combat vehicle (type	Near Novomykhailivka (28km southwest of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV	
	3	undetermined)	Near Novotoshkivske (53km west of		
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	Luhansk)		
31/10/2020	2	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm)	In Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk)	Patrol	
	3	Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2)	In Oleksandropillia (71km west of		
	1	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm)	Luhansk)		
01/11/2020	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60)			
		Non-government-cont	rolled areas		
30/10/2020	1	Probable armoured personnel carrier (type undetermined)	In a compound in Stare (formerly Chervonyi Prapor, 58km west of Luhansk)	Long-range UAV	
	1	Armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined)	Near Sanzharivka (67km north-east of Donetsk)	UAV	


 7 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 1 November⁸

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera at	400-900m SSE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	30-Oct, 22:34
Donetsk Filtration	0.5-1km SSW	Recorded	3	Projectile	W to E	N/K	30-Oct, 22:35
Station (15km N of	0.5-1km SSW	Recorded	3	Projectile	W to E	N/K	30-Oct, 22:36
Donetsk)	1-2km SSW	Recorded	2	Projectile	NW to SE (also recorded by the SMM camera in Avdiivka)	N/K	31-Oct, 04:51

⁸ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an "N/K"), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions⁹



⁹ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).