



Daily Report 254/2020

26 October 2020¹


Summary

- Between the evenings of 23 and 25 October, the SMM recorded 38 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded no ceasefire violations in the region.
- Between the evenings of 23 and 25 October, the Mission recorded ten ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded no ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During evening and night-time hours, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted people inside the latter two disengagement areas.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 pandemic, including at an entry-exit checkpoint and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The SMM observed public gathering places and areas around polling places during local elections on 25 October and found the situation calm and peaceful in all areas observed.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*


¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 25 October 2020. All times are in Eastern European Time.

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³



Number of recorded explosions⁴



² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and Berezove were not operational on either day.

³ Including explosions


⁴ Including from unidentified weapons

Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 24-25 October 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 26/10/2020

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 23 and 25 October, the SMM recorded 38 ceasefire violations, most of which within a 5km radius of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 23 and 25 October, the SMM recorded 10 ceasefire violations. In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,880 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 550 explosions, 30 projectiles in flight, 16 muzzle flashes, 23 illumination flares and 1,261 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske

On 24 October, while positioned in government-controlled areas of the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission observed a calm situation. On 25 October, inside the disengagement area, the Mission saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) south of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the night of 23-24 October, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a person inside a former position of the armed formations near the area’s eastern edge, about 1.4km north of its south-eastern corner.

On 24 October, while positioned about 400m south of the southern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM observed 20 workers with heavy machinery and equipment, welding new fence on a metallic structure, ten workers moving containers on the northern edge, and ten workers paving a surface, reportedly to be used as a parking lot, on the southern edge of the checkpoint of the armed formations.

On 24 and 25 October, outside the disengagement area, the SMM observed members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) entering the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returning. On 24 October, members of the armed formations were accompanied by a three people wearing protective gear.

On 25 October, while positioned on the southern edge of the disengagement area, the Mission recorded 10 shots of an undetermined weapon at an assessed distance of about 1km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery.

On the evening of 23 October, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted a person inside a former position of the armed formations near the area’s south-eastern corner.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The SMM observed 27 weapons in violation of withdrawal lines, all in training areas of non-government-controlled areas of both Donetsk and Luhansk regions. It also spotted 23 weapons

beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, including 22 tanks in a training area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region (for further information, see the tables below).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁵

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including in a residential area (for further information, see the table below).

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

On 24 and 25 October, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction works south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above); maintenance of road T-1316 near Zolote; construction work north of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia; maintenance and vegetation clearance near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); and demining activities across road H-21 near the bridge in Shchastia.

On 24 October, at the intersection of roads H-21 and T-1309, 190m north of the bridge in Shchastia, at the junction of roads H-21 and T-1309, the SMM observed six workers with heavy machinery installing electricity cables in containers, reportedly to be used for administrative purposes. About 3km south-east of the bridge, the Mission also observed 20 workers, using a crane and two trucks, to build facilities for crossing inspections and to install air conditioners, reportedly for processing booths.

On the same day, on road H-21, about 3km south-east of the bridge, the SMM observed 16 workers with heavy machinery clearing and asphaltting the road and cutting vegetation.

On the morning of 25 October, at the junction of roads H-21 and T-1309, north of the bridge, the Mission observed four workers drilling the ground in the area of what was assessed to be the new parking lot. About 3km south-east of the bridge, the SMM observed five workers with heavy machinery and equipment welding a metal structure, reportedly as part of a bus shelter.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned at two locations close to the station, the SMM recorded 22 ceasefire violations (including an undetermined explosion) within a 5km radius of the station.

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter the COVID-19 pandemic

During the reporting period, the Mission observed that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska remained closed.⁶

On 24 October, at 09:00 the SMM observed 25 women and five men (mixed ages) queuing to exit government-controlled areas.

⁵ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

⁶ The EECP's temporary closure, in the period from 15 October to 31 October 2020, was published on the [website](#) of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 13 October. A representative of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine reconfirmed to the SMM on 25 October that the EECP would remain closed until 31 October because of COVID-19 mitigation measures, with special exceptions.

On 25 October, the SMM observed that the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations was operational. While at the checkpoint at 11:42, it saw a woman waiting to enter government-controlled areas.

SMM observed a calm situation on local election day

On 25 October, on the occasion of the local elections in most government-controlled areas of Ukraine, the SMM visited public places and observed the areas around polling stations in Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk), Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk), Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Kyiv and found the situation everywhere calm and stable.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report 12 October 2020](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Delay

- On 24 October, at a checkpoint near Kremiets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations [again](#) allowed the SMM to proceed towards Donetsk only after about 150 minutes of waiting and after one person sprayed the SMM's vehicles with a substance from a canister.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On 24 October, on five separate occasions, SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming: once while flying over areas near Mineralne (non-government-controlled, 10km north-east of Donetsk), twice near Vesele (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk) and twice near Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Table of weapons

Weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
23/10/2020	1	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
	1	Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela-10</i>)	In a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk)	
	14	Self-propelled howitzers (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)		
	11	Towed howitzer (D-30A <i>Lyagushka</i> , 122mm)		

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
23/10/2020	1	Probable surface-to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela-10</i>)	In a yard near the railway station in Kostiantynivka (33km south-west of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
Non-government-controlled areas				
23/10/2020	10	Tank (six T-72 and four type undetermined)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
	10	Tank (type undetermined)		
	2	Probable tank (T-72)	In a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk)	

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁷

Date	No.	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
23/10/2020	1	Armoured combat vehicle	Near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
	2	Probable armoured combat vehicle	In a residential area in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk)	


⁷ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 25 October 2020⁸

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	3-6km SE	Recorded	1	Muzzle flash		N/K	23-Oct, 21:29
	3-6km SE	Recorded	1	Projectile	NW to SE (subsequent to previous event.)	N/K	23-Oct, 21:29
	3-6km ESE	Recorded	4	Explosion		N/K	23-Oct, 21:41
SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km NW of Donetsk city centre)	1-3km WSW	Recorded	1	Illumination flare	WNW to ESE	N/K	23-Oct, 21:57
SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	24-Oct, 18:14
About 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	2-3km SSW	Heard	16	Shot		Small arms	24-Oct, 09:36-09:45
	2-4km W	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	24-Oct, 09:46
Mineralne (non-government-controlled, 10km NE of Donetsk)	1-2km NW	Heard	7	Shot		Small arms	24-Oct, 10:14-10:22
About 500m NE of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km N of Donetsk)	1-2km E	Heard	3	Shot		Small arms	25-Oct, 09:11-09:15
	1-2km E	Heard	1	Shot		Small arms	25-Oct, 09:23
	1-2km E	Heard	1	Shot		Small arms	25-Oct, 09:26
About 2km E of Bohdaniivka (government-controlled, 41km SW of Donetsk)	10km NNE	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	25-Oct, 10:05
About 3.5km N - Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk)	1km SE	Heard	10	Shot	Assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote	N/K	25-Oct, 10:47

⁸ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions⁹



⁹ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).