



Daily Report 245/2020

14 October 2020¹

Summary

- The SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in either Donetsk or Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 14 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and one in Luhansk region. The Mission had previously recorded no ceasefire violations in either region between the evenings of 24 and 25 September.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During night hours, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted people inside the latter two disengagement areas.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 pandemic, including at an entry-exit checkpoint and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The SMM observed a calm situation in southern Kherson region.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 13 October 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

Ceasefire violations^{2,3}

The SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in either Donetsk or Luhansk region. In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded 14 ceasefire violations (including 12 undetermined explosions) in Donetsk region and one ceasefire violation (an undetermined explosion) in Luhansk region. The Mission had previously recorded no ceasefire violations in either region between the evenings of 24 and 25 September (see [SMM Daily Report 26 September 2020](#)).

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,620 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 398 explosions, 17 projectiles in flight, seven muzzle flashes, 21 illumination flares and 1,177 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske

On 13 October, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) south of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the night of 12-13 October, inside **the disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a person inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the area’s north-eastern corner. The same UAV spotted a person near a former position of the armed formations near the area’s eastern edge, about 1.4km north of its south-eastern corner.

On 13 October, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw eight members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), three of whom walked inside the disengagement area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned.

On the same day, about 200m south of the southern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM saw heavy machinery and about 30 workers cleaning fresh asphalt, welding and joining pipes.

On the night of 12-13 October, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted a person inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 1.5km east-north-east of the area’s south-western corner. The same UAV spotted two people inside a former position of the armed formations near its south-eastern corner.

On the same day, while positioned at three locations near the disengagement area, the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

² During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.

³ During the reporting period, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations; therefore, the report does not contain the chart presenting trends or the map of ceasefire violations.

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region. Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the Mission saw a surface-to-air missile system in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region, and 51 weapons in four training areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (for further information, see the tables below).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁴

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, some of which in residential areas (for further information, see the table below).

On the morning of 13 October, the SMM camera at the Prince Ihor monument south-east of the bridge recorded the arrival of a covered military-type vehicle at the monument from a south-westerly direction. Two people in military-type clothing carrying bags exited the vehicle and entered a position of the armed formations at the monument, while two other people in military-type clothing exited the same position and entered the vehicle, which subsequently departed in a south-westerly direction.

On the same morning, about 300m north-east of the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, the Mission saw a military truck with a mounted crane, an excavator, a military jeep and concrete blocks in a nearby field and 15 Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel conducting groundwork.

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, north of Shchastia, and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia.

About 200m north-west of the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the bridge in Shchastia, at the junction of roads H-21 and T-1309, the SMM observed ten workers erecting booths. At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south-east of the bridge, the Mission observed about 35 workers conducting groundwork with heavy machinery and 41 containers, assessed as for use as offices.

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance in Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); repairs to water infrastructure near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk); and maintenance of road H-21 south of Shchastia.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Security situation in southern Kherson region

⁴ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

On 11 and 12 October, the SMM observed a calm situation at checkpoints near Zaliznyi Port (62km south-west of Kherson), Lazurne (62km south of Kherson), Skadovsk (62km south of Kherson), Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson) and Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson), all in southern Kherson region.

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter the COVID-19 pandemic

In Luhansk region, the Mission saw that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational.

While at the EECP at about 09:10 and 14:40, the Mission saw in total 40 people (about 20 men and 20 women, mixed ages) entering government-controlled areas and in total 50 people (25 men and 25 women, mixed ages) traveling in the opposite direction. The SMM also saw a golf cart operating between the new section of the bridge and the EECP.

While positioned at the northern edge of the disengagement area, the Mission saw an ambulance driving from the direction of the EECP towards Stanytsia Luhanska. At the EECP, two representatives (women, about 40 years old) of an international organisation told the SMM that a man (in his sixties) had suffered from a serious heart complication while at the EECP and had been immediately given first aid before being transported to a hospital in Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report 12 October 2020](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On 13 October, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk).⁵
- On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

⁵ The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

Table of weapons

Weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines

Date	No.	Type of weapons	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
13/10/2020	1	Surface-to-air missile system (9K33 <i>Osa</i>)	Near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk)	Patrol

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites


Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapons	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
12/10/2020	1	Surface to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela-10</i>)	Near Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk)	Mini-UAV
Non-government-controlled areas				
12/10/2020	7	Tank (type undetermined)	In a compound near a residential area in Khrustalnyi (54km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 13 October 2020)	Long-range UAV
	12	Towed howitzer (D-30A <i>Lyagushka</i> , 122mm)	In a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk)	
	9	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)		
	1	Tank (type undetermined)		
	4	Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela-10</i>)		
	1	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)	
	8			
	9	Tanks (probable T-72)	In a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk)	

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
12/10/2020	2	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)	In a compound in a residential area of Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk)	Long-range UAV
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	In a training area near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk)	
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)	In a compound in a residential area in Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk)	

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions⁷



⁷ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).