



Daily Report 237/2020

5 October 2020¹

Summary



- Between the evenings of 2 and 4 October, the SMM recorded 20 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 18 ceasefire violations in the region.
- Between the evenings of 2 and 4 October, the Mission recorded three ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded six ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During evening hours, an SMM long-range UAV spotted people inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
- The SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations remained closed due to the wildfires.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM monitored border areas in the south-eastern and southern parts of Donetsk region and a border crossing point in Luhansk region.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at a border crossing point outside government control near Dovzhanske, Luhansk region. *

¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 4 October 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴



² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.

³ Including explosions


⁴ Including from unidentified weapons

Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 3-4 October 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 05/10/2020

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 2 and 4 October, the SMM recorded 20 ceasefire violations, most of which occurred north-west of Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) and in areas east-north-east of Pisky (government-controlled, 11km north-west of Donetsk). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded 18 ceasefire violations, including 15 explosions.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 2 and 4 October, the SMM recorded three ceasefire violations – all undetermined explosions, two in areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) (see below) and one in an area south of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded six ceasefire violations, all undetermined explosions.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,501 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 336 explosions, 15 projectiles in flight, three muzzle flashes, 14 illumination flares and 1,133 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske

On the evening of 2 October, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-5km west-south-west. Early in the evening on 4 October, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the Mission heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-5km south-east. Both ceasefire violations were assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** but within 5km of its periphery.

On 3 and 4 October, while positioned north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw smouldering areas outside the disengagement area and, inside it, the Mission saw smouldering areas north of the Siverskyi Donets river south of the new section of the bridge.

On 4 October, inside the disengagement area, the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) south of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening of 2 October, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a person inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 550m west-south-west of its north-eastern corner and another near its north-eastern corner, as well as a person inside a former position of the armed formations near the area’s eastern edge, about 1.4km north of its south-eastern corner.

On 3 and 4 October, outside the disengagement area, the SMM saw members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), some of whom entered the disengagement area, walked about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned.

On both days, about 400-500m south of the southern edge of the disengagement area along both sides of road T-1316, the Mission saw workers with heavy equipment welding pillars, asphaltting the road and conducting groundwork.

On 3 and 4 October, while positioned at four locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁵

The SMM observed two armoured personnel carriers – one in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region and the second within a non-government-controlled residential area of Luhansk region (for further information, see the table below).

Remnants of ammunition near non-government-controlled Metalist, Luhansk region

On 4 October, about 1.5km north-north-east of Metalist (non-government-controlled, 7km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw for the first time remnants of ammunition embedded in soil about 1.5m west of road H-21, assessed as an exploded part of an anti-tank guided missile system (9M133 *Kornet*, 152mm).

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

On 3 October, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above). On 3 and 4 October, it facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work north of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia.

On the same days, about 200m north-west of the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the bridge in Shchastia, the SMM observed workers using an excavator to dig a ditch, reportedly for draining sewage, at the junction of road H-21 and road T-1309, as well as other workers installing street lighting.

On 3 October, the Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to water infrastructure near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), and on 3 and 4 October, it facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance in Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), and maintenance of road T-1316 near Zolote.

On both days, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

⁵ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

On 3 October, while at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the Mission observed a truck with Georgian licence plates carrying seven vehicles with no licence plates and three pedestrians (two women and one man, mixed ages) entering Ukraine, as well as a woman (in her forties) exiting Ukraine. After about 20 minutes, a member of armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 35 minutes, the SMM saw no traffic entering Ukraine and seven pedestrians (three men and four women, mixed ages) exiting Ukraine.

Also on 3 October, the Mission monitored border areas south-east and south of Donetsk region, including near Novoivanivka (57km south-east of Donetsk), Kumachove (55km south-east of Donetsk), Hlynka (60km south-east of Donetsk), Kuznetsovo-Mykhailivka (67km south-east of Donetsk), Zori (76km south-east of Donetsk), Mykhailivka (74km south-east of Donetsk), Huselshchikovye (95km south-east of Donetsk), Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk), Lavrynove (formerly Radianske, 77km south of Donetsk), Ivanivka (78km south of Donetsk) Konkove (79km south of Donetsk) and Samsonove (101km south of Donetsk), where it observed a calm situation. On the southern edge of Huselshchikovye, about 12km west of the border, where there are no border crossing facilities, the SMM saw a white vehicle stationary on the side of road C051215, with “military inspection” written on it in Russian. On the same road, the Mission saw fresh infantry fighting vehicle tracks running south to north and east to west on road C0533 leading towards Patriotychno (94km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Wildfires near entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska

The SMM continued to monitor the aftermath of the wildfires near the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska. It saw that that the wildfires in the area had been extinguished and that the EECP and its corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations remained closed. It also saw smouldering in non-government-controlled areas, south of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report 3 October 2020](#)).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial

- On 3 October, at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (non-government-controlled, 84km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments

- On 2 October, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between government-controlled Ivanopillia (51km north of Donetsk) and Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), and between Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) and Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk).
- On 4 October, an SMM mid-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying near Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk).⁶

⁶ The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁷

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
04/10/2020	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70)	Near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk)	Patrol
Non-government-controlled areas				
03/10/2020	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)	In a residential area of Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk)	Patrol


⁷ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 4 October 2020⁸

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration Station (15km N of Donetsk)	1-2km SSW	Recorded	1	Projectile	NNW to SSE	N/K	2-Oct, 20:23
SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km S of Donetsk)	4-7km NNE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	2-Oct, 21:58
Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km SW of Donetsk)	2-3km NW	Heard	10	Shot		Small arms	3-Oct, 13:50
SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km NE of Luhansk)	3-5km WSW	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	2-Oct, 22:04
About 2km WNW of Pisky (government-controlled, 11km NW of Donetsk)	3-4km ENE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	4-Oct, 10:38
	2-3km ENE	Heard	3	Shot		Small arms	4-Oct, 10:41
	2-3km ENE	Heard	4	Shot		Small arms	4-Oct, 10:44
N edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km W of Luhansk)	5-7km S	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	3-Oct, 20:55
E edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km NE of Luhansk)	2-5km SE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	4-Oct, 18:25

⁸ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions⁹



⁹ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).