

# **Daily Report 235/2020**

2 October 2020<sup>1</sup>

#### **Summary**

- The SMM recorded one ceasefire violation in Donetsk region and four in Luhansk • region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 40 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and eight in Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, • Zolote and Petrivske.
- In Luhansk region, it saw wildfires in and near the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote.
- The SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska was closed on the • morning of 1 October due to a wildfire in the area.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable • repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.\*

#### Ceasefire violations<sup>2</sup>

#### Number of recorded ceasefire violations<sup>3</sup> Number of recorded explosions<sup>4</sup> 1000 800 600 400 200 0 2019 daily Daily Report previous previous Daily Report previous previous 02.10.2020 7 days 30 days average 02.10.2020 7 days 30 days average average average average

 $^{2}$  For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.

<sup>3</sup> Including explosions


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 1 October 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Including from unidentified weapons

#### Map of recorded ceasefire violations



## Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 1 October 2020



In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded one ceasefire violation – an undetermined explosion – in an area south of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (see below). In the <u>previous reporting period</u>, the Mission recorded 40 ceasefire violations in the region.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded four ceasefire violations, all undetermined explosions: three at westerly directions of the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) (see below) and one in an area north-east of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded eight ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,454 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 310 explosions, 11 projectiles in flight, three muzzle flashes, 14 illumination flares and 1,116 bursts and shots).

#### Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske

On 1 October, at about 13:00, while positioned at the parking lot north of the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska, the Mission saw wildfires burning inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (see below) and a fire truck in front of the EECP.

While positioned on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the Mission heard three undetermined explosions, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery.

On 1 October, at about 9:00, the camera inside the **disengagement area near Zolote**, located about 350m north of the area's southern edge, recorded a wildfire inside the area, west of the camera. While positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, and later inside the disengagement area, about 350m north of the checkpoint, the SMM saw heavy smoke and fire near the north-western corner of the disengagement area, in the vicinity of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) and on the eastern side of road T-1316, about 300m east of its position. The SMM also saw three fire trucks crossing into the area from its southern edge and six firefighters trying to extinguish the fire.

Near the checkpoint, the Mission saw seven members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them), three of whom, accompanied by three people wearing protective gear, walked inside the disengagement area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned.

While positioned on the southern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed distance of 3-5km north-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery.

On the same day, about 200m south of the southern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM saw 26 workers with heavy construction equipment cleaning the asphalt on road T-1316, welding pillars next to it and spraying tar onto it.

While positioned at four locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

#### Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The SMM saw a towed mortar beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region (see table below).

#### SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above), north of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia.

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance in Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); repairs to water infrastructure near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk); as well as maintenance of road T-1316 near Zolote.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned in the southern part of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the Mission recorded an undetermined explosion assessed as within a 5km radius of the station.

#### Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 105 minutes, the Mission saw 27 cars (including 12 with "DPR" plates), seven mini-vans (with "DPR" plates), three buses (with "DPR" plates, carrying a total of about 120 passengers (mixed genders and ages)) and 20 pedestrians (eight women and 12 men, mixed ages) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw 25 cars (including 11 with "DPR" plates), three mini-vans (including two with "DPR" plates) and eight men (in their twenties and thirties) exiting Ukraine.

While at the same border crossing point, the Mission saw a car with "DPR" plates with four men (in their twenties and thirties) in military-style uniforms arrive from a northerly direction at the facility. The SMM saw how two of the men, who were carrying luggage, were met by another man in military-style uniform who came from the direction of the border crossing point and accompanied the two men back there. The two men then entered one of the booths of the border crossing point and the two other men drove back in a northerly direction.

The SMM also monitored border areas in eastern parts of Donetsk region near Tarany (74km east of Donetsk), Hryhorivka (75km east of Donetsk), Semenivske (73km east of Donetsk) and Biloiarivka (64km east of Donetsk), where it observed a calm situation.

#### Wildfire near the entry-exit checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska

On the night of 30 September-1 October, the SMM camera at the Prince Ihor monument southeast of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge recorded a wildfire on both sides of the road leading towards the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, which continued into the morning of 1 October. Between 10:00 and 10:05, the Mission saw that the EECP in Stanytsia Luhanska was open. It was also informed by a representative of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine that a wildfire was burning inside the disengagement area, about 30m east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. At about 11:00, a representative of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the Mission that the EECP had just been closed due to the wildfire. Between 13:00 and 13:20, while positioned at the parking lot north of the EECP, the SMM saw that the EECP was closed and that the fire had advanced towards a location just east of the EECP. Later in the afternoon, a representative of the Stanytsia Luhanska fire brigade department told the Mission that the fire had reached and heavily damaged the EECP infrastructure. The Mission will follow up on the damage.

On the morning of 1 October, the SMM camera at the parking lot south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge recorded that the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge was open but that civilian crossings through the checkpoint towards both government- and non-government-controlled areas stopped at about 12:00.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

# \*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, <u>SMM Daily Report 24 September 2020</u>). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

*Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:* 

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

### Table of weapons


### Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapons	Location	Source of observation						
Government-controlled areas										
1/10/2020	1	Towed mortar (120mm, type undetermined)	Near Polkove (65km south of Donetsk)	Patrol						

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SE part of Avdiivka (government- controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	2-3km SE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	1-Oct, 12:25
E edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government- controlled, 16km NE of Luhansk)	3-5km SW	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	1-Oct, 23:37- 00:39
3km north of Pervomaisk (non- government- controlled, 58km W of Luhansk)	3-5km NE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	1-Oct, 15:20

#### Table of ceasefire violations as of 1 October 2020<sup>5</sup>

 $<sup>^{5}</sup>$  The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an "N/K"), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.



Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions<sup>6</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).