Summary

- The SMM recorded three ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 32 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and ten in Luhansk region.
- The Mission followed up on reports of two people injured by explosive objects on two separate occasions in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region in April and May.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanitsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. Inside the disengagement area near Zolote, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted people during evening hours, and the Mission also saw demining activities near road T-1316, near the northern edge of the disengagement area.
- The SMM saw weapons in violations of withdrawal lines, including multiple launch rocket systems, in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 pandemic, including at an entry-exit checkpoint and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The Mission’s freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at a checkpoint of the armed formations in Nova Marivka, Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of recorded ceasefire violations</th>
<th>Number of recorded explosions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Report 30.09.2020</td>
<td>previous 7 days average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 29 September 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.
2 For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.
3 Including explosions
4 Including from unidentified weapons
Map of recorded ceasefire violations

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM
29 September 2020

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA, Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005), IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

© OSCE SMM 2019 Use, copy, reproduction, transmission, broadcasting, sale, license, or exploitation not permitted without OSCE prior written authorization.

Estimated line of contact

Created: 30/09/2020
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded three ceasefire violations, all undetermined explosions, two of which were recorded in an area south of Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) and another in an area west-north-west of Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk). In the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded 32 ceasefire violations (including 14 explosions) in the region.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. In the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded ten ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,401 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 260 explosions, nine projectiles in flight, three muzzle flashes, 13 illumination flares and 1,116 bursts and shots).

Two civilians injured due to explosion of objects on two separate occasions in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

The SMM followed up on reports of two civilians injured by explosive objects on two separate occasions in April and May 2020 in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.

On 29 September, the SMM spoke on the phone with a man (in his forties) who said that on 5 April, he had gone fishing with his brother on the edge of a dacha area in Krasnyi Yar (non-government-controlled, 12km north-east of Luhansk), close to the Siverskyi Donets River, when he stepped on an object which had exploded and caused injuries to his leg, which had later been amputated at a hospital. On 5 April, medical staff at a hospital in non-government-controlled Luhansk city told the Mission over the phone that a man (in his forties) had been admitted to the hospital on the same day. On 29 September, the SMM spoke on the phone with a woman, who introduced herself as the man’s wife, who said that her husband (in his forties) had been injured on 5 April when an object he had stepped on exploded.

On 29 September, the SMM spoke on the phone with a man (in his fifties) who said that on 2 May, he had been walking from his house in Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk) to a forested area located near the Siverskyi Donets River, where he had stepped on an object that had exploded. He added that, as a result, he had sustained shrapnel injuries and had been transferred to a hospital in Zymohiria (non-government-controlled, 27km west of Luhansk). On 5 May, medical staff at the hospital told the SMM over the phone that a man had been admitted on 2 May with injuries consistent with ones caused by a mine explosion. On 29 September, the SMM spoke with a representative of a forestry company, where the injured man worked, who told the Mission that the man had sustained injuries due to a mine-related incident on 2 May.

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske

On 28 September, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) south of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the night of 28-29 September, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
spotted two people inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 530m west-south-west of its north-eastern corner, and a person inside a former position of the armed formations near the area’s eastern edge, about 1.4km north of its south-eastern corner.

On 29 September, inside the disengagement area, about 600m south of its northern edge, the SMM observed six de-miners of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine using metal detectors, prodding sticks and shovels to conduct demining activities along road T-1316, between the railway bridge and the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the area’s northern edge, reportedly to prepare the road for asphalting.

On the same day, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw six members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), two of whom walked inside the disengagement area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned.

Also on the same day, south of the southern edge of the disengagement area, the Mission saw 20 workers with heavy construction equipment cleaning the asphalt on the northern edge of road T-1316, welding a new fence on its western side and conducting groundwork, reportedly to lay communication cables.

On 29 September, while positioned at three locations near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The Mission saw 20 multiple launch rocket systems in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and a surface-to-air missile system in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, all in violation of withdrawal lines, as well as 35 weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a training area in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region (for further information, see the tables below).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles and a self-propelled anti-aircraft system on both sides of the contact line in Donetsk region, including in a residential area (for further information, see the table below).

Mine hazard sign near Taramchuk, Donetsk region

On 29 September, about 500m south of Taramchuk (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk), on the northern side of the road leading from Stepne (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk) to Taramchuk, the SMM observed for the first time a rectangular mine sign with text written in Ukrainian.

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

---

5 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above), north of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia.

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance of railway tracks in Vilkove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); repairs to water infrastructure near non-government-controlled Pankivka (16km north of Luhansk) and Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk); repairs to power lines near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk); repairs to sewage collectors near Dolomites (53km north-east of Donetsk); as well as demining activities near Heivka (government-controlled, 27km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

**Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter the COVID-19 pandemic**

In Luhansk region, the Mission saw that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanitsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanitsia Luhanska bridge were operational.

While at the EECP at about 10:30 and 12:55, the Mission saw in total 100 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and ten people (six women and four men, mixed ages) queuing in the opposite direction. The SMM also saw a golf cart operating between the new section of the bridge and the EECP.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

**Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 24 September 2020). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials:

- At a checkpoint of the armed formations in Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations (visibly armed) denied the Mission passage, citing an ongoing operation in the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.
### Table of weapons

**Weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of weapons</th>
<th>Type of weapon</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Surface-to-missile system (9K35, Strela-10)</td>
<td>In a residential area of Chernenko (86km south of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Mini-UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/09/2020</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 Grad, 122mm)</td>
<td>Near Krasnolutskyi (52km south-west of Luhansk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of weapons</th>
<th>Type of weapon</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28/09/2020</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Tanks (probable T-64)</td>
<td>In a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), where the same UAV also revealed the presence of 40 infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-variant) and four armoured personnel carriers (three MT-LB and one BTR-80)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Towed howitzer (D-30A Lyagushka, 122mm)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Towed anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of weapons</th>
<th>Type of weapon</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28/09/2020</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Armoured combat vehicle</td>
<td>Near Novoselivka (31km north of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm)</td>
<td>In a residential area of Chernenko (86km south of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Mini-UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Probable armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB variant)</td>
<td>In a residential area of Shyroka Balka (34km north-east of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Mid-range UAV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

6 The armoured combat vehicles mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

7 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
Table of ceasefire violations as of 29 September 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMM position</th>
<th>Event location</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Date, time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km W of Donetsk)</td>
<td>4-6km WNW</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>29-Sep, 09:39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About 1km E of Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km NE of Donetsk)</td>
<td>8-10km S</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>29-Sep, 10:52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions, technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.
The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).