


Daily Report 232/2020

29 September 2020¹

Summary

- The SMM recorded 32 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and ten in Luhansk region. In the previous 24 hours, it recorded eight ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and nine ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
- Small-arms fire was assessed as aimed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flying in areas east of Artema, Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During evening hours, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a person inside the disengagement area near Petrivske.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 pandemic, including at entry-exit checkpoints and the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka, Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations²



Map of recorded ceasefire violations

¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 28 September 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.


³ Including explosions

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 28 September 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement

..... Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 29/09/2020

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 32 ceasefire violations, including 14 undetermined explosions. The majority of ceasefire violations occurred near the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), including 12 undetermined explosions and 14 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire (see below). In the [previous 24 hours](#), the Mission recorded eight ceasefire violations in the region.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded ten ceasefire violations – all shots of small-arms fire assessed as aimed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flying in areas east of Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) (see below). In the [previous 24 hours](#), the Mission recorded nine ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,398 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 257 explosions, nine projectiles in flight, three muzzle flashes, 13 illumination flares and 1,116 bursts and shots).

Small-arms fire assessed as aimed at SMM mini-UAV east of Artema, Luhansk region

During the day on 28 September, while conducting a mini-UAV flight on the eastern edge of Artema, the SMM heard ten shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 800m east of its position, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying 800m east-north-east of the patrol. The SMM safely landed its UAV and left the area.*

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske

On 28 September, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) south of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On 28 September, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the Mission saw six members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), two of whom walked inside the disengagement area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned.

On the same day, south of the disengagement area’s southern edge, the Mission saw 33 workers with heavy construction equipment asphaltting road T-1316.

On the evening of 26 September, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted a person inside a former position of the armed formations near the area’s south-eastern corner.

On 28 September, while positioned near the SMM camera system located about 200m east of the north-eastern corner of the disengagement area, the Mission heard two undetermined explosions and four shots of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 2-5km east and south-east and assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of four weapons in violation of withdrawal lines and 119 weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, all inside training areas in non-government-controlled areas of both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (for further information, see the tables below).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁵

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles on both sides of the contact line in Donetsk region, including in a residential area (for further information, see the table below).

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above), north of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia.

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance in Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); repairs to water infrastructure near non-government-controlled Pankivka (16km north of Luhansk) and Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk); repairs to power lines near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) and between Vesela Hora and Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk); as well as demining activities near government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. While positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the Mission heard shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire. All these ceasefire violations were assessed as within a 5km radius of the station.

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter the COVID-19 pandemic

In Donetsk region, the Mission observed that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were operational.

While at the EECP between 9:00 and 15:00, the SMM saw in total four people (mixed genders and ages), three vehicles and five buses entering government-controlled areas and no vehicular or pedestrian traffic in the opposite direction.

⁵ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

While at the checkpoint of the armed formations between 8:44 and 15:00, the Mission saw in total 35 people (20 women and 14 men, mixed ages, and one child) and five vehicles traveling towards government-controlled areas. It also observed in total 49 people (26 women and 22 men, mixed ages, and one child) and 15 vehicles exiting government-controlled areas.

In Luhansk region, the Mission saw that the EECP in Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational.

While at the EECP at about 10:40 and 13:55, the Mission saw in total 26 people (14 women and 12 men, mixed ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and four people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction. The SMM also saw a golf cart operating between the new section of the bridge and the EECP.

While at the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations at about 13:15 and 13:55, the SMM observed ten people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 20 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction. It also saw a shuttle bus operating between the checkpoint and a bus stop south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, [SMM Daily Report 24 September 2020](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Denials:

- At a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations denied the Mission passage towards government-controlled areas, referring to a lack of permission from his superiors.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- An SMM mid-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk).⁶
- While conducting a mini-UAV flight on the eastern edge of Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 800m east, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV safely and immediately left the area (see above).

⁶ The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV's position.

Table of weapons

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapons	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
24/09/2020	1	Multiple launch rocket system (type undetermined)	In a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk)	Aerial imagery
	1	Probable tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk)	
	2	Probable surface-to-air missile system (type undetermined)		

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapons	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
24/09/2020	10	Self-propelled howitzer (type undetermined)	In a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk), where the same imagery also revealed the presence of 31 armoured combat vehicles ⁷	Aerial imagery
	2	Tank (type undetermined)		
	12	Towed artillery (type undetermined)		
	24	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk)	
	28		In a training area near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk)	
	18	Self-propelled artillery (type undetermined)	In a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), where the same imagery also revealed the presence of 55 armoured combat vehicles ⁸	
	9	Towed artillery (type undetermined)		
	11			
5	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014		

Other weapons⁹

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
24/09/2020	3	Towed howitzer (type undetermined)	In a training area near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014	Aerial imagery

⁷ Armoured combat vehicles mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone¹⁰

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
26/09/2020	3	Armoured combat vehicle	In a residential area of Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
	1	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm)		
	1	Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2)		
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (probable BMP-1)	Near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk)	
	2	Armoured combat vehicle	In a compound in Trudivske (47km south of Donetsk)	
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (probable MT-LB variant)	Near Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk)	
Non-government-controlled areas				
24/09/2020	1	Armoured combat vehicle	In a training area near Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk)	Aerial imagery
26/09/2020	10	Infantry fighting vehicle (seven BMP-1 and three BMP-2)	In a training area near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
	3	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)		


¹⁰ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 28 September 2020¹¹

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	1-3km ENE	Recorded	5	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	28-Sep, 03:08
	1-3km ENE	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	28-Sep, 03:11
	1-3km ENE	Recorded	5	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	28-Sep, 03:19
About 1km NW of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km NE of Donetsk)	2-3km SW	Heard	2	Burst		HMG	28-Sep, 09:25
	2-3km SW	Heard	2	Shot		Small arms	28-Sep, 09:27
	2-3km SW	Heard	1	Burst		HMG	28-Sep, 09:40
	2-3km SW	Heard	2	Burst		HMG	28-Sep, 09:54
	2-3km SW	Heard	7	Burst		HMG	28-Sep, 10:06
Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km S of Donetsk)	2-4km SE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	28-Sep, 10:08
	2-3km E	Heard	4	Shot	Assessed as outside the disengagement area	Small arms	28-Sep, 10:43
	4-5km E	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	28-Sep, 14:19
E edge of Artema (government-controlled, 26km N of Luhansk)	0.8km E	Heard	10	Shot		Small arms	28-Sep, 11:02-11:06

¹¹ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹²



¹² The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).