Summary

- The SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in either Donetsk or Luhansk regions. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 24 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and four in Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 pandemic, including at entry-exit checkpoints and the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM visited a border crossing point in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
- The Mission’s freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka, Donetsk region.

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Footnote:

Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 25 September 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.
The SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in either Donetsk or Luhansk regions. During the previous reporting period, it recorded 24 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and four ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. The Mission had previously recorded no ceasefire violations in both regions between the evenings of 14 and 15 September (see SMM Daily Report 16 September 2020).

Following the agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,337 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 232 explosions, nine projectiles in flight, 13 illumination flares and 1,083 bursts and shots).

### Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske

Inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) between the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) and the checkpoint south of it.

Near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw six members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), three of whom, together with three people in hazmat suits, walked inside the disengagement area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned.

About 100m south of the disengagement area’s southern edge, the Mission saw 42 workers with heavy construction equipment conducting works on both sides of road T-1316, including graveling and levelling, as well as conducting excavation works followed by installation of plastic pipes.

Outside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), while positioned near the SMM camera on the western edge of Petrivske, the Mission observed a man in military-type clothing (visibly armed) walking on the road east towards Petrivske from the direction of Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk).

While positioned at four locations near the disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

### Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

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2 During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.
3 During the reporting period, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations, therefore the report does not contain the chart presenting trends or the map of ceasefire violations.
On 24 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three surface-to-air missile systems beyond withdrawal lines, but outside designated storage areas, in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region (for further information, see the table below).

**Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone**

The SMM saw armoured combat vehicles in the security zone on both sides of the contact line, including in residential areas in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (for further information, see the table below).

**Mine hazard signs near Zhovte and in Kruta Hora, Luhansk region**

On the northern edge of a local road from Zhovte (non-government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk) to Kruta Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk), the Mission observed improvised mine hazard signs with ‘Stop. Mines’ written on it in Cyrillic. In Kruta Hora, the Mission observed a poster with a mine hazard warning information on the gates of a former youth camp.

**SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure**

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above), near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) and north and south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable railway inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance in Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); repairs to water infrastructure near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk); repairs to power lines near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) and Kruta Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk); demining activities near government-controlled Hirsko (63km west of Luhansk), Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk) and Stanytsia Luhanska, as well as maintenance works on the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

**Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter the COVID-19 pandemic**

In Donetsk region, the Mission saw that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were operational.

While at the EECP from 09:00 to 11:50 and from 12:50 to 15:00, the Mission saw 28 people (21 women, five men, different ages, and two children), a bus with nine passengers (women, mixed ages) and seven cars entering government-controlled areas, and six buses with about 110 passengers entering government-controlled areas.

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4 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
passengers in total (mixed genders and ages), 21 cars and a convoy consisting of a car and five trucks belonging to an international organization travelling in the opposite direction.

While at a corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations, from 08:45 to 12:00 and from 13:25 to 15:00, the SMM saw 60 people in total (mixed genders and ages, including six children), ten cars and a bus travelling towards government-controlled areas and 32 people (mixed genders and ages, including a child) and seven cars travelling in the opposite direction.

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the EECP in Stanitsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanitsia Luhanska bridge were operational.

While at the EECP at about 09:15 and 11:00, it saw in total 15 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and in total 100 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction. The Mission also saw a golf cart operating between the new section of the bridge and the EECP.

While at a corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations at about 10:15, the Mission observed nine people (five women and four men, mixed ages) queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 12 people (seven women and five men, mixed ages) queuing in the opposite direction. It also saw a shuttle bus operating between the checkpoint and a bus stop south of the Stanitsia Luhanska bridge.

**Border areas outside government control**

While at the border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 90 minutes, the SMM observed five cars (including two with “DPR” plates), three trucks (cargo not visible, including two with “DPR” plates), two minivans (including one with “DPR” plates), a bus (with “DPR” plates, about 30 passengers, mixed genders and ages) and 17 people (12 women and five men, all in their thirties and forties) all entering Ukraine. During the same time, it saw 15 cars (including six with “DPR” plates), eight trucks (cargo not visible, including seven with “DPR” plates), five minivans (all with “DPR” plates), one bus (about 40 passengers, mixed genders and ages, with “DPR” plates) and three pedestrians (a man and two women, in their thirties and forties) all exiting Ukraine.

The Mission monitored border areas east of Donetsk region, including near Chervona Zoria (84km east of Donetsk) and Semenivske (73km east of Donetsk), and observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate*

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border
outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 24 September 2020). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

**Denial:**

- At a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) a member of the armed formations denied the Mission passage towards government-controlled areas, referring to a lack of permission from his superiors.

**Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:**

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

**Other impediments:**

- An SMM mini-UAV experienced a GPS signal interference assessed as caused by probable jamming while flying over areas near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk).  

5 The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres from the UAV’s positions.
# Table of weapons

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of weapons</th>
<th>Type of weapon</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24/09/2020</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Surface-to-air missile system (9K37M1)</td>
<td>Near Vesele (87km north of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of weapons</th>
<th>Type of weapon</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government-controlled areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured combat vehicle (MT-LB variant)</td>
<td>In a residential area of Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Mini-UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Probable infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)</td>
<td>Near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Combat reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K)</td>
<td>In a compound near Trudivske (47km south of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (8 BMP-1 and 2 BMP-2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2)</td>
<td>Near Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant)</td>
<td>Near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Probable armoured combat vehicle</td>
<td>In a residential area of Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/09/2020</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (BTR-3)</td>
<td>Northern edge of Hirske (63km west of Luhansk)</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-government-controlled areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Probable armoured combat vehicle</td>
<td>Near Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Mini-UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Armoured combat vehicle</td>
<td>In a probable compound near Bohdanivka (44km west of Luhansk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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6 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).