Summary

- The SMM recorded 157 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded no ceasefire violations in either Donetsk or Luhansk region.
- Small-arms fire was assessed as aimed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flying in areas north-east of Lebedynske, Donetsk region.
- The Mission followed up on the death of three and injury of two men in the detonation of an explosive device in Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch), Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanitsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During evening and night hours, an SMM long-range UAV spotted people inside the latter two disengagement areas.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 pandemic, including at an entry-exit checkpoint and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The Mission’s freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at checkpoints in areas near the international border outside government control in Novoazovsk and Bezimenne, Donetsk region.

Ceasefire violations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of recorded ceasefire violations</th>
<th>Number of recorded explosions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Report 22.09.2020</td>
<td>prev. 7 days average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 22 September 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.
2 For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.
3 Including explosions.
4 Including from unidentified weapons.
Map of recorded ceasefire violations

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM
22 September 2020

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap, Sea - YU2 (2005), IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 23/09/2020
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 157 ceasefire violations (some of which assessed as probable live-fire exercise, and also including seven undetermined explosions), almost all of which were recorded in areas north-east of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) (see below) and at north-easterly directions of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99km south of Donetsk). In the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded one ceasefire violation in the region.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in the current or previous reporting period. The last time the SMM recorded ceasefire violations in Luhansk region was on 20 September (see SMM Daily Report 21 September 2020).

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,228 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 217 explosions, nine projectiles in flight, 13 illumination flares and 989 bursts and shots).

The SMM followed up on reports of an incident involving the detonation of an explosive device in Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, non-government-controlled, 56km south-west of Luhanski), killing three men and injuring two other men on the evening of 29 May.

On 20 September, a 42-year-old man told the SMM over the phone that on the evening of 29 May, near a shop at 2 Novikova-Pryboia Street in Khrustalnyi, he had been drinking alcohol with four other men (aged 46, 48, 53 and 57) when an argument broke out. According to him, one of the men (57 years old) had left the scene, and, when he returned shortly after, an explosion had occurred, caused by what the interlocutor assessed as a hand grenade, reportedly killing two of the men (aged 53 and 57) on the spot, severely injuring one of them (48 years old) and lightly injuring a fourth man (46 years old) and himself. On the same day, a woman (in her forties), who presented herself as a worker of the shop, told the Mission that on the evening of 29 May, she had been inside the shop when she heard fighting erupt out front among the same men. A few minutes later, she had heard an explosion, and, when exiting the shop, she had seen the five men on the ground and had called an ambulance. Also on 20 September, in the Myrnyi district of Khrustalnyi, a woman (in her fifties), who presented herself as the spouse of the 53-year-old casualty, confirmed that her husband had died following an explosion at the abovementioned address on 29 May. Another woman, (in her forties), who presented herself as the spouse of the 46-year-old casualty, confirmed that her husband had been injured in an explosion at the abovementioned address on 29 May and had spent a week at the hospital.

Previously, on 1 June, medical staff (man, age unknown) of a hospital in Khrustalnyi told the SMM that on 29 May, five men (in their forties and fifties) had been brought to the hospital from the same settlement, adding that all of them had injuries consistent with an explosion and that two of them had been dead upon arrival, while the 48-year-old casualty had died in the hospital. Later, on 3 June, in a roofed courtyard at 2 Novikova-Pryboia Street, next to a shop in the south-eastern part of Khrustalnyi, the Mission saw a table and a corrugated roof with holes in them, assessed as caused by shrapnel.
Small-arms fire assessed as directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle north-east of Lebedynske, Donetsk region

On 22 September, while positioned on the north-eastern edge of Lebedynske to conduct a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard 15 bursts of small-arms fire about 4.5km north-east of its position, assessed as targeting its UAV, which was flying about 4.5km north-east of the patrol’s location, over areas between forward positions of both the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations. The SMM safely landed its UAV and left the area.*

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske

On 22 September, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) near its checkpoint south of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening of 22 September, inside the disengagement area, the SMM camera located north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge recorded six people (five men and one woman, age unknown) with trollies with boxes and sacks crossing the bridge from non-government-into-government-controlled areas to the bus stop shelter near the bridge. After spending the night there, in the early morning of 23 September, outside the reporting period, the SMM camera recorded these people returning across the bridge towards non-government-controlled areas.

On the night between 21 and 22 September, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted a person inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the area’s north-eastern corner, and another inside a former position of the armed formations near the area’s eastern edge, about 1.4km north of its south-eastern corner.

On 22 September, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw six members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), two of whom were walking inside the disengagement area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returning.

On the evening of 21 September, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a person inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 1.5km east-north-east of the area’s south-western corner. It also spotted five people within former positions of the armed formations: three people near the area’s south-eastern corner and two about 300m north of the area’s south-eastern corner.

On 22 September, while positioned near the SMM camera system located about 200m east of the north-eastern corner of the disengagement area, the SMM heard five shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km north-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery. While positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the Mission heard about 126 shots of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 4-5km north-east, assessed as a probable live-fire exercise outside the disengagement area.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
The SMM saw 17 weapons, mostly tanks, beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage, 13 of which were in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and four in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region (for further information, see the table below).

### Weapons storage site

**At a weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region**

22 September

The SMM noted that all inventoried weapons were present.

### Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of both Donetsk and Luhansk regions and in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region (for further information, see the table below).

On 22 September, on road H-21, about 5km north of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), the Mission saw a temporary checkpoint staffed by police officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk), near Fedorivka (government-controlled, 71km south of Donetsk), near Starohativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk) and on the northern edge of Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk), the Mission also saw temporary checkpoints staffed by soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

### Presence of mines near Vodiane and mine hazard sign near Holmivskyi, Donetsk region

On 21 September, about 2km north of Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted about 19 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across the road, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 11 August 2020).

On the same day, about 1 km south-east of Vodiane, the same UAV again spotted about 11 anti-tank mines, assessed as part of a larger minefield belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 26 May 2020).

On the same day, next to a damaged house assessed as used by members of the armed formations in a residential area in northern Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time a mine hazard sign with “mines” written in Russian. On 22 September, the Mission saw that the mine sign had been removed.

### SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above) and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), north of Shchastia and south of the bridge in Shchastia.

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5 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance in Vilkove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); repairs to water infrastructure near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk); repairs to power lines near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk); as well as demining activities near government-controlled Hirské (63km west of Luhansk) and Orihove (57km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS). While positioned near Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the Mission heard a shot of small-arms fire, assessed as within a 5km radius of the station.

### Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter the COVID-19 pandemic

In Luhansk region, the Mission saw that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational.

While at the EECP at about 9:10 and 9:50, the Mission saw in total 200 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 25 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction. The SMM also saw a golf cart operating between the new section of the bridge and the EECP.

While at the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations at about 14:25, the SMM observed five people (two women and three men, mixed ages) queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 25 people (12 women and 13 men, mixed ages) queuing in the opposite direction.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

### Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfillment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials:
- At a checkpoint of the armed formations near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk), three members of the armed formations (one visibly armed) denied the SMM passage, citing an ongoing operation in the area.
- At a checkpoint of the armed formations near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk), three members of the armed formations (two visibly armed) denied the SMM passage without giving a reason.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On 21 September, an SMM-long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Valentynivka (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk), Syhnalne (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), Bila Kamianka (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk) and Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk).6
- On 22 September, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 4-5km north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV safely and immediately left the area (see above).

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6 The interferences could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s positions.
### Table of weapons

**Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of weapons</th>
<th>Type of weapon</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10)</td>
<td>Near Vozdvizhenka (40km north-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Mini-UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Tank (T-64)</td>
<td>Near Tymofiiivka (39km west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tank (T-72B)</td>
<td>At a compound near Perevalsk (38km west of Luhansk)</td>
<td>Mini-UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/09/2020</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tank (T-72)</td>
<td>It a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk)</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone

**Government-controlled areas**

- **19/09/2020**
  - 1 Trench digger (BTM-3) at Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk) - Mid-range UAV

- **21/09/2020**
  - 1 Armoured personal carrier (MT-LB) at Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk) - Mid-range UAV
  - 1 Armoured combat vehicle at Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk)
  - 1 Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant) at Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk) - Long-range UAV
  - 12 Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) at Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk)

**Non-government-controlled areas**

- **20/09/2020**
  - 1 Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) at Alchevsk (40km west of Luhansk) - Mini-UAV
  - 1 Towed anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) at Alchevsk (40km west of Luhansk) - Mini-UAV

- **22/09/2020**
  - 1 Armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant) at Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk) - Long-range UAV

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7 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
Table of ceasefire violations as of 22 September 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMM position</th>
<th>Event location</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Date, time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>About 1.8km N of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km S of Donetsk)</td>
<td>4-5km NE</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>Assessed as outside the disengagement area</td>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>22-Sep, 09:20-09:31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4-5km NE</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>Assessed as outside the disengagement area</td>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>22-Sep, 09:35-09:37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4-5km NE</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>Assessed as outside the disengagement area</td>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>22-Sep, 09:38-09:39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4-5km NE</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>Assessed as outside the disengagement area</td>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>22-Sep, 09:40-09:42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4-5km NE</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>Assessed as outside the disengagement area</td>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>22-Sep, 09:46-09:50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km S of Donetsk)</td>
<td>3-4km NE</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>Assessed as outside the disengagement area</td>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td>22-Sep, 14:10-14:12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About 2.3km SE of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99km S of Donetsk)</td>
<td>3km NE</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>22-Sep, 09:40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3km NNE</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>22-Sep, 10:00-10:02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/K NNE</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Burst</td>
<td></td>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td>22-Sep, 10:32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About 800m NE of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99km S of Donetsk)</td>
<td>4.5km NE</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Burst</td>
<td></td>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td>22-Sep, 10:33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About 2.6km SE of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)</td>
<td>2-3km E</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td></td>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td>22-Sep, 10:30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions, technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.
The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).