Summary

- The SMM recorded one ceasefire violation in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region. In the previous 24 hours, it recorded no ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and two ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanitsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During evening hours, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted a person inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
- The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 pandemic, including at entry-exit checkpoints and the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission’s freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at a border crossing point near Izvaryne, Luhansk region, as well as at checkpoints of the armed formations near Olenivka and Rozdolne, Donetsk region. *

Ceasefire violations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of recorded ceasefire violations</th>
<th>Number of recorded explosions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Report 22.09.2020</td>
<td>previous 7 days average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 21 September 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.
2 For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.
3 Including explosions.
4 Including from unidentified weapons.
Map of recorded ceasefire violations

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM
21 September 2020

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA, Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap, Sea - VLIZ (2005), IHO Sea Areas, Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 22/09/2020
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded one ceasefire violation – an undetermined explosion in an area north-east of Hranitime (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk). In the previous 24 hours, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations in the region.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. In the previous 24 hours, the Mission recorded two ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,071 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 210 explosions, nine projectiles in flight, 13 illumination flares and 839 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske

On 21 September, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) near its checkpoint south of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening of 20 September, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a person inside a former position of the armed formations near the area’s eastern edge, about 1.4km north of its south-eastern corner.

On 21 September, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), two of whom walking inside the disengagement area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returning.

On the same day, from about 75m to 200m south of the disengagement area’s southern edge, the SMM saw workers with heavy construction equipment spreading and levelling gravel.

On 21 September, while positioned at four locations near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The SMM saw three weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region. Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage, it saw two weapons in government- and five in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region (for further information, see the tables below).
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region (for further information, see the table below).

Presence of mines near non-government-controlled Holmivskyi and Petrivske and near government-controlled Luhanske and Pisky, all in Donetsk region

On 21 September, about 1.7km north of Petrivske and about 170m east of the road between Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk) and Petrivske, the Mission spotted for the first time a transparent plastic bag filled with anti-personnel mines (assessed as PMN-2 type) lying on the ground (not seen on 20 September 2020).

On 19 September, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted 13 anti-tank mines laid across a road between Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) and Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk), assessed as belonging to the armed formations (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 15 June 2020).

On the same day, the UAV again spotted at least 14 anti-tank mines (TM-62) across road M-03 about 5km south-east of Luhanske (government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Reports of 12 March 2020 and 7 August 2020).

Also on 19 September, at two locations about 1.5km south-east of Pisky (government-controlled, 11km north-west of Donetsk), the UAV again spotted 20 anti-tank mines laid across a road leading to non-government-controlled Donetsk city, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 25 August 2020).

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

On 21 September, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above), north of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia.

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance in Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk) and repairs to water infrastructure near non-government-controlled Pankivka (16km north of Luhansk) and Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 19 September, at 22:09, about 1km east-south-east of Kvashyne (65km south-east of Donetsk) and about 7km from the border with the Russian Federation, an SMM long-range

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5 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
UAV spotted a cargo train consisting of two locomotives and 50 empty hopper cars traveling north-westward from the direction of the border.

On 21 September, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM observed 14 cars (including ten with “DPR” plates), 16 cargo trucks (cargo not visible, including five with “DPR” and one with “LPR” plates), a bus (about 30 passengers, mixed genders and ages), and 17 pedestrians (13 women, three men, mixed ages and one child) entering Ukraine. It also observed 16 cars (including six with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about fifteen minutes, the Mission observed members of the armed formations but no traffic.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) the Mission observed 18 cars (including seven with “LPR” plates) and 20 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing to exit Ukraine. After five minutes, a member of armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 40 minutes, the Mission noted that it appeared to be closed and there were no personnel present.

**Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter the COVID-19 pandemic**

In Donetsk region, the Mission observed that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were operational.

While at the EECP, between 09:00 and 15:00, the Mission saw in total 20 people (14 women and four men, mixed ages, and two children) entering government-controlled areas. It also observed in total 121 people (mixed genders and ages, including five children), six buses and 18 vehicles exiting government-controlled areas.

While at the checkpoint of the armed formations, between 9:05 and 12:00, the SMM saw in total 70 people (mixed genders and ages, including five children), ten vehicles and a bus travelling towards government-controlled areas. It also observed in total ten people (mixed genders and ages) and three vehicles traveling in the opposite direction.

In Luhansk region, the Mission saw that the EECP in Stanitsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanitsia Luhanska bridge were operational.

While at the EECP at about 9:20 and at 12:20, the Mission saw in total 90 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 65 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction. The SMM also saw a golf cart operating between the new section of the bridge and the EECP.

While at the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations at about 10:10 and at 11:10, the SMM observed 99 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 35 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials:
- At a border crossing point in Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
- On the same day, at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage towards government-controlled areas.
- At a checkpoint of the armed formations near Rozdolne (non-government-controlled, 46km south-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing the Mission’s safety.

Delay:
- At a checkpoint of the armed formations near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), three members of armed formations (two of them visibly armed) allowed the SMM passage only after 19 minutes of waiting.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:
- An SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk).
- An SMM mid-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99km south of Donetsk).6

6 Both interferences could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.
# Table of weapons

## Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of weapons</th>
<th>Type of weapons</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government-controlled areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Probable self-propelled anti-tank guided missile system (9P133 Malyukha, 135mm)</td>
<td>Near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/09/2020</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10)</td>
<td>In a residential area of Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of weapons</th>
<th>Type of weapons</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government-controlled areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Probable surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa)</td>
<td>In a military compound near Kalyonoe (35km north of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10)</td>
<td>In a military compound near Arkhanhelske (32km north of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non-government-controlled areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of weapons</th>
<th>Type of weapons</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19/09/2020</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tank (probable T-64)</td>
<td>Near Markyne (94km south of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of weapons</th>
<th>Type of weapons</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government-controlled areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/09/2020</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Probable armoured combat vehicle</td>
<td>Near Novgorodsk (35km north of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured combat vehicle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/09/2020</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70)</td>
<td>In a military compound near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)</td>
<td>Near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured combat vehicle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70)</td>
<td>In a residential area of Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (three BMP-2 and four BMP-1)</td>
<td>In a military compound near Trudivske (47km south of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/09/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)</td>
<td>Near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)</td>
<td>In a residential area of Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)</td>
<td>Near Novomykhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non-government-controlled areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of weapons</th>
<th>Type of weapons</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19/09/2020</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Armoured combat vehicle</td>
<td>In a compound near a residential area of Komisarivka (60km west of Luhansk)</td>
<td>Mini-UAV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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7 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
Table of ceasefire violations as of 21 September 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMM position</th>
<th>Event location</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Date, time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>About 1.5km SSW of Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km S of Donetsk)</td>
<td>4-5km NE</td>
<td>Heard and saw</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>21-Sep, 12:55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.
The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).