Summary

- The SMM recorded one ceasefire violation in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded three ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During evening and night-time hours, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted people inside the latter two disengagement areas.
- The SMM again saw unexploded ordnance near Kruta Balka, on a road frequently used by the SMM and employees of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 outbreak.
- The Mission monitored a peaceful gathering in Kyiv concerning the latest COVID-19 protective measures.
- The SMM continued to follow up on reports of an attack on a bus carrying people near Kharkiv on 27 August.
- The Mission’s freedom of movement continued to be restricted including at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka.*

Ceasefire violations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of recorded ceasefire violations</th>
<th>Number of recorded explosions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 28 August 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.
2 For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.
3 Including explosions.
4 Including from unidentified weapons.
Map of recorded ceasefire violations
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded one ceasefire violation – an illumination flare in an area south of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk). During the previous reporting period, it recorded three ceasefire violations in the same area.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations. During the previous reporting period, it also recorded none. The SMM had previously recorded a ceasefire violation in Luhansk region during the evening of 24 August (see SMM Daily Report 26 August 2020).

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 727 ceasefire violations, both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 111 explosions, two projectiles in flight, 12 illumination flares and 602 bursts and shots).

**Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske**

On the morning of 28 August, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCC C” written on them) on the southern edge of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening of 27 August, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted four people inside former positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces – one in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), about 1km east-south-east of the area’s north-western corner, one south of the railway track and about 750m east from road T-1316, one about 500m west of the area’s north-eastern corner and close to its northern edge, and one near the area’s north-eastern corner. The same UAV also spotted two people inside former positions of the armed formations near the area’s eastern edge, about 1.4km north of its south-eastern corner.

On 26 August, outside the disengagement area, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time a new L-shaped trench (30m long) about 150m west of the area’s western edge and about 100m north of the railway tracks that pass through the disengagement area, assessed as belonging to the armed formations (not seen in imagery from 7 June 2020).

During the day of 28 August, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), three of whom walked about 350m north inside the disengagement area and then returned, accompanied by four other people (two in hazmat suits).

On the same day, outside of the disengagement area, about 100m south of its southern edge, the Mission saw 15 workers with three excavators and a truck with a trailer conducting groundworks across and along road T-1316.

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5 The sentence “The Mission had previously recorded ceasefire violations in the region between the evenings of 22 and 23 August (see SMM Daily Report 24 August 2020)” in the SMM Daily Report 28 August 2020, should have read the same as the one included in this report.

6 Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
On the night between 27 and 28 August, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted a person in a former position of the armed formations near the area’s south-eastern corner.

On 28 August, an SMM mini-UAV flying over the north-western corner of the disengagement area experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming.*

On the same day, while positioned at three locations close to the disengagement area, the Mission observed a calm situation.

### Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in a training area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014. It also saw weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage areas in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region (for further details, see the tables below).

### Anti-tank mines near Vodiane and unexploded ordnance (UXO) near Kruta Balka, both in Donetsk region

On 27 August, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted about 50 anti-tank mines in a field on the north-eastern edge of Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), east of the road leading to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 92km south of Donetsk) (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 4 August 2020](https://www.osce.org/mission/437687)). The same UAV also **again** spotted 16 anti-tank mines in fields about 1km south-east of Vodiane. All these mines were assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 28 August, the Mission **again** observed the previously reported UXO embedded in the asphalt of road M-04 near Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk) and assessed it as an unexploded 73mm projectile. About 1.3km south of the aforementioned location, the SMM observed an improvised demolition charge (with an undetermined number of 152mm artillery rounds) placed in four underground vertical chambers extending under both lanes of road M-04 (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 10 March 2020](https://www.osce.org/mission/437687)).

### Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (for further details, see the table below).

On 28 August, about 700m south-west of Novoluhranske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted for the first time a 120m-long

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* The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
trench extension, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (not seen in imagery from 8 June 2020).

**SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure**

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable preparations for construction works south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above) and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway track maintenance and vegetation clearance in government-controlled Vilkhove (22km north-east of Luhansk); maintenance of and repairs to power lines near non-government-controlled Vesela Hora, Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (58km north-west of Luhansk), Kalynove-Borschchuvate (61km west of Luhansk) and Almazna (55km west of Luhansk); and maintenance of and repairs to a power substation near Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to water infrastructure near non-government-controlled Pankivka (16km north of Luhansk); maintenance works to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk); as well as demining near government-controlled areas of Orlikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk), Hirsky (63km west of Luhansk) and Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation near the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). On the night of 27 August, the Mission recorded an illumination flare within a 5km radius of the station (see above and in the table below).

**Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter COVID-19 outbreak**

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the EECP in Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational.

While at the EECP at about 09:00, 13:10 and 15:30, the SMM observed about 100 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to enter the government-controlled areas and about 1,050 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction.

While at the EECP, four people (two men, around 40 years old, and one woman, 30-35 years old, one accompanied by her daughter) told the SMM that they had spent the night near the bus stop after being denied entry to non-government-controlled areas since they could not demonstrate at the checkpoint of the armed formations that they lived in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region. Throughout the day, the SMM saw a golf cart transporting people between the EECP and the new section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.
The SMM monitored a peaceful gathering in Kyiv

On 28 August, in Kyiv, in front of the Cabinet of Ministers at 12/2 Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street, the SMM monitored a peaceful gathering of about 100 people (mixed genders and ages) expressing critical messages in relation to a recent temporary ban on entry of foreigners into Ukraine, adopted as part of COVID-19 protective measures.

The SMM's follow up on an attack on a bus near Kharkiv on 27 August

The Mission continued to follow up on the 27 August attack on a minibus carrying people on road M-03 near Liubotyn (22km west of Kharkiv) (see SMM Daily Report 28 August 2020). On the evening of 27 August at the place of the incident, the SMM saw a minibus with all windows on one of its sides and two on the opposite side shattered or damaged, as well as shards of broken glass on the ground near the vehicle. On the ground, it also saw several marks assessed as bloodstains. The Mission noted that the area was cordoned off and saw ten law enforcement officers present.

The Mission continued monitoring in Dnipro, Odessa, Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Chernivtsi.

Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate*

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government. (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 25 August 2020). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial:

- At a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations denied the Mission passage towards government-controlled areas, referring to the need for permission from those in control.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.
Other impediments:

- On 28 August, an SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) (see above).\(^8\)

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\(^8\) The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.
# Tables of weapons

## Weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of weapons</th>
<th>Type of weapon</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27/08/2020</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm)</td>
<td>In a training area near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Towed howitzers (D-30A Lyagushka, 122mm)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of weapons</th>
<th>Type of weapon</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27/08/2020</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Tank (T-64)</td>
<td>Near Oleksandriyske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, 90km south-east of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government-controlled areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/08/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured combat vehicle</td>
<td>Near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Mid-range UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)</td>
<td>Near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Trench extension (120m long) (not seen in imagery from 8 June 2020)</td>
<td>Near Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2)</td>
<td>In a compound in Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Mini-UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mine layer (GMZ-3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-government-controlled areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/08/2020</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Trench (L-shaped) (30m) (not seen in imagery from 7 June 2020)</td>
<td>About 1.8km north-east of Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk) and 150m west of disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk)</td>
<td>Mini-UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Armoured combat vehicle</td>
<td>Near Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/08/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)</td>
<td>In a training area near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier (probable BTR-80)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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9 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
Table of ceasefire violations as of 28 August 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMM position</th>
<th>Event location</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Date, time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration Station (15km N of Donetsk)</td>
<td>2-4km S</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Illumination flare</td>
<td>In vertical flight (also recorded by the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine)</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>27-Aug, 23:48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.
The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well.)