

Daily Report 205/2020


28 August 2020¹

Summary


- The SMM recorded three ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded ten ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region.
- The Mission followed up on reports of a man who died from the explosion of a grenade inside his home in Mariupol.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During night-time hours, an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle observed people inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 outbreak, including at the entry-exit checkpoint and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The Mission observed a convoy of trucks with Russian Federation licence plates in non-government-controlled Donetsk city.
- The SMM followed up on reports of an attack on a bus carrying people near Kharkiv on 27 August.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³



Number of recorded explosions⁴



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 27 August 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.

³ Including explosions.


⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 27 August 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 28/08/2020

In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded three ceasefire violations – an undetermined explosion and two illumination flares were recorded in areas south of Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (see below). During the [previous reporting period](#), it recorded ten ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations. During the [previous reporting period](#), it recorded no ceasefire violations. The SMM had previously recorded a ceasefire violation in Luhansk region during the evening of 24 August (see [SMM Daily Report 26 August 2020](#)).

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 726 ceasefire violations, both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 111 explosions, two projectiles in flight, 11 illumination flares and 602 bursts and shots).

Man died from grenade explosion in Mariupol

The SMM followed up on reports of a man (in his fifties) who died on 21 August from the explosion of a grenade in a house in Mariupol (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk).

On 25 August, staff at a morgue in Mariupol's Kalmiuskyi district told the SMM that the body of a man had been brought to the morgue on 21 August. On the same day, two police officers in front of a house at 75 Zelenohirska Street in Mariupol told the Mission that a man had died there because of an explosion. On 26 August, a woman (in her fifties) told the Mission at the house that her partner had died on the afternoon of 21 August in the house when a grenade exploded. She added that at that time, she had been working in the summer kitchen when she heard a loud explosion inside the house. She then had called a neighbour for help, who had gone into the house and told her that the man had lost both hands and died in an explosion.

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

On the morning of 27 August, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) on the southern edge of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the night of 26 August inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a person inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the area's north-eastern corner. The same UAV also spotted a person inside a former position of the armed formations near the area's eastern edge, about 1.4km north of its south-eastern corner.

Throughout the day on 27 August, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them), three of whom walked inside the disengagement

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and back, accompanied by four medical personnel, two in protective garments.

On the same day, outside of the disengagement area, about 300m south of its southern edge, the Mission saw six workers with heavy construction equipment spreading rubble, loading soil into trucks and levelling the gravel surface of the road with a steamroller.

While positioned at two locations near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in training areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014. The SMM also saw weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage areas in non-government-controlled areas of both regions (for further details, see the tables below).

Anti-tank mines near Vodiane and Pikuzy, Donetsk region

On 26 August, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 24 anti-tank mines in a field about 1.8km north-east of Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report 3 August 2020](#)).

The same UAV spotted an anti-tank mine, as well as 11 patches of burnt tarmac, assessed as burnt anti-tank mines, on road T-0519, about 100m west of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 92km south of Donetsk) (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 22 April 2020](#)). The same UAV [again](#) spotted ten anti-tank mines (part of a larger minefield) near the western edge of Pikuzy, south of road T-0519, as well 120 more (part of a larger minefield) in a field about 2.5km south-south-west of Pikuzy (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 11 August 2020](#)). All these mines were assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in government- and non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk region. (For further details, see the table below.)

On 26 August, about 2.8km south-south-west of Pikuzy, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time a 50m-long trench extension, assessed as belonging to the armed formations (not seen in imagery from 6 July 2020). The same UAV also spotted for the first time a 20m-long trench extension about 1.8km north-east of Vodiane, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (not seen in imagery from 5 August 2020).

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Also on 26 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted ongoing upgrades to a military-type position about 2km north-east of Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), assessed as belonging to the armed formations (not seen in imagery from 8 August 2020).

On 27 August, the SMM observed for the first time a recently dug military position 1km west of Bolotene (government-controlled, 22 north-east of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

On 27 August, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable preparations for construction works south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above) and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway track maintenance and vegetation clearance in Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), as well as to enable repairs to power lines in Shumy (government-controlled, 41km north of Donetsk), near Vesela Hora and near Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk).

It also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable demining activities on the northern side of the bridge in Shchastia and in areas near government-controlled Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk), Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation near the pumping station near Vasylivka. On 26 August, the Mission recorded an undetermined explosion within a 5km radius of the station (see above and table below).

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter COVID-19 outbreak

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska was operational.

While at the EECP at about 09:00, the Mission observed about 200 people (mixed genders and ages, including one child) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and about 100 people (mixed genders and ages, including one child) queuing in the opposite direction.

North of the EECP, the SMM saw 26 people (18 women and eight men, mostly over 60 years old) queuing in front of a facility where COVID-19 tests were performed. Throughout the day, the SMM observed a golf cart operating between the new section of the bridge and the EECP.

On the 26 August, at the EECP, eight civilians (five women and three men, 25-40 years old) told the Mission that they had spent the previous night sleeping on benches near the bus stop since they could not demonstrate at the checkpoint of the armed formations that they lived in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.

Convoy of trucks with Russian Federation licence plates in non-government-controlled Donetsk city

On 27 August, the Mission observed a convoy of six covered cargo trucks with Russian Federation licence plates (with “Russian Federation humanitarian aid” written in Russian on the side) escorted by another vehicle (with “MChS” written on the side) driving near a compound in Donetsk city’s Budonivskyi district (for previous observations, see [SMM Daily Report 31 July 2020](#)).

SMM followed up on reports of an attack on a bus carrying people near Kharkiv on 27 August

On 28 August, a Kharkiv police representative told the Mission that at about 19:10 on 27 August, near Liubotyn (22km west of Kharkiv), a passenger car had blocked the way of a minibus with 20 people on board which had been traveling on highway M-03. Subsequently, several people exited the car and started shooting from traumatic weapons at the bus, after which they had entered back into the car and driven away. She added that as a result, four people had sustained injuries and had been hospitalised, and that the minibus had also been damaged. She told the SMM that an investigation into the incident had been launched under articles 296.4 (hooliganism) and 115 (attempted murder of two or more persons with hooliganism motives under prior conspiracy) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. The Mission is following up on the case.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate*

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government. (for example, see [SMM Daily Report of 25 August 2020](#)). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Tables of weapons

Weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
23/08/2020	4	Self-propelled howitzer (type undetermined)	In a training area near Buhaiivka (37km south-west of Luhansk)	Aerial imagery
	3	Multiple launch rocket system (type undetermined)	In a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk)	
	6	Towed artillery (type undetermined)	In a training area near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014	

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
23/08/2020	10	Self-propelled howitzer (type undetermined)	In a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk)	Aerial imagery
	12	Towed mortar (type undetermined)		
	2	Tank (type undetermined)		
	20	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), where the same imagery also revealed the presence of 67 armoured combat vehicles ⁷	
	8	Self-propelled artillery (type undetermined)		
	16	Towed artillery (type undetermined)		
24/08/2020	22	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk), where the same imagery also revealed the presence of ten armoured combat vehicles ⁸	
	35	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk), where the same imagery also revealed the presence of 74 armoured combat vehicles ⁹	

Other weapons observed¹⁰

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
23/08/2020	9	Towed artillery (type undetermined)	In a training area near Buhaiivka (37km south-west of Luhansk)	Aerial imagery
24/08/2020	1	Self-propelled artillery (type undetermined)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)	

⁷ ACVs mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone¹¹

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
26/08/2020	1	Probable armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant)	Near Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
	1	Probable infantry fighting vehicle (BTR-4)	Near Prymorske (102km south of Donetsk)	
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR type)	On the eastern outskirts of Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk)	
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)	Near Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk)	
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)	Near Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk)	
	1	Armoured combat vehicle		
	1	Probable infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)	Near Novoselivka (66km south of Donetsk)	
	2	Armoured combat vehicle	Near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk)	
	-	Trench extension (20m long) (not seen in imagery from 5 August 2020)	Near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk)	Mid-range UAV
Non-government-controlled areas				
26/08/2020	-	Trench extension (50m long) (not seen in imagery from 6 July 2020)	Near Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 92km south of Donetsk)	Mid-range UAV
	-	Ongoing upgrades to a military-type position (not seen in imagery from 8 August 2020)	Near Vasylivka (20km north of Donetsk)	
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)	Near Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk)	Patrol


¹¹ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 27 August 2020¹²

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	4-6km ESE	Recorded	1	Illumination flare	In vertical flight	N/K	26-Aug, 20:20
	4-6km ESE	Recorded	1	Illumination flare	In vertical flight	N/K	26-Aug, 20:21
SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration Station (15km N of Donetsk)	0.5-1km S	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	26-Aug, 23:30

¹² The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹³



¹³ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well.)