Summary

- The SMM recorded ten ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded ten ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and one in Luhansk region.
- The Mission lost spatial control of one of its mini-unmanned aerial vehicles, after it experienced signal interference, while flying over the disengagement area near Petrivske.
- A boy was injured due to the detonation of a grenade in Kypuche, Luhansk region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During evening and night-time hours, an SMM long-range UAV spotted people inside the latter two disengagement areas.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 outbreak, including at the entry-exit checkpoint and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The Mission’s freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of recorded ceasefire violations</th>
<th>Number of recorded explosions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2020 daily average</strong></td>
<td><strong>2020 daily average</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 days average</td>
<td>7 days average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 days average</td>
<td>30 days average</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 26 August 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.
2 For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.
3 Including explosions.
4 Including from unidentified weapons.
Map of recorded ceasefire violations

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM
26 August 2020

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA, Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap, seas - VLIZ (2005), IHO Sea Areas, Other - OSCE

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 27/08/2020
In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded ten cease-fire violations, all undetermined explosions, in areas south-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk). During the previous reporting period, it also recorded ten cease-fire violations.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded no cease-fire violations. During the previous reporting period, it recorded one cease-fire violation.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the cease-fire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 723 cease-fire violations, both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 110 explosions, two projectiles in flight, nine illumination flares and 602 bursts and shots).

**Boy injured due to detonation of grenade in Kypuche, Luhansk region**

On 14 August, medical staff at the hospital in Perevalsk (non-government-controlled, 38km west of Luhansk) told the SMM that on the evening of 7 August, a seven-year-old boy was admitted with heavy blast injuries to his right leg caused by the explosion of a grenade.

On 24 August, in Kypuche (formerly Artemivsk, non-government-controlled, 46km west of Luhansk) a couple (man and woman in their seventies) who introduced themselves as the grandparents of the injured boy said that on the early evening of 7 August, they had been called by a neighbour to their daughter’s house in Kypuche, at 22-2 Shchorsa Street, after they heard a loud explosion. The grandparents said that their two grandchildren had been playing in the yard of the abovementioned house with an object that they had found in a neighbor’s house. According to them, while the younger child had been alone in the yard of his mother’s house, he had picked up the device, which had exploded. Another neighbour (man in his thirties) said that he had seen the injured boy lying on the ground in the abovementioned yard and that he had been bleeding profusely from a wound on his right leg.

On the same day, in the yard of the abovementioned house in Kypuche, the SMM saw blood marks in the middle of the yard.

**SMM lost spatial control over its mini-unmanned aerial vehicle while flying over disengagement area near Petrivske**

On the morning of 26 August, an SMM patrol was positioned outside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), about 450m east-north-east of its north-western corner, to conduct an announced mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight. At 10:43, while the SMM mini-UAV was flying over the disengagement area, the aircraft experienced signal interference, after which the SMM lost spatial control over it, at an assessed range of 500-700m south-east of the patrol’s position. The SMM was unable to recover the UAV and left the area.*
Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske

On 26 August, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) between the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) and their checkpoint south of it.

On the evening of 25 August, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted nine people inside former positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: three near the area’s north-eastern corner and six in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), about 1km east-south-east of the area’s north-western corner. The UAV also spotted three people inside former positions of the armed formations near the area’s eastern edge, about 1.4km north of the area’s south-eastern corner.

During the day on 26 August, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), three of whom entered and walked about 350m north inside the disengagement area and then returned.

On the night of 25-26 August, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske, the same long-range UAV spotted three people inside a former position of the armed formations near the area’s south-eastern corner.

On 26 August, while positioned at three locations close to the disengagement area near Petrivske, the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The Mission spotted four weapons in violation of their respective withdrawal lines, all at a training area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.

The Mission also saw 34 weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites on both sides of the contact line in Donetsk region, including at a training area in a non-government-controlled area (for further details, see the tables below).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn

At three heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region
26 August

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5 Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
6 The SMM visited areas holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. Two such sites appeared to be abandoned.
The SMM noted that six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and two self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) were present and that ten multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), nine towed howitzers (six D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm and three 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), seven anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and three self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona, 120mm) were again missing.

**Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone**

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, as well as in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region (for further details, see the table below).

On 25 August, on the south-eastern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) and about 3km north-east of the same settlement, an SMM long-range UAV spotted for the first time two trenches (both running north-west to south-east for about 100m and 20m) assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (not visible in imagery from 26 July and 5 July 2020) (for similar observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 25 August 2020).

**Presence of unexploded ordnance near Raivka**

Near a checkpoint of the armed formations on the eastern edge of Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw for the first time a mortar shell (82mm) lying on the eastern shoulder of the road. While present, the SMM saw a member of the armed formations remove the unexploded ordnance (UXO).

**SMM facilitation of repairs to and maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure**

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable preparations for construction works south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to water infrastructure between Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk) and Horlivka, and to a gas pipeline between non-government-controlled Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk) and Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk); maintenance and repairs to power lines near Vesela Hora; and railway track maintenance and vegetation clearance in Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk).

It also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable demining activities on the northern side of the bridge in Shchastia and in areas near government-controlled Orihove (57km north-west of Luhansk), Hirsko (63km west of Luhansk) and Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation near the pumping station near Vasylyivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter COVID-19 outbreak

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational.

While at the EECP at about 09:15 and 14:30, the SMM saw 500 people and 100 people (mixed genders and ages), respectively, queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 100 people and 60 people (mixed genders and ages), respectively, queuing in the opposite direction.

While at the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations between about 10:30 and 12:30, the Mission saw 95 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 210 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction.

Throughout the day, the SMM saw a golf cart transporting people between the EECP and the new section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, as well as a shuttle bus operating between the checkpoint of the armed formations and a bus stop about 1.8km south of the bridge.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate*

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government. (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 25 August 2020). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.
Other impediments:

- An SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference during two separate flights, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk). During the second flight, the Mission lost spatial control over the mini-UAV and was unable to retrieve it (see above).
- An SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference on two separate occasions, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Zhabunki (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk).
- An SMM mid-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99km south of Donetsk).

7 The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV's position.
Table of weapons

Weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of weapons</th>
<th>Type of weapons</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23/08/2020</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 Grad, 122mm)</td>
<td>In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Mid-range UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Towed howitzer (D-30A Lyagushka, 122mm)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of weapons</th>
<th>Type of weapon</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25/08/2020</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa)</td>
<td>In Kalynove (35km north of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/08/2020</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Tank (28 T-72 and four T-64)</td>
<td>In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Mid-range UAV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25/08/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)</td>
<td>Near Lopaskyne (23km north-west of Luhansk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Combat engineering vehicle (BAT-2)</td>
<td>Near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Two trenches (in total 120m long) (not seen in imagery from 26 and 5 July 2020)</td>
<td>On the south-eastern edge and about 3.5km north-east of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non-government-controlled areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25/08/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)</td>
<td>Near Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Long-range UAV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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8 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMM position</th>
<th>Event location</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Date, time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>About 7.5km WNW of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km NE of Donetsk)</td>
<td>8-10km WSW</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>26-Aug, 09:14-09:16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.
The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well.)