Summary

- Between the evenings of 21 and 22 August, the SMM recorded 60 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region (in the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations). Between the evenings of 22 and 23 August, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations in the region.
- Between the evenings of 21 and 22 August, the SMM recorded one ceasefire violation in Luhansk region (in the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations). Between the evenings of 22 and 23 August, the Mission recorded one ceasefire violation in the region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske.
- The SMM visited three border crossing points in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 outbreak, including at an entry-exit checkpoint and its corresponding checkpoint in Luhansk region.
- The Mission’s freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

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* Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 23 August 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.
Ceasefire violations

Number of recorded ceasefire violations\(^2\)  
Number of recorded explosions\(^4\)

\(^2\) For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske, Zolote and near Shyrokyne were not operational.

\(^3\) Including explosions.

\(^4\) Including from unidentified weapons.
Map of recorded ceasefire violations

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM
22-23 August 2020

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005), IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 24/08/2020
In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 21 and 22 August, the SMM recorded 60 ceasefire violations. The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in an area south-south-east of Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk). In the previous reporting period, the Mission did not record any ceasefire violations.

Between the evenings of 22 and 23 August, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations in the region.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 21 and 22 August, the SMM recorded one ceasefire violation – an explosion in an area south-west of Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). In the previous reporting period, the Mission did not record ceasefire violations.

Between the evenings of 22 and 23 August, the Mission recorded one ceasefire violation in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 696 ceasefire violations, both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 94 explosions, two projectiles in flight, nine illumination flares and 591 bursts and shots).

**Disengagement areas near Stanitsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske**

On 22 and 23 August, inside the disengagement area near Stanitsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) between the new span of the Stanitsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) and their checkpoint south of it.

On 22 and 23 August, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the Mission saw members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), some of whom it saw entering and walking about 350m north inside the disengagement area and then returning.

On 22 August, outside the disengagement area, about 500m south of its southern edge, the SMM observed 12 workers with heavy construction equipment conducting groundworks on road T-1316.

On 23 August, outside the disengagement area, about 100m south of its southern edge, the Mission saw two workers with heavy construction equipment conducting ground works on the same road.

On 22 and 23 August, while positioned at two locations near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

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5 Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles on both sides of the contact line (for further details, see the table below).

Presence of mines near Shchastia and mine hazard sign near Chermalyk

On 21 August, about 2km southeast of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted 30 anti-tank mines laid across road H-21 about 150m south-east of the bridge in Shchastia, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations of mines in this area see SMM Daily Report of 13 August 2020).

On 23 August, on the eastern edge of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk), the Mission again saw that a previously seen mine hazard sign, which had been attached to a rope extending across a road leading to a cemetery, was on the ground by the side of the road.

On 22 August, near Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), on road M-03 leading towards Lohvynove (non-government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed that the previously reported five objects, assessed as rocket-propelled grenades, were no longer present.

SMM facilitation of maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

On 22 and 23 August, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable preparations for construction works south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above) and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the Shchastia bridge (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

On 22 August, the SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to water infrastructure near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) as well as demining activities on the northern side of the bridge in Shchastia.

On 22 and 23 August, the Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable vegetation clearance, inspection and maintenance of railway tracks near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); as well as demining activities near government-controlled Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk) and Hirskye (63km west of Luhansk).

6 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
On 22 and 23 August, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk). On 22 August, the SMM also monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

**Border areas outside government control**

On 22 August, while at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about one hour and 40 minutes, the Mission saw 14 cars (including four with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks and four tanker trucks, one bus with “DPR” plates (about 30 passengers, mixed genders and ages) and 15 people (mixed genders and ages) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM also observed 41 cars (including 18 with “DPR” plates), seven covered cargo trucks (including one with “DPR” plates) and three buses with “DPR” plates (about 60, 55, and 40 passengers, respectively, mixed genders and ages) exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the Mission saw five cars (including three with “DPR” plates), one bus with “DPR” plates (about 40 passengers, mixed genders and ages) and 19 people (mixed genders and ages) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM also observed 82 cars (including 73 with “DPR” plates), one covered cargo truck, one bus with “DPR” plates (about 45 passengers, mixed genders and ages) as well as about 16 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to exit Ukraine. On 23 August, while at the same border crossing point for about ten minutes, the Mission saw 25 cargo trucks (including 17 with “DPR” plates) and two buses (about 50 passengers each, mixed genders and ages) queuing to exit Ukraine.

On 22 August, while at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM observed two cars and four people entering Ukraine. During the same interval, the Mission also observed 15 cars, 22 trucks (including 15 with “LPR” plates), and one bus with “LPR” plates (about 40 passengers, mixed genders and ages) queuing to exit Ukraine.

On the same day, while at the Chervona Mohyla railway station near Voznesenivka for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw four stationary cargo trains (each with 10-15 open freight wagons, with no visible cargo).

**Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter COVID-19 outbreak**

In Luhansk region, on 22 and 23 August, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanitsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanitsia Luhanska bridge were operational.

On 22 August, while at the EECP at about 10:20 and 11:30, the SMM saw no people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and about 700 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction. The Mission saw that one golf cart was transporting people between the EECP and the new span of the Stanitsia Luhanska bridge.
On 23 August, while at the EECP at about 10:20 and 11:20, the SMM saw about 400 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and about 400 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction. On the same day, while at the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations between 11:30 and 11:45, the Mission saw about 60 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to travel to government-controlled areas and about 130 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 18 August 2020). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On 23 August, on two occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near government-controlled Vodiane (78km south of Donetsk).7

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7 The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.
**Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22/08/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60)</td>
<td>In Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70)</td>
<td>Near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/08/2020</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70)</td>
<td>Near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk)</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60)</td>
<td>In a residential area of Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicles (BMP variant)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Non-government-controlled areas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source of observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22/08/2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier (probable MT-LB)</td>
<td>Near Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk)</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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8 The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
Table of ceasefire violations as of 23 August 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMM position</th>
<th>Event location</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Date, time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SMM camera in Berezove (government-controlled, 31km SW of Donetsk)</td>
<td>2-4km SE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>21-Aug, 23:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration Station (15km N of Donetsk)</td>
<td>3-5km SSW</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Illumination flare</td>
<td>In vertical flight (also recorded by Avdiivka 2 camera and Oktiabr Mine 2 camera)</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>21-Aug, 22:03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5km SSW</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Illumination flare</td>
<td>In vertical flight (also recorded by Avdiivka 2 camera and Oktiabr Mine 2 camera)</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>21-Aug, 22:04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About 600m SSE Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km S of Donetsk)</td>
<td>2-3km NNE</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td></td>
<td>22-Aug, 12:36-12:50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-3km NNE</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td></td>
<td>22-Aug, 15:02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S edge of Kalynove (non-government controlled, 60km W of Luhansk)</td>
<td>5-10km SW</td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>22-Aug, 12:46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMM camera on N edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km W of Luhansk)</td>
<td>2-4km SSE</td>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Illumination flare</td>
<td>In vertical flight</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>23-Aug, 02:41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.
The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well.)