

# Daily Report 188/2020

8 August 2020<sup>1</sup>

#### **Summary**

- From 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 256 ceasefire violations.
- In the reporting period, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, for the second time since it began systematic data collection.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. Inside the disengagement area near Petrivske, an SMM long-range UAV observed people during evening hours.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable the maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 outbreak, including at entry-exit checkpoints in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including in non-government-controlled Donetsk city\*

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 7 August 2020. All times are in Eastem European Summer Time.

### Ceasefire violations<sup>23</sup>

For the second time since the Mission began systematic data collection, it recorded no ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.<sup>4</sup> In the <u>previous reporting period</u>, the SMM recorded five ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region. The Mission had previously recorded no ceasefire violations in both regions between the evenings of 4 and 5 August 2020 (see <u>SMM Daily Report 6 August 2020</u>).

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 256 ceasefire violations, both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 45 explosions, two projectiles in flight, three illumination flares and 206 bursts and shots of small-arms fire).

### Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske<sup>5</sup>

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) on the southern edge of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

Throughout the day, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the Mission saw seven members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them), three of whom it saw entering the disengagement area, about 350m north inside the disengagement area and then returning.

On the evening of 6 August, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two persons within former positions of the armed formations near the area's south-eastern corner.

On 7 August, while positioned at two locations near Petrivske and Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

#### Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In the reporting period, the SMM did not record ceasefire violations, therefore the report does not contain the chart presenting trends and map of ceasefire violations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivs ke and near Shyrokyne were not operational.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The SMM's systematic data compilation began on 1 March 2015. Previous ceasefire violation information can be found in daily reports prior to that date.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

### Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone<sup>6</sup>

The Mission observed an anti-aircraft gun and infantry fighting vehicles in a residential area of government-controlled Taramchuk, Donetsk region (for further details, see the table below).

# SMM facilitation of repairs to as well as maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to localised ceasefires to enable preparations of construction works south of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above), and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

The Mission also continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to power lines in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk and near Vesela Hora and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 97km south of Donetsk), as well as repairs to water infrastructure in Yashchykove (non-government-controlled, 46km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to localised ceasefires to enable vegetation clearance, inspection and maintenance of railway tracks near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), as well as demining activities near government-controlled Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk), Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk) (including to support access to agricultural land).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitored the security situation near the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

# Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter <u>COVID-19</u> outbreak

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska was operational.

While at the EECP at about 09:10, 10:05 and 12:15, the Mission observed about 1,100 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and about 440 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction.

In Donetsk region, the SMM saw that the EECP near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were operational. At the checkpoint, at about 08:45, 11.00, 14.00 and 14.50, the Mission observed about four cars and about 35 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing to travelling towards government-controlled areas. It also saw two buses (one with about fifty passengers, mixed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

genders and ages; and one with number of passengers not visible) entering the non-government controlled areas.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

## \*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments — which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 6 August 2020). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

#### Conditional access:

- In non-government-controlled Donetsk city, a member of the armed formations allowed the Mission to access its regular observation post at the central railway station only upon escort of a member of the armed formations.

### Other impediments:

- On 6 August, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between governmentcontrolled Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) and Kalynove (35km north of Donetsk).<sup>7</sup>
- On 7 August, on two occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk).
- On 7 August, at the central railway station in non-government-controlled Donetsk city, a member of the armed formations denied the Mission to take photos at its regular observation post with its camera.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

### Table of weapons

### Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites


Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapons	Location	Source of observation		
Government-controlled areas						
06/08/2020	1	Surface-to-air missile system (9K33 <i>Osa</i> ) including two transloader vehicles (9T217)	Near a residential area of Kalynove (35km north of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV		

### Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>8</sup>

Date	No.	Туре	Location	Source of observation		
Government-controlled areas						
06/08/2020	1	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm)	In a residential area of Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV		
	5	Infantry fighting vehicles (BMP variant)				

 $<sup>^8</sup>$  The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

### Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions<sup>9</sup>



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned.

