


# Daily Report 182/2020

1 August 2020<sup>1</sup>

## Summary

- The SMM recorded nine ceasefire violations in Donetsk region (compared with one during the previous reporting period) and 93 ceasefire violations in Luhansk region (compared with none during the previous reporting period).
- From 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM recorded a total of 225 ceasefire violations.
- The SMM corroborated reports of a man injured due to shrapnel on 27 July in government-controlled Marinka, Donetsk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. Inside the latter two areas, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle observed people during evening and night hours.
- The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to as well as maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 outbreak, including at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Olenivka.\*

## Ceasefire violations<sup>2</sup>




<sup>1</sup> Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 31 July 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

<sup>2</sup> For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.


<sup>3</sup> Including explosions.

<sup>4</sup> Including from unidentified weapons.


### Map of recorded ceasefire violations



## Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 31 July 2020



#### Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- ..... Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

© OSCE SMM 2019 Use, copy, reproduction, transmission, broadcasting, sale, license, or exploitation not permitted without OSCE prior written authorization.

Created: 01/08/2020

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded nine explosions, all in areas near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) (see below). During the [previous reporting period](#), the SMM recorded one ceasefire violation.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded 93 ceasefire violations, including three explosions. Almost all ceasefire violations, including one explosion, were recorded in areas south-east of Novozvanivka (government-controlled, 70km west of Luhansk) and assessed as a live-fire exercise inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone. The SMM did not record any ceasefire violations in Luhansk region during the previous four days.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the TCG on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM recorded a total of 225 ceasefire violations, both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 44 explosions, a projectile in flight and 180 bursts and shots of small-arms fire).

### **Man injured by shrapnel in Marinka, Donetsk region**

The SMM followed up on reports of a man injured in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) on 27 July.

On 28 July, a man (in his thirties) told the SMM by phone that on 27 July around midday, when he had been working in his garden in Marinka with his mother, he had heard a shot and the sound of a bullet flying past him. A few seconds later, as he tried to take cover, he heard an explosion. According to him, medical personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, stationed nearby, brought him to a medical facility in Marinka, from where he was taken by ambulance to the hospital in Kurakhove (government-controlled, 40km west of Donetsk). On the same day, the man's mother told the SMM by phone that she had been in the same garden with her son on 27 July when she had heard a shot and then an explosion. She said that after running for cover, she had seen blood on her son's arm. The house and garden are located about 100m from the contact line. On 30 July, medical staff at a medical facility in Marinka told the Mission that on 27 July, they had provided first aid to a man with shrapnel injuries to his left arm, who had then been transported to the hospital in Kurakhove for further treatment.

### **Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske<sup>5</sup>**

On the night of 30-31 July, while positioned in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 4-6km south-east, assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** but within 5km of its periphery.

On 31 July, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) between the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and their checkpoint south of it.

---

<sup>5</sup> Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

On the evening of 30 July, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three people walking across the railway track in a northerly direction near a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 1.5km west-south-west of the area's north-eastern corner. The UAV also spotted two people near a former position of the armed formations, near the area's eastern edge and about 1.5km north of its south-eastern corner.

On 31 July, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw seven members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them), two of whom it saw walking along road T-1316 inside the area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returning.

On the same day, outside the disengagement area, about 300m south of its southern edge, the SMM saw 12 workers from non-government-controlled areas with one bulldozer, one excavator and one truck clearing vegetation from the eastern and western edges of road T-1316, as well as levelling the ground east of the same road.

On the night of 30-31 July, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske**, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a person near a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 1.5km east-north-east of the area's south-western corner. The UAV also spotted another person near a former position of the armed formations near the area's south-eastern corner.

During the day on 31 July, while positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-5km south-south-east, assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area's periphery.

### **Withdrawal of weapons**

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The Mission saw a mortar in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region and three tanks and two probable towed howitzers in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, all in violation of withdrawal lines. It also observed 22 tanks beyond respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region (for further details, see tables below).

### **Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone<sup>6</sup>**

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region (for further details, see the table below).

While positioned about 500m north-east of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a non-SMM UAV (dark colour), flying about 300m above the patrol's position, despite the ban on operation of any types of aerial vehicles included in the 22 July TCG decision regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire.

---

<sup>6</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

### **Presence of anti-tank mines near Sakhanka and Vodiane**

On 30 July, an SMM-mini UAV [again](#) spotted about 25 anti-tank mines (of which eight were assessed as TM-62 and two were assessed as burned) laid across road M-14, about 2.5km south of Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 97km south of Donetsk) and assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

On 31 July, an SMM mini-UAV [again](#) spotted about 350 anti-tank mines (assessed as probable TM-62, 20 of which were assessed as burned) laid in two rows running north to south in fields on the eastern edge of Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk) and assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

### **SMM facilitation of repairs to as well as maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure**

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to power and gas lines in Novozvanivka and Troitske (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk); maintenance and repair works to a power line near Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk); repair works to electrical power lines near Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk); maintenance and repairs to gas lines near government-controlled Zalizne (formerly Artemove, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and Nelipivka (40km north-east of Donetsk); and to enable preparations of construction works south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above) as well as near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable vegetation clearance, inspection and maintenance of railway tracks near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk) and demining activities near government-controlled Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk) (including to support access to agricultural land) and Hirske (63km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitored the security situation near the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

### **Border areas outside government control**

On the evening of 30 July, between 22:27 and 22:46, about 5.5km west-south-west of Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted a vehicle (SUV-type) driving on an unpaved road along the border with the Russian Federation in a northerly direction for about 3km and then returning on the same road in the opposite direction.

### **Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter COVID-19 outbreak**

In Donetsk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were operational.

At the EECP, between about 11:30 to about 12:30, the Mission did not see any civilian traffic in either direction. At the checkpoint of the armed formations, between about 11:00 and 13:00, the SMM noted 25 civilians (mixed genders and mostly in their thirties and forties, including three children) queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas. Some of these civilians told the SMM that they had been denied passage towards government-controlled areas by members of the armed formations reportedly due to insufficient documentation. A woman (in her twenties) told the Mission that she was denied from travelling towards government-controlled areas with her young child by members of the armed formations because of the abovementioned lack of documentation.

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational.

While at the EECP at about 09:00 and again at about 14:30, the Mission saw about 100 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) and then no pedestrians, respectively, queuing to enter government-controlled areas and about 300 and 50 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages), respectively, queuing in the opposite direction. The Mission saw that a golf cart was transporting people between the EECP and the new section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. Also, at the same EECP, three workers of an internet company told the SMM that they were installing free of charge Wi-Fi at the EECP.

While at the EECP, two men (in their seventies), told the SMM that they had not been allowed to enter government-controlled areas due to a lack of smartphones with the self-isolation application “Act at Home”. Another man (in his thirties) told the Mission that he was going to spend the seventh night south of the EECP, inside the disengagement area, to continue to attempt to enter into non-government-controlled areas. He said he had not been allowed to enter so far, after not being able to demonstrate that he lived in non-government-controlled areas.

While at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge at about 11:15 and again at about 13:00, the SMM saw about 15 and 20 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages), respectively, queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 10 and 30 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages), respectively, queuing in the opposite direction. The Mission saw a shuttle bus operating between the checkpoint and a bus stop about 1.8km south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

#### **\*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

*The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily](#)*

*Report of 14 July 2020*). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following *the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb*; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Conditional access:

- At a checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations only allowed an SMM patrol passage towards non-government-controlled areas after inspecting the trailers of its vehicles.

*Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:*

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On two occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99kmm south of Donetsk).<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

## Table of weapons

### Weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapons	Location	Source of observation
<b>Government-controlled areas</b>				
30/07/2020	1	Mortar (2B14 <i>Podnos</i> , 82mm)	Near Shyrokyne (100km south of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV
<b>Non-government-controlled areas</b>				
30/07/2020	3	Tanks (T-64)	Near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk)	Mini-UAV
	2	Probable towed howitzer (D-30A <i>Lyagushka</i> , 122mm)	Near non-government-controlled Luhansk city	

### Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
<b>Government-controlled areas</b>				
31/07/2020	22	Tanks (T-72)	At the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk)	Patrol

### **Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>8</sup>**

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
<b>Government-controlled areas</b>				
31/07/2020	2	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)	In a residential area of Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60)	Near Novobakhmutivka (29k north-west of Donetsk)	Patrol
<b>Non-government-controlled areas</b>				
30/07/2020	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)	Near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk)	Mini-UAV
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)		

<sup>8</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.




**Table of ceasefire violations as of 31 July 2020<sup>9</sup>**

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
About 2km N of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km S of Donetsk)	3-5km SSE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	31-Jul, 13:17
	8-10km SSE	Heard	8	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	31-Jul, 13:41-13:48
SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km NW of Luhansk)	3-4km SSW	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined		31-Jul, 18:21
E edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km NE of Luhansk)	4-6km SE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	30-Jul, 23:12
2km S of Novozvanivka (government-controlled, 70km W of Luhansk)	2km SSE	Heard	1	Explosion	Impact (assessed as live-fire exercise)	N/K	31-Jul, 10:23
	2km SSE	Heard	23	Shot	Assessed as live-fire exercise	Small arms	31-Jul, 10:23-10:25
	2km SSE	Heard	67	Shot	Assessed as live-fire exercise	Small arms	31-Jul, 10:38-10:41

<sup>9</sup> The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

### Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions<sup>10</sup>



<sup>10</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well).