


# Daily Report 181/2020

31 July 2020<sup>1</sup>

## Summary

- The SMM recorded one ceasefire violation in Donetsk region (the same as during the previous reporting period) and again no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
- From 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM recorded a total of 123 ceasefire violations.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle observed people inside the latter two areas during night hours.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to as well as the maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 outbreak, including at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM saw a convoy of trucks with Russian Federation licence plates in non-government-controlled Donetsk city.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.\*

## Ceasefire violations<sup>2</sup>



<sup>1</sup> Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 30 July 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

<sup>2</sup> For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.

<sup>3</sup> Including explosions.


<sup>4</sup> Including from unidentified weapons.

### Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and  
Co-operation in Europe  
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

## Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 30 July 2020



#### Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- ..... Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 31/07/2020

In Donetsk region, the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded one projectile in flight at an assessed range of 0.1-2km west. During the [previous reporting period](#), the SMM recorded one explosion.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations for the fourth consecutive day.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM recorded a total of 123 ceasefire violations, all in Donetsk region (including 32 explosions, one projectile in flight and 90 bursts and shots of small-arms fire).

### **Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske<sup>5</sup>**

On 30 July, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw for the first time a flag (with a hammer and a sickle against a red background) near the queuing shelter south of the metal span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk). On the same day, the SMM saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) between the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and their checkpoint south of it.

On the night of 29-30 July, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a person inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 200m west-south-west of the area’s north-eastern corner, as well as a person inside a former position of the armed formations near the area’s eastern edge, about 1.5km north of its south-eastern corner.

On 30 July, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), four people (two in hazmat suits and two in medical suits), all of whom were walking along road T-1316 inside the area up to about 350m north of its southern edge. At this location, the SMM observed two of the people wearing hazmat suits spraying a disinfecting substance from a canister onto four SMM vehicles traveling towards non-government-controlled areas.

On the same day, outside the disengagement area, about 300m south of the area’s southern edge, the SMM saw seven workers from non-government-controlled areas with a bulldozer and two trucks clearing vegetation from the eastern and western edges of road T-1316 (see below).

On the night of 29-30 July, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted six people inside a former position of the armed formations near the area’s south-eastern corner.

On 30 July, while positioned at two locations close to the disengagement area, the Mission observed a calm situation.

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<sup>5</sup> Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

## **Withdrawal of weapons**

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The Mission saw three weapons beyond respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region (for further details, see the table below).

## **Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone<sup>6</sup>**

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone on both sides of the contact line in Donetsk region (for further details, see the table below).

## **SMM facilitation of repairs to as well as maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure**

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to power and gas lines in government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) and Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), maintenance and repairs to gas lines near government-controlled Zalizne (formerly Artemove, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and Nelipivka (40km north-east of Donetsk), repairs to power lines near Verkhnotoretske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk) and Smile (non-government-controlled, 31km north-west of Luhansk), repairs to water infrastructure near non-government-controlled Yashchykove (46km west of Luhansk) and Pankivka (16km north of Luhansk), and preparations for construction works south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above), as well as near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) and south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable the assessment and maintenance of the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne; vegetation clearance, inspection and maintenance of railway tracks near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); and demining activities near government-controlled Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk) (including to support access to agricultural land) and Hirske (63km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

## **Border areas outside government control**

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 26 July of three stationary military-type trucks (one of which probable) on an unpaved road about 3km north-west of Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), about 3.5km west of the border with the Russian Federation.

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<sup>6</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

## **Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter COVID-19 outbreak**

In Donetsk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk) remained operational but did not see any civilian traffic in either direction.

The Mission also noted that the checkpoint of the armed formations near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk) remained closed.

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the EECP in Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational.

While at the EECP at about 09:00 and at about 14:00, the Mission saw about 150 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) and no pedestrians, respectively, queuing to enter government-controlled areas, and about 300 and 50 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages), respectively, queuing in the opposite direction. The Mission saw that a golf cart was transporting people between the EECP and the new section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

While at the same EECP, three people (a 40-year-old mother with her 16-year-old daughter, and a man in his thirties) told the SMM that they had spent their first and fourth night, respectively, near the EECP after not being able to enter non-government-controlled areas at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, reportedly because they could not demonstrate that they lived in non-government-controlled areas.

While at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge at about 11:45 and at about 14:00, the SMM each time saw about 20 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 30 and 20 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages), respectively, queuing in the opposite direction. The Mission saw a shuttle bus operating between the checkpoint and a bus stop about 1.8km south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

On the afternoon of 30 July, the SMM camera at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge recorded seven members of an international organization carrying 23 pallets from the northern edge of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge towards non-government-controlled areas and loading them onto two trucks parked near the aforementioned checkpoint of the armed formations.

## **Convoys of trucks with Russian Federation licence plates in non-government-controlled Donetsk city**

On 30 July, the SMM observed a convoy of eight covered cargo trucks with Russian Federation licence plates (with “Russian Federation humanitarian aid” written in Russian on the side) escorted by six vehicles (including one with Russian Federation licence plates) entering a compound in the Budonivskyi district of non-government-controlled Donetsk city. Subsequently, the Mission saw the trucks being unloaded (for previous observations at the same compound, see the SMM Daily Reports of and [20 December 2019](#)).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

### **\*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

*The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report of 14 July 2020](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.*

*Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:*

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On the evening of 29 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between government-controlled Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) and Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV's positions.

## Table of weapons

### Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
<b>Government-controlled areas</b>				
29/07/2020	3	Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela-10</i> )	In a compound in Andriivka (61km south of Donetsk)	Mid-range UAV

### **Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>8</sup>**

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
<b>Government-controlled areas</b>				
29/07/2020	2	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)	Near Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
	8	Infantry fighting vehicle (seven BMP-2 and one BMP-1)	In a compound near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk)	
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)	Near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV
30/07/2020	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	At a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk)	Patrol
<b>Non-government-controlled areas</b>				
29/07/2020	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2)	Near Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, 23km north-east of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV

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<sup>8</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.


**Table of ceasefire violations as of 30 July 2020<sup>9</sup>**

<b>SMM position</b>	<b>Event location</b>	<b>Means</b>	<b>No.</b>	<b>Observation</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Weapon</b>	<b>Date, time</b>
SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km NW of Donetsk city centre)	0.1-2km W	Recorded	1	Projectile	SE to NW	N/K	29-Jul, 21:30

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<sup>9</sup> The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

### Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions<sup>10</sup>



<sup>10</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well).