


Daily Report 215/2019

11 September 2019¹

Summary

- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
- The SMM saw damage to civilian houses due to shelling in Roza and damage to a school and a kindergarten in Kozatske.
- Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the Mission saw workers from government-controlled areas laying asphalt on the road north of the broken section of the bridge and members of the armed formations with metal detectors at the base of the broken section of the bridge.
- The SMM observed military hardware inside the Petrivske disengagement area and recorded a ceasefire violation inside the Zolote disengagement area.
- The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure, including power lines near Holmivskyi and in Horlivka.
- Restrictions of the Mission's access continued, including at checkpoints in Petrivske, restricting SMM's access to its camera, and near Verkhnoshyrokivske.*




¹ For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Kriakivka and Chermalyk were not operational.

³ Including from unidentified weapons.

² Including explosions.

Maps of recorded ceasefire violations



Estimated line of contact

Created: 11/09/2019

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (11), compared with the <u>previous reporting period</u> (about 55 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas east-south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including three explosions, compared with the <u>previous reporting period</u>. All ceasefire violations were recorded in areas in and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Damage due to shelling to civilian houses in Roza

On 9 September, in Roza (non-government-controlled, 89km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed damage from shelling to seven civilian houses, six of which were completely burned, and saw 14 craters nearby. In the centre of the village, at Tsentralna Street, accompanied by a member of the armed formations, the SMM saw a completely burned single-storey residential brick house with debris and pieces of metal roof plates scattered on the ground around it. Within 5m north and north-east of the house, the SMM saw five fresh craters, and the fuse of a 152mm artillery shell in one of them, assessed as caused by 152mm artillery rounds fired from the north-west.

About 35m south-west of the above house, the SMM saw a completely burnt single-storey residential brick house with a collapsed roof and debris around it and a destroyed brick barn about 5m north. About 50m west-south-west of the barn, it saw a crater in a field assessed as fresh and caused by a 152mm artillery round fired from a north-westerly direction. The Mission also saw pieces of ammunition boxes, camouflage netting and exercise equipment close to the house.

About 150m south-east of the aforementioned house, the SMM saw a completely burnt single-storey residential brick house and a destroyed brick barn south of it, with debris and ash around both buildings. About 25m north-east, the SMM saw a fresh crater in a field, assessed as caused by a 152mm artillery round fired from a north-westerly direction. About 60m north of the house, the SMM saw a completely destroyed single-storey civilian house with collapsed roof and walls. About 25m north-west of the house, the SMM saw a crater, assessed as caused by a 152mm artillery round, but could not determine direction of fire.

About 40m north of the aforementioned house, the SMM saw a destroyed single-storey residential brick house and, about 15m west, it saw a crater in a field, assessed as fresh and caused by a round of 152mm artillery fired from a north-westerly direction. About 55m north of the house, the SMM saw a completely burned single-storey residential brick house. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by the blast wave of an explosion. The Mission also saw tracks of undetermined military vehicles in a field west of the settlement.

Damaged school and kindergarten in Kozatske

On 6 September, on the northern edge of Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 36km northeast of Mariupol) the SMM saw that about 17 windows (on the south, east and west walls) of a two-storey functioning school building were shattered. About 300m north of the school, it

saw a crack in a north-west facing window of a two-storey functioning kindergarten building. The SMM could not assess the cause of the damage to the buildings.

Several school and kindergarten employees (women in their thirties, forties and fifties) told the SMM that they had been in Kozatske when they heard explosions on the morning of 6 September. They added that the school and kindergarten would be closed until repairs are completed. On 9 September, the school director told the SMM that the school is again operational.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

Inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), on the afternoon of 9 September, the SMM observed six members of the State Emergency Service (SES) clearing vegetation about 40m east of the road, about 500m north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk). In the morning of 10 September, the SMM saw five deminers of the SES checking areas on the eastern edge of the same road, about 50m north of the broken section of the bridge.

On the same day, the SMM saw that about 500m of asphalt had been laid on the western side of the road and about 25 workers from government-controlled areas working with a roller, a loader and two trucks, about 400m north of the broken section of the bridge. The SMM also observed workers from government-controlled areas cutting wood and melting wires on the fallen concrete sections on the northern side of the broken section of the bridge. On the morning of 10 September, the SMM saw five SES deminers with two metal detectors and prodding devices and a spade on the eastern and western edges of the broken section of the bridge as well as nine workers approach the eastern edge of the broken section of the bridge with a chainsaw, gas bottle and a gas torch.

In the afternoon of 10 September, the SMM saw workers from government-controlled areas digging and cutting logs as well as welding on the western and eastern edges of the broken section of the bridge and SES members with a tractor clearing the debris. The SMM also saw five SES deminers clearing vegetation and loading chopped trees about 70m west of the road, about 500m north of the broken section of the bridge (inside the disengagement area).

The SMM also saw eight Ukrainian flags on poles on both sides of the road, in an area between the container of an international organization and the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, respectively 750m and 500m north of the broken section of the bridge. In the early afternoon of 10 September, the SMM saw a new camera on a concrete pole (two other cameras were already present) and five SES members dismantling an electricity pole, about 10m north of the broken section of the bridge (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 9 September 2019).

In the morning of 10 September, the SMM saw nine deminers from non-government-controlled areas and a member of the armed formations (wearing an armband with "JCCC" written on it) approach the broken section of the bridge, close to the riverbank.⁴ The SMM

⁴ The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

also saw seven deminers from non-government-controlled areas with a metal detector and an axe approach the base of the broken section of the bridge and three members of the armed formations clearing vegetation in the area of the broken section of the bridge.

On the same day, the SMM saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them) between the southern edge of the broken section of the bridge and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge.

Other disengagement areas⁵

On 8 September, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted again a "barely visible obstacle" (MZP) stretched across road T-1316, about 350m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 28 August 2019). The same UAV spotted a recent trench, running for about 350m from east-west, about 950m north of the area's southern edge and about 2km west of its eastern edge, assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

The UAV also spotted two stacks of at least three mines each on the north-western edge of the same road, over the railway bridge, about 800m south of the area's northern edge and about 2km east of its western edge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 3 September 2019). The UAV also spotted a 40m trench extension (not seen in imagery from 20 August 2019) and a 45m recent trench (assessed as built between 17 and 29 August 2019), with six ammunition crates inside it, connected to the previous trench, about 1km south of the area's northern edge and about 2km east of its western edge, all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 10 September, inside of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM <u>again</u> saw a 120mm mortar tailfin embedded in the ground on the eastern edge of road T-1316 between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations. The Mission also saw 12 <u>previously reported</u> anti-tank mines laid across road T-1316 about 1km south of the area's northern edge. Personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces removed all 12 anti-tank mines to allow the SMM passage and placed them about 20m north of the railway bridge, 50cm from the road shoulder. The SMM travelled south until it saw again the abovementioned "barely visible obstacle" (MZP) stretched across the road, thus rendering it impossible for the Mission to cross through the disengagement area.

On the night of 9-10 September, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight, at an assessed range of 1.5-3km east-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On 10 September, positioned on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard about 20 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, at an assessed range of 2-3km north-east and two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-5km north-east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

On 9 September, inside of the disengagement near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable armoured combat

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the <u>Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces</u> and hardware of 21 September 2016.

vehicle (ACV) about 1km south of the area's northern edge and about 1.2km east of its western edge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On 10 September, positioned north of the Petrivske disengagement area the SMM saw smoke rising from the fields at an assessed range of 1.5km west, assessed as due to bush fires.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

On 10 September, the SMM observed weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage areas in government and non-government-controlled sites (for more details, see the below table of weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites as of 10 September 2019).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

Government-controlled areas

6 September

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near residential houses in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-60) (one of which in the yard of a house used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces) in and near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk).

8 September

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP variants) near Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk).

9 September

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP-1) near Vyskryva (76km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) and three IFVs (BMP variants) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

- two IFVs (BMP-1) and two ACVs near Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk);
- three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Novohnativka (40km south of Donetsk);
- two probable IFVs (BMP variants), three probable APCs (BTR variants) and an ACV in and near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk);
- an ACV near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk); and
- two probable APCs (BTR variants) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk).

10 September

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

The SMM saw an APC (BTR-70) in Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

9 September

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three APCs (MT-LB) and an armoured communication vehicle (R-145) on a military truck at a medical facility used by the armed formations in Luhansk city.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

- a trench digger (PZM or TMK variants) in Petrivske and
- two IFVs (BMP-1) in Styla (34km south of Donetsk).

10 September

The SMM saw two trench diggers working in a treeline near Petrivske (see above).

Presence of anti-tank mines near Dokuchaievsk

On 10 September, the Mission <u>again</u> saw ten anti-tank mines laid in two rows on each side of a road near a checkpoint of the armed formations on the northern edge of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to and the operation of civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines near Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) and in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and to facilitate the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM also monitored adherence to the ceasefire in order to enable a transfer of funds from non-government- to government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, reportedly related to water payments.

SMM monitored the security situation in south-east Kherson region

On 8 and 9 September, the Mission continued to monitor the security situation along the Sea of Azov coast in Kherson region and at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km southeast of Kherson) and Crimea and observed a calm situation.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All

signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 7 September 2019). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Denial of access:

- At a checkpoint in Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations <u>again</u> denied the SMM passage, citing "demining activities in the area".
- At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly, Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage citing "orders from superiors".

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

- On 9 September, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between Taramchuk (government-control, 29km south-west of Donetsk) and Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk).⁷

Tables of weapons as of 10 September 2019

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapons	Location	Source of observation				
Government-controlled areas								
10/09/2019	15	Tank (T-64)	Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km northwest of Donetsk)	Patrol				
10/09/2019	23	Tank (21 T-72 and two T-64)	At the railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk)	Patrol				

⁷ The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapons	Location	Source of observation
10/09/2019	1	Self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm)		
10/09/2019	2	Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela-10</i>)	Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk)	Patrol
10/09/2019	4	Multiple launch rocket system (type undetermined)	Near railway station in Sloviansk (95km north of Donetsk)	Patrol
		Non-governm	nent-controlled areas	
09/09/2019	10	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations see SMM	Long range UAV
	3	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)	Daily Report 8 August 2019)	

Table of ceasefire violations as of 10 September 2019⁸


SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera	2-4km SE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	9-Sep, 20:40
in Berezove	Z-4KIII SE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Ondetermined	IN/IX	9-Sep, 20.40
(government-							
controlled,							
31km SW of							
Donetsk)	2-4km SE	Recorded	13	Projectile	W to E	N/K	9-Sep, 21:35
SMM camera	2-4km SSE	Recorded	6	Projectile	WNW to ESE	N/K	9-Sep, 21:09
at Donetsk	2-4km SSE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	10-Sep, 00:46
Filtration	2-4km SSE	Recorded	1	Illumination flare	In vertical flight	N/K	10-Sep, 01:21
Station (15km					J		• •
N of Donetsk)	1.5-3km SSE	Recorded	5	Projectile	WNW to ESE	N/K	10-Sep, 04:29
	3-5km E	Recorded	1	Projectile	NNW to SSE	N/K	9-Sep, 20:13
CMM	3-5km E	Recorded	1	Explosion	Impact	N/K	9-Sep, 20:13
SMM camera	3-5km E	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	9-Sep, 20:14
1.5km NE of Hnutove	3-5km E	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	9-Sep, 20:15
(government-	3-5km E	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	9-Sep, 20:43
controlled,	3-5km E	Recorded	1	Muzzle flash		N/K	9-Sep, 20:43
20km NE of	5-7km E	Recorded	1	Projectile	NNW to SSE	N/K	9-Sep, 21:14
Mariupol)	2-4km ENE	Recorded	1	Projectile	N to S	N/K	10-Sep, 01:47
marapor)	5-7km E	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	10-Sep, 02:53
	2-4km ENE	Recorded	1	Projectile	NNW to SSE	N/K	10-Sep, 04:01
SMM camera	2-4km NNE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Airburst	N/K	9-Sep, 19:39
E of Lomakyne (government- controlled, 15km NE of							
Mariupol)	2-4km NNE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Airburst	N/K	9-Sep, 19:44
(Mariapor)	3-5km SSE	Recorded	1	Projectile	W to E	N/K	9-Sep, 19:33
	3-5km SSE	Recorded	3	Projectile	W to E	N/K	9-Sep, 19:37
	6-8km S	Recorded	1	Projectile	W to E	N/K	9-Sep, 20:11
	7-9km S	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	9-Sep, 20:15
	7-9km S	Recorded	1	Projectile	W to E	N/K	9-Sep, 20:33
	7-9km SSE	Recorded	3	Projectile	E to W	N/K	9-Sep, 21:03
	7-9km SSE	Recorded	5	Projectile	E to W	N/K	9-Sep, 21:40
SMM camera	7-9km SSE	Recorded	5	Projectile	E to W	N/K	9-Sep, 21:53
at entry-exit	7-9km SSE	Recorded	1	Illumination flare	In vertical flight	N/K	9-Sep, 22:12
checkpoint in	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		_		E to W (approx. 10		,p,
Pyshchevyk	7-9km SSE	Recorded	1	Burst	rounds)	N/K	9-Sep, 22:12
(government-	7-9km S	Recorded	8	Projectile	E to W	N/K	9-Sep, 22:19
controlled,	7-9km S	Recorded	3	Projectile	E to W	N/K	9-Sep, 22:40
25km NE of	4-6km S	Recorded	1	Projectile	W to E	N/K	9-Sep, 22:42
Mariupol)	4-6km SSE	Recorded	4	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	9-Sep, 22:53
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	1	Projectile	ENE to WSW	N/K	9-Sep, 22:53
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	1	Projectile	In vertical flight,	N/K	9-Sep, 22:54
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	1	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	9-Sep, 22:54
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	8	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	9-Sep, 23:20
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	6	Projectile	ENE to WSW	N/K	9-Sep, 23:20
			4		ENE to WSW		
	7-9km S	Recorded	4	Projectile	ENE IO WOW	N/K	9-Sep, 23:21

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⁸ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an "N/K"), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
Position	7-9km SSE	Recorded	10	Projectile	E to W	N/K	9-Sep, 23:24
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	32	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	9-Sep, 23:27
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	11	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	9-Sep, 23:28
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	11	Projectile	ENE to WSW	N/K	9-Sep, 23:28
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	2	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	9-Sep, 23:30
	7-9km S	Recorded	2	Projectile	E to W	N/K	9-Sep, 23:48
	7-9km S	Recorded	1	Projectile	E to W	N/K	9-Sep, 23:52
	7-9km S	Recorded	3	Projectile	W to E	N/K	10-Sep, 00:14
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	4	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	10-Sep, 00:16
	7-9km S	Recorded	1	Projectile	W to E	N/K	10-Sep, 00:19
	8-10km S	Recorded	2	Projectile	W to E	N/K	10-Sep, 01:17
	8-10km S	Recorded	1	Projectile	W to E	N/K	10-Sep, 01:18
	8-10km S	Recorded	2	Projectile	W to E	N/K	10-Sep, 01:19
	8-10km S	Recorded	9	Projectile	W to E	N/K	10-Sep, 01:20
	8-10km S	Recorded	10	Projectile	W to E	N/K	10-Sep, 01:21
	8-10km SSE	Recorded	5	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	10-Sep, 01:25
	8-10km S	Recorded	11	Projectile	W to E	N/K	10-Sep, 01:31
	8-10km S	Recorded	2	Projectile	W to E	N/K	10-Sep, 01:32
	8-10km S	Recorded	6	Projectile	W to E	N/K	10-Sep, 01:33
	8-10km S	Recorded	3	Projectile	W to E	N/K	10-Sep, 01:34
	8-10km S	Recorded	5	Projectile	E to W	N/K	10-Sep, 01:57
	8-10km SSE	Recorded	5	Projectile	E to W	N/K	10-Sep, 02:16
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	5	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	10-Sep, 02:51
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	4	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	10-Sep, 03:05
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	14	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	10-Sep, 03:06
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	5	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	10-Sep, 03:07
	4-6km S	Recorded	2	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	10-Sep, 03:26
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	6	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	10-Sep, 03:29
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	3	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	10-Sep, 03:34
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	7	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	10-Sep, 03:35
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	3	Projectile	ENE to WSW	N/K	10-Sep, 03:35
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	17	Projectile	WSW to ENE	N/K	10-Sep, 03:50
	4-6km SSE	Recorded	1	Projectile	ENE to WSW	N/K	10-Sep, 03:50
	4-3km SSE	Recorded	4	Projectile	NE to SW	N/K	10-Sep, 04:36
	5-7km ESE	Recorded	4	Projectile	SSW to NNE	N/K	10-Sep, 00:17
SMM camera	5-7km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	10-Sep, 00:17
in Svitlodarsk	5-7km ESE	Recorded	1	Projectile	SW to NE	N/K	10-Sep, 00:18
(government-	5-7km ESE	Recorded	20	Projectile	N to S	N/K	10-Sep, 01:34
controlled,	5-7km ESE	Recorded	10	Projectile	N to S	N/K	10-Sep, 01:40
57km NE of	5-7km ESE	Recorded	1	Projectile	S to N	N/K	10-Sep, 01:48
Donetsk)	5-7km ESE	Recorded	5	Projectile	N to S	N/K	10-Sep, 02:20
	5-7km ESE	Recorded	7	Projectile	N to S	N/K	10-Sep, 02:21
SMM camera				,			1,
on N edge of Popasna (government- controlled, 69km W of							
Luhansk)	4-6km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Airburst	N/K	9-Sep, 22:34
SMM camera							
in Zolote							
(government-					NE to SW		
controlled,					(assessed as inside		
60km W of		_			the disengagement	1	
Luhansk)	1.5-3km ESE	Recorded	1	Projectile	area)	N/K	10-Sep, 01:20
S edge of					Undetermined		
disengagement					(assessed as outside		
areas near					the disengagement		10-Sep,
Zolote	4-5km NE	Heard	2	Explosion	area)	N/K	10:03-10:08
(government-					A 1		
controlled,					Assessed as outside		10 500
60km W of	2.3km NE	Поста	20	Chote and humata	the disengagement	Small arms	10-Sep, 11:18-11:19
Luhansk)	2-3km NE	Heard	20	Shots and bursts	area	Sman arms	11.10-11.19

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions⁹



⁹ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well).