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**STATEMENT BY MR. ALEXANDER GRUSHKO,
DEPUTY MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE
2011 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE**

Vienna, 30 June 2011

Mr. Chairperson,

This Review Conference is the first major political event since the OSCE Astana Summit. As we see it, the main task of the 2011 Annual Security Review Conference is to find answers to the most pressing issues concerning the implementation of the key instruction at the Summit, namely the creation of a “common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community”. This is consistent with the idea of concluding a Treaty on European Security as proposed by the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Dmitry Medvedev, and aimed at overcoming once and for all the dividing lines in the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

Guided by the unifying impulse of Astana, it is now vital to focus on the truly important issues likely to consolidate the OSCE community. Unfortunately, we have not seen much of this positive dynamic so far.

During the forthcoming discussion we propose holding a detailed exchange of views on the problems of hard security, first and foremost arms control. Unless we overcome the unfavourable situation that has emerged in this area, it will be impossible to develop co-operation in the economic and environmental and human dimensions to the full and to ensure the right of the citizens of our countries to a peaceful and safe existence.

The Heads of State issued instructions in Astana to revitalize the conventional arms control regime and take additional steps to strengthen confidence and security. So far no tangible results have been achieved in this area. A matter of particular concern is the persisting deadlocked situation surrounding the mandate for future negotiations on conventional arms, which has been caused by linking it to problems that have nothing to do with maintaining military stability in Europe. Without the launch of fresh negotiations, the arms control regime will degenerate completely. The uncertainty factor in this sphere will have a negative effect on security in Europe, foster mistrust and encourage a trend towards unilateral approaches rather than collective ones.

We trust that by the end of this year substantial results will have been achieved in the process of updating the Vienna Document 1999, which will lead to the adoption of an updated version of the document at the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Vilnius (6 and 7 December 2011). The negotiators still have much work ahead of them in this regard. In

bringing confidence-building measures into line with the new security conditions and current developments in the military structure, it is important not to yield to the temptation of a “mechanical” increase in intrusiveness, i.e., using approaches that are more characteristic of the Cold War period.

Clear and widely supported guidelines for strengthening hard security are contained in the Russian draft of an OSCE programme for further action in the field of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures. We hope that the participating States will show sufficient political will to approve that document at the Ministerial Council meeting in Vilnius as well.

The leaders of our countries agreed in Astana “to achieve greater unity of purpose and action in facing transnational threats”. It is time to translate these agreements into specific action. It is in our common interests to adopt an OSCE concept to combat the threat of illicit drugs, which should determine the Organization’s contribution to the global efforts to prevent drug trafficking. We expect that this concept, which was drawn up by a broad coalition of countries (Russia, the United States of America, Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkey), will be one of the main documents of the Ministerial Council meeting in Vilnius. We are ready to work together with our partners in other priority areas as well, such as combating terrorism and organized crime, ensuring information security and countering the illicit arms trade and trafficking in human beings. We believe that there is a niche for pooling the OSCE’s efforts to respond to natural and man-made disasters. In the context of strengthening the role of the OSCE in these areas, we are ready to examine measures for enhancing the co-ordination functions of the OSCE Secretary General. Thought could also be given to certain structural changes within the OSCE Secretariat, taking into account these new priorities.

Russia has consistently supported efforts to strengthen the OSCE’s crisis-response potential, primarily through more effective use of its existing tools. This task should begin by laying “foundations” and drawing up uniform principles for conflict prevention and resolution. Crisis-response efforts will be viable only if they are based on consensus within the OSCE and take full account of the position of the host country. The events of last year in Kyrgyzstan were further evidence of the fact that there is no alternative to this approach.

Another pressing issue is maintaining dialogue and developing the OSCE’s practical co-operation with other international and regional structures in the spirit of the Platform for Co-operative Security adopted at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999.

We have listened carefully to the statement by Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General of NATO. We welcome the high level of interest shown in this Review Conference by a number of integration associations concerned with security – the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States and NATO. We intend to continue to support in every way we can the efforts to use the OSCE as the main platform for inter-institutional dialogue.

Mr. Chairperson,

The state of hard security in the OSCE region is and will continue to be largely determined by the practical efforts of countries and organizations in the politico-military sphere. The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security approved at the

CSCE Budapest Summit in 1994 has therefore lost none of its relevance. Equally relevant is the set of principles concerned with hard security, including the unconditional respect for international law. The importance of these “conduct-related” norms only increases at a time of more frequent crises and the emergence of situations requiring the involvement of a military factor, up to and including the use of force. We are greatly alarmed at how the activities of the NATO-led coalition increasingly exceed the framework of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973. Disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force leads to victims among the civilian population and complicates the search for a political settlement. The new NATO strategic concept approved last year at the summit meeting in Lisbon states that the Alliance will be guided in its activities by the norms of international law. Today, this provision of the NATO strategic concept is undergoing its first “test of strength” in the Libyan desert.

Respect for the norms of international law and prerogatives of the United Nations Security Council form the basis for co-operation within the Russia-NATO Council. We take the position that future resolutions of the United Nations Security Council should set absolutely clear limits for the use of force and rule out any ambiguities or possibilities for “flexible interpretations”.

The Russia-NATO Council summit meeting held in Lisbon on 20 November 2010 gave a fresh positive impetus to our relations. Co-operation is being effectively developed in combating terrorism and piracy, training anti-drug officers, stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan and many other areas of activity.

The creation of a joint European anti-missile defence system could become a key project in the formation of a common security space and genuine partnership. We firmly believe that there are no objective obstacles to the elaboration of this kind of anti-missile defence configuration, which would reliably defend Europe against possible missile threats and simultaneously not undermine strategic stability. It is of fundamental importance that we resolve a number of issues to that end. First and foremost, we need clear legal guarantees that an anti-missile defence system deployed in Europe will not be used against any of the participants in it. The composition, characteristics, quantities and geographical deployment must be based on objective criteria making it possible to reliably guarantee that European anti-missile defence is in line with its declared purpose, namely to neutralize missile threats from beyond the borders of the Euro-Atlantic region. This approach can be based solely on the equal participation of Russia in the drafting of the European anti-missile defence concept and architecture and on appropriate confidence-building and transparency measures.

If it is carried out, the European anti-missile defence project will make a tangible contribution to the process of forming a “security community” free of dividing lines, in other words to the implementation of the key task set by the leaders of the OSCE States at the Astana Summit.

Thank you for your attention.