



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Permanent Council**

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Chairmanship: Kazakhstan

2010 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE

Vienna, 14 and 16 June 2010

CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT

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**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Permanent Council**

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26 March 2010

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801st Plenary Meeting
PC Journal No. 801, Agenda item 4

DECISION No. 934
DATES OF THE 2010 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE

The Permanent Council,

Taking into account the recommendation of the Forum for Security Co-operation,

Decides that the 2010 Annual Security Review Conference will take place in Vienna from 14 to 16 June 2010.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Permanent Council**

PC.DEC/937
29 April 2010

Original: ENGLISH

807th Plenary Meeting

PC Journal No. 807, Agenda item 1

**DECISION No. 937
AGENDA AND ORGANIZATIONAL MODALITIES OF THE 2010
ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE (ASRC)**

The Permanent Council,

Recalling Porto Ministerial Council Decision No. 3 on the Annual Security Review Conference,

Taking into account its Decision No. 934 on the dates of the 2010 Annual Security Review Conference,

Taking into account the recommendation of the Forum for Security Co-operation,

Decides to organize the 2010 Annual Security Review Conference in accordance with the programme, agenda and organizational modalities contained in the annexes to this decision.

2010 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE

Vienna, 14 to 16 June 2010

I. Programme

Monday, 14 June 2010

- 10 a.m.–1 p.m. Opening session
- 3–6 p.m. Working session I: Transnational threats and challenges

Tuesday, 15 June 2010

- 10 a.m.–1 p.m. Working session II: The role of the OSCE in early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation
- 3–6 p.m. Working session III: The role and perspectives of arms control and confidence- and security-building regimes in building trust in the evolving security environment

Wednesday, 16 June 2010

- 10 a.m.–1 p.m. Working session IV: Threats and challenges stemming from the territory of Afghanistan and the OSCE's contribution to stability in the region
- 3–5.30 p.m. Working session V: Review of OSCE police-related activities
- 5.30 p.m.–6 p.m. Closing session

II. Agenda

Opening session

(14 June 2010, 10 a.m.–1 p.m.)

Under the overall theme of Strengthening Indivisible Security, Recapturing Common Purpose and Building Trust and Transparency in the OSCE Area, the opening session will set the stage for the Conference by exploring the concept of indivisible security and how this relates to the security work undertaken by the OSCE and its participating States. The session

will allow for an exchange of views on ways to re-establish trust and confidence amongst participating States and to recapture the sense of common purpose in dealing with current and future security challenges. In particular, this session will focus on ways to further improve the wider European security environment, taking into account the work carried out by the OSCE, as well as other international and regional organizations and institutions.

Working session I: Transnational threats and challenges

(14 June 2010, 3–6 p.m.)

Working Session I will offer the opportunity for participants to discuss ways to further strengthen synergies in OSCE activities aimed at countering transnational threats to security. With reference to MC Decision No. 2/09 on further OSCE efforts to address transnational threats and challenges to security and stability, this session will explore the linkages between transnational threats such as terrorism and organized crime, including illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and trafficking in human beings, and consider the role of border security and management and anti-terrorism activities in combating these threats. Participants will also have an opportunity to consider the recommendations of the Secretary General contained in his final report pursuant to MC Decision No. 2/09. Moreover, participants are encouraged to discuss ways to comprehensively enhance cyber security in the OSCE area. The session will also allow participating States to exchange views with representatives of relevant international and regional organizations on how to enhance co-operation in countering transnational threats, taking into account the comparative advantages of the OSCE in addressing these challenges.

Working session II: The role of the OSCE in early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation

(15 June 2010, 10 a.m.–1 p.m.)

Building on previous discussions, including the 42nd Joint FSC-PC Meeting of 10 March, Working Session II will assess OSCE activities in early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. In particular, it will review the OSCE activities related to crisis situations in its region, *inter alia* armed conflicts, including in August 2008. The Session will examine the implementation of relevant OSCE norms, principles and commitments, discuss the need to further improve/update the OSCE toolbox in the above-mentioned areas and to strengthen the OSCE's ability to move from early warning to early action. Participants are encouraged to discuss proposals put forward by participating States. Other topics may include examining the role for military and non-military confidence building measures in the conflict-cycle and a review of existing OSCE mechanisms and procedures.

Working session III: The role and perspectives of arms control and confidence- and security-building regimes in building trust in the evolving security environment

(15 June 2010, 3–6 p.m.)

With reference to paragraph 2 of MC Decision No. 16/09 on issues relevant to the Forum for Security Co-operation, Working Session III will focus on the current situation and perspectives in the area of conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). Participants will have the opportunity to take stock of the work done since the Athens Ministerial Council and explore ways in which to strengthen the

Organization's politico-military toolbox. Furthermore, the session will provide the opportunity to discuss how the OSCE can contribute to efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in its area.

Working session IV: Threats and challenges stemming from the territory of Afghanistan and the OSCE's contribution to stability in the region
(16 June 2010, 10 a.m.–1 p.m.)

With reference to MC Decision No. 4/07 on OSCE engagement with Afghanistan, Working Session IV will provide a forum for reviewing OSCE engagement with Afghanistan, including activities related to border security and management, policing, countering terrorism and illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and other areas. This session will allow for a focused discussion on ways to strengthen co-operation among the OSCE, Afghanistan and other relevant international and regional organizations and actors in this area. Moreover, participants are encouraged to reflect on international and regional initiatives to facilitate co-operation in the region, with the aim to counter threats and challenges emanating from the territory of Afghanistan.

Working session V: Review of OSCE police-related activities
(16 June, 3–5.30 p.m.)

Recalling PC Decision No. 914 on further enhancing OSCE police-related activities, Working Session V will be used to discuss how to focus and improve OSCE activities in this field and consider options for future OSCE engagement. Participants will have the opportunity to exchange views on the conclusions of the Annual Police Experts Meeting 2010 and on the report by the OSCE Secretary General on police-related activities of the OSCE executive structures up to the end of 2009. Participants are encouraged to reflect on comparative advantages of the OSCE in the policing area, lessons learned and ways to combat organized crime and terrorism by enhancing police-related activities in the OSCE area. In addition, this session will focus on the existing frameworks for co-operation with other international and regional actors in this area, in order to address threats in a co-ordinated and complementary way and to avoid duplication. This session will contribute to further discussions for the potential provision of a framework and strategic recommendations for future OSCE police-related activities.

Closing session
(16 June 2010, 5.30 p.m.–6 p.m.)

In the closing session, the Chairperson will present a first perception of the results of the working groups, as well as recommendations made at the Conference on ways to follow up on them, in order to enhance the security dialogue. A particular focus will be given to the proposals which might contribute to the Corfu Interim Report.

PC.DEC/937
29 April 2010
Annex 2

ORGANIZATIONAL MODALITIES OF THE 2010 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE

Vienna, 14 to 16 June 2010

Background

The Tenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, at Porto, by adopting its Decision No. 3, dated 7 December 2002, established the Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) to provide a framework for enhancing security dialogue and for reviewing security work undertaken by the OSCE and its participating States, to provide an opportunity to exchange views on issues related to arms control and confidence- and security-building measures, and to promote the exchange of information and co-operation with relevant international and regional organizations and institutions.

Organization

A representative of the Chairperson-in-Office will chair the opening and closing sessions. The Secretariat will issue a journal of the Conference.

Each working session will have one moderator and at least one rapporteur. The Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) will serve as co-ordinator for preparing the session.

The contribution of the FSC will be made in accordance with its procedures, mandate and competences. The FSC contribution to the ASRC includes the chairing of the third working session by a member of the FSC Troika or the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC).

The Rules of Procedure of the OSCE will be followed, *mutatis mutandis*, at the Conference. Also, the guidelines for organizing OSCE meetings (Permanent Council Decision No. 762) will be taken into account.

Interpretation from and into all six working languages of the OSCE will be provided at the opening, working and closing sessions.

The Chairmanship will co-ordinate the preparation of the ASRC with the FSC Chairperson and the OSCE Secretariat.

The Chairperson-in-Office will distribute a comprehensive report on the Conference before the summer recess.

The Press and Public Information Section (PPIS) will inform the press, as appropriate.

Participation

The participating States are encouraged to be represented at a high level, by senior officials from capitals, responsible for security-related policy in the OSCE area.

The OSCE institutions will participate in the Conference, as will the Secretary General and the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC). The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Partners for Co-operation will be invited to participate.

The Chairmanship may also invite some heads of OSCE field operations to participate in the Conference. Consideration should be given to the possibility of inviting heads of field operations to be present as keynote speakers or moderators.

The international organizations that may be invited are the security-related organizations mentioned in Permanent Council Decision No. 900 of 22 October 2009.

Consideration is to be given to the possibility of inviting security-related scientific institutes, think-tanks of international standing, and NGOs to send keynote speakers or to be represented as members of national delegations.

General guidelines for participants

The work of the ASRC will be conducted in seven sessions. The opening session is intended to provide an opportunity for formal statements to be delivered and to set the stage for substantive, focused and interactive discussions at the working sessions. The opening session will include the welcoming remarks by the Chairperson-in-Office or his representative and the report by the FSC Chairperson. The Chairmanship will explore the possibility of inviting high-level special guest(s) to address the Conference.

The working sessions will concentrate on one topic, introduced by one or two keynote speakers, whose addresses may be followed by a discussion of relevant subtopics that are mentioned in the agenda.

The aim is an interactive and free-flowing discussion.

In order to reinforce the effectiveness of security activities across all three dimensions of the OSCE, it is expected that, at each of the sessions, the interfaces of security, and also the question of co-operation with other international organizations, will be addressed.

To promote interactive discussion, the formal statements at the opening session and the interventions at the working sessions should be as concise as possible and should not exceed five minutes in length. Prior circulation of statements and interventions will enhance the possibility for engaging in discussion.

By 1 June 2010, the participants in the Conference should inform the OSCE Secretariat of the composition of their delegations to the ASRC, in response to the information circular regarding organizational aspects of the Conference which will be sent out by the OSCE Secretariat.

By 7 June 2010, the participating States and other participants in the Conference are invited to submit any written contributions they may have, including those that contain reactions to the keynote speeches.

Written contributions should be submitted to the Conference Services, which will then distribute them. The information could also include contributions from OSCE institutions and other international organizations, if appropriate.

Guidelines for keynote speakers

The contributions of the keynote speakers should be focused on the subject of the relevant session, thus setting the scene for the discussion at the sessions, and should stimulate debate among delegations by raising appropriate questions and suggesting potential recommendations based on OSCE realities.

The maximum available speaking time is 20–25 minutes per keynote speaker.

Keynote speakers should be present during the entire session at which they are speaking, and should be ready to engage in the debate following their presentation.

To enable delegations to prepare themselves, keynote speakers should provide a written contribution and their biographical synopsis to the CPC by 24 May 2010. In their presentations, keynote speakers should touch on the highlights of their written contribution.

Guidelines for moderators and rapporteurs

The moderator chairs the session and should facilitate and focus the dialogue among delegations. The moderator should stimulate the debate by introducing items related to the subject of the opening and working sessions, as appropriate, in order to broaden or focus the scope of the discussion.

The rapporteurs' written reports should address issues raised during the relevant sessions, and should cover problem areas, improvements, suggestions made at the session, and other relevant information.

Personal views shall not be advanced.

Guidelines for the participation of other international organizations

International organizations may participate in all the sessions. They are invited to concentrate their contributions on aspects of co-operation with the OSCE within the scope of the relevant session.

International organizations should provide factual information, useful for the participants of the ASRC, to the Conference Services by 7 June 2010.

OPENING SESSION

- Opening address: H.E. Konstantin Zhigalov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan
- Chairperson: Ambassador Kairat Abdrakhmanov, Chairperson of the Permanent Council
- Report by: Ambassador György Molnár, Chairperson of the Forum for Security Co-operation
- Rapporteur: Mr. Valerio Negro, Permanent Mission of Italy to the OSCE

The purpose of the opening session was to set the stage for the Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) by exploring the concept of indivisible security and the ways in which it related to the security work undertaken by the OSCE and its participating States.

In his opening remarks, the Chairperson of the Permanent Council said that the overall theme of the 2010 Conference reflected some of the main objectives of the Corfu Process, highlighting several topics that had been on its agenda in 2010, such as transnational threats and challenges; the role of the OSCE in early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation; and the role and perspectives of arms control and confidence- and security-building regimes in building trust in the evolving security environment. The addition of two more items to the agenda – namely, threats and challenges emanating from the territory of Afghanistan and police-related matters – would hopefully contribute to and inform discussions between participating States ahead of the forthcoming interim report of the OSCE Chairmanship on the Corfu Process and the informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers, to be held in Almaty on 16 and 17 July 2010.

The concept of indivisible security, and the way it related to the work being carried out in the OSCE, rested on the essential process of restoring confidence and trust among the participating States. That concept would be further explored by the Conference with a view to moving forward towards the construction of an improved security framework.

The improved framework would still rest on the foundations of the OSCE's tradition of comprehensive, indivisible, co-operative and multidimensional security, but it would evolve into a "security community", in which there would be no dividing lines, no differing levels of security and no use of force, where common interest and security would finally prevail.

Referring to the violent clashes that had occurred in the previous days, and since 10 June, in the cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad in southern Kyrgyzstan, the Chairperson-in-Office expressed condolences to the families of those who had lost their lives in the tragic events. He also reported on the actions undertaken by the Chairmanship-in-Office, in consultation with participating States and relevant international organizations, in order to restore calm, public safety and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the affected areas.

Ambassador György Molnár, Chairperson of the Forum for Security Co-operation informed the Conference of the Forum's progress and activities since the 2009 Annual Security Review Conference. He noted that the past year had been characterized by the Corfu Process and its informal discussions on issues related to wider European security. That had been reflected in the work of the Forum, whose debates in the security dialogue and in the working groups had been partly shaped by the Corfu sessions dedicated to arms control and confidence- and security-building measures. Significant progress had also been achieved in implementing relevant tasks assigned by the Ministerial Council, by approving decisions on a procedure for regular updates of the Vienna Document 1999, and on the OSCE Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

In his report, he pointed out that the previous months had witnessed an increase in the co-operation between the Forum for Security for Co-operation and the Permanent Council, as evidenced by the six joint meetings that had been convened on issues of great relevance to the OSCE, such as the situation in Afghanistan, conflict prevention and crisis management, the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and cyber security.

The report also enumerated several matters that had been dealt with by the Forum in the past two months, including the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and new security threats. Ongoing and forthcoming projects on small arms and light weapons and stockpiles of conventional ammunitions, as well as their respective objectives and challenges, were also mentioned.

Mr. Konstantin Zhigalov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, delivered the opening address of the 2010 Annual Security Review Conference. He noted that the decision by the participating States to lengthen the Conference to three days was evidence of the seriousness of the issues to be debated and, at the same time, of the participating States' intention to engage in a results-oriented discussion. The Conference would therefore strive to seek a solution to the crisis of confidence in the OSCE, brought about *inter alia* by the stagnation of the conventional arms control regime, the failure to resolve protracted conflicts and the lack of progress in restoring an OSCE mission to Georgia. The Organization needed to rediscover the thrust last seen at the Istanbul Summit of 1999, when the Charter for European Security had been adopted.

A first step in the direction of renewing the spirit of co-operation in the OSCE had been taken with the Corfu Process, initiated by the Greek Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2009, which afforded an opportunity to bring together the approaches and ideas of all the participating States with a view to establishing the parameters of a new security system in line with today's realities. The meetings of the Corfu Process had already tackled the most pressing and topical themes confronting the OSCE, some of which were on the agenda of the Annual Security Review Conference.

It was therefore to be hoped that the Conference would generate proposals for inclusion in the interim report called for by the relevant Athens Ministerial Council decisions, where they would be set side-by-side with the recommendations that had emerged during the Corfu Process sessions and form the basis for the discussions at the informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers in Almaty on 16 and 17 July, and further inform the debate in view

of a possible OSCE Summit. The stage was therefore set to transition from general discussions to substantive negotiations.

Some progress had already been made in the Forum for Security Co-operation with the adoption of a procedure for incorporating relevant decisions into the Vienna Document 1999, thus paving the way for substantive work on chapters of the Document itself. He also hoped that the mutual understanding that had allowed for the signature of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the so-called “new START”) could be equally achieved in the Joint Consultative Group and lead to the start of new negotiations on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

Conflict prevention and crisis resolution remained high on the agenda of the Conference: the Chairperson-in-Office was actively engaged in co-ordinating OSCE activities to stabilize the political and security situation in Kyrgyzstan, and diplomatic efforts were underway in particular to end interethnic conflict in the south of the country. The Chairperson-in-Office was committed to achieving progress on all the protracted conflicts, and since the beginning of the year had travelled extensively to the South Caucasus, South Eastern Europe and Eastern Europe.

No notable progress was being made in the situation with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the number of people killed along the line of contact had increased in the past year. With regard to the conflict of August 2008, its consequences had to be dealt with mainly through constructive dialogue, abstention from the use of military force and re-establishment of contacts from both sides. The Chairperson-in-Office remained committed to supporting the negotiations in the so-called Geneva format and was in favour of strengthening the OSCE’s role in the region, including through the restoration of an OSCE field presence in Georgia. The speaker also advocated a genuine settlement of the Transdnestrian protracted conflict by peaceful and political means.

On transnational threats, he particularly emphasized the need for enhanced co-operation to prevent terrorism and radical extremism, as well as to curb drug trafficking; promote border security; and combat organized crime, illegal migration, trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of weapons. Conceptual action plans might be devised in key OSCE areas for combating transnational threats.

He reminded the audience that two working sessions had been added to the agenda of the 2010 Annual Security Review Conference, allowing for a more thoroughgoing discussion on the threats emanating from the territory of Afghanistan and police-related activities. Concerning Afghanistan, the Chairperson-in-Office had started working on a possible declaration by the OSCE Heads of State or Government on assistance to that country.

In closing, he stated that the security challenges of the OSCE region could not be resolved without political will and involvement at the highest level: the Kazakh Chairmanship was therefore convinced that it was high time for the political leaders of the OSCE to convene and lend fresh impetus to the work of the Organization. He hoped that the debates at the 2010 Annual Security Review Conference could provide ideas and substance for the possible Summit at the end of the year.

Discussion

Following the opening statement, 14 delegations took the floor.

The first delegation to take the floor, speaking also on behalf of a group of States, pointed out that the 2010 Annual Security Review Conference was taking place at a critical juncture for security in Europe at large and the OSCE in particular, and that the lengthening of the Conference would allow for more thoroughgoing and substantive discussions, drawing on the debates in the Corfu Process and having a view to the informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers in Almaty and the possible Summit.

On transnational threats, the OSCE needed to more clearly define and develop its profile and activities, including through the improvement of its co-ordination and co-operation, both internally and with relevant outside actors. Border security and management, policing, combating of terrorism, prevention of proliferation and fostering of cyber security were priorities. To ensure an increased role for the Organization in combating transnational threats, the participating States should consider reviewing and possibly updating the OSCE's underlying framework documents and the overarching Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, adopted in 2003 at Maastricht.

The delegation supported enhancing the role of the OSCE in all the phases of the conflict cycle and welcomed the proposals made to that end by a number of participating States in the framework of the Corfu Process. The delegation supported the ideas aiming at empowering the Secretary General and the Chairperson-in-Office to address crisis situations and at strengthening the analytical and operational capacities of the OSCE's executive structures. It also stressed the existing link between the concept of comprehensive, indivisible and co-operative security and the framework of arms control agreements and confidence- and security-building measures: it was therefore in the common interest of all the participating States to preserve the viability of the Treaty on Open Skies and the Vienna Document 1999, to overcome the impasse on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and to further progress in the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and in the fight against the threats posed by small arms and light weapons.

Finally, the delegation welcomed the food-for-thought paper by one participating State on possible opportunities for an OSCE role in the establishment of security and stability in Afghanistan as a timely contribution to the debate, stressing that the Organization should strive to avoid duplication and provide added value in all its assistance activities to that country. The additional session on police-related activities was also welcome, since it would provide the opportunity to further review the Secretary General's report in that area.

The second delegation to take the floor emphasized that contradictory signals were being sent by the participating States: on the one hand, the fruitful and productive Corfu Process launched by the Greek Chairmanship-in-Office in 2009 and actively pursued by the Kazakh Chairmanship of 2010; on the other, the ongoing stagnation and erosion of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty regime. The current year afforded a chance to remodel the framework for co-operation, continue the discussion on the politico-military toolbox of the OSCE and relaunch the concept of indivisible security.

A new "security community" had to be based on a larger concept of security, embracing all its military, human and economic aspects: it was to be hoped that the informal

meeting of OSCE foreign ministers in Almaty would focus on the possible Summit and give a strong political impetus to the reaffirmation of the concept of indivisible security in the twenty-first century.

The third delegation to speak stressed that the Annual Security Review Conference, and the informal meeting of foreign ministers that was to follow, constituted key opportunities to “discuss, debate and decide” on ways to improve and expand the capacity of the Organization to resolve security issues in the OSCE region through hard work and constructive dialogue. The violent acts in Kyrgyzstan were a reminder of the responsibility of the OSCE to prevent and resolve all types of conflicts.

The participating States should focus on rebuilding trust and confidence among themselves, striving to fill the gaps between commitments and their implementation in all three dimensions of security and assessing the work carried out by the OSCE institutions and field operations. At the same time, ideas and initiatives generated by the Corfu Process, and new mechanisms and commitments had to be explored to enhance the OSCE’s effectiveness in terms of transparency, consultation and crisis response. The delegation recalled its own proposal to empower the Chairmanship to respond more effectively and efficiently to emerging crises.

It furthermore stressed its commitment to give the OSCE a broader role in promoting stability and democratic development in Afghanistan, for that purpose availing itself of its unique toolkit of capacities and expertise and implementing programmes and initiatives that would help improve security not only in that country but in the whole OSCE area. Finally, it stressed the importance of the OSCE’s first dimension in its overall comprehensive approach to security.

The fourth delegation taking the floor expressed the view that major advances had been made towards developing a security dialogue, thanks to the proposal by one participating State for the initiation of negotiations on a European security treaty and thanks also, within the OSCE, to the advance in the dialogue in the context of the Corfu Process. Constructive compromise had been reached in the Forum for Security Co-operation on the procedure to update the Vienna Document 1999, and it was now necessary to resolve the crisis surrounding the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, possibly by resuming dialogue in the Joint Consultative Group.

Seemingly common views were emerging among participating States on the need to face transnational threats in the OSCE region, and work should continue to solve protracted conflicts. It was expected that the informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers in Almaty would provide elements for the agenda of a possible Summit of OSCE Heads of State and Government to be held by the end of the year.

The fifth delegation praised the Kazakh Chairmanship-in-Office for restoring the OSCE’s status as a privileged forum for dialogue. It was nevertheless necessary to achieve tangible progress to avoid further fragmentation of security throughout the OSCE area and to truly implement its indivisibility. That was the rationale for a legally binding European security treaty, as had been proposed by its Government. It also expressed a strong interest in renewed efforts in the first dimension of security, referring to the possible update of the Vienna Document 1999, with a view to possibly adopting a new document in 2010, and in the establishment of a system of interlinking legal and political confidence- and security-building

measures within the OSCE framework for arms control adopted by the Forum for Security Co-operation in 1996.

It was also necessary to inject new impetus into the search for solutions to the protracted conflicts, acknowledging the importance of the role of the parties involved themselves, without whose commitment any international mediation could not succeed, as borne out by the events of August 2008, which had unfolded despite an established international presence on the ground.

On transnational threats, the delegation welcomed the seemingly emergent commonality of purpose with other participating States and groups of participating States, advocating an enhanced OSCE capability to face the related challenges, in particular in combating trafficking in illicit drugs, if possible through the adoption of an ad hoc OSCE plan of action. Co-ordination with other international organizations was important, and it could be achieved in the framework of the Platform for Co-operative Security adopted in 1999.

The sixth delegation to take the floor praised the Corfu Process as affording a unique opportunity to discuss the broad spectrum of OSCE activities and to propose ideas for bringing about progress in all three dimensions of security. In particular, on conflict resolution, it supported proposals aimed at equipping the Chairmanship-in-Office with more flexible tools so that it could quickly react to emerging crises.

The seventh delegation stressed the importance of the Corfu Process, which should remain the main forum for discussion, focusing on building on the existing security architecture and moving towards an “OSCE plus” rather than an “OSCE *à la carte*”. The OSCE was not about “either/or” when it came to priorities in different dimensions; it was about “and/and”. Improvement of the implementation of human dimension commitments, most notably related to the freedom of the media, was needed, as was progress on conventional arms control, including the Vienna Document 1999 and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The eighth delegation stated that the main threats in the OSCE area still stemmed from the protracted conflicts and their consequences, and that no progress would be achieved if violations of territorial integrity continued to be tolerated. Participating States should be aware that terrorism, trafficking in human beings and arms smuggling flourished in territories not controlled by legitimate authorities.

The ninth delegation welcomed the lengthening of the Conference and praised the OSCE for the unique link it provided between security in all three dimensions, and the Corfu Process for its provision of a forum for a debate on the implementation of the existing commitments and *acquis*. The participating States should now assess the existing instruments to ascertain whether they would still stand the test of an emerging crisis and whether they would provide credible answers to transnational threats. Dialogue with the OSCE Partners for Co-operation should also be intensified in order to instil more confidence and credibility into the Organization.

The tenth delegation to take the floor emphasized that the 1999 Platform for Security Co-operation remained a valuable basis for engaging in dialogue and interaction with international organizations, and also for countering transnational threats such as terrorism,

organized crime, illicit drugs, trafficking in human beings and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It praised the work carried out by the OSCE field presence to which it was host, and stressed the need for the OSCE Mission in Kosovo to continue operating under the provisions of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), as respect for international law remained of paramount importance.

The eleventh delegation called attention to the progress that had been achieved with the signing of the new START Treaty and with the success of the recent Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. That positive environment should encourage participating States to explore possible ways to overcome the deadlock relating to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and to make significant advances in the OSCE's role in non-proliferation. Achieving stability in Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries was a central objective; therefore, the OSCE should become more involved, in Afghanistan, in the fields of border security, counter-narcotics, policing and democracy-building, maintaining close co-ordination with other international actors to avoid duplication.

The delegation indicated five priority themes for discussion at the Almaty informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers and in view of a possible OSCE Summit:

- Reaffirmation of the validity and relevance of the Helsinki Final Act commitments;
- Progress on conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures;
- Enhanced work to counter transnational threats;
- Conflict prevention and crisis management;
- Ways of making headway on protracted conflicts, including through the restoration of an OSCE field presence in Georgia.

The twelfth delegation welcomed the lively dialogue taking place in the framework of the Corfu Process, whose main objective was improvement of the security architecture throughout the OSCE space and preservation of the concept of indivisible, co-operative and comprehensive security. The OSCE remained the most suitable forum for discussing the Euro-Atlantic and the Eurasian security landscapes, thanks also to its multidimensional nature, an asset that should be preserved as a basis not only for the interim report, but also for the informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers and a possible Summit.

The thirteenth delegation considered the Annual Security Review Conference an excellent opportunity to discuss regional issues and challenges and the need for continuous compliance by the participating States with all the OSCE commitments. The OSCE had been successful so far in establishing a framework for security arrangements, but some shortcomings still remained which had to be addressed by revitalizing the OSCE toolbox and by preserving existing formats and arrangements in the resolution of protracted conflicts.

The fourteenth speaker, taking the floor on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), reported on the new strategic concept that his Organization was working on, including ideas for reinforcing co-operative and comprehensive security. NATO

was looking at how the OSCE could complement its activities and its bilateral relationships with some participating States and welcomed the efforts of the Greek and Kazakh Chairmanships in the Corfu Process.

All the delegations taking the floor joined the Chairmanship-in-Office in expressing their condolences to the victims of the violent incidents in Kyrgyzstan.

Recommendations and suggestions

A number of proposals and recommendations were made at the opening session, and several speakers announced their intention of further discussing those subjects during the working sessions:

- The Organization’s strategic goals should be to restore trust and confidence co-operatively, and promote transparency and openness collaboratively;
- The “OSCE toolbox” should be reviewed to address security challenges more effectively and cross-dimensionally. The participating States welcomed the Corfu Process and the upcoming informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers, which would provide an opportunity to improve and expand the Organization’s instruments, and to adapt them to the new security environment;
- The participating States should look at all three dimensions to assess the gaps between commitments and their implementation and then focus the Organization’s work in those areas where the greatest gaps were identified;
- The role of the OSCE in early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management should be enhanced. That had to be done with a strategic vision for co-operating with partner organizations, adding value and avoiding duplication. Special attention was devoted to the current crisis in Kyrgyzstan. In that context, some States called for the short-term enhancement of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek;
- Progress should be made towards the resolution of protracted conflicts in order to restore trust and confidence among the participating States;
- The participating States should implement existing OSCE commitments in carrying forward the negotiations on arms control agreements. Any revisions to agreements should lead to the strengthening, not the weakening, of the arms control regime;
- OSCE’s efforts should be enhanced on transnational threats and challenges, including counter-terrorism, the combating of trafficking in human beings and narcotic drugs and organized crime, non-proliferation, and cyber security;
- The engagement of the Organization should be increased in police co-operation and border-related activities, an area in which the OSCE had gained expertise and could provide added value, especially on the borders with Afghanistan;
- A joint meeting of the OSCE and other relevant international organizations active in the field of European security should be convened in the framework of the 1999 Platform for Co-operative Security;

- The participating States should consider convening a Summit at year's end to give the Organization new impetus, restore confidence and trust, and reaffirm the concepts of co-operative, comprehensive and indivisible security.

WORKING SESSION I: TRANSNATIONAL THREATS AND CHALLENGES

- Keynote speakers: Mr. Jenishbek Jumanbekov, Director, Executive Committee of the Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
- Ms. Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings
- Moderator: Ambassador Heiner Horsten, Permanent Representative of Germany to the OSCE
- Rapporteur: Mr. Dmitry Krayushkin, Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Belarus to the OSCE

In his introductory remarks, the moderator, Ambassador Heiner Horsten, stressed the importance of further efforts by the OSCE in combating new transnational threats to security in the OSCE area. Such threats and challenges could be tackled jointly with the greatest effectiveness.

The first keynote speaker, Mr. Jenishbek Jumanbekov, outlined the activities and measures undertaken by the Executive Committee of the Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure (RCTS) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism. He opened his presentation by pointing out that the extent of the danger posed by terrorist threats depended on the sophistication of the forms, methods, forces and means used for terrorist activities and the tactics employed for their implementation, as well as on the effectiveness of anti-terrorist measures adopted by national and international counter-terrorism systems.

Some of the modern trends in the evolution of terrorism were:

- The geographical spread and internationalization of terrorism;
- The increase in the level of organization of terrorist activities;
- The link between terrorism and organized crime;
- The growth in the financial, material and technical resources for terrorism;
- The attempts being made to obtain components or resources connected with weapons of mass destruction;
- The active use of modern information technologies and communications.

The evolution in the forms and methods used by terrorists had resulted in a rise in the number of victims.

The rapid growth in drug trafficking and the substantial financial support it provided to terrorist, separatist and extremist organizations contributed to the threats and challenges faced by the SCO Member States, especially with regard to Afghanistan. Action to combat the drug threat emanating from Afghanistan seemed to need further improvement, including through an increase in the activities carried out by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

The terrorist organizations in the territory of Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan were looked upon as a particular focal point of international terrorism for the SCO Member States. Their main efforts in that regard were being concentrated on the conduct of joint operations and the exchange of information and other measures aimed at reducing threats to security and developing co-operation between their respective intelligence services and law-enforcement agencies, and with international structures. The speaker particularly outlined the co-operation between the SCO's Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure and the OSCE Secretariat's Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU).

The co-ordinated activities of the anti-terrorist coalition had produced some results. In particular, the coalition had inflicted losses on the hub of international terrorism in Afghanistan. There appeared to have been a gradual reduction in the number of terrorist acts committed in the world, and an increasing number of terrorist acts had been frustrated. Progress had also been made in the conduct of joint investigations. The practice of detaining and extraditing persons who had committed crimes in the territories of partner countries was evolving.

The problem of international terrorism in the SCO region, however, had not been resolved. The efforts of international and regional organizations needed to be intensified, and international anti-terrorist bodies such as the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee or the OSCE's ATU had an important co-ordinating role to play.

The following measures might improve the effectiveness of the fight against international terrorism within the SCO:

- Elaboration by the SCO Member States of national programmes to counter terrorism, separatism and extremism and the ideologies behind them;
- Acceleration of the implementation of the programme to create a “security belt” along the Afghan border using the resources of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group and the co-operation with the United Nations forces;
- Identification of new areas for co-operation with third countries in combating terrorism and extremism;
- A constant improvement in the ways and means of tracking information to reveal the true aims of terrorism, separatism and extremism.

The second keynote speaker, Ms. Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, spoke about trafficking in persons as a transnational threat to international and national security. That trafficking was also a human rights violation, a serious crime perpetrated on a massive scale,

resulting in modern-day slavery, mostly committed by organized crime, and, therefore, of crucial concern for comprehensive security.

It was important to draw a distinction between human trafficking and human smuggling, because the former crime was conducted on a regular and organized basis and seriously violated the human rights of the persons involved.

Out of 12 million victims of forced labour, there were a minimum of 2.45 million victims of trafficking globally, at least half a million of whom were in the OSCE area. The total market value of human trafficking amounted to an estimated USD 32 billion.

The organized crime networks that mostly operated the trafficking process were called “criminal hubs”, since they combined factors such as proximity to major destination markets, geographic location, infrastructure, types of organized crime groups and migration processes. Trafficking in human beings could involve different types of organized crime as well as linkages to associated criminal activities. The proceeds from trafficking in human beings were also potential sources of income for terrorism.

Given the massive scale of operations and their linkage to organized crime, trafficking in human beings could be looked upon as one of the most serious transnational threats to security. It violated the fundamental rights and dignity of people and threatened health security. When trafficking in human beings was linked with conflict situations, further aspects of security were involved. Conflicts exacerbated trafficking in human beings. It was a threat to security also from the point of view of its impact on the economy and democratic institution building. One of the main drivers of the crime of human trafficking was corruption. The proceeds of trafficking were channelled into the legitimate economic sector through money laundering. The law enforcement and criminal justice response to trafficking in human beings remained largely inadequate, as did financial investigation of it. Trafficking in human beings remained a low-risk crime compared to other types of organized crime.

The first step in tackling the problem was to acknowledge that trafficking in human beings was not an exception in many local or regional areas of the OSCE participating States. Consistent operational objectives were:

- Increasing the capacity of law enforcement operational units;
- Generalizing the use of the most advanced and sophisticated investigative tools;
- Promoting the full involvement and co-operation of specialized financial police units, capacity-building of practitioners, and international networking of police and specialized prosecution units.

The OSCE was ideally placed to combat the transnational threat of human trafficking, given its ability to work comprehensively across all three dimensions of security. One of its tools was a Code of Conduct prohibiting and preventing the promotion/facilitation of trafficking in human beings. Decision No. 16/05, adopted at the meeting of the Ministerial Council in Ljubljana, had recommended measures to address that challenge, for example, in conflict areas. The OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings remained relevant seven years after its adoption and endorsement by all the participating States. In the field of international partnership, one of the first steps aimed at improving co-operation

between the OSCE and other international organizations had been the establishment of the Alliance against Trafficking in Persons.

Discussion

The most significant point emerging from the discussion was the view that the transnational, cross-border and cross-dimensional nature of the new threats called for the consolidated efforts of all the OSCE participating States. The need for further strengthening of co-operation within the OSCE in that field was generally confirmed. However, some differences in approaches to the new threats with regard to specific unresolved regional situations were noted. The comments of other regional organizations acting in the OSCE area, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States, demonstrated their effectiveness and the potential for further co-operation between the OSCE and those organizations in combating the transnational threats and challenges to collective security.

Twelve delegations and other speakers made contributions.

The first speaker, representing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), said that, within the CIS, joint work was carried out in accordance with inter-State programmes which had been approved by the Heads of State. Those programmes addressed the issues of combating terrorism, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and trafficking in human beings. He enumerated the various decisions, conventions, agreements, programmes of co-operation and declarations adopted in the last few years by the CIS Member States to combat transnational threats to security. In addition, model laws had been adopted as part of a long-term plan for harmonization of national laws regarding those issues. The preventive and special operations carried out by law enforcement authorities in the territories of the CIS Member States had produced significant results in terms of reducing the number of crimes. Special attention was now being devoted to data gathering and the exchange of information and intelligence among the CIS law enforcement authorities. He concluded by calling attention to the strategic importance of the initiative of one OSCE participating State regarding the drafting of a treaty on European security. The proposal had already been approved by the Council of CIS Foreign Ministers.

One delegation said that the main focus for joint action on transnational threats was counter-terrorism. It highlighted key events that had taken place under the OSCE's auspices and said that it looked forward to the conference scheduled to take place in October in Astana, which would hopefully lead to the adoption of an OSCE document on counter-terrorism. One issue that deserved special attention was the problem of drug production and trafficking, which was closely connected to the threat of terrorism, especially in Afghanistan. That was an issue that affected global security and required co-operation at the international level. The delegation called on the OSCE participating States to implement key documents on the fight against drug trafficking. It also suggested that the OSCE should adopt a comprehensive concept regarding ways of addressing the issue and provide training to narcotics control squads in Afghanistan. Cyber security was another area that the OSCE should focus on and which could be addressed through the adoption of a document or convention.

The next delegation reiterated that the OSCE was well placed to play a decisive role in the fight against terrorism. The Organization clearly had comparative advantages in

addressing the issue, but any activity that it conducted should remain in line with existing mechanisms and agreements. It also considered that activities relating to transnational threats should not be incorporated into the OSCE conflict prevention and resolution activities. It stressed the importance of fully implementing commitments in the fight against transnational threats.

Another delegation recalled that the participating States had agreed in the context of the Corfu Process to concentrate on activities where the OSCE could offer added value. The OSCE could make use of the political bonds that existed among the participating States with a view to exchanging expertise and experiences. In its opinion, the priorities for the OSCE's activities aimed at countering transnational threats were:

- Enhancing activities related to border security and management;
- Strengthening police training, through the adoption of an action plan or framework document;
- Increasing the involvement of the ODIHR in transnational justice;
- Continuing the work of the OSCE's ATU regarding travel document security.

The next speaker, representing the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), underlined the need for a new European security architecture and welcomed the proposal for a European security treaty. The CSTO looked forward to an upcoming meeting of regional organizations to discuss how to improve early warning and conflict prevention. The OSCE's expertise in those areas would be of great help to the CSTO Member States in developing their own mechanisms, and common mechanisms could also be envisaged for the peaceful resolution of disputes.

One delegation stated that terrorism, extremism and separatism were dangerous problems which its participating State had suffered from for many years. It suggested that the OSCE analyse the links between conflicts and terrorism. It also noted that cyber security was an important issue to be addressed, in particular regarding the use of the Internet to spread hatred and justify conflicts.

Another delegation referred to the decision on transnational threats which it had co-sponsored with another participating State, and which would form the basis of a report by the Secretary General. Although the nature of the threats was not entirely new, the OSCE's response to them had to be rethought and adapted to include all three dimensions of security. It supported further work by the OSCE on cyber security, including on development of a mandate to enable the Organization to address the issue comprehensively. It also favoured joint work with the United Nations 1540 Committee, which had been established pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), on addressing issues related to the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In conclusion, it reiterated the importance of developing a path towards stability for Afghanistan and suggested that the OSCE could play a regional role in addressing threats to security emanating from the territory of that country.

One delegation expressed the view that there was potential for the OSCE to move forward on the issues under consideration; however, it had to define clear priorities and focus its activities on areas where it could offer added value. Much work had already been achieved

by the Organization in the area of transnational threats and challenges, so it suggested that existing OSCE documents such as the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, adopted at the meeting of the Ministerial Council in Maastricht in 2003, should be analysed and updated.

Another delegation pointed out that transnational threats were interlinked and therefore had to be addressed comprehensively. The OSCE could provide assistance to participating States to address those issues by facilitating regional co-operation. It was also important to strengthen co-operation with other international organizations through the Platform for Security Co-operation.

One delegation supported the carrying out of a lessons-learned assessment on transnational threats. In its view, key areas for OSCE involvement included cross-border security, policing, trafficking and money-laundering. Cyber security was a threat that was global in nature, and the OSCE had to assess what comparative advantage it could offer regarding the issue. In respect of threats emanating from Afghanistan, the delegation was of the opinion that OSCE assistance would be more effective if it was delivered within the territory of Afghanistan.

The next delegation stated that, although links existed between organized crime and terrorism in certain areas, such as Afghanistan, that did not reflect a common trend. It asked the keynote speakers to elaborate on the links between terrorism and human trafficking.

The last speaker, representing the Secretariat's Action against Terrorism Unit, provided some clarifications regarding the links between organized crime and terrorism.

During the discussion, a large number of recommendations and suggestions were made regarding transnational threats and challenges and their impact on security in the OSCE area, as well as regarding enhancing the OSCE's capacities and effectiveness in combating them.

Recommendations and suggestions

- The cross-border and cross-dimensional nature and underlying causes of transnational threats required consolidated efforts by all the OSCE participating States. The threats were interlinked. Trafficking in all its forms generated considerable financial gains, which were then used to finance criminal and terrorist activities.
- Counter-terrorism should remain a priority topic for OSCE involvement, in particular in terms of making use of public-private partnerships in combating terrorism and preventing the trafficking of narcotic drugs emanating from the territory of Afghanistan, which contributed to financing terrorism.
- The OSCE should provide a framework to ensure that internationally agreed documents on combating the trade in narcotic drugs would be implemented by the participating States.

- OSCE assistance and capacity-building, including in counter-narcotics, should be delivered both within and outside Afghanistan in order to be effective; the diverging views on whether OSCE activities should be conducted in Afghanistan were noteworthy.
- The OSCE should focus on the links between conflicts and terrorism.
- The OSCE's new anti-terrorism activities should be in keeping with already existing mechanisms; however, the OSCE was well placed to play an important role in fighting terrorism.
- The OSCE's ATU should be provided the necessary resources to organize expert meetings and conferences in the area of counter-terrorism.
- The OSCE's ATU should continue pursuing its activities relating to travel document security.
- The OSCE should work with the United Nations on Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) to address the risks related to the danger of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorist groups.
- The United Nation's approach to developing norms on cyber security should be supported. The OSCE could develop its own document on cyber security. In particular, the use of Internet websites as a means to propagate hate campaigns towards neighbouring countries represented a threat to security in some regions.
- Border security, police activities and the fight against organized crime should remain focus areas for OSCE involvement. There was, however, a need for participating States to agree on the priorities for future efforts to address transnational threats.
- In the field of policing, the OSCE should adopt a plan of action. The findings in the Secretary General's recent report on police-related activities provided a valuable basis on which to elaborate operational proposals.
- The issues of tolerance, cross-border migration and discrimination had thus far not received sufficient attention from the OSCE and should be more fully addressed by the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities.
- Co-ordination with other international actors needed to be improved, with the OSCE focusing on aspects in which it had strengths and could add value, avoiding duplication and/or complementing the work of others.
- The OSCE could provide useful assistance to participating States in facilitating regional co-operation regarding transnational threats.
- The OSCE should remain flexible and be prepared to adapt to the changing nature of the threats.

- A lessons-learned assessment regarding transnational threats would be useful. Key OSCE documents such as the Maastricht Strategy, the Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism and the Border Security and Management Concept needed to be scrutinized with a view to making better use of them, and possibly adapting them.
- Transnational threats should be considered as an agenda item for the possible Summit.

WORKING SESSION II: THE ROLE OF THE OSCE IN EARLY WARNING, CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION, CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND POST-CONFLICT REHABILITATION

Keynote speakers: Ambassador William H. Hill, Professor, United States National War College

Brigadier General Giovanni Manione, Deputy Director, Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union

Moderator: Ambassador Herbert Salber, Director, Conflict Prevention Centre

Rapporteur: Mr. Donatas Butkus, Permanent Mission of Lithuania to the OSCE

In his introductory remarks, the moderator, Ambassador Herbert Salber, identified four major common areas for discussion among the proposals distributed by participating States on the issues related to early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation:

- Strengthening of OSCE executive structures;
- Exploration of further OSCE mechanisms and procedures;
- Movement from early warning to early action and strengthening of the role of the Chairmanship;
- Examination of the role of the Permanent Council in crisis and conflict situations.

He stressed that it was crucial to make wider use of existing mechanisms and procedures that the OSCE already had in its toolbox and to have early warning followed by early action. He encouraged the participating States to articulate and put forward some concrete recommendations that could serve as a basis for “real” political action on the ground.

The first keynote speaker, Ambassador William H. Hill, started his presentation by suggesting that the main challenges to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area came from without, not from within. In addressing new threats, OSCE institutions and operations would need to communicate and co-operate with an expanding list of international organizations and NGOs. In order to keep track of and support such operational co-operation and co-ordination, the capabilities of OSCE institutions, in particular of the Secretariat and the Conflict Prevention Centre, would need to be expanded somewhat. In the same context, the OSCE must maintain and keep current the capabilities enabling it to deploy field operations with sufficient flexibility and speed to meet the challenge as early as possible in the conflict process.

In order to be effective in the twenty-first century, the OSCE must bring up to date both its ability to reach consensus on deciding when and how to intervene, and also the operational capacity to support such activities.

He acknowledged that the Russian proposal for a draft decision on conflict prevention and crisis management in the OSCE posed in stark clarity what was perhaps the most difficult dilemma of the OSCE approach to all stages of the conflict process: the requirement for consensus. The problem was that long-term blocking of a conflict situation by one actor in the process could sometimes lead to the increasing frustration of other parties. On the other hand, he found the proposal, in the same paper, for the expansion and maintenance of political dialogue at all levels and the use of confidence- and security-building measures to be extremely useful and effective.

Over the past decade, the OSCE, and in particular the Permanent Council, had been increasingly unable to reach agreement on important questions involving security in Europe. High-level discussion and decision-making had migrated on a number of issues to the more limited fora of NATO, the EU, or the Council of Europe, where at times reaching agreement proved easier because of the more limited membership. However, the OSCE remained the only forum that could provide agreement on norms or operations by all the Euro-Atlantic States.

He agreed with the food-for-thought paper produced by Finland and ten other participating States regarding the better use of the Permanent Council to improve the political dialogue. The participating States must consider how to structure the work of the Permanent Council so as to encourage sustained deliberations on important security issues, rather than only an exchange of polemical point and counterpoint on issues of the day.

He shared one of the opinions of the United States, namely, that broadening the possible scope of the Chairmanship's action could be useful in enhancing existing rapid response capabilities, while not weakening the need for consensus on fundamental political decisions or on basic institutional changes.

Finally, he concurred with those who did not believe that wholly new OSCE institutions or mechanisms were necessary, but thought that the Secretariat and in particular the Conflict Prevention Centre needed to be further strengthened to provide the OSCE with a better institutional memory that would contribute to more effective guidance and support for field operations and activities.

The second keynote speaker, Brigadier General Giovanni Manione, acknowledged that the OSCE was a major actor, and the European Union attached great importance to its partnership with the Organization. In today's complex crises, military and civilian efforts needed to be carefully tailored in size, application and time. The European Union had adopted a comprehensive approach to crisis management. In that context, it had elaborated a concept of "Civil-Military Coordination: a Comprehensive Approach". The European Union strived, by using a wide range of instruments at its disposal (political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, military and civilian), and by means of close international co-operation, to take a coherent and holistic approach to crisis management and conflict resolution.

Conflict prevention was a central and integral part of the European Union's efforts to promote peace and security. Its approach to conflict prevention could be characterized as a co-operative approach to facilitating peaceful solutions to disputes which implied addressing the root causes of conflicts. In conclusion, he said that the international community needed to be equipped with effective instruments in the areas of conflict resolution and, often in parallel, crisis management.

The Special Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office for Protracted Conflicts, Ambassador Bolat Nurgaliyev, said that all protracted conflicts, with all their differences and nuances, presented certain universal patterns: from the stark divergence of goals of the parties to the conflict, through the escalation of tensions, pressure without resorting to the use of force and use of force to resolve the conflict, and finally post-conflict management. In the mediation process, it was important to narrow the scope of the contradictions. In that context, it was important that an OSCE presence in Georgia should be restored in a form acceptable to all the stakeholders.

The resolution of the conflict could be possible if and when the parties were ready and willing. Mediators were limited in their ability to bring pressure to bear, prevent escalation and arrange a settlement. In conclusion, he was convinced that, without compromising its effectiveness, the OSCE could maintain constructive relationships with other international organizations in a joint endeavour to manage protracted conflicts.

Discussion

The discussions took place against the background of the ongoing internal crisis in Kyrgyzstan. Bearing that and previous conflicts in mind, the debate in session II focused primarily on the need to strengthen existing OSCE early warning and crisis management mechanisms and/or to create new ones. The most debated questions arose from the proposals presented by a group of States on the need to develop pre-consensual mechanisms in the area of preventive action and crisis management. Some of the delegations expressed their belief that the OSCE's role in crisis situations should not be strengthened at the expense of the consensus principle.

One delegation said that the OSCE needed new capacities, a means of effective transition from early warning to early action, and most importantly, the political will to act, in order to be able to respond to crises arising. In that context, it put forward its proposal for the creation of an OSCE crisis prevention mechanism which could respond efficiently and effectively to emerging conflict situations. That would empower the OSCE to offer rapid humanitarian relief, and provide impartial monitoring to build confidence and reduce tensions on the ground. It expressed its belief that providing the Chairmanship with some flexibility and the tools to act quickly and decisively was a vital step towards improving collective security.

The same delegation also presented its own and co-sponsored proposals, e.g.: strengthening of the ability of the Representative on Freedom of the Media to conduct fact-finding missions; creation of a possible energy-security early-warning (ESEW) mechanism; and strengthening of the OSCE response in post-crisis and post-conflict stabilization and rehabilitation. More attention must be devoted to resolving protracted conflicts, as they represented a serious, ongoing threat to security and stability. In that

context, restoring a meaningful OSCE presence in Georgia would help to reduce tensions and facilitate the resolution of the conflict.

Another delegation welcomed the prompt reaction from the Chairmanship to the crisis in Kyrgyzstan. The issue of protracted conflicts must remain on the international political agenda, and the OSCE could make an important contribution towards defusing tensions, including in Georgia. Joint discussions between the European Union and the Russian Federation regarding the resolution of the Transdniestrian conflict were also mentioned. It agreed with the proposals presented within the framework of the Corfu Process on the need to strengthen the ability of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Secretary General and Secretariat to act in crisis situations. It also noted the importance of raising issues early in the Permanent Council and of bringing about greater co-operation among the OSCE institutions. Lastly, there was a need to strengthen the OSCE's co-operation with regional and international organizations through the Platform for Co-operative Security, in order to better address crisis situations.

One delegation stressed that the OSCE very much needed to improve its conflict resolution and prevention tools. The armed conflict of August 2008 in Georgia, as well as the current events in Kyrgyzstan, demonstrated how short-handed the OSCE could be in times of crisis. It urged the OSCE to pay close attention to the current security and human rights situation in Georgia and to the implementation of the cease-fire agreement of 12 August, and called upon the Organization to find a way to re-establish a presence in Georgia.

Another delegation emphasized that there was a need for stronger political will among the participating States to utilize the OSCE as a forum for political dialogue and crisis management. OSCE confidence- and security-building measures could exercise a preventive function in post-conflict situations. It was appropriate to address the need for sustainability of conflict resolution by building comprehensive security, so that it would become unlikely that conflicts would break out again.

One delegation stated that there was a need to redefine OSCE crisis reaction tools. The Chairmanship should be better equipped with tools to react to crises, for example, by being authorized to send fact-finding missions to crisis areas. That would not undermine the consensus principle because it would be decided after intensive consultations with all the OSCE participating States.

Two delegations supported the proposal introduced by the previous speaker to strengthen the Chairmanship's role in the conflict prevention sphere and to authorize it to send fact-finding missions to crisis areas. One of them also reiterated the need to restore an OSCE presence in Georgia.

One speaker stressed that conflicts could not be resolved successfully without the involvement of parliamentarians in the conflict-resolution process. Field operations were therefore invited to co-operate more closely with the Parliamentary Assembly in their conflict-resolution endeavours.

One delegation proposed a strengthening of the consensus basis in the work of the OSCE, above all in the area of crisis management, and also the elaboration and adoption of uniform principles for conflict resolution. In its view, any activities related to conflict prevention and resolution had to be based on the unconditional observance of consensus in all

stages of the crisis cycle, combined with a strengthening of the powers of the collective decision-making bodies (the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Co-operation) as well as on the clearly expressed consent of the parties to the conflict to the measures being proposed by the OSCE.

The same delegation suggested making maximum use of the Chairperson-in-Office's existing mandate, including in the sphere of preventive diplomacy, instead of expanding his powers. Increasing the effectiveness of the OSCE in conflict prevention and resolution was impossible without strengthening its legal basis, by converting it into a fully fledged international organization. The peaceful means of settlement and the inadmissibility of the use of force or the threat of force were of major significance in the application of conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms. In that context, it urged Georgia to reiterate its commitment regarding the non-use of force.

Another delegation stated that the OSCE had everything needed to be successful and effective when addressing conflict prevention and resolution, but lacked proper implementation of its decisions and observance of its commitments. It reiterated that the principles and norms of international law, as envisaged in the Helsinki Final Act and the UN Charter, constituted the backdrop for conflict settlement. Settlement of conflicts should be based, first of all, on the exclusion of any territorial claims, on the respect of internationally recognized borders of States and on a spirit of constructiveness and pragmatism. And, lastly, it should create the proper security environment for the peaceful co-existence of the communities affected by the conflict.

Another delegation said that the discussions in the context of the Corfu Process should address all aspects of the conflict management cycle rather than focusing only on the ongoing conflict settlement process. In conflict resolution, priority should be assigned to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the development of confidence- and security-building measures and adherence to the principle of non-use of force. Furthermore, conflict resolution should be based on the consent of all the parties to a conflict.

One delegation noted that it considered the Corfu Process to be a great opportunity to strengthen the dialogue on conflict resolution as well as to reinvigorate debates on the arms control regime in Europe and on the relevant commitments in that respect. It proposed that Corfu-type meetings should be convened on protracted conflicts. It also agreed with the proposals made by other delegations, including those for the strengthening of the Conflict Prevention Centre, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, and early-warning and early-action capacities. It was important to work on adaptation of the existing mechanisms and procedures within the OSCE, but first of all, there had to be the political will to use those mechanisms. Finally, it reiterated its interest in closely co-operating with relevant international actors, with a view to achieving consolidation of the indivisibility of European security, including by resolution of the Transnistrian conflict on the basis of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova.

Another delegation stressed that, in order for the OSCE to become more efficient and relevant in addressing conflicts, there was a need for a political will to use existing mechanisms, for greater efforts to effectively implement OSCE commitments, and finally for a revision of the toolbox of diplomatic and operational instruments for conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation. It was important that the three dimensions of security should be taken into account when addressing conflicts. The OSCE field

operations played a key role in supporting the implementation of OSCE commitments and contributed to stability in Europe. In that context, it was important that an OSCE presence should be re-established throughout the entire territory of Georgia. There was also a need to strengthen the role of the OSCE Chairmanship, the Secretary General, the OSCE Secretariat and the institutions in crisis situations and in particular to make use in that sphere of the OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. In conclusion, the OSCE should pay greater attention in all stages of conflicts to the issues of national minorities and displaced persons.

One delegation pointed out that the OSCE was unique in its consensus-based decision-making process, which constituted the Organization's quality and value. Therefore, any improvements to the decision-making process should not challenge the Organization's consensus-based approach. It also reiterated the support expressed for the activities of the High Commissioner on National Minorities and called for closer co-ordination among international organizations as part of the OSCE's comprehensive approach to addressing conflicts.

Another delegation echoed the proposals for enhancing the Organization's flexibility and capacity for rapid reaction in responding to crisis situations. It also called for improving the Organization's inter-institutional co-operation in conflict management by reinforcing the links between the Secretariat, the field operations and the institutions. It stressed the importance of strengthening the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in particular, as in its view many conflicts were of an intra-State nature and originated from tensions between national minorities and national authorities.

The Corfu Process co-ordinator for those issues recalled that conflict management was one of the key areas of focus of the Process, and provided an overview of the discussions and topics agreed upon so far.

Recommendations and suggestions

- The OSCE must improve its ability to move from “early warning” to “early action” across the three dimensions of security, since that represented its area of comparative advantage. It should look not only at its capabilities, e.g. by strengthening its field operations, but also at the political will as to where and when to act.
- Resolving protracted conflicts remained a priority for the Organization. Several participating States called for the re-establishment of an OSCE field presence in Georgia.
- The implementation of existing commitments was a first step towards the resolution of existing conflicts.
- Confidence- and security-building measures needed to be implemented not only regarding military issues, but also in the economic and human dimensions, for example, through education and people-to-people contacts.
- The capabilities of the High Commissioner on National Minorities should be strengthened. More work could be conducted, for example, in relation to movements of populations, which provided useful early warning signals regarding deteriorating human-rights situations and looming conflicts.

- The roles of the Chairmanship and the Secretary General should be expanded to enable them to respond more effectively to crisis situations, for example, through the deployment of short-term missions or by temporarily augmenting existing field operations. An appropriate balance should be found between early action in crisis situations and the consensus principle.
- The working methods of the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Co-operation should be reviewed in order to improve the quality of debates and the speed of the decision-making process in crisis situations.
- Within the Secretariat, the Conflict Prevention Centre should be strengthened to provide better analytical and operational support to the participating States, particularly in early warning. There should be tighter co-operation among all the OSCE executive structures.
- Participating States should consider endorsing the Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations.
- The OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration should be used to resolve conflicts. Participating States which had not yet ratified the Stockholm Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration were called upon to do so.
- The OSCE executive structures should make better use of the Parliamentary Assembly. In particular, the Chairmanship, the field operations and the Secretariat should involve the Parliamentary Assembly, as well as a host country's democratically elected leadership and its civil society, in their conflict resolution activities.
- Providing the OSCE with a legal basis through the adoption of an OSCE Charter would make the Organization more effective in dealing with conflicts.
- There should be closer co-operation between international organizations based on the Platform for Co-operative Security.

WORKING SESSION III: THE ROLE AND PERSPECTIVES OF ARMS CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING REGIMES IN BUILDING TRUST IN THE EVOLVING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

- Keynote speakers: Ambassador Alyson Bailes, Professor, Iceland University

 Ambassador Vladislav Chernov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
- Moderator: Ambassador Mara Marinaki, Permanent Representative of Greece to the OSCE
- Rapporteur: Mr. Attila Pokol, Deputy Permanent Representative of Hungary to the OSCE

The main focus of the session was on the current situation and perspectives in the area of conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures. The participants had the opportunity to take stock of the work done since the Athens meeting of the Ministerial Council and to explore ways in which to strengthen the Organization's politico-military toolbox. Furthermore, the session provided the opportunity to discuss how the OSCE could contribute to efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in its area.

Ambassador Alyson Bailes said that there was a renewed interest in the revitalization of inclusive, Europe-wide security co-operation, of which arms control and confidence-building measures were an integral part. She cited three reasons for that development: the economic crisis, the realization that military strength alone could not guarantee long-term stability and, finally, the return of the debate about local territorial security and the recognition of the importance of further stabilizing strategic relationships in the OSCE region. While there was interest in revisiting past successes, the considerable changes that had taken place since the *acquis* had been developed should not be overlooked.

Quantitative restraints on armaments needed to be combined with rules of behaviour and dialogue. While transparency had increased, there were clear deficiencies in the latter area. Even though the participating States recognized the importance of strengthening the politico-military toolbox, there were considerable obstacles on the way forward, as technical and political conditions for arms control were interrelated. Small steps in improving the CSCE and OSCE *acquis* could pave the way to a qualitative change. At the same time, restraints on armaments could not provide an overall solution to strategic problems.

Over-focusing on open armed conflicts should be avoided, and there was a need to be aware of other institutional actors shaping the process. The improved atmosphere in international relations had opened up the possibility for progress; however, commitment by all the parties involved was needed in order to achieve concrete results, since the risks associated with unresolved security problems were larger than the risks involved in mutual and constructive steps to set a situation right.

Ambassador Chernov expressed the view that the existing deadlock in the OSCE's work in the politico-military sphere was attributable to the persistence of the Cold War mentality in participating States and the wish of some countries to use the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) for their own foreign policy purposes. With the changing political atmosphere, there was a real opportunity to overcome the existing impasse. Conventional arms control in Europe needed to be preserved, and it should remain one of the ways of organizing the pan-European security space. The control of conventional armed forces could be restored only on the basis of the key provisions of the adapted CFE Treaty. He called for a lowering of the national ceilings of NATO member countries and for development of a definition of the term "substantial combat forces". In relation to the "flank limitations", there was a need to balance different concerns, and it might be possible to do that through the conclusion of a series of bilateral agreements outside the framework of a new treaty.

Regional conflict zones could be removed from the sphere of arms control, while preserving transparency, until the conflicts were resolved, so as not to undermine a new agreement. States Parties could work towards a new adaptation of the adapted CFE Treaty, or a new treaty, or if that was not possible, they could try to translate the basic values of the CFE Treaty into confidence-building measures.

The moderator noted that the discussions in the Corfu Process had proved that arms control was an integral part of European security and drew the attention of delegations to a number of questions posed by the two keynote speakers.

Discussion

Following the presentations, a large number of delegations took the floor, contributing to a lively debate.

The first delegation argued that there was a need to assess new requirements and look at possible changes to the existing politico-military toolbox. Instead of a new treaty of a declaratory nature, the participating States should rather focus on a comprehensive approach and concrete measures. They should try to preserve as much as possible from the existing measures; however that should not be an aim in itself. Any new regime should preserve the following basic principles: the sovereign right of States to join alliances, host nation consent, and reciprocal restraints. Agreeing with Professor Bailes and drawing a parallel with the negotiations relating to the adapted CFE Treaty, the delegation called for a step-by-step approach, focusing first on a strengthening of transparency.

The next delegation to take the floor recalled the major achievements of the work of the Forum for Security Co-operation since the last Annual Security Review Conference, and highlighted the importance of the decision on establishing a procedure to incorporate the Forum's decisions into the Vienna Document 1999, which could serve as a starting point for updating it. In connection with that decision, it recalled that there were a number of proposals already on the table to be considered. It called attention to its efforts to improve implementation of politico-military commitments at the regional level. It appealed for a dialogue on arms control to overcome the current impasse and stated that the adapted CFE Treaty should be the point of departure.

Another delegation said that any arms control regime needed to be based on the underlying principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New

Europe. It recalled the many successes achieved in the politico-military dimension: the Treaty on Open Skies, the implementation of the Vienna Document 1999 and the Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The recent Open Skies Review Conference had highlighted the important role of that transparency measure, the commitment of the States Parties to work together to make it more cost effective and the possible contribution of the Treaty to monitoring other agreements. It also referred to the importance of contributing to global non-proliferation efforts and drew attention to its proposal to organize a workshop on the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). It also recalled recent high-level statements setting out its views on European security and arms control.

Another delegation argued that arms control contributed to a culture of transparency. While highlighting the central role of the CFE Treaty, it stated that existing measures were mutually reinforcing. It was important to preserve the principles and implement outstanding commitments. It called the attention of other delegations to its paper on post-conflict situations. It also stated that the success of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had wider relevance and held lessons for security in Europe.

Another delegation reiterated the importance of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures and noted the task that had been assigned by the Athens meeting of the Ministerial Council. It also noted the importance of holding joint meetings between the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Co-operation. The Vienna Document 1999 should be adapted, but only in the areas where it was outdated. It also supported the development of non-military confidence- and security-building measures on the basis of existing military measures. In addition, there was a need to expand the measures contained in the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and those related to small arms and light weapons.

Another participating State agreed that the implementation of existing confidence- and security-building measures should be improved and that those measures should be adapted and extended to cover new threats and challenges. It drew attention to its proposal on that issue. The updating of the Vienna Document 1999 should take into account new military capabilities. The Code of Conduct was not being implemented properly; its implementation and possible development should be discussed in the framework of the Annual Security Review Conference or a special conference.

Another delegation argued that arms control and confidence- and security-building measures were an irreplaceable part of Euro-Atlantic security, with the Vienna Document 1999 at its core. The Athens meeting of the Ministerial Council had assigned a mandate, and the Forum for Security Co-operation decision on the Vienna Document provided a framework; hence it was time to modernize the document to reflect the new circumstances.

Another delegation expressed the view that the politico-military *acquis* was increasingly under threat, as the basic principles of the CSCE/OSCE process were not being observed. Agreements with regard to the 2008 conflict in Georgia were not being implemented, similarly to commitments undertaken at the Istanbul Summit. The Open Skies Treaty was also being violated. Those developments undermined the effectiveness of the whole politico-military toolbox. The OSCE was the natural forum for discussions designed to rebuild trust.

Another delegation pointed out that the new approach that maintained the principles underpinning the existing arms control framework should lead to the full implementation of the CFE Treaty in the current year and pave the way for agreement in 2011. It also noted the importance of fully implementing the provisions of the Vienna Document 1999.

Another delegation agreed that there was renewed momentum to overcome the crisis surrounding the CFE Treaty, which was a crucial element in European security. While that participating State was not currently a party to the Treaty, it reiterated its intention to accede to it. If it was possible to save the CFE regime, then new measures should be developed based on the original values. Concerning the Vienna Document 1999, it called for a targeted review of core mechanisms. Based on its own successful experience with subregional confidence- and security-building measures in Southeast Europe, it called on other participating States to follow that example.

Another delegation said that the Corfu Process highlighted the need to focus on modernization of the arms control regime. The decision on the Vienna Document adopted by the Forum for Security Co-operation earlier in the year had paved the way towards modernization, and it referred to its proposal concerning Vienna Document demonstration events as an initiative that could be followed up.

Another delegation shared the opinion that initiatives to renew confidence- and security-building measures had to take into account the new security environment. The CFE Treaty and the arms control framework affected the security of the whole OSCE area, so efforts aimed at its development should include all 56 participating States. In relation to the modernization of the Vienna Document 1999, it referred to its proposal that the number of available quotas should be increased. It recalled the success of the Open Skies Treaty and noted that it could be used for verifying other measures.

Another delegation recalled the recent initiative by a number of participating States as constituting an important effort to overcome the crisis and restore the CFE regime. It also noted that the Joint Consultative Group was the only body mandated to discuss issues relating to the CFE Treaty. It agreed with the statement that there was no easy solution concerning “the flanks”, and said that the legally binding nature of restraints should be maintained, as other approaches would result in different levels of security. There was a link between conflicts and armaments, so those issues should be addressed in the framework of the CFE Treaty as well. It was of the view that a little progress was already possible concerning the updating of the Vienna Document 1999.

Another delegation argued that the success of the NPT Review Conference in May 2010 should encourage the participating States to update the OSCE Principles Governing Non-Proliferation, which dated back to 1994. It also welcomed the proposal of other delegations in relation to United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which usefully complemented its own initiative.

Another delegation stressed the importance it attached to the full implementation of politico-military commitments, in particular in relation to the CFE Treaty. It drew the attention of delegations to the fact that one State Party to the Treaty had violated numerical limitations under the Treaty for several years, and that was a matter of concern to a number of States Parties. It argued that political issues should not serve as justification for non-compliance, and confidence- and security-building measures should not be implemented selectively or randomly.

Another delegation shared the view that arms control and confidence- and security-building measures were an integral part of European security. There was a need to build on the achievements in the politico-military framework. There was great potential in the near future concerning the Vienna Document 1999 and there were signs of hope for the CFE Treaty. While at the strategic level there was no threat of confrontation, at the regional level, threats to stability did exist. Technological developments also needed to be taken into account.

Another delegation, in response to the question raised by one of the keynote speakers as to whether the participating States cared about arms-control issues, replied that European arms control had fallen victim to its own success, and was in a state of benign neglect. The Corfu Process had helped to call attention to the fact that that could lead to misperceptions and misinterpretation. None of the elements of the arms control framework should be lost, as they were complementary. There was positive movement in the Forum for Security Co-operation and regarding the CFE Treaty that could open the way to dialogue and negotiations.

Another delegation stated that the conflict in Georgia in 2008 had taken place because one participating State had ignored OSCE principles. In the current year, there had been a positive change in the atmosphere compared to previous years, and that needed to be followed up by concrete steps. It reiterated its proposal that agreement should be reached on a programme for further action in the area of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures by the end of the year. It was of the view that the updating of the Vienna Document 1999 should include provisions on maritime and rapid-reaction forces and could be concluded by the end of the year. On the CFE Treaty, there was also a new initiative; however, it was of the view that there should be no linkages between arms control and other issues. The Forum for Security Co-operation should be re-established as the main venue for discussions on arms-control issues. It suggested that a special session should be organized on the topic after the summer break.

Another delegation pointed out that one State Party to the CFE Treaty was in violation of the principles of the Treaty. In addition, equipment limited by the CFE Treaty was not being reported. Those problems should be addressed in the discussions on the revitalization of the arms-control regime.

The representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) pointed out that international humanitarian law was constantly developing and stated the ICRC's readiness to assist participating States in developing internal legislation in that sphere. It also encouraged participating States to take part in initiatives concerning cluster munitions and the international arms trade. The importance of adopting a regulatory framework dealing with private military companies was also referred to.

In her concluding remarks, Ambassador Bailes stated that the discussions proved that the participating States did care about the future of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures. A step-by-step approach was possible and the updating of the Vienna Document 1999 could be the first element. While finding a solution to the situation surrounding the CFE Treaty remained difficult, it was not impossible. The OSCE participating States generally followed similar approaches at the global level; however their differences came to the fore at the regional level.

Ambassador Chernov stated that the participating States should not use basic principles of the OSCE to pursue aims that affected the security of others. The preservation of principles should not lead to the collapse of arms control. He hoped that a programme of action could lead to progress.

In conclusion the moderator said that the positive atmosphere of the discussions reflected the spirit of the Corfu Process. However, the political wishes of the participating States still had to be translated into political will.

Recommendations and suggestions

- The participating States expressed gratification that the situation in the politico-military dimension had progressed positively after several years of stagnation. The existing momentum should not be lost. In that respect, one possibility could be an agreement on a programme of action in the spheres of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures.
- Conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building agreements should be adapted and modernized where possible to reflect the new security environment and technological developments, while preserving existing basic principles, including by:
 - Developing subregional and complementary regional confidence- and security-building measures;
 - Expanding the CSBM regime to cover new areas of threats, including non-military actors. Such non-military CSBMs should be elaborated in the same spirit as the existing military CSBMs and in harmony with them;
 - Elaborating a more open regime towards military inspections;
 - Strengthening the OSCE's non-proliferation regime in light of developments taking place within the United Nations and elsewhere.
- FSC Decision No. 1/10, recently adopted, on procedures for updating the Vienna Document 1999 provided a useful framework; however, it depended on the collective political will of the participating States to agree as to which measures should be updated and/or reinforced and in what way. It might be possible to reach agreement by the end of 2010. A number of proposals already existed.
- New measures needed to be realistic and practical, focusing first on ones that would be non-confrontational.
- Future Annual Security Review Conferences, or a specific annual conference, could be used to discuss violations of the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security.
- The stagnation relating to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe remained a major stumbling block to strengthening the arms control regime; hence the participating States wished it would be overcome by the States Parties. Differing

views were expressed as to whether or not discussions on the CFE Treaty should take place among all the 56 participating States.

WORKING SESSION IV: THREATS AND CHALLENGES STEMMING FROM THE TERRITORY OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE OSCE'S CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY IN THE REGION

- Keynote speakers: Ambassador Omirtai Bitimov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan
- Mr. Daniel Korski, Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations
- Moderator: Ambassador Ian Cliff, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the OSCE
- Rapporteur: Mr. Alattin Temür, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the OSCE

The main focus of the fourth working session of the Annual Security Review Conference was on reviewing the OSCE's engagement with Afghanistan, including activities related to border security and management, policing, counterterrorism and the fight against illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, and other areas, with reference to Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/07 on OSCE engagement with Afghanistan.

The first keynote speaker, Ambassador Omirtai Bitimov, noted that a multilateral mechanism for co-operation among the relevant international agencies and regional associations needed to be put in place in order to resolve the Afghan question. Notwithstanding the successes of military and political endeavours, he suggested that the international community should draft a comprehensive programme for the implementation of large and medium-sized projects designed to bolster the Afghan economy. The implementation of large-scale economic projects would restore the Afghan people's trust in the process and help to bring about progress in matters relating to military and political stability. His country was proposing that the international community, together with the Afghan Government, should prepare a list of projects targeting principally the manufacturing, energy, oil and gas, mining, irrigation and construction sectors of the Afghan economy.

As the current holder of the OSCE Chairmanship, Kazakhstan intended to make more active use of the Organization's potential for the rehabilitation of Afghanistan. He also described Kazakhstan's bilateral assistance efforts towards Afghanistan, including a programme for the higher education of Afghan nationals in Kazakhstan, co-operation in combating the traffic in narcotic drugs emanating from the territory of Afghanistan and the signing of an agreement for the overland transport of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) freight destined for Afghanistan.

The following points were priority areas in dealing with Afghanistan:

- Development of a constructive political dialogue based on trust;
- Promotion of commercial and economic ties;
- Encouragement of economic investments;

- Support for cultural and humanitarian co-operation; and
- Cost-free assistance provided in various areas.

In conclusion, he noted the relevance of the initiative by Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan, for the holding of an OSCE Summit in 2010, the principal theme of which could be Afghanistan.

The Ambassador of Kazakhstan in Afghanistan echoed Ambassador Bitimov's call for the OSCE to contribute to the process of socio-economic rehabilitation. He outlined key initiatives taken by Kazakhstan to help develop the Afghan local economy in the agricultural sector, for example, through the introduction of new farming techniques and new crops, as well as in the mining and construction industries.

The second keynote speaker, Mr. Daniel Korski, believed that, after nine years of warfare, the situation in Afghanistan was actually regressing. In his view, the crisis in Afghanistan was multidimensional and could not be addressed primarily through a military surge.

His negative assessment of the situation was based on the following factors:

- The fraudulent elections of 2009 and concerns about the ability of President Karzai's new Government to regain the public trust;
- The divided and weak state of the international community;
- The expansion of the insurgency from the south and the east of the country to the northern and western areas;
- The rising number of military and civilian casualties;
- Concerns over the possibilities of a military success;
- Questions about the Afghan national army's ability to deal with the situation effectively;
- Afghanistan's reliance on the opium economy.

Other complicating factors were the rising public pressure on European countries to withdraw quickly and the difficulty of persuading Afghanistan's immediate neighbours to work for a common solution. Since a purely military victory was not feasible in the near future, he proposed striking a new political settlement building on the 2001 Bonn Agreement, which would address its failures and omissions. Looking upon Al-Qaida as its strategic enemy, the West should focus on defeating Al-Qaida and preventing it from escaping from its safe refuges. The main conditions for such an arrangement would be for the Taliban structures in the south and east to cease to provide refuge to Al-Qaida and for NATO to be prepared to exercise sanctions against both the Taliban and Al-Qaida elements, if that was not respected. If such a scenario could be realized, he believed NATO's engagement in the south and east could be ended or reduced, and coalition forces could concentrate on special forces

and intelligence-led air operations geared towards keeping Al-Qaida out, maintaining law and order in Afghanistan and preventing another Taliban march on Kabul. NATO could assume a purely training role with the Afghan national army and the Afghan national police. In his view, that scenario was rooted in the real bottom-line interests of the West.

He saw a role for the OSCE in the three following areas:

- Providing long-term assistance, including security advice, in the northern parts and along the northern frontier of Afghanistan;
- Contributing to better oversight mechanisms in respect of the security forces;
- Continuing and expanding the cross-border co-operation between the Central Asian States and Afghanistan.

Overall, he argued that the OSCE should decide and focus on a limited number of issues and set realistic goals for itself.

Discussion

One delegation said that a comprehensive programme for the socio-economic rehabilitation of Afghanistan was needed; otherwise, the international community would have to keep on allocating massive resources to meet the country's security and humanitarian needs. It specifically suggested that a non-military programme of assistance for Afghanistan should be formulated in the OSCE context, targeting principally the agro-industrial, extractive and manufacturing sectors. It went on to say that, with its wide membership composition, the OSCE was well positioned to assume a permanent co-ordinating role in the implementation of a comprehensive programme of that type. In order to ensure the success of such a programme, specific economic projects supported by financial donors could be implemented through the involvement of international businesses; NATO and Coalition forces could provide security and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities could be involved. The delegation believed that such a programme could be decided upon at the OSCE Summit in Astana, and afterwards specific development projects could be elaborated and included in the programme with the agreement of the Afghan Government.

Another delegation said that it advocated placing Afghanistan in the forefront in the current year's OSCE agenda. The threats and challenges emanating from Afghanistan were indeed serious and the long-term security and stability of Afghanistan was vitally important for the OSCE region as a whole. It was important that the Afghan Government and people should be allowed to increasingly assume ownership and leadership of their affairs and their country's future. The international community should assign priority to building civilian institutions, providing training and education, and building infrastructure in Afghanistan. It supported inclusion of the situation in Afghanistan on the agenda of a possible OSCE Summit.

One delegation pointed out that the activities focusing on Afghanistan which could make a positive impact on regional security needed to be increased. It further noted the importance of avoiding duplication, creating synergy and co-operating with other international and regional organizations for that purpose.

Another delegation spoke about the generally worsening state of the security situation in Afghanistan. Given the magnitude of the problem, Afghanistan should be assisted in its fight against the production of narcotic drugs. Accordingly, joint action by the international community under United Nations auspices with the active participation of all interested States, and international and regional organizations such as NATO, the OSCE, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Collective Security Treaty Organization was necessary. Dismissing the feasibility of a military solution to the Afghan problem, the delegation supported the main thrust of the final document of the London Conference, which suggested “Afghanizing” the process. It also suggested that at least 50 per cent of the financial resources invested in Afghanistan by international donors be granted to the government with a view to increasing national ownership of projects.

The same delegation further supported the continued co-operation by the OSCE with Afghanistan on the basis of the OSCE Ministerial Council decision adopted at Madrid in 2007. That co-operation would include providing help to strengthen the borders of Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries in Central Asia, providing training for border and customs services, and arranging counter-narcotics police training in specialized centres in the OSCE participating States. It also advocated the intensification of contacts among the OSCE, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Collective Security Treaty Organization with respect to Afghanistan and indicated its preference that the *de facto* neutral status of Afghanistan be maintained. Due to difficult security circumstances on the ground, it opposed any OSCE activity inside Afghanistan, including in the northern provinces.

One delegation expressed its belief that the OSCE, in co-operation with the European Union, the United Nations and Partners for Co-operation, had wide-ranging means at its disposal. It suggested that, in addition to its institutions, the OSCE could use its field operations to reach out to relevant Afghan partners in all three dimensions of security.

Another delegation, supporting the view that success in Afghanistan would never be achieved through military means alone, agreed that the OSCE had a role to play in the regional dimension regarding the stability of Afghanistan and neighbouring Central Asia. It welcomed the commitments assumed by the Government of Afghanistan at the London Conference, including in the areas of security, good governance and human rights, and expected the Government to deliver on those commitments. It also called on the Afghan authorities to fulfil the recommendations contained in the report by the ODIHR on the last presidential elections. Pointing out that the OSCE was not a development agency, and should therefore avoid providing development assistance, it mentioned border security, counter-narcotics, policing, good governance and democracy-building as the areas in which the OSCE could create an added value. Finally, it argued that the OSCE should also conduct activities inside the territory of Afghanistan.

One delegation warned that the shift of instability to northern Afghanistan and the “buffer zone” along the southern borders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) would pose serious security challenges in the region. It voiced satisfaction that NATO had finally realized that it could not win the war against an irregular opponent without the support of local law enforcement forces.

The same delegation was concerned that terrorist groups emanating from the territory of Afghanistan were increasingly operating in neighbouring countries. In its view, one of the

major security risks for the region related to the possibility of terrorist groups acquiring nuclear weapons. Afghan drug production contributed to financing terrorist activities in the region. It proposed that consideration be given to establishing an analytical anti-terrorism centre at the OSCE Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe with a view to drafting proposals on a possible mechanism for resolving the problem of terrorism emanating from the territory of Afghanistan.

Another delegation indicated that, since Afghanistan was a Partner for Co-operation bordering on three OSCE participating States, its security was inextricably linked to security in Central Asia and in the OSCE region as a whole. It appreciated the Chairmanship's continuing emphasis on Afghanistan. It commended the co-operative efforts by the Secretariat and OSCE field operations and institutions to implement Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/07 on OSCE engagement with Afghanistan. Such efforts would be most effective if they took place within the territory of Afghanistan in co-ordination with the NATO Training Mission for Afghanistan, or at least in close proximity to the Afghan border, so it called on the participating States to reconsider their opposition to work inside Afghanistan. It further proposed that the OSCE should:

1. Enhance its political engagement with Afghanistan;
2. Include more Afghans in OSCE events and activities;
3. Expand the programmes of the OSCE's Asian Partners for Co-operation on issues relevant to Afghanistan's stability and development.

In its view, priority should be assigned to the following areas for enhanced OSCE engagement with Afghanistan:

- In the politico-military dimension: border security and customs training, counter-narcotics training, and enhanced efforts to combat transnational threats;
- In the economic and environmental dimension: transportation security, integrated border management activities, efforts to counter corruption and facilitate licit trade, energy security, and water and resource management;
- In the human dimension: support for electoral reforms, review of legislation, promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, training for justice sector professionals, seminars for journalists, women's empowerment programmes, civil society development, and promotion of tolerance and non-discrimination.

One speaker drew attention to the new strategy his organization had adopted for Afghanistan. Substantial resources and manpower had been devoted to Afghanistan; in the current year alone, 30,000 troops had been deployed and more would follow. Noting the importance of handing over responsibility to Afghans, he stated that a broad-based transition was needed, covering not only the security area but all aspects of governance. Training efforts were essential to that effect. Further, the activities conducted by foreigners should fully reflect the priorities of the Afghan side. In conclusion, any OSCE activities related to Afghanistan should be closely co-ordinated with those of other organizations active on the ground.

Another delegation stated that its country had the capacity to provide assistance and training to Afghan police officers in integrated border security and management, travel document security and the combating of drug trafficking. It also noted that five police officers from its country were participating in the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan.

One delegation stated that the OSCE was better placed than any other international organization to provide assistance to Afghanistan covering the three dimensions of security. Highlighting the importance of the OSCE's contribution to the fight against the trafficking in illicit drugs emanating from the territory of Afghanistan, it noted that its national police had been co-operating with OSCE bodies in enhancing the capacity of Afghan law enforcement agencies. It stated the willingness of its country to continue that fruitful co-operation. The ownership of activities by the Government and people of Afghanistan was crucial to the success of the OSCE's engagement. Regional co-operation was another important aspect which had to be taken into account while addressing the threats and challenges facing Afghanistan. In that context, its country had formed a trilateral summit process with the participation of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Finally, it called attention to the importance of the Istanbul Summit on Friendship and Co-operation, which had brought together 22 nations and many international organizations on 26 January 2010 for the purpose of emphasizing regional co-operation in supporting Afghanistan.

Another speaker urged all interested parties to be cautious and patient in dealing with Afghanistan. It stressed the importance of training Afghan police and border guards.

Recommendations and suggestions

- The long-term stability and security of Afghanistan was of utmost importance for the OSCE as a whole and for the Central Asian participating States in particular.
- The OSCE was better placed than any other international organization to extend assistance to Afghanistan covering all three dimensions of security.
- Ownership of the OSCE activities by the Government and people of Afghanistan was of great importance for the success of the OSCE engagement.
- The OSCE should assist Afghanistan on issues in which it had a comparative advantage, such as:
 - Training of police, border guards and customs officials, with a view to combating drug trafficking and securing the country's borders;
 - Counter-terrorism;
 - Good governance;
 - Election assistance, electoral reform and democracy-building;
 - Policing and assistance in securing the rule of law;

- Strengthening of civil society and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular women's rights;
- Socio-economic activities, such as, *inter alia*, facilitating trade with neighbouring countries, helping to develop local economic projects, and providing education and training.
- The OSCE should decide and focus on a limited number of issues and set realistic goals for itself.
- The OSCE was not a development aid agency and could therefore not carry out large-scale infrastructure projects.
- Regarding counterterrorism, the OSCE should use its Border Management Staff College to train officials to address that threat, which was spreading to the northern provinces and was already spilling over into neighbouring OSCE participating States.
- Regarding the geographical scope of the OSCE's engagement, some participating States supported activities being implemented inside Afghanistan, whereas others argued that the security situation was too volatile and that the OSCE should therefore continue to provide training and capacity-building in the OSCE field operations in neighbouring countries or in other OSCE participating States.
- The OSCE should co-operate with other international organizations and regional structures to avoid duplication.
- The OSCE should assist in the subregional development of Afghanistan and its neighbours, including through dialogue with, and by making better use of, the OSCE's Asian Partners for Co-operation in respect of issues relevant to the security of Afghanistan.
- At the political level, the OSCE should support efforts directed towards granting Afghanistan a neutral status under United Nations auspices, to protect it from being further drawn into regional conflicts.
- Afghan representatives should be invited to more OSCE events.
- Afghanistan should be a key topic for a possible Summit meeting.

WORKING SESSION V: REVIEW OF OSCE POLICE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

Keynote speaker: Professor Ibrahim Cerrah, Turkish National Police Academy

Moderator: Mr. Kevin Carty, OSCE Senior Police Adviser

Rapporteur: Mr. Aaron Jackson, United States Mission to the OSCE

In his opening remarks, the moderator, Mr. Kevin Carty, Senior Police Adviser of the OSCE Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU), placed the final working session of the Conference within the context of a wider attempt by the Secretariat to conduct a holistic review of the Organization's police-related work with participating States. To that end, he traced the recent review of OSCE police-related activities back to a Permanent Council decision on further enhancing OSCE police-related activities (PC.DEC/914) adopted in 2009 that had tasked the Secretary General with carrying out an analysis of previous OSCE police-related assistance. The Secretary General had been directed to use the analysis to provide a forward-looking perspective on OSCE police-related activities, and to submit recommendations to the Permanent Council. He, in turn, had requested that the review be conducted by the SPMU, which had then entered into a wide and comprehensive consultation with relevant institutions, field operations, and participating States, using the online POLIS system.

The Secretary General had presented the completed report to the Permanent Council in advance of the Annual Police Experts Meeting in May 2010, which had focused on evaluating the Secretariat's analysis. As the participants in that experts meeting had advised further review of the matter at the Annual Security Review Conference, the moderator suggested that the participating States focus on evaluating the conclusions and recommendations of both the April 2010 report and the May Police Experts Meeting.

He noted that the ongoing review of OSCE policing activities constituted a watershed moment for the OSCE, since the current comprehensive assessment was the first real attempt to thoroughly encapsulate what the Organization had achieved in the area to date. He asked the delegates to use the session to provide greater clarity to the SPMU in terms of its mandate for policing activities, and expressed his hope that the participating States would help the Secretariat determine where the OSCE should focus its priorities in the area of police-related activities.

The keynote speaker, Professor Ibrahim Cerrah, used his presentation to illustrate the importance of promoting democratic policing in OSCE participating States. He identified three specific areas of OSCE police-related activities that should be prioritized in the coming years: police development and reform, community policing, and the fight against organized crime. Any effort by the OSCE to take stock of its policing work and strategically plan the Organization's future police-related activities should recognize the critical need for systematic analysis of contemporary trends in each of those areas. He elucidated the reasons why those areas should guide future OSCE policing work.

With respect to police development and reform, the OSCE must work to ensure that internal security functions were carried out by civilian-led law enforcement agencies, not paramilitary organizations. In addition, he highlighted the need to foster public-police partnerships in participating States. Both of those efforts would facilitate the process of consolidating democratic policing and would expand community policing. He also discussed the need for rigorous, systematic efforts to root out police corruption. Police corruption and lack of integrity hindered participating States' law enforcement agencies from accomplishing their primary purpose of ensuring the safety and stability of the State and made the fight against organized crime extremely difficult. He therefore suggested that the OSCE should support States' efforts to promote a culture of service amongst police forces and to instil transparency and adopt accountability measures.

He concluded his presentation by noting that focusing future OSCE policing work on the areas enumerated, as part of a broader effort to ensure democratic policing in participating States, could enable the OSCE to effectively promote stability and security in Europe and Eurasia over the long term.

Discussion

Nine delegations made contributions to the working session.

The first delegation commended the work of both the Secretary General in producing a thorough report and the Police Experts Meeting that had taken place in May, and expressed its satisfaction with the way the current review was proceeding. It expressed the hope that a strategic concept and an operational action plan could be adopted in the immediate future, based on the work of the review, with a focus on cultivating an ethic of public service among the law enforcement agencies of OSCE participating States. Such strategic documents would increase the visibility and help improve the planning and evaluation of OSCE policing activities. The delegation also suggested that the Secretary General submit proposals to the Permanent Council for the adaptation of his office, as well as of the SPMU, in regard to enhancing OSCE policing work.

The next delegation stated that OSCE police-related activities had consistently helped participating States address security issues across all three dimensions, in spite of the increasing demands placed on the SPMU and the changing nature of emerging transnational threats. It subscribed to the first delegation's commendation of the ongoing review, but noted that the Organization was currently in the early stages of developing any strategic stance on future OSCE policing activities. Therefore, it was premature to insist on a medium- to long-term action plan for OSCE police-related activities conducted by relevant institutions and field operations. It then provided its recommendations for the areas on which the OSCE could focus its police-related activities in the future, including:

- Enhancing co-operation between the OSCE and other international actors;
- Adapting and optimizing the co-ordination of ongoing policing activities among and within the Secretariat, field operations, and other relevant OSCE institutions; and
- Promoting regional and cross-border interaction among participating States.

Another delegation asserted that, because police authorities in local contexts were so close to the population and were the first line of defence in confronting security challenges, assessing OSCE police-related activities was essential. Therefore, the delegation thanked the Secretariat for its report. It also stressed the need to acknowledge the broad, multifaceted, and sometimes tedious nature of OSCE policing work in Europe and Eurasia. It provided recommendations for enhancing OSCE policing work, suggesting firstly that participating States' police forces needed additional support in fighting cross-border crime. Regarding the structure of OSCE policing work, it advocated the creation of a concerted strategy or plan of action, and called for the establishment of a co-ordinated set of procedures for field mission policing work. In addition, it expressed its support for the Secretary General's call for better co-ordination between OSCE headquarters, field operations, and other relevant institutions, and commended his focus on expanding co-operation with outside organizations.

The next delegation began by noting that the OSCE had a particular added value in its police-related activities, but more could be done to enhance the effectiveness of OSCE work in that area. It then stated its belief that OSCE police-related activities could be particularly effective in addressing issues of trafficking in illicit drugs, money laundering, trafficking in human beings, and the arms trade. Given the increasing emergence of transnational threats, the OSCE had to have comprehensive strategies – developed in conjunction with other security organizations – in place to address crime. In light of the Secretary General's report and the recommendations of the Annual Police Experts Meeting, the delegation suggested:

- Working more closely with INTERPOL;
- Facilitating information-sharing with other international organizations working on similar policing issues;
- Using existing legal structures and instruments grounded in international law (e.g., extradition procedures) to aid in the fight against cross-border crime, or creating them where appropriate;
- Offering more training sessions for police forces in participating States.

The following delegation reiterated the need for OSCE institutions working in the areas of policing to develop strategic, long-term plans as well as tangible benchmarks for policing programmes in the field.

The next delegation stated that Professor Cerrah's presentation provided a good foundation on the basis of which to review OSCE police-related activities. Like other delegations, it noted the need to develop a far-reaching strategy for OSCE policing work. For the OSCE to address the ever-growing number of transnational threats with existing resources, it suggested closer collaboration among relevant units in the Secretariat (such as the SPMU, ATU, and the Conflict Prevention Centre's OS/Borders Team) and with external international organizations. Lastly, it recommended that participating States use the framework of the Corfu Process to provide suggestions regarding the Organization's police-related activities.

Another delegation agreed with the moderator that the Secretary General's report constituted the first in-depth study of OSCE police-related activities. It expressed the view that the process of internal review could be moved forward by the preparation of a strategy

paper clarifying how the future work of field operations and relevant institutions would fit in with the OSCE's strategic objectives in the area of policing. Lastly, it noted the success of using OSCE police-related activities to modernize participating States' law enforcement agencies by describing its own efforts – in co-ordination with the SPMU – to implement police training programmes.

The next delegation began its intervention by noting the newness of police-related activities as a topic for discussion at the Annual Security Review Conference. Nevertheless, it commended the addition because it viewed OSCE policing as essential in helping participating States bolster the rule of law. It then went on to describe how it had concluded over 90 bilateral agreements on co-ordinated efforts to fight various forms of transnational crime. It expressed its belief that police training programmes should be sustained, given their role in creating solid police forces across the OSCE area, but it acknowledged that the Organization must develop a strategic assessment of how its policing work could fit into other conflict-prevention efforts. It asked how political leaders and diplomats working with the OSCE could further the mission of the Organization regarding its police-related activities.

The final delegation to take the floor noted that transnational security problems must be tackled in a co-ordinated way, not only within individual participating States, but also within OSCE institutions. It advocated greater co-operation with other international organizations as well as greater co-ordination within OSCE institutions working in the area of policing. It also highlighted the growing links between terrorism in participating States and growing insecurity and instability, suggesting that the OSCE's policing work would be essential to counter current trends in that realm.

In response to a question posed during the session, Professor Cerrah stated that the promotion of democratic values represented the only way to combat the transnational threats that OSCE States were facing. Senior Adviser Carty responded that OSCE bodies that carried out the Organization's police-related activities looked to participating States' politicians to enact laws, commitments, and the recommendations by OSCE institutions. He also noted that the SPMU continued to be assigned new tasks every year without the corresponding increases in attention and resources needed to complete those assignments. He suggested that that was clearly reflected in the Secretary General's April 2010 report, and said that the Permanent Council could provide guidance on the priorities that the SPMU and other OSCE bodies working in the area of policing should focus on. He reiterated that diplomats could offer the Secretariat and relevant field operations more clarity for their policing mandate. As an example, he noted that it was unclear in OSCE documents whether the SPMU should focus on reducing the demand or the supply of drugs, and suggested that the SPMU would likely be more effective at focusing on supply-side interdiction.

One delegation took the floor in response to the moderator's comments, and recommended that the OSCE should continue to focus on organizing workshops and seminars, and holding training sessions for law enforcement agencies in participating States. It also noted that the moderator's remarks substantiated the claim that there was a need to create a strategy for the OSCE's policing work, even though that should normally occur at the political – rather than the local – level. In addition, the number of counter-narcotics conventions already in place provided a legal basis for OSCE action as a co-ordinator for regional police-related activity to fight drug trafficking.

In his final concluding remarks, the moderator thanked delegations for their attention and for validating the work of the Secretary General in his report. He suggested that broad agreement had emerged in the current working session amongst the participating States that the OSCE should not simply continue with the policing work that had been done so far, but had to critically assess its actions and progress over time. He acknowledged the consensus view that there existed a need for more co-ordination of policing activities within and among OSCE institutions, field operations, and the Secretariat, as well as with other regional and international organizations, to ensure that efforts were not being duplicated, and that participating States were taking advantage of existing opportunities for collaboration.

He also took note of delegations' agreement that the OSCE needed to develop strategies for future policing work, but that such an endeavour required further substantive discussion by the OSCE participating States. He noted that the delegations' interventions had focused on enhancing policing work to combat existing and emerging transnational threats, such as organized crime and drug trafficking. Lastly, he commended the desires expressed by delegations for OSCE policing activity to correspond to the efforts of the larger international community.

Recommendations and suggestions

- The OSCE should adjust the doctrine and methodology of police activities to the new threats and challenges, such as organized crime, human trafficking, illicit trade in narcotic drugs and small arms, and money laundering. The implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime was advocated.
- OSCE police activities should also address police reform, including on issues such as accountability, transparency and combating of corruption.
- The OSCE should adopt a concept document for police-related activities, similar to the “Border Security and Management Concept” of 2005, which would lay out the Organization's strategic objectives in the area of policing. That strategic concept should clarify both the mandate and the priorities of the OSCE's work in police-related activities. In addition, that concept should promote democratic policing, which entailed civilian control and management of law enforcement institutions in OSCE participating States.
- The OSCE should adopt a plan of action, similar to the one adopted on combating trafficking in human beings, which would provide operational guidance.
- In order to provide continuity and predictability, the OSCE should develop strategic long-term (3–5 year) plans for policing projects and activities. It should also develop programmatic priorities and create benchmarks to assess progress towards objectives.
- Regional and cross-border co-operation among participating States were important to improve policing methods. The OSCE Academy in Bishkek and the Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe could be used to provide specialized training for police officers in the region.
- The co-ordination of activities within the Secretariat, with institutions and field operations, as well as with other members of the international community, especially

those having a more focused expertise in particular fields (such as UNODC in organized crime) was essential to create synergies. In the latter respect, the OSCE should focus its police-related activity on those areas in which it could add value and/or be complementary.

- Police-related training seminars were needed and valuable in capacity-building for participating States. Exchanging information among States on police training was beneficial.

CLOSING SESSION

Closing address: Ambassador Kairat Abdrakhmanov, Chairperson of the Permanent Council

Ambassador Abdrakhmanov, representing the Chairperson-in-Office in his closing address, said that the Chairmanship was very pleased with the outcome of the Conference, which had taken place under the overall theme of “Strengthening Indivisible Security, Recapturing Common Purpose and Building Trust and Transparency in the OSCE Area” and, unfortunately, against the backdrop of unrest in Kyrgyzstan. Those events, however, had shown once more that challenges to security and stability in the OSCE area were “real” problems and ever-present, and therefore required constant attention.

He noted that the main themes addressed in the opening and the working sessions of the 2010 ASRC had benefitted significantly from the thoughtful and thorough presentations by keynote speakers, which had set the tone for dialogue. He then highlighted several aspects of the discussions over the past three days which would also be taken into account, along with others, in the drafting of the interim report of the OSCE Chairmanship on the Corfu Process:

- There was general agreement that the OSCE remained one of the key forums for discussions on a wide range of security threats and challenges, given its broad membership and its unique geographical span – linking the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security spaces;
- The various sessions had conveyed the belief that much had already been done in meeting some of those threats and challenges, but that still more hard work and co-operation were required among all the participating States and with other international actors;
- Many participating States had advocated reviewing the OSCE toolbox to address security challenges more effectively as a major course of action. In that spirit, the participating States had welcomed the Corfu Process and the upcoming informal meeting of foreign ministers in Almaty, which would also afford an opportunity to enhance the OSCE’s capabilities to adapt to the new security environment. Support for a possible Summit meeting at the end of the year had also been expressed by many;
- The participants had agreed that, in meeting transnational threats and challenges, issues related to counterterrorism, border security and cyber security should remain priorities. Concrete suggestions that derived from lessons-learned assessments regarding transnational threats had been seen as useful. Regional co-operation regarding transnational threats should be further facilitated. The exploration of linkages between conflict and transnational challenges also deserved further attention. There had been a general view that transnational threats should be considered as an item for a possible Summit agenda;

- On the role of the OSCE in early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, the participants had reiterated several major issues already reflected in the relevant proposals in the framework of the informal Corfu meetings, and had indicated that further discussions were essential and welcome. It had been considered to be of vital importance to address all the phases of a conflict. The resolution of protracted conflicts remained a priority; the need for early action and for strengthening of the role of the Chairmanship and the Secretary General for effective crisis response and the elaboration of a universal strategy for crisis response had also been seen as subjects for further discussions. It had been recommended that use should be made of the existing mechanisms in the OSCE tool box for addressing security challenges more effectively;
- On the role and perspectives of arms control and confidence- and security-building regimes in building trust in the evolving security environment, many participants had applauded the fact that the situation in the politico-military dimension had progressed positively after several years of stagnation. There had been an emphasis on implementing existing OSCE commitments and pressing forward with negotiations on arms control agreements, with a view to the strengthening of such agreements. The CFE Treaty remained, however, a stumbling block that the participating States wished would be overcome by its States Parties. Agreements on confidence- and security-building measures should be adapted and modernized where possible, reflecting the needs of a new security environment and new technological developments;
- With regard to threats and challenges emanating from the territory of Afghanistan and the OSCE's contribution to stability in the region, there had been general agreement that the long-term stability and security of Afghanistan was of the utmost importance, not only for the Central Asian countries, but for all the OSCE participating States. A cross-dimensional approach should be adopted in the OSCE's further engagement with Afghanistan, with a focus on assistance to Afghanistan in those areas in which the OSCE had a comparative advantage, such as border police and customs training, counterterrorism and election assistance. Issues such as co-operation and co-ordination with OSCE Partners and other international actors were crucial;
- In the review of OSCE police-related activities, the participants had welcomed the steps taken recently to highlight efforts in that area, including the Secretary General's report on police-related activities, and the subjects raised during the Annual Police Experts Meeting in 2010. Those had been seen to serve as a basis for much needed further strategic dialogue on how and according to what order of priority to move forward. Participants had pointed to the links between conflict prevention and policing, and areas to be further addressed, such as corruption, money-laundering, and the illicit trade in narcotic drugs and small arms. Also, a comprehensive strategy to address organized crime should be considered. The need to work closely and in an integrated manner with other international partners had also been emphasized, as had been the need for police activities to be transparent and geographically balanced.

In closing, Ambassador Abdrakhmanov expressed his belief that there was much that was positive, and to some extent there was consensus, on some specific issues which could become part of the substance of a possible OSCE Summit at the year's end.