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International conference proceedings
(Astana, 23 October 2015)
On 23 October 2015 in Astana, the OSCE Programme Office in Astana jointly with Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan and the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies held an international conference entitled “Accomplishments and challenges for the OSCE on the anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Astana Summit (2010)”. This compendium, which includes presentations given at the conference by both Kazakhstan’s and foreign participants, explores a broad range of topics related to the OSCE’s main areas of focus, as well as current international security and regional co-operation issues.

The edition will be of interest to political scientists, international relations experts, civil servants, scholars, educators, university-level students, and broad sections of the public interested in the contemporary development of the OSCE.

Any opinions and recommendations expressed in the materials arising from the conference are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the conference organizers.

The publication is not for sale and distributed free of charge.
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Welcoming speech by

Erlan Idrissov
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic Kazakhstan

Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you for joining us here at this conference, and let me welcome to today’s event His Excellency Mr. Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Chairman of the Senate, Member of the OSCE Panel of Eminent Persons, Her Excellency Ms. Gulshara Abdykalykova, Kazakhstan Secretary of State, and His Excellency Ambassador Vuk Zugic, Representative of the OSCE Chairmanship.

I have no doubt that today we will hear interesting speeches from the participants and will enjoy fruitful discussion. Allow me to introduce to you our esteemed moderators of today’s sessions. The first session, “Security Architecture in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Space”, will be moderated by Her Excellency Ambassador Natalia Zarudna, Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana. The moderator of the second session, “Risks and Challenges to Regional Security in Central Asia”, is Mr. Erlan Karin, Director of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Finally, Her Excellency Ambassador Madina Jarbussynova, OSCE Special Representative and Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, will moderate the third session, “Rule of Law and Development of Civil Society as a Prerequisite for Sustainable Economic Growth”.
The purpose of the forum is not just to celebrate a commemorative event, but to deliver a message of a safe future to the entire community of our great region. Today, we call for a practical review of the OSCE achievements and challenges on the occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the OSCE Helsinki Final Act and the 5th Anniversary of the OSCE Summit in Astana.

Looking back, we see the huge amount of groundwork that has been laid by the founding fathers of this Organization, which can rightfully be called unique. 57 countries are united, as Kazakhs say, under one “Shanyrak” (roof).

I am confident that the representatives of the OSCE participating States, as well as my compatriots, have common principles and concepts concerning the security of their home, their country. In this regard, Kazakhstan is rightly proud of its contribution to the Organization. Thanks to the policies of President Nursultan Nazarbayev, we have managed to maintain stability in our country, despite turbulent times. Today, Kazakhstan is a kind of anchor of security in Central Asia, a reliable international partner in this area. Five years ago, during our Chairmanship, we managed to gather under the peaceful sky of the Great Steppe the heads of states and governments at the OSCE Summit.

During that high-level meeting, the participants confirmed that in order to overcome the threat of a new split in Europe, we need to adhere to the idea of “a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments and common goals”.

The Helsinki principles, which formed the basis of the OSCE, have passed the test of time and continue to maintain their significance today. The fact that we continue to discuss issues of compliance with regard to its principles and other OSCE commitments emphasizes their relevance in today’s Europe.
The potential of the OSCE is huge. The unique nature of the Organization, based on cooperation, inclusiveness, experience and responsiveness, has allowed it to quickly deploy the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. This reminded the world of the advantages of the OSCE, such as universality and equality of the participants, as well as the flexibility that this Organization has championed throughout its history.

Undoubtedly, over the past 40 years, the OSCE has dealt with a number of crises. It has faced many challenges, but managed to deal with them well, which demonstrated to the member states the importance and indispensability of this Organization. The OSCE has repeatedly acted as a mediator, helping Member States to maintain a constructive relationship. Currently, this function of the OSCE is in demand more than ever.

I would like to wish you all fruitful work on the development of an updated and innovative approach to the role of our Organization today.

Thank you for your attention and let me give the floor to our honorable guest, His Excellency Mr Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Chairman of the Senate.
Welcoming speech by
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev
Chairman of the Senate
of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Madam Secretary of State,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

At the outset, I would like to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and first of all Minister Idrissov for the invitation to this conference with its extremely acute and interesting agenda.

We are living at a time of changes and turmoil. Each year brings us new challenges such as wars, conflicts, economic upheavals, human and drug trafficking, refugee crises, pandemics, natural and man-made disasters, proliferation of nuclear materials and the arms race. The Ukraine crisis, having developed into a national tragedy, has undermined global security and revealed differences in perceptions of the security system. Amid existing contradictions, fundamental norms and principles of international law embedded in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act have been interpreted in different ways.

So-called ‘dividing lines’, which are frequently discussed by politicians and diplomats, emerged long before the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis. We have witnessed conflicts that turned into ‘frozen’ ones and then - into ‘protracted’ ones. All of them have taken place in the post-Soviet area. There are reasonable concerns that the Ukraine crisis may slide into a ‘frozen’ conflict. Therefore, we still pin our great hope on the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. This forum, comprising 57 participating states including four nuclear powers, can and
should help to strengthen trust among countries in the interests of comprehensive security.

As you know, the OSCE, created during the Cold War tensions, has been playing a key role in preserving peace and stability over a vast area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The OSCE served as a valuable structure to maintain optimal temperature or equilibrium in international relations at the end of the Cold War. We should praise the OSCE for preventing the conflicts from devolving into large-scale calamities and bloodshed across its region. 40 years after, the OSCE, spanning a huge geographical area and taking a comprehensive approach to security, remains crucial and relevant. It offers an indispensable platform for dialogue where its participating States coordinate their positions and take collective decisions.

In this regard, it is worth mentioning the outcome of the OSCE Summit in Astana in 2010. It was this forum that introduced the notion of “security community”, replacing the old one - “security space”. This security community comprises a geographical area stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok “free of dividing lines, conflicts, spheres of influence and zones with different levels of security”. The Astana Declaration noted that “the security of each participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others”. Indivisible security is the ‘spirit of Astana’, which launched the common Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.

The OSCE Summit in 2010 marked the culmination of Kazakhstan’s successful Chairmanship. This meeting took place after more than 10 years of an involuntary break and gave a strong impetus to achieving consensus on security matters.

In our view, the OSCE participating States should continue their efforts to resolve the question of its legal framework. We fully realize how difficult this task is; however, it does not imply that this issue is not on the current and future OSCE agenda. This
task is becoming even more critical given that old approaches to security need to be adjusted to new geopolitical realities.

First and foremost, it is essential to strengthen, primarily, trust among states, as it is trust that brings predictability in international affairs. Unfortunately, the international system lacks this glue.

Contradictions among world powers, resulting from divergent perceptions and interpretations of events, have been around for centuries; yet the highest wisdom of a statesman is to seek common ground to avoid a war for the sake of humanity. The clash of strategic interests of states should not be a dominant trend in the contemporary world. We ought to make security and cooperation the top priority, as the name of the Organization says. Therefore, Kazakhstan’s Chairmanship laid special emphasis on rebuilding and strengthening trust between states. Proceeding from this idea, the President of Kazakhstan initiated the first meeting of Russian and Ukrainian leaders in Minsk, which was the starting point to stop the bloodshed and resolve the crisis.

There is no alternative to dialogue. The OSCE is unique for its potential to facilitate negotiations fostering consensus. It is very complicated, but we, as the “security community”, must make efforts to improve the international climate. The world is changing fast. The signing of the Helsinki Final Act was a turning point of the Cold War that led to its end with the collapse of the Soviet Union; yet the standoff between political systems and ideologies was succeeded by a new type of confrontation that occasionally becomes chaotic. 40 years ago, nobody could even have imagined that international terrorism would emerge as the cynical and destructive force it is today.

I would like to recall that 40 years ago China, currently an economic giant, was a poor country that had come through a cultural revolution and was at odds with another socialist nuclear power, the USSR. The signatories of the Helsinki Final Act, while
taking commitments not to change the European borders, most certainly did not think about the reunification of Germany, a ‘velvet revolution’ in Czechoslovakia, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the break-up of Yugoslavia. The essence, the nature and even the scope of the OSCE have changed tremendously, especially with the accession of Mongolia to the Organization, which was also difficult to imagine 40 years ago. Furthermore, it was inconceivable that later the OSCE would have to address such a difficult crisis in Ukraine. Therefore, at this time of changes the OSCE should encourage and even generate positive trends in international developments.

On the initiative of the Swiss Chairmanship, the Panel of Eminent Persons was established. This panel is working on recommendations on how European security could be re-consolidated as a common project, including on how to help the OSCE work more efficiently.

I am convinced that the OSCE may play a more visible role in crisis diplomacy. Conflicts of all types and at all levels - international, local, interreligious or sectarian ones, not only jeopardize the security of millions of people, but also undermine the world economy with far-reaching consequences for the generations to come. Against this backdrop, President Nursultan Nazarbayev, addressing the 70th session of the UN General Assembly, called for building a zero conflict world pursuing the concept of a “New future” and enhancing the rule of international law.

While dealing with international security architecture, we should not forget about the OSCE economic and environmental dimension, which was somehow put aside amid increasing battles in the politico-military and human baskets. This dimension is very promising since successful economic cooperation, based on mutual benefits, will ensure building a world free of conflicts. It is worth mentioning the words of one of the founders of the European Coal and Steel Community, the French politician and diplomat, Mr. Robert Schuman, who said that this organization
“will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible”. This declaration is still relevant nowadays.

Holding this conference in Astana, it should be noted that Asia is playing an ever-increasing role in global affairs. It is in the interests of the OSCE to enhance its cooperation with Asian fora for security, including the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The Parliament of Kazakhstan pays special attention to the activity of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. We must take full advantage of the opportunities that this forum offers.

I wish the conference participants fruitful and interesting work.

Thank you for your attention.
Welcoming speech by
Gulshara Abdykalikova
State Secretary
of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Welcome to the International Conference, which is being held in our capital.

It is a well-known fact that Kazakhstan considers peace and prosperity to be its main goal in the course of its development. Therefore, to maintain unity and harmony and to ensure global security, Kazakhstan adheres to strong positions and clear recommendations.

At today’s panel meeting, we will pay attention to these noble initiatives and the main areas of our country’s international profile.

Participants of the International Conference,

The OSCE was created as a major tool for early warning, crisis prevention, resolution of existing conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction in Europe. As a ‘connecting bridge’ between East and West, the OSCE has been successfully carrying out its historic mission.

As is known, today’s political reality requires the strengthening of security architecture corresponding to modern challenges. For this purpose, it is necessary to improve the system of pan-European security where, as agreed by the participating States of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, “their people can live in true and lasting peace”.
The current OSCE potential in the area of conflict resolution, and the mechanisms laid down by its founders for conflict settlement, are unique and effective. Kazakhstan supports all of the OSCE initiatives aimed at restoring trust in international relations, and strengthening peace and security based on international law.

Thus, one of the significant milestones in the history of modern Kazakhstan was its OSCE Chairmanship in 2010 and the holding of the OSCE Summit in Astana on December 1-2, which was aimed at exploring ways to restore confidence among participating States on the way to the 40th anniversary (2015) since the day of signing the Helsinki Final Act.

The main topics of the Summit were the issues of sustainable security in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space, the problem of Afghanistan, and the resolution of ‘frozen’ conflicts.

As was noted by President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, at the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly, “in the next 30 years, the world’s civilization will find the wisdom and will to cut the ‘Gordian knot’ of wars and conflicts. In the 21st century the central task of humankind must be the realization of a strategy that will forever deliver the world from the threat of wars as such and eliminate their causes”. To this end, the Head of State proposed the development of the ‘Global Strategic Initiative Plan - 2045’. Its aim is to introduce to the world a new trend of development based on fair conditions of access for all nations to global infrastructure, resources and markets, and the shared responsibility for the development of humankind.

Colleagues,

Indeed, there is a long-felt need to clearly define the tasks for a new stage in the development of humankind, including the role of the OSCE in resolving this uneasy task.
The ‘New Future’ concept, voiced by our President, is nuclear, energy, water and food security, trust, mutual understanding and reforms. Kazakhstan has made and is making mediating efforts to reconcile the conflicting parties in the Eurasian region. The above-mentioned areas and principles form the foundation of Kazakhstan’s election bid for non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council for 2017–18. Taking advantage of this opportunity, I would like to call upon the OSCE to support the initiatives of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, N. Nazarbayev, voiced at the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly.

I proudly note that Kazakhstan is the first country to decommission its nuclear test site, voluntarily relinquish the world’s fourth-largest nuclear arsenal, and create a nuclear-free zone in Central Asia. We believe that it is necessary to continue creating nuclear-free zones in other regions of the world as well. Nuclear powers must provide guarantees of non-use of force to all the countries that refuse to possess nuclear weapons.

An important task is to create a Global Anti-nuclear Movement. Everyone on the planet can and must contribute to the prohibition of nuclear tests.

Participants of the Conference,

The erosion of international law and weakening of the role of global institutions present a dangerous challenge. Any violation of international law, in particular with regard to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, leads humankind to the repetition of the tragic mistakes of the past.

I would like to emphasize the exclusive role of the OSCE as a universal forum-organization. Compliance by the countries with their international obligations remains the cornerstone of the modern world order.
Today, it is necessary to make every possible effort to restore dialogue, mutual understanding and trust in international relations. In this connection, Kazakhstan has consistently advocated peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian crisis and full implementation of the Minsk agreements by the conflicting parties.

The threat of terrorism and religious extremism has reached a global scale. The efforts to prevent and eliminate the consequences of man-made, natural and environmental disasters, as well as the rehabilitation of Afghanistan, a Partner State of the OSCE, are assuming greater significance. It is important to draw the attention of the participating States of the Organization to the development of comprehensive measures to address these priority issues.

I am convinced that the Panel of Eminent Persons, created on the initiative of the ‘OSCE Troika’, will contribute to the stable development of security processes by generating fresh ideas.

The principles of non-discrimination and tolerance are extremely important for Kazakhstan, which is a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional state.

Thanks to the policy pursued by the Head of the State, N. Nazarbayev, a unique institution of civil society, the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, which is a Kazakhstani model of public accord and nation-wide unity, has been successfully functioning since 1995.

This year, Astana hosted the Fifth Congress of the Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, created on the initiative of President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan. The renowned Forum has been successfully functioning for over 10 years now, and brings together representatives of world religions and prominent political figures in their desire to contribute to the search for answers to the new challenges to global security for modern society.
**Welcoming speech**

*Participants of the Conference,*

As you know, the Head of our State has identified five institutional reforms, which will guide the development of our country. In order to implement these reforms we have developed the Plan of the Nation ‘100 Concrete Steps’, aimed at achieving the main goal, which is to be included in the list of the top 30 most developed states of the world.

*Colleagues,*

I congratulate all the participants on the opening of the International Conference “Accomplishments and Challenges for the OSCE on the Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Astana Summit (2010)”

I am sure that today we shall have an effective, constructive and meaningful dialogue, aimed at further strengthening and developing the architecture of the modern world order.

I wish you successful work at the Conference.

Thank you for your attention.
Welcoming speech by
Erlan Karin
Director of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies

Esteemed Mr Tokayev, Mr Idrissov, Madam Abdykhalikova,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all, I would like to cordially congratulate you all on
this event, wish you the most fruitful and successful meeting, and,
in turn, thank the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Astana Of-
fice of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
for participating in the arrangement of today’s conference.

One of the milestone dates, to which today's conference is
dedicated, is the fifth anniversary of the OSCE Summit in Astana,
which became one of the most significant international events at
the time. The events of recent years - the crisis in Ukraine, the war
in Syria, deterioration of the Afghanistan situation - demonstrate
the severity of the challenges that we faced then and are facing
now. In this connection, I would like once again to remind you of
the main topics and issues that were raised 5 years ago.

The President of Kazakhstan, chairing the Astana Summit,
made a number of crucial points. In particular, he said that it was
necessary to expand the boundaries of the Euro-Atlantic commu-
nity problems under consideration, to move to the Eurasian di-
mension and to strive towards a common and indivisible security
community across the entire region. The currently unfolding cri-
ses yet again demonstrate that, unfortunately, conflicts can flare
up anywhere, and can be caused by a wide variety of problems;
therefore, the attitude, response and approaches to the resolution
of the key issues of security must be systemic and comprehen-
sive. UN: Over the last 5 years, 15 new conflicts have broken out
throughout the world, and none of the previous conflicts were re-
solved. Armed conflicts is the main issue. It is for this reason that the President of Kazakhstan, speaking at the Astana Summit, said that the Transatlantic integration developed in the last century had to be naturally complemented by the Trans-Eurasian community. The President of Kazakhstan, as is known, is a proponent of active implementation of proposed ideas and initiatives. One such example is the Eurasian Economic Union, which has to serve as a mechanism to bring together states on the principles of mutually beneficial cooperation.

Nursultan Nazarbayev also spoke about the necessity of developing a dialogue along a ‘North-South’ line and proposed that close relations be established between the OSCE and a number of Asian integration structures, first of all, with the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), created on Kazakhstan’s initiative. As is known, last year the Chairmanship of this Organization passed over to China. Speaking at the Summit in Shanghai, on 21 May 2014, the President of Kazakhstan suggested that an idea of creating the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Asia, similar to the OSCE, should be considered. Proposing and developing the idea of creating such an Organization, Kazakhstan is trying to synchronize the comprehension of security processes in Asia and Europe. All these issues can also be the subject of expert discussions. It is not accidental that at the Astana Summit Nursultan Nazarbayev said that Kazakhstan was prepared to become the connecting link for Eurasian security. Mediating efforts undertaken to resolve the Ukrainian crisis, to create a forum on the Iranian nuclear problem and organise negotiations on the Syrian crisis once again demonstrate the potential of Kazakhstan as an important link in Eurasian security. In his speech, the President particularly dwelt on the Afghan problem, saying that 43 OSCE participating States were involved in Afghanistan’s knotty problem. Unfortunately, we see that the situation in that country is still far from being fully settled. Moreover, the situation there has recently noticeably deteriorated, which makes
the issue of building joint efforts and rendering aid to that state on the part of various international organizations, including the OSCE, even more pressing.

One of the major topics that Kazakhstan continues to raise at all world fora is the anti-nuclear initiatives. Both then and now, Astana deems it necessary to activate work in the area of non-proliferation and disarmament. There are 15,000 nuclear warheads in the nine states possessing nuclear weapons. I believe that it is important to remind everyone that in his recent address at the UN General Assembly, Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed adopting a Universal Declaration of a Nuclear-Free World. Kazakhstan is the first country in history to close down a nuclear test site and voluntarily relinquish the world’s fourth-largest nuclear arsenal, as well as to create a nuclear-free zone in Central Asia. In this connection, the President of Kazakhstan proposed yet again going back to the task of creating a nuclear-free zone in other regions of the world, in particular in the Middle East. Today’s situation in this region once again confirms the correctness of ideas and initiatives proposed by Kazakhstan. Therefore, I believe that issues of this kind must be included in the list of topics to be discussed within the framework of the expert fora of the OSCE. In general, I think that it is necessary to synchronize similar topics raised by different international organizations. Experts, within the framework of various fora and institutions of the OSCE, must also join in the discussion of the proposal to develop the ‘Global Strategic Initiative Plan – 2045’, put forward by the President of Kazakhstan. This will allow us to elaborate, to the fullest extent, common approaches, assessments and criteria of joint efforts to achieve stability and security. Therefore, today’s conference is very significant for expert insight into the current processes and identification of new trends for expert and intellectual discussions with the involvement of politicians, academics and civil society activists.
Welcoming speech by
Natalia Zarudna
Ambassador, Head of the OSCE
Programme Office in Astana

Excellences,
Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is my honor to address such a distinguished audience. Above all, I would like to thank Minister Idrissov and our colleagues at the Foreign Ministry for hosting us here today as well as our partners from the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies for helping us build strong co-operation in organizing this conference and many events to come.

Let me warmly welcome Ambassador Vuk Žugić, Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council, and Ambassador Marcel Pesko, the Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, who have both travelled great distances to share their vision on the accomplishments and challenges for the Organization in the context of the present and future priorities of the OSCE.

I am pleased to greet the group of permanent representatives to the OSCE in Vienna who have included our conference in their robust visit to Kazakhstan. We are sure that you will enjoy the same hospitality that our field operation has felt for so many years here.

It is stimulating to see such a wide range of stakeholders engaged in exchanging views on the Organization’s place in the modern security architecture and potential areas where its role could be strengthened. Most notably, we are honored that two members of the Panel of Eminent Persons launched by the Swiss Chairmanship in 2014 - H.E. Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev and Professor Ivo Viskovic - have joined us today.
The Panel faces a very challenging task to provide recommendations on how to build a more resilient system of European security based on the Helsinki and Paris documents. In marking the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, all in the OSCE have been encouraged to reflect on what has been accomplished and consider what challenges still remain and lie ahead.

Our commitment to consensus and politically binding agreements paved the way for a better understanding of what security means. The OSCE has managed to build confidence in security co-operation, facilitate political will and leadership for collective actions and help resolve the collective action dilemma among states with different interests and agendas.

Although it did not come without hard work and compromise, considerable progress was made in the areas of conventional arms control, military confidence- and security-building measures, environmental protection, sustainable economic development, good governance and the protection of fundamental freedoms, to name but a few.

In this connection, the Astana Commemorative Declaration was visionary in its timing and foresight on the need to re-envision the definition of security. It was a product of the participating States’ political will, translated into life through the dedicated efforts of Kazakhstan’s Chairmanship. Not only did the declaration acknowledge the existence of serious challenges and threats, but it also reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of the OSCE as an efficient forum for promoting mutual security interests and an effective tool for preventing and resolving conflicts. The comprehensive vision of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community formulated at the 2010 OSCE Summit in Astana has sought to conceptualize and address changing geopolitical dynamics and security challenges within the OSCE space.

Nevertheless, we should admit that the goals of the Final Act, the Charter of Paris and the Astana Commemorative Dec-
laration are far from having been achieved in the OSCE region. However, the spirit of the agreement is still alive, although the Organization now has to work under drastically changed circumstances and under conditions of new challenges and threats to regional security.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

As all of you can attest, the OSCE grew significantly in prominence during the last year, achieving a level of international recognition it had not enjoyed for decades. However, the circumstances, under which it had to prove its relevance, were dramatic, to say the least.

In the course of the conflict in and around Ukraine, which many view as the most serious threat to Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security since the end of the Cold War, the OSCE became the most important multilateral actor, primarily due to its ability to provide a rapid and flexible response to emerging threats to security. Actually, it is precisely with regard to the crisis in and around Ukraine that the OSCE was able to help re-establish and identify its current role.

Unlike many other regional actors, it can act as an impartial observer or peace-broker, although with a somewhat limited mandate. The OSCE possesses the necessary prerequisites for that and has expanded its tools for systematic early warning and rapid crisis reaction, dialogue facilitation, mediation and mediation support. Furthermore, it has vast experience of working on the ground and has learned to develop ramified and strong ties with national and international stakeholders. That is what best defines us as an organization and is a trait we should recognize, embrace and advocate.

The OSCE has also proven its relevance by addressing emerging threats to security totally unknown or little known 40
years ago. What these challenges are and how to meet them will be one of the topics for you to discuss. The so-called ‘transnational threats’ emanate less from confrontation between states but from terrorism, organized crime, illegal trade and migration, cybercrime, and environmental degradation.

Globalization and technological advances have allowed humanity to share knowledge and ideas in ways never imagined, but it also allowed organized crime to increase the scope and size of its criminal activities. Smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, drugs, arms, sensitive materials and technologies pose a threat to security both inside and outside the OSCE area.

Open borders and free movement of persons and goods are beneficial to international co-operation but equally present growing challenges that did not exist when the Helsinki Final Act was signed. Ineffective labour migration management and the failure to allow migrants to integrate can undermine stability and security.

Discrimination and intolerance, radicalization and terrorism give rise to wider-scale violence. Very often they are rooted in exclusion from society, lack of economic opportunities or chances for social progress, aggressive nationalism, chauvinism and xenophobia.

Hard-won experience worldwide tells us that conflicts and instability are often caused by a failure to respect human rights or to adhere to democratic principles. Hence, one of the OSCE’s core principles claims that developments related to human rights and democracy are not confined to internal affairs of the State but are an issue of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States.

The rule of law and civil society are pivotal for ensuring sustainable economic growth. In this regard, the rule of law is essential not only for protecting basic political and human rights, but it is also a fundamental pillar for achieving fair and broad-
based prosperity, so critical for long-term sustainable development. Civil society, in its turn, plays a key role in pushing for new legislation or policies, in holding governments accountable for their commitments while enhancing transparency and promoting good governance.

These and other topics will be offered for your deliberations today. Actually, they epitomize the biggest challenges the OSCE faces in this time of trials. However, forty years after Helsinki the Organization more than ever remains committed to a free, democratic and more integrated world with fewer dividing lines.

It is clear that its comprehensive approach to security should be maintained and further strengthened. It is obvious that the OSCE participating States should find ways to overcome political disagreements and forge a new consensus – not about fundamentally changing the OSCE’s identity of mission but rather to ‘optimize it’ by building on its strengths, expertise and capabilities.

Speaking from the perspective of field missions, which have been instrumental in translating political agreements into operational activities, I would like to stress an obvious need for the OSCE to remain a flexible political organization. Both the needs and priorities of the host countries are often dynamic in their nature, and the swiftly mounting changes on the ground cannot wait for a consensus to be reached. The OSCE should continue providing a quick response to emerging regional threats as well as to various needs of the host countries related to their development in line with OSCE principles and commitments.

The OSCE Programme Office in Astana could serve as a good case in point in this regard: with our partners in government and civil society, our Office, working under the new mandate, remains actively engaged in a wide range of programmatic activities pertaining to all three dimensions of security.
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I hope that this conference will be instrumental in the search for opportunities to better use both the potential and the rich experience of the OSCE in strengthening security through cooperation in the entire Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space, especially in Central Asia.

I wish us all an engaging and, most importantly, a constructive and effective discussion.

Thank you.
I thank the Government of Kazakhstan and the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies for organizing this conference to mark both the 40th Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and the 5th Anniversary of the Astana Summit. At the outset let me on behalf of the Chairmanship in Office express my gratitude for giving me the opportunity to address this important conference. I would like to make some remarks in particular with reference to the Helsinki+40 process.

This year a number of commemorative events have taken place in the OSCE area, most prominently in Helsinki in July, but also in many other capitals. Alongside and in co-operation with governments and civil society, the OSCE Chairmanship, the Executive Structures and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly have used the occasion to consider both the lasting legacy of the Helsinki Final Act as well as the accomplishments of our Organization in the last 40 years.

Today’s conference is special, not just within the Central Asian context but more widely. The 2010 Astana Summit (and, in particular, the Summit’s Commemorative Declaration) remains a significant point of reference in our work, and it is closely connected to our efforts to implement the norms, principles
Accomplishments and challenges for the OSCE on the anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Astana Summit (2010)

and commitments to which the OSCE participating States have agreed since the Helsinki Final Act was signed forty years ago.

The Astana Commemorative Declaration and its vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community set us on a course which at the time held a lot of promise for a renewal of European security, the bridging of persistent divisions and the revitalization of the OSCE as a forum for dialogue and joint action.

At the 2012 OSCE Ministerial Council in Dublin, the OSCE participating States, with explicit reference to the Astana Commemorative Declaration, took the decision to launch an ambitious initiative with the aim of providing “strong and continuous political impetus to advancing work towards a security community”.

The essence of this initiative, the Helsinki +40 Process, was to pursue and broaden the dialogue with a view to culmination in the year of the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. The anniversary, it was hoped, would act as a catalyst for change.

Almost three years later, despite the best efforts of successive Chairmanships, we did not meet the expectations raised in Dublin. Similarly, we are also too far from the expectations raised in Astana five years ago. Should we therefore be discouraged? My answer would be that we cannot afford to turn our backs on each other in disappointment. Instead, against the backdrop of the current crisis, we must make even greater efforts to engage with each other and to try to find common ground. However, we need to be realistic and pragmatic as we approach the question of how to pursue our dialogue beyond 2015.

We are well aware of the reasons for this setback. Neither the ambition was at fault, nor the methodology chosen to pursue this process. Indeed, in its first year, under the 2013 Ukrainian Chairmanship, important progress was made on defining the most relevant thematic areas for deeper discussion; and an overall constructive and open atmosphere characterized the in-
formal discussions that we held within the Informal Helsinki+40 Working Group set up in line with the Dublin Ministerial Decision. The 2014 Swiss Chairmanship, which took over the following year, also felt encouraged to move the process forward and together with Serbia launched a roadmap and joint work plan to allow for a more structured, results-driven approach.

However, the emergence and escalation of the crisis in and around Ukraine threw a spanner into the works. Even though discussions continued in 2014 and this year, there was not enough interest for substantive debate. However, the fact that discussions continued and were not suspended or brought to a premature close is in itself a small, but important achievement.

Keeping the dialogue going in these times of profound crisis is crucial and one of the key tasks of any Chairmanship. In the run-up to the Ministerial Council in Belgrade, it appears that there is considerable interest among participating States in continuing an inclusive and forward-looking dialogue on the broader crisis of security and co-operation in the OSCE area and on advancing efforts to strengthen the OSCE as an organization.

Given this evident commitment to engage, the Serbian Chairmanship, together with the Troika, is exploring possibilities for transforming the Helsinki+40 Process into an open-ended reflection platform to continue beyond 2015.

In my view and in the view of many of my colleagues present here today, Helsinki+40 was a worthwhile experience. It clearly showed the potential of informal debate for stimulating new approaches to issues of common concern. In the context of the current crisis, we are more than ever in need of dialogue on critical aspects of European security.

Yet in addition to the Astana vision and the spirit of Helsinki, which has been evoked many times this year, we will mainly need to employ common sense and pragmatism. As important as anniversaries may be as a means to focus our minds at regular intervals, we should recognize that genuine dialogue on issues
of fundamental importance may more often than not escape any attempt to enforce rigid deadlines. This is why prevailing thinking is to opt for an open-ended and very flexible arrangement as a means for result-oriented discussion on broad issues and problems of European security as well as on concrete ways to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the OSCE.

As an organization, the OSCE currently stands at a crossroads. It has received recognition and renewed attention for its efforts in support of a peaceful settlement of the crisis in and around Ukraine; and it is keeping communication channels open when many other dialogue formats have been suspended. With its comprehensive definition of security based on its three dimensions, its inclusive membership and shared normative base of political commitments, the OSCE, more than ever, could act as a vital bridge-builder.

At the same time, the current crisis in European security is taking its toll on the functioning of the Organization itself. Its founding principles have been violated and brought into question and trust and confidence have been lost. In addition all of this is taking place against the backdrop of a growing number of complex and interconnected security challenges affecting the OSCE area and its neighborhood.

Nevertheless, we see no alternative but to continue with an open and frank dialogue to help narrow and bridge differences, encourage the participating States to renew their commitment to the OSCE’s founding principles and allow us to move forward on the challenging path towards a more solid and co-operative European Security.

In that context, let me add that we are looking forward to the outcome of the Panel of Eminent Persons to be presented at the Ministerial Council in Belgrade.

Thank you.
It is a great pleasure to be here and have the opportunity to participate in the event that marks the signing of the milestone document in the modern history of Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security. The signing of the Helsinki Final Act 40 years ago was a historic triumph of cooperation over conflict. For decades the principles enshrined in this landmark document served as the foundation of our security. It is of symbolic significance that we have gathered particularly here in Astana, where the heads of OSCE states and governments met for the last summit and where they confirmed that overcoming the growing risk of new divisions in the OSCE area would require recommitment to the vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community. They also reiterated their commitment to the concept, initiated in the Final Act, of comprehensive, co-operative, equal and indivisible security, which relates the maintenance of peace to the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and links economic and environmental co-operation with peaceful inter-State relations.

I find it important to stress these high-level commitments as we have gathered here in Astana against the backdrop of the worst crisis of security in the OSCE area since the Cold War. The crisis in and around Ukraine saw the blatant violation of almost all the ten Helsinki principles. Instead of celebrations, we are going through a defining moment for Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security, and also for the future of the OSCE.
When the OSCE’s predecessor, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), was established, Cold War divisions were deeply entrenched and leaders with opposing ideologies were seeking a flexible multilateral forum where they could work out differences through high-level political dialogue. The result was a process, which not only provided a framework for discussions on security but over time also created the most advanced international regime of conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), such as the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the Open Skies Treaty and the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-building Measures. Many argue that the CSCE helped to end the Cold War by contributing to dramatic changes that took place in the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe. “The Iron Curtain is rusting”, observed the then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in 1989 – perhaps in recognition of the contribution made by the Helsinki Final Act to the disintegration of Europe’s dividing lines. Reflection on the dramatic developments during that time and on the events that led to the signing of the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe offers us an important lesson for the challenges that we are facing today. Even during the Cold War, with its clearly delineated spheres of influence, what appeared impossible was made possible through painstaking dialogue and perseverance.

In Paris participating States declared an end to confrontation and the division of Europe and welcomed “a new era of democracy, peace and unity” for the continent. The CSCE was then called upon to play a part in managing the historic changes taking place in Europe and responding to the new challenges. It stated positively and perhaps also idealistically that “we undertake to build, consolidate, and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations”.

Even though the Central Asian states, then still a part of the Soviet Union, were not present at the Paris Summit, just months
later they declared independence and also joined the CSCE, while making commitment to the values underpinning the OSCE’s vision of inclusive and comprehensive security. Since then our cooperation marked many achievements as the OSCE and its distinct field operations in all Central Asian participating States contributed to their dynamic transformation processes and to strengthening their capacities in many areas. Even though a lot has been achieved since 1991, we all face a growing number of security threats and concerns, which are particularly imminent in the Central Asian region. The OSCE and its field operations are regularly reviewing and identifying the new challenges and potential of co-operation with Central Asian host governments. We stand ready to continue deepening our cooperation in addressing threats that affect the security in Central Asia, including radicalisation, terrorism and security aspects of climate change. Central Asia is on the geographical border of the OSCE community and on the front line of a dynamic part of the world. Countries in the region are very important actors of global peace and security. At the same time, each of the Central Asian countries is tackling its specific set of security challenges as well as challenges in strengthening democratic institutions and good governance. I am convinced that we all share the view that maintaining the current level of cooperation, including through our field operations and actively seeking opportunities for its enhancement, is crucial particularly today in a time of growing instability and volatility of our security system.

Let me now turn back to the OSCE’s evolution. It continued throughout the 1990s and well into the twenty-first century, constantly adapting to new strategic challenges arising from the turbulent post-9/11 international context and an increasingly globalized world. The OSCE managed to respond quickly and dynamically to these emerging threats. It has developed and strengthened its ability to provide expert advice and capacity-building support in areas such as good governance, economic re-
form, environmental protection, minority protection, tolerance and non-discrimination, anti-terrorism, border management and anti-trafficking. Ultimately, the OSCE’s inclusiveness and impartiality have, over time, become its key comparative advantage in responding to the changing security environment.

On the other hand, it needs to be admitted that even though the OSCE’s core role has been to provide a platform for dialogue between East and West, over the years its relevance declined as both in the West and in the East other issues began to occupy a larger role in the European security agenda. As a result, we have been witnessing increased erosion of trust and confidence and weakening attachment to the OSCE and the concept based on comprehensive, inclusive and equal approach, multiplied by contradictory security narratives and opposing expectations. All main actors have been disillusioned about the OSCE as it failed to deliver in terms of creating an effective, sustainable and integrated model of security cooperation. It is obvious, however, that the OSCE is just a mirror of security discourses, which, despite numerous declarations in the OSCE context, have never managed to overcome the zero-sum approach and continued to nurture antagonisms in East-West relations even during the best days of rapprochement.

Since the war in Georgia there has been continued effort to address deficit of trust, and the 2010 Kazakh OSCE Chairmanship, which culminated in the memorable Astana Summit, played an important role in these efforts. Despite all that work, we have failed to generate a genuine discussion on the key issues of European security, such as arms control, continuation of institutionalization processes in the OSCE area, resolution of protracted conflicts, substantial reform and empowering the OSCE, historical reconciliation, reduction of risks of military encounters, establishing a viable mechanism for cooperation and eliminating barriers between respective institutional arrange-
ment within the OSCE area, and thus launch a process towards building a reinforced security architecture.

At the same time, the OSCE’s response to the crisis in and around Ukraine has reconfirmed the Organization’s relevance to European security, as it has highlighted the enduring utility of the OSCE as the organization best suited to bridging growing divides and facilitating co-operative solutions.

40 years after Helsinki it is clear that we have lost the sense of togetherness and recognition of the need to ensure cohesiveness of differentiated European structures. 25 years ago in Paris we formulated a shared vision and demonstrated strong determination to work jointly towards its implementation. Then we were determined to build our security on the basis of our shared commitment to the democratic values and respect for agreed commitments. Today the institutions and commitments are in place, while the determination to work together towards the shared vision is absent. We see each other as enemies again; psychological and physical fences are re-built again. Them-and-us culture and militarization of our policies are gaining ground. Risk of escalation and confrontation is imminent.

The good news is that despite, or perhaps, because of the current gridlock on key security issues, the OSCE is now recognized as a key regional platform for dialogue and joint action. However, much more needs to be done to re-vitalize the OSCE as a platform for co-operative security and to re-start joint efforts to create a security community based on the implementation of shared commitments and values.

Looking ahead, the key task for the OSCE is to continue working towards the peaceful resolution of the crisis in and around Ukraine through supporting the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements by using all available means to facilitate the political solution. On that account I am pleased to note that the ceasefire is holding and the withdrawal of heavy weapons with a lower calibre from the line of contact is continuing as
agreed. This would not be possible without the valuable role of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in facilitating this process and creating space for the implementation of steps agreed within the Trilateral Contact Group and its working groups. This in turn contributes to seeking a compromise formula for all points agreed in Minsk, including the framework for local elections, special status law and exchange of all detainees.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

As we mark the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, we should look back to the roots of the Helsinki process and learn from the commitment of those Cold War-era leaders to work together. We should remember that we have a joint responsibility for peace and security. In the past we have succeeded because “responsibility and far-sightedness rather than timidity and thinking in terms of rivalry were determining factors”, to quote long-serving German Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

In that context, the OSCE Troika-appointed Panel of Eminent Persons, which is looking at ways to reinvigorate the 2010 OSCE Astana Summit’s vision of a security community and exploring how to reconsolidate European security as a common project, is a most welcome initiative. Indeed, at a time when deep divisions are emerging, fresh and innovative ideas are needed. There is a need to ensure a follow up to the H+40 process and to create space for discussing the recommendations of the panel.

The current crisis creates pressure not only for the OSCE but also for the whole security system as we know it. Contradictory security narratives, rivalry and currencies of power question traditional multilateralism, including with regard to the role of the OSCE, without providing new answers to security gover-
The world is more connected but also more contested, more integrated but also more fragmented; it is very complex. This situation calls for engagement, leadership and commitment to jointly explore opportunities for re-launching a forward-looking agenda. This is not an easy task as the mistrusts have reached critical levels and governments are mainly focused on short-term gains as opposed to discussing how to overcome the current stalemate and reengage in joint work for long term objectives.

Particularly in the light of current challenges, participating States should try to look beyond their differences and seek solutions to the current impasse together, while upholding their common values and principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, Astana Commemorative Declaration and other landmark OSCE documents. We need to understand that we live in a rapidly changing world of increasingly complex security challenges, so we must ensure that our divisions do not keep us from working together on the larger, more global and transnational challenges that affect the lives of our citizens in all participating States without exception.

Before the crisis in and around Ukraine the OSCE suffered from a lack of visibility and lack of understanding of the extent and range of activities it covered. Now the OSCE is in the spotlight and there is greater appreciation of both the relevance and indispensability of the Organization. The increased attention has also highlighted the negative impact that the lack of political will on part of some participating States has on realizing the capacities of the OSCE. We need to address this challenge and jointly work towards shared understanding that there is a benefit and added value in strengthening the OSCE’s role as a unique forum for dialogue and conflict prevention. We know that it might take a lot of effort, patience and perseverance, but there is no other viable way forward, only through open and frank dialogue and readiness for compromise.
One way forward could be to discuss lessons learned from the OSCE’s response to the current crisis in and around Ukraine, including how to strengthen the capacity of the OSCE to prevent, manage and react to current and future challenges to our security through strengthening its institutional framework and enhancing its tools and capacity to prevent and resolve conflicts. We also need to strengthen its ability to address new and emerging threats to security. If we want to ensure that the OSCE can carry out its many mandates effectively, we must invest more in the Organization, both politically and in terms of resources.

Our ultimate aim should be to ensure that principles and commitments that all participating States have committed to uphold, are respected and implemented fully and in good faith.

The OSCE is a unique and invaluable asset for the international community with its enduring strengths and its utility as the Organization best suited to bridge divides and facilitate cooperative solutions. Now it is up to us to make very best use of it.

Thank you.
The 2010 Astana Commemorative Declaration: “Towards a Security Community”
– Achievements and Remaining Challenges

I should like to thank the conference organizers for the opportunity to address such an impressive audience. In particular, I should like to thank our hosts for this warm Astana welcome, which brings back a lot of memories of December 2010.

I need to begin with a disclaimer: I have been asked to share with you my experience in preparing the Astana Summit and negotiating the final summit declaration. My remarks are personal in nature, and do not represent the official position of the United States government. I will try to be as candid as possible.

Why is the Astana Summit important? First of all, because it was the most recent gathering of OSCE heads of state and government. This means that the agreements reached there remain the basic blueprint for the Organization’s work. I would like, if I may, to touch briefly on three subjects: what brought us to Astana, what was achieved there, and what remains to be done.

What brought us to Astana?

The 2010 Astana Summit came about as the result of three interrelated factors:

1) First of all, there was the larger institutional context. Let us be honest. The OSCE, in 2010, had been in a period of prolonged drift. The 1990 Charter of Paris had envisioned that the then-CSCE would convene at the level of heads of state and government every two years, a pace that was maintained, more or less, throughout the 1990s. By 2010, however, it had been 11 years since OSCE leaders had last gathered in Istanbul in 1999. In political time, this was a near-eternity; put another way, there had not been a single meeting at the highest level throughout the
entire presidential administrations of George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin.

Why is that important? For two reasons. Firstly, given the political nature of the OSCE, periodically refreshing its commitments at the highest level gives those commitments added relevance. Political leaders can more easily be held to account for commitments they themselves have undertaken than for those their predecessors accepted a generation ago. Secondly, summits provide an opportunity to tie together the disparate threads of the OSCE’s work. We talk a lot about ‘multidimensionality’ as a major advantage of the OSCE, but in practice, on a day-to-day basis, the OSCE is dozens of different organizations that have little contact with each other. Experts tend to stick to their own lanes – for arms control specialists, the OSCE is primarily an arms control and CSBM organization; for human rights activists, it is a human rights organization; for others, it is primarily about combating trafficking, or police training, and so on. Summits catalyze interaction in OSCE capitals among these disparate groups of experts, and permit the OSCE community as a whole to tie the Organization’s work together into a coherent whole, and to prioritize its work.

2) The second factor that brought us to Astana was the August 2008 war in Georgia. That conflict served as a wake-up call for the OSCE community, exposing the fact that armed conflict remained possible among OSCE participating States, despite the complex network of organizations, mechanisms and commitments that promote security in our region. It is hard to point to any one mechanism or organization ‘not doing its job’ in the months leading up to the outbreak of hostilities: the OSCE institutions and the OSCE Mission to Georgia issued increasingly dire warnings; OSCE ambassadors even visited Georgia in July 2008 and assessed the deteriorating situation for themselves. Yet all of these warnings went unheeded, and neither the OSCE nor any
of the other organizations operating in the Euro-Atlantic/Eurasian security space proved capable of preventing the conflict.

This led to a thorough re-examination of the region’s tools and priorities, which began at the December 2008 Helsinki Ministerial Council. That dialogue was formalized by the 2009 Greek Chairmanship in the Corfu Process, which ultimately provided the substance for the Astana Summit.

3) Finally, Kazakhstan came to the Chairmanship determined to have a meaningful impact on the Organization’s work. The Kazakhstani proposal to host a summit in Astana at the end of 2010 was met in some quarters with skepticism, but was pursued with determination and eventually found consensus.

Preparation of the Astana Summit posed several practical challenges. Unlike previous meetings at the highest level, which were decided upon years in advance, the December 2010 meeting in Astana was agreed only in August 2010. This left just a few short months to organize a review conference, assess the Organization’s work across the three dimensions, and prepare the Summit documents. The overall political environment also presented a challenge – while not quite as polarized as it is today, the mood among OSCE participating States, still defined by the conflict in Georgia and divergent perceptions as to the major challenges to the OSCE region, was clouded by mutual suspicion and mistrust.

**What was achieved at Astana?**

Given these challenges, the Astana Summit produced a surprisingly solid outcome. The Astana Commemorative Declaration, despite its somewhat underwhelming title, provided a comprehensive reaffirmation at the highest level of the OSCE’s accumulated acquis of commitments across the three dimensions. The document drew heavily upon language that had been agreed in previous Summit and Ministerial Council declarations; yet this reiteration was important, as it demonstrated the con-
tinued relevance of the OSCE acquis for a new generation of political leaders. In some cases, commitments were even strengthened – the document, for example, declared the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms to be the “first responsibility” of participating States, a commitment undertaken by OSCE Heads of State and Government for the first time in Astana. The document was also admirable for its brevity – in just over three pages, it provided a concise statement of the raison d’être of the Organization. This makes it a uniquely valuable tool in spreading public awareness of the OSCE.

The Astana Declaration also provided participating States with a long-term vision, the idea of a free, democratic, common and indivisible security community, encompassing the entire OSCE area; yet, as previous speakers have noted, that vision remains far from our current reality, arguably farther than it was five years ago.

What challenges remain?

The basic challenge to OSCE participating States remains what it was five years ago: realizing the Astana vision of a security community, and making the OSCE area a place where participating States’ relations with each other and with their own citizens are governed by agreed ‘rules of the road’.

The specific challenges issued in the Astana Declaration remain surprisingly current: the call for greater efforts to deter, prevent, resolve and manage the consequences of conflict is more relevant than ever, as we struggle with the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. The idea that the security of the OSCE area is “inextricably linked” to the security of neighboring regions has become more evident, as we cope with the consequences of continued instability in Afghanistan and the refugee crisis in Europe. The bold declaration of our heads of state and government that the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms was their “first responsibility” has not slowed the erosion of respect for
those rights and freedoms in significant parts of our region. Astana set the agenda, and issued a challenge to the OSCE community. Meeting that challenge will require the sustained engagement and political will of all OSCE participating States, because ultimately, it is you, and not the OSCE’s executive structures, that are ‘the OSCE’. The Organization provides a range of valuable tools that can facilitate progress across the three dimensions of security, but it is the participating States who must wield those tools.
Risks and Challenges in a Most Difficult Period of Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security

Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Forty years Helsinki Final Act, five years Astana Commemorative Declaration - this would have been a joyful birthday party in normal times. However, times are not normal.

The documents of these two landmark meetings brought breakthroughs towards a co-operative security policy: The Helsinki Final Act spoke of the “indivisibility of security in Europe”, the Astana Commemorative Declaration even of “comprehensive, co-operative, equal and indivisible security”, which relates the maintenance of peace to “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. If this vision had been translated into practice, we would live in a peaceful world, in a “security community” as this vision is called in the Astana Document.

Unfortunately, the real world has become completely different:

Russia and Western States are involved in wars in Ukraine and Syria. Comprehensive military activities on both sides have led to a number of near-accidents including incidents with civilian aircraft. Last week, Turkish fighter aircraft shot down an unmanned aerial vehicle, presumably owned by the Russian Federation. In the course of a comprehensive militarisation of relations, the relevance of nuclear weapons is increasing again.

These military developments are accompanied by grave violations of international law and key OSCE principles through the Russian annexation of Crimea and its barely covert invasion in Eastern Ukraine.
Altogether, we are experiencing the worst security situation since the end of the Cold War. The danger of an unintended war is greater than at any time in the past thirty years. In more scientific terms, the current situation can be characterised as an unregulated confrontation mixed with some elements that have survived from the security regimes established over the past twenty-five years.

Outside of Europe, we are experiencing long and extremely brutal wars in the Near and Middle East with profound impact on the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space.

The key questions now are: How could it happen that we have arrived at such a dangerous situation? And what can be done to create a turn for the better?

Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I believe that the current security situation in Europe is not the result of a strategy, but rather the consequence of a lack of proper strategies on both sides.

For about fifteen years now, we have observed diverging developments in different parts of the OSCE space. This started with security: Western countries have striven to enhance security by enlarging their own security alliance – NATO. This has been increasingly perceived as a threat by Russia. We have experienced increasing disputes over human dimension issues, particularly human rights and democracy; and finally, the crisis in and around Ukraine has brought to our attention that issues of economic integration can also become causes of violent conflict. As a result, all relevant dimensions have now become part of a comprehensive confrontation.

These diverging and divisive tendencies have been aggravated by consciously unilateral strategies; and they have been
played down and belittled by many states. It has been a long time since a serious, non-propagandistic dialogue on key issues of the European security order has taken place among the key players.

Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

The most urgent matter today is resuming a serious dialogue among governments on how the current situation can be stabilised. However, such a dialogue is made more difficult by the widely different, almost mutually exclusive, narratives of the sides. In addition, a number of states are not yet ready to discuss the more fundamental issues of a future European security order.

An initial serious attempt to enter into such a dialogue is the ‘Panel of Eminent Persons for European Security as a Common Project’, initiated by the foreign ministers of the OSCE troika – Serbia, Switzerland and Germany. The Panel has already tabled an interim report and recommendations on “Lessons Learned for the OSCE from its Engagement in Ukraine”. A second report on the wider issues of European security will follow by early December.

The dialogue between governments should be complemented by Track II dialogues involving a broad spectrum of civil society actors. While the human dimension of the OSCE has always included many NGOs, this has not been the case with the two other dimensions. This has changed with the “OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions” that was founded in 2013. Meanwhile, the Network includes almost 50 institutes from about 35 countries and has worked on a number of OSCE-related issues, such as threat perceptions in the OSCE area, OSCE field operations or a contribution to the Panel of Eminent Per-
sons. As the Co-ordinator of the Network, I can only encourage institutes from Central Asia to join.

A second priority is to de-escalate the whole situation, both in words and in deeds. That means stopping the dangerous manoeuvring with aircraft and vessels and it also means stopping loose war rhetoric. Allegedly, there are more than five dozen bilateral agreements between Russia and Western states on the avoidance and management of accidents and incidents. Apparently, they still need to be implemented. In this context, it would be fruitful to resume military-to-military contacts in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council.

Third, sustainable progress in the overall security situation is difficult to imagine without further steps in the implementation of the Minsk Agreement. Since the meeting of the Normandy Group in early October in Paris, the situation is, for the first time, looking a bit more promising. For the first time, we have a clear sequence and timetable for the different elements contained in the Minsk package. Initial steps agreed upon have been implemented. Both on the ground, with its Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and the Trilateral Contact Group, and in the political dimension, the OSCE has played an irreplaceable role for managing and resolving the crisis in and around Ukraine.

Fourth, it is important to avoid having the general conflict spill over to the sub-regional level. This primarily concerns the protracted conflicts in Moldova, Georgia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, it also concerns countries such as Kazakhstan that have friendly relations with both Russia and Western states. Kazakhstan, which is a member state of the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union and has an Enhanced Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with the EU, could serve as a bridge between Russia and the West.

Fifth, the relevance of the OSCE has increased substantially. While we had to deplore the marginalisation of the Organization throughout the zero years, this has changed fundamentally,
seemingly paradoxically, as overall relations between Russia and the Western States have soured. Since NATO and the EU are perceived as parties to the conflict, the OSCE has become the only available platform not only for practical conflict management, but also for strategic dialogue. It is imperative to use this platform, both in Vienna and in the countries that host OSCE presences, which now have become real assets.

*Excellencies,*  
*Ladies and Gentlemen,*

We should not give up hope that the current confrontational situation can be overcome in favour of a return to co-operative security policies. The Astana Commemorative Declaration stands for this hope and aspiration.  
I thank you for your attention.
A New Architecture or Status Quo: Regional Security Complexes or the Challenge of Non-State Actors

As we gather in Astana on the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and the 5th anniversary of the OSCE Astana Summit, there is a need to reflect on the essence and basis of cooperation between states in a world characterized by highly divided poles and in high deficit of trust. The argument that this paper proposes is that the status quo in international security relations, that of two main supposed motivations for cooperation between states, that of common threats from non-state actors and that of common geography, have actually led to more conflicts than cooperation. A more propitious way forward would be to build a new security architecture based not on contested and conflicted state interests, but on the values of empathy and on the needs, fears and dignity of people within states. A new security architecture requires focus on human security and not state interests. The paper will look at two current security narratives as they pertain to the Central Asia/Afghanistan region before presenting the Human Security alternative.

The case study under consideration for this paper is that of the so-called Heart of Asia countries. The region presents a valuable case study because at its center, Afghanistan is both a place from where insecurity can spread, and from where stability could also create a number of dividends for regional prosperity when Afghanistan would be transformed into a land bridge, a hub for trade and transit in the region. In this sense, the case study is ideal for making the case for cooperation as the most natural tendency of relations between states. Interests are theoretically merged in the region. For Central Asian neighbors, members of the OSCE (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in the first place, and Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan as
further implicated), Afghanistan represents both a threat and an opportunity. Continued instability is seen as a substantial source for breeding extremism, terrorism, and organized trafficking of drugs and arms. At the same time, stabilization and reconstruction could lead to an opportunity for cooperation over electricity, gas, roads, pipelines, and hydroelectric power transfers.

Discussions on the future of Afghanistan are informed by two different fundamental conceptions of regional cooperation: one based on alliances against the threat of non-state actors and the other based on patterns of amity based on shared geography.

**Cooperation Against the Threat of Non-State Actors**

The first conventional security narrative argues that the neighboring states of Afghanistan would benefit from cooperation given the common threat from non-state actors’ destructive behavior in the wider region. It puts emphasis on the need for collective security to counter threats from non-state actors: criminal groups, trans-border traffickers of narcotics and arms, extremist groups and terrorists. This perspective sees Afghanistan as the ‘core’ of a larger conflict formation insinuated by various transnational networks with the potential to mobilize across borders. ¹ From this perspective, cooperation is natural among states which share concerns for threats stemming from non-state actors, especially trans-boundary ones, such as criminality, extremism and terrorism, much of which are supposed to be present in the core country of the region, Afghanistan. Given that stabilization of the unstable ‘core’ is a shared concern, the patterns that govern the region would

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naturally lead more towards amity and cooperation than enmity between states.

Most countries of the region are now increasingly affected by the presence of Daesh both in the Middle East and in the region. Central Asian countries also have become an exporter of radicalized fighters, with between 2,500 and 5,000 people, depending on estimates, having been recruited to join Daesh in Syria and Iraq. Most recruits have been from among labor migrants in Russia and motivated to a large extent by socio-economic grievances (unemployment, poverty and marginalization) even though political/religious ideology and recruitment by Salafi groups that have spread in the region also play a role in preparing the ground. On the other side of the Amu River, in Afghanistan, Daesh has opened a new front, Welayat-e Khurasan, in the provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar, uniting disgruntled Taliban fighters, representatives of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Chechens, some al Qaeda members, etc.

The presence of the Taliban, al Qaeda, and now Daesh in the territory of Afghanistan necessitates new collective and cooperative security arrangements between the neighbors. However, the entry of Daesh in the region has also given rise to a paradox. On the one hand, the non-state entity is painted in official discourses as a common enemy, which needs to see regional countries cooperate more closely. On the other hand, however, official discourses on countering violent extremism and terrorism in the region are heavily based on the tradition of blaming other states of using non-state entities as proxies for their national interests. This paradox is created primarily because Daesh is seen as a political entity in the midst of a state-based system, instead of being seen for what it also is: a social movement that starts with radicalization.
The assumption that states would cooperate in the presence of common threats from destructive non-state actors has a number of fallacies:

- First, it fails to consider the potential for non-cooperation among states, even if they share common concerns for dangers emanating from non-state actors. Other interests may come into play that shape relations: economic rivalry, national interest, hegemonic ambitions, historical animosity, etc. Although many of Afghanistan's direct and extended neighbors view the presence of Daesh, al Qaeda and the Taliban as threatening to their national interests, they are often locked into various types of security competitions with one another that trump cooperation over the common interest in fighting terrorism and insurgency.

- Second, cooperation is hampered by the way that the origins of the threat of non-state actors are explained within national security narratives. These tend to blame terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization on foreign elements and classify them as cross-border threats, most often imported from an unstable Afghanistan. However, these threats are not just cross-border imports but also the result of factors inherent to the Central Asian countries themselves. Rising violent extremism, for example, is also home-grown in the region, instigated by groups with the explicit ideology to overcome the secular regimes, or in response to repression and unfavorable socio-economic factors. Similarly, the booming narco-trafficking is not to be blamed solely on increased production in Afghanistan but also on high demands in Russia and Europe, the lucrative and quick cash nature of trafficking at times of high unemployment for Central Asian populations, insufficient border controls, corruption in the law enforcement agencies and among customs officials and border troops, as well as in some cases vested interests by political elites.
While it is obvious that regional cooperation is necessary to defeat insurgents, it is also true that the first order of cooperation should be political commitment and mutual trust. Technical measures and capacity, such as intelligence sharing, data gathering, proper analysis, border control, harmonized extradition laws etc., are all naturally important tools but they should come on the heels of political commitment in the first place. Yet, mutual trust, the quintessential ingredient for cooperation on countering radicalism, terrorism and violent extremism, is low in a region where states have hitherto used non-state actors to further their national interests: India and Pakistan accuse each other of using militant groups to target the interests of each other on Afghan soil, while Iran and Saudi Arabia do so in the Middle East, etc.

The phenomenon of Daesh, far from having created impetus for cooperation, has reinforced divisions: in Syria, Daesh has become a point of contention between the US and its allies on the one hand, and a Russia/Iran alliance on the other. Reactions to Daesh have also raised the specter of mistrust between states, with accusations of double standards between Russia and the United States and the renewal of a Sunni/Shia strife. The danger of the non-state actor has therefore not opened the path for a new security architecture in the region: the status quo, where states compete conventionally and blame the use of non-state actors by their rivals, reigns.

*Cooperation Based on Common Geography: Regional Security Complexes*

A second security narrative for analyzing regional cooperation puts the focus on a state-based perspective where patterns of amity and enmity or cooperation and conflict are the results of states sharing common geography. The conceptual framework for this second argument rests on the Regional Security
Complex (RSC) theory defined by Buzan and Wæver as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another”. Accordingly, security interaction tends to be more frequent among neighbors than among states located in different regions, simply due to physical adjacency. Geographical proximity is supposed to define patterns of security interdependence.

Yet the narrative of a security architecture based on regional security complexes also shows how there is more impetus for conflict and competition rather than cooperation. Afghanistan is surrounded by three distinct Regional Security Complexes (RSCs): the South Asian, the Central Asian, and the Persian Gulf Security Complexes, each with its own core security dynamics.

- The South Asia Security Complex is dominated by a robust rivalry between India and Pakistan, attributed to historical legacies over territory, as well as to irreconcilable differences over national identity ever since Pakistan, the homeland for Muslims on the subcontinent, separated from a secular, multicultural, multi-religious India during the 1947 partition. New factors, such as dispute over the sharing of water from the Indus River, exacerbate tensions. Economic cooperation, despite new opportunities, proves hard to bring about. The rivalry persists while relative asymmetry between the two countries is increasing rapidly, with India outweighing Pakistan by far in terms of all measures of strength (territory, population, economy, armed forces), and Pakistan weakening owing to multiple internal challenges: rising militancy, social fragmentation and economic

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woes. The rivalry is extended into their relations with Afghanistan where each country is motivated by checking the influence of the other, leading to a proxy war on Afghan soil.

- The Central Asian countries of the region are locked into a distinct Regional Security Complex that originates from their common geography, historical legacy and durable patterns of conflict and cooperation. Yet, despite geographic proximity and common security interests, rivalry between these states persists, exacerbated by the presence of strong states (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) and animosities between the strong and the weaker ones (e.g. Uzbekistan–Tajikistan), as well as hostility over the sharing of natural resources. The security dynamics within the region are reinforced by the rivalries between global powers. Lack of cooperation among Central Asian countries, the asymmetry of power that exists within the region, and the fear of domination makes them vulnerable to external strategic interests. This further hampers cooperation within because of the tendency of powerful external actors to promote incentives for bilateral and centrifugal relations in pursuit of their own interests. External rivalries may force Central Asian countries to develop strategies to balance between external powers, but this then translates into little ability to coordinate security and defense policies within the sub-region.

- The Persian Gulf Regional Security is characterized by the antagonistic relationship between Iran, a rising power with hegemonic regional ambitions which is using the conflict over nuclear capability to its advantage, and a more insecure Saudi Arabia, which is forced to rely on the security guarantees of external powers against both regional and domestic threats. The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is played out across a number of areas: 1) mutual accusations of support for terrorism

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and insurgencies, 2) competing ideological orientations, rooted in national and religious identities and claims to the leadership of the Islamic community, and 3) economic competition, particularly over the production and pricing of oil and gas.

Common geography is therefore not an impetus for cooperation. States compete over resources, regional hegemonic aspirations, etc. They then project their rivalries onto their relationship with weaker state, in this case Afghanistan. Global powers, such as the US, China and Russia, use the rivalries both to create alliances for themselves against each other and are used in turn by states for their own ambitions. This type of security architecture explains tendencies for further divisions among states. Stability, and cooperation, would come when the national interests of each state are taken care of. However, the solution is complicated by the fact that states tend to see their security in zero sum terms.

**Cooperation Based on Human Security Imperatives**

If neither of the two frameworks is sufficient for enhancing cooperation among states, a third way should be considered where interest of people within states, and not the defense of state interests, becomes the basis for cooperation. In other words, human security instead of national or regional security would be the impetus for cooperation. Such a proposal does not have to require altruistic affinities among states. After all, the stability and security of the state very much depends on its ability to protect, provide and empower its population. Otherwise the very basis of the social contract that Thomas Hobbes foresaw is threatened and neither security nor sovereignty can be ensured.

When it comes to defeating violent extremists and eradicating radicalization for example, the basis of cooperation among
Afghanistan and neighboring countries should not just be political declarations to fight extremism globally or regionally, but first and foremost a commitment to eradicate domestic conditions that could lead to radicalization. Regional cooperation would then be about joint examination of sources and drivers of radicalization and collectively devising strategies to combat it. It would also mean exchanges of best practices in terms of preventing and dealing with radicalization at the national level that can be adopted by others with similar challenges and capabilities.

To have a lasting defeat of radicalized movements and long-term stability, the discourse which blames other states for the external phenomenon of Daesh as a terrorist organization needs to be changed. A more productive use of the problem of Daesh is to recognize it not just as an external political entity but as a social phenomenon that has domestic root causes. As such, it should not be Daesh as a terrorist organization but Daesh as the symbolism of radicalization as a process that should be of a common concern to all the countries of the region. By reshaping this discourse, regional countries could forge a more cooperative dénouement while at the same time recognizing and preventing the spread and danger of radicalization at home. The emphasis on finding solutions to the phenomenon of Daesh, in other words, should be not as much about insurgency or terrorism as political tools, as it should be about radicalization as a process.

Another example for a human security approach to regional cooperation concerns the question of border security. Border security is squarely located within the scope of the national security of countries of the region, and responses to perceived threats rest on strengthening border control. This approach requires regional cooperation in joint operations, intelligence sharing and coordination between national law enforcement authorities at the technical level. However, security in border areas is also tied to the human insecurity of border communities. The inability to
Accomplishments and challenges for the OSCE on the anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Astana Summit (2010)

earn a decent livelihood, access to quality healthcare and education, and adequate water for irrigation are everyday challenges. They make border communities vulnerable to recruitment by extremists, collaboration with smugglers and migration. They require a rethink of the question of border security from a state-centric perspective. Otherwise, not only do states fail to take advantage of the potential of involving communities in preventing illegal trespassing and facilitating exchanges, but leaving populations isolated and impoverished can also lead to increasing tensions and competition over resources. Cooperation around border security in the Central Asia/Afghanistan region should rely on investing in the needs of border communities while supporting cross-border cooperation and exchanges as a means to stability and prosperity.  

Conclusion

In the final analysis, when security based on states’ interest does not necessarily induce regional cooperation, global peace or even human security, a new security architecture is needed. Such a new order should be based not on state interests but on compassion for the predicament of people populating the state and the state system. The proposal goes beyond ensuring that states abide by their obligations to human rights. It would require more direct involvement by people in finding solutions to problems that plague them. People, as such, are soldiers of international relations. They should be given a more active role in shaping them. They should not be mere recipients of top down security, but empowered from below as agents of change, stability and of cooperation among states.

Wolfgang Richter

The Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Order at Risk – Ways out of the Crisis

Madam Moderator,
Excellencies,
Distinguished Colleagues,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me first to express my appreciation to the organizers for inviting me to speak before this handpicked audience in Astana on the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Order and possible ways out of the crisis. Before dealing with substantial issues I would like to state that I left government service six years ago and since then have been working as an analyst in the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). The following theses do not represent the official positions of the German government but only my personal views as an independent researcher.

We are discussing the security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Space at a time when its very foundations are at risk. Europe is facing a serious armed conflict in and over Ukraine, which has evolved into a wider politico-military confrontation between NATO and Russia. The annexation of territory and military intervention in the internal affairs of an OSCE participating State by another OSCE State and neighboring country have led to growing threat perceptions in many quarters of Europe during the past 18 months. The numbers and size of military exercises and close-border over-flights on both sides have reached a new height, which is unprecedented since the end of the Cold War. While we see encouraging signs of quiet in Eastern Ukraine, the political provisions of the Minsk Agree-
ment have not yet been implemented and harbor a potential for new escalation.

At the same time, OSCE participating States have not come closer to solutions to ‘frozen’ conflicts and there are still serious shortfalls as to the OSCE’s third dimension obligations. All these developments sharply contradict the commitments made in Paris in 1990, in Istanbul in 1999 and in Astana in 2010 towards a comprehensive and undivided security order in the OSCE area between Vancouver and Vladivostok. The new dividing lines in the OSCE area also stand in stark contrast to the need to cope in common with global security challenges which all OSCE participating States, including those in Central Asia, are facing.

What is particularly worrying is the fact that narratives and perceptions in different parts of the OSCE area are more and more diverging. They seem to describe two quite different developments that allegedly had taken place in the same orbit; while Western countries accuse Russia of severe breaches of international law by annexing Crimea and militarily intervening in Eastern Ukraine in support of rebels, Russia holds that the United States and other NATO member States have broken earlier promises and commitments reached in the 1990s.

The keywords are:
- NATO’s enlargement towards Russian borders and neglect of the agreed role of the OSCE in maintaining an undivided security order;
- Regime change policies to topple legal governments through military interventions without or in excess of Security Council mandates;
- Failure to implement NATO-Russia commitments as to strategic self-restraint, inter alia, by forward stationing of substantial combat forces, refusal to ratify the CFE Adaptation Agreement and undermining Russian strategic capabilities through the development of missile defense and prompt global strike concepts;
- Differences in views and unilateral action on territorial conflicts such as Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia increased tensions and resulted in
- the war in Georgia in August 2008 which evolved from local tensions to a full-fledged attack of the Georgian army against South Ossetia militias and Russian peacekeepers followed by Russian military intervention.

In the face of such a number of problems, dialogue is obviously urgently needed to understand each other’s threat perceptions and deescalate the situation. It should be based on a sober and fair account of what happened after the Istanbul Summit meeting in 1999 and be carried out without camp bias. However, bilateral and multilateral dialogue has been broken off in most fora such as the NATO-Russia Council or the CFE Joint Consultative Group. The OSCE remains the only inclusive forum for common action in crisis management and for promoting dialogue. It must be strengthened to prevent Europe from falling back into permanent division and confrontation. The OSCE should use and further develop its toolbox of CSBMs which are unprecedented on the globe.

Dialogue starts with the question on which commitments we are speaking about. The Astana Summit in 2010 was devoted to commemorating the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the promise by participating States to reinvigorate a cooperative Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Order in the 21st century. It is worthwhile reconsidering its agreed principles and instruments:

The Helsinki Final Act had set a precedent as to how 35 States could coexist peacefully by respecting realities and developing certain elements of cooperation gradually, despite their differences in ideologies, political concepts and military postures. Helsinki confirmed that the principles of international law also applied in Cold War Europe; but it did not overcome
the division of Europe resulting from the 1945 Yalta decisions. Thus, it did not create a new security order but only opened a door through which States still had to go. In fact, they needed another 15 years and several severe crises before they were prepared to end mutual threats and the division of Europe, reduce their armaments and agree on a truly cooperative security order. I would suggest that participating States do not wait another 15 years of instability and crises before returning to a cooperative order that they have been committed to since 1990.

The basic elements of such a cooperative order are enshrined in the 1990 Charter of Paris, the Charter for European Security of 1999, the CFE Treaty of 1990, its Adaptation Agreement of 1999, the Vienna Document and NATO-Russia commitments of 1997 and 2002:

- In line with the Charter of Paris (1990), the OSCE has been pursuing a comprehensive security concept. It is based on the principles of international law – as confirmed by the Helsinki Final Act – and includes not only military but also economic aspects and common political standards as to the development of democracy, rule of law and good governance.

- In 1999, with the Charter for European Security, OSCE participating States agreed to strengthen the role of the OSCE and to create a common area of undivided and equal security from Vancouver to Vladivostok without geopolitical zero sum games. While reaffirming the freedom of States to choose their security arrangements, States also committed not to strengthen their security at the expense of others. Accordingly, no State or alliance should have any pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability or consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence. Relations should be guided by the concept of common security, equal partnership, solidarity and transparency since the security of each participating State was inseparably linked to that of all the others. The Astana Com-
memorative Declaration of 2010 reconfirmed these principles and called for developing an undivided security community.

- Up to 2009, the CFE Treaty (1990) was labeled by the whole OSCE community, including by NATO member States and Russia, the “cornerstone of European security”. It maintained equality in numbers and geographical distances between the two blocs existing at the time. It ensured that NATO’s military postures would not move forward to take geopolitical advantages after Russia’s military withdrawal from Central Europe.

- Such provisions were in line with obligations contained in the “Two-plus-Four Treaty” on the re-unification of Germany. Germany promised not to station foreign troops in the territories of the former GDR and Berlin. It kept this promise.

- In 1999, all States Parties signed an Adaptation Agreement to the CFE Treaty (ACFE) in Istanbul together with a Final Act in order to adapt conventional arms control to NATO’s first enlargement by Central European States, which belonged to the CFE Eastern Group of States Parties. The ACFE replaced the obsolete CFE bloc-to-bloc limitations by national and territorial ceilings. With the opening of the Treaty for accession by all states within the area of application, the Agreement had the potential of supporting the creation of a common and undivided OSCE security space in Europe.

- In the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997) both sides promised not to station additional substantial combat forces permanently in relevant areas and to cooperate closely. The foundation of the NATO-Russia Council (2002) aimed at deepening such cooperation as to questions of mutual security interests such as arms control and missile defense. It was agreed that such consultations would be conducted by all delegations in their national capacities rather than by pursuing bloc positions.

This list is by far not exhaustive. However, it provides a basis for substantial discussion. It should be clarified why most of these commitments have not been implemented, why the situa-
tion did not improve but even worsened after the Astana Declaration and, most importantly, what should be done to return to a rule-based peace and security order.

To overcome the current crisis it will be crucial to tackle its root causes, that is, its wider strategic context. To that end, all sides should reengage in a broad dialogue in parallel to the implementation of the Minsk Agreement. Such dialogue should frankly consider all areas which caused frustration and new threat perceptions. Among these areas the following seven issues seem to be of particular relevance:

1. Return to a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Order which is based on the principles of international law and the security accord achieved by all OSCE participating States in 1999

2. Strengthening the role of the OSCE – not only in conflict prevention and conflict management but also as an overarching arrangement for cooperative, undivided and equal security

3. Finding an acceptable balance of the role of the OSCE, NATO (including its enlargement policies), the European Union and the CSTO within the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security architecture

4. Revitalizing conventional arms control and CSBMs with the objectives of ensuring strategic restraint and increasing transparency and verification, particularly in border areas

5. Finding acceptable compromises as to the desire to protect allies against realistic missile threats and the need to avoid misperceptions of undermining strategic capabilities of partners on the basis of renewed dialogue, transparency, cooperation and restraint

6. Solving territorial disputes in accordance with international law and within the framework of a cooperative security order that allows local compromises without fear of losing vital positions in a new geostrategic competition
(7) Cooperation on common responses to global challenges such as non-proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction, transnational organized crime including illicit trafficking of drugs, weapons and human beings, risks emerging from failed states and terrorism in our immediate vicinity which threatens the security of the whole OSCE community including that of States in Central Asia.

I thank you for your attention.
Presentation of Recommendations and Comments by Moderators

Session I

The first session highlighted the potential of the OSCE, and the importance of the Organization’s acquis of commitments, from the 1975 Helsinki Final Act to the 2010 Astana Commemorative Declaration.

Participants agreed that the Organization remains a unique and indispensable framework for security in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area, offering advantages – inclusiveness, comprehensiveness and flexibility – that others lack. At the same time, speakers noted the disconnect between the goals, principles and commitments set forth, for example, in the Astana Commemorative Declaration, and the reality of security in the OSCE space.

More needs to be done to achieve the Astana vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible security community, and this is a task for all OSCE participating States.

Session II

The second session highlighted the particular security challenges of Central Asia, including drug trafficking, violent extremism, spillover from continued instability in Afghanistan, environmental challenges and the need for sustainable economic development.

Participants stressed the need for increased regional cooperation among the states of Central Asia, and the inadequacy of current regional frameworks to address the region’s security challenges. They called for enhanced OSCE engagement both in the region, and in promoting more stable relationships with neighboring regions, particularly through increased outreach to Afghanistan.


Session III

The third session highlighted the importance of progress in the economic/environmental and human dimensions to underpin regional security, and the necessity of engaging and encouraging a vibrant civil society to complement and reinforce governmental efforts.

Speakers noted that democratic accountability, good governance and transparency, and the rule of law are absolute prerequisites for sustainable economic growth, and that sustainable economic growth, in turn, can help lay the groundwork for democratic reform.

Using Kazakhstan’s experience as a model others in the region might seek to emulate, speakers highlighted the important progress made in promoting good governance and economic growth, while assessing frankly the challenges that remain.

Finally, participants highlighted the need for the OSCE to work effectively with other organizations active in the Euro-Atlantic/Eurasian space, and in particular for the European Union to clarify its approach to working within and in partnership with the OSCE, on the basis of the Platform for European Security.
SESSION II
OLD AND NEW RISKS AND CHALLENGES TO REGIONAL SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA

Daniel Warner

Is Regional Security Relevant in a Globalized World?

The subject of Session II is “Old and New Risks and Challenges to Regional Security.” I would like to pose some questions with regard to the very concept of regional security. Ever since Halford Mackinder wrote his article “The Geopolitical Pivot of History” in 1904, international relations has been dominated by the paradigm of geopolitics. The importance of place, such as large landmasses or access to seas or warm-water ports, has become dominant.

The dominance of place has been followed by the creation of regional organizations such as the OSCE, the European Union and the African Union. Here in Central Asia we should mention the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), or the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) among others. Nostalgia for a revival of the Silk Road would be another example of the prioritization of geopolitics.

It seems to me that the term nostalgia is the pertinent term to describe all these geographic regional organizations, for if we look at the prioritization of space in describing regional security and regional organization, we are struck by the exclusion of the concept of time. Space without time has no meaning. The acceleration of time has led to a world of globalization, includ-

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7 We are focusing here on geographic organizations as opposed to trade or financial organizations.
ing nanosecond internet information and planes traveling at supersonic speeds. In this situation of deterritorialization,⁸ should we remain nostalgic about outmoded concepts of the politics of place?

I am not suggesting that space has no meaning and that a politics of place is irrelevant in today’s world. I am not suggesting that the OSCE should disappear or that commemorations or birthdays are not important. Today, in fact, is my granddaughter’s birthday. Rather, I am pointing out that regional organizations and concepts of regional security are in many ways a reaction to the reality of globalization. At the same time we are becoming more interdependent, we are seeing greater and greater emphasis on the local. At the same time we are seeing greater and greater fusion in the creation of regional and subregional organizations, we are seeing fission within fragile states such as Syria, Iraq and even votes for separation in such traditional states as Spain. Even within the European Union, the Visegrad countries – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – have proposed a different refugee policy from the larger EU. As a result of globalization, the new conflicts we are witnessing are identity conflicts, very different from traditional territorial battles.

There are some obvious rebuttals to the above position. The most pertinent is that concepts of globalization and universality are Western concepts that are not relevant in much of the world. Cyber security, for example, would be less relevant in parts of the world where access to the internet is limited if non-existent. Corruption in the financial sector would be less important in regions where economies are agriculturally based and large bank transfers extremely limited. Security, in this sense, has different meanings in different places.

Does that rebuttal undermines my argument about the importance of time as opposed to a politics of space? Not at all. On

the contrary. My argument about the politics of time, or chronopolitics⁹, means that instead of observing geopolitics, we should be observing chronopolitics. Instead of looking at where people live and their geopolitical security, we should be looking at how they live, and the time they are living in. An agricultural worker in Afghanistan is in a very different time zone from a hedge fund manager on Wall Street. Their security issues are very different.

Regional security organizations have difficulty responding to these temporal problems. Unless all members of a geographic region have the same chronopolitics, the organization lacks homogeneity. The situation of the Visegrad countries within the European Union is a classic example. Just because countries are geographically near each other does not necessarily mean that they have the same interests and values or security risks and challenges. As a counter-example, there may be a community of the willing that is not geographically contiguous but can cooperate on a specific issue - Singapore, Switzerland and the United States, for example, on banking.

Today’s security threats are more and more global threats. Terrorism is not limited to one region. So, as risks and challenges become globalized, as new risks arise that are not bounded geographically, the idea of regional security organizations to deal with global threats seems to me to be limited, if not outdated. Chronopolitics has not replaced geopolitics, but it must be taken into consideration, just as time must be factored into all spatial questions.

Sanat Kushkumbayev

Problems and Potential for Cooperation of Central Asian Countries on Regional Security Issues

The Central Asian countries preserve the potential for conflicts covering water and energy, transit and transport, trade and economy, and border issues. Regional cooperation is constrained by the growing contradictions in interstate relations, by different priorities in foreign policy, and by the growing disparities in the social and economic development of the states in the region.

The problem of developing the agreed approaches to the water and energy issues continues to be quite relevant in the region. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are among those countries, which suffer a shortage of fresh water, the main reserves of which are concentrated in the upper reaches of the largest Central Asian Rivers of the Syr-Darya and the Amu-Darya, which form predominantly in the mountainous areas of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The said factor is becoming ever more important for the deepening of regional cooperation. Despite the fact that earlier the Central Asian countries agreed to set up an expert group to work out such a form of water management, acceptable to all the countries, regular meetings, both at the highest level and at the level of ministries, have not resulted in the signing of a mutually acceptable package and long-term agreement on the issue concerned.

The most important constituent part of a set of the water and energy problems is the issue of construction and operation conditions of hydroelectric power plants and dams in the upper reaches of large rivers. The “upstream” states - Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan deem the water to be a national strategic resource and seek to switch over this issue to the economic field whereas the “downstream” states - Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Ka-
zakhstan are convinced of the artificiality of this approach and are afraid for water flow stability.

The issue has become particularly acute in the relationship between Tashkent and Dushanbe. Periodic demarches in relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan remain a disturbing phenomenon, which are indicative of the persisting high proneness to conflict in the water and energy sector. The main concern of the Uzbek Government is caused by the decisiveness of Tajikistan in relation to the construction of new large hydraulic works - the Rogun and Sangtuda Hydro-Electric Power Plant-2. In the opinion of Tashkent, it constitutes a threat to the ecological security in the entire region.

In turn, the energy problems in Tajikistan, which have become chronic, significantly affect the social atmosphere in the country. This fact nurtures the growing discontentment with the position and actions of neighboring Uzbekistan in Tajik society and the political elite.

All of this further polarizes the positions of the two neighboring countries even more, since under the existing conditions, the Tajik Authorities have to intensify the energy-operating mode of the country’s hydro-electric power plants at the cost of the mode used for irrigation. There are some problems concerning the operating mode of hydraulic works in Kyrgyzstan, in particular, at the Toktogul Hydro-Electric Power Plant (part of the Cascade of the Naryn Hydro-Electric Power Plant), and the Kambarata Hydro-Electric Power Plants under construction, which affect the Syr-Darya flow, but these said issues are relatively less likely to create conflict.

Having their large water resources and capabilities to generate electric energy, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are suffering a great shortage of electricity. For this reason, the increased operation of hydro-electric power plants in energy mode is designed to cover the energy deficit in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan that periodically manifests itself as a water shortage for irrigation in
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summer in the countries situated downstream of the Amu-Darya and the Syr-Darya. Some politicians in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan declare that water is a commodity like oil and gas, the significant reserves of which are in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Accordingly, in the irrigation period, the switchover from the energy-operating mode of hydroelectric power plants to irrigation mode should be compensated by the “downstream” countries. This issue should be the subject of multi-lateral discussion and accordingly be resolved on a mutually beneficial basis.

The relations in the Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan triangle are, inter alia, especially complicated by the water and energy issues, the situation on the border, the visa system, the migration, and transit and transport issues. The said issues affect the entire atmosphere of international relations in Central Asia and require permanent attention.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, situated in the lower reaches of the most important rivers of Central Asia, have similar positions on a set of issues related to the mode of using trans-border water resources. At the same time, Kazakhstan regards the energy problems of its neighbors in the region - Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan - with understanding. All the countries are interested in a mutually acceptable operation of various hydraulic works - dams and power plants on trans-border rivers. For this purpose, an international comprehensive expert examination of the hydraulic works currently under construction and the potential ones is required.

In case of a positive assessment by independent experts, Kazakhstan, if so desired by its neighbors, is ready to participate in the construction of the said facilities on a mutually beneficial basis. The substance of the position of Astana is to use dialogue negotiation mechanisms to the maximum. To solve the water and energy and many other economic problems in Central Asia, Kazakhstan proposes intensifying regional multilateral cooperation. The package of proposals from Astana includes
the establishment of some sectorial consortia: water and energy, transport and food; special frontier zones; joint investment structures and some others. These initiatives are undoubtedly open to discussion and new proposals from the Central Asian neighbors.

Kazakhstan has announced its aspiration for closer cooperation and intends to consolidate the positive trends both politically (bilateral and multilateral dialogue) and economically (investments in the energy sector, transport and other areas). These efforts are not associated with leadership ambitions but are conditioned by the state of bilateral and multilateral relations of countries in the region, the necessity for ensuring stability and security in the region, and the creation of a favorable foreign economic and foreign policy environment.

Thus, Astana suggests that its Central Asian partners should consistently move towards closer regional cooperation on a pragmatic basis in view of the features of each country.

The economies of the countries in the region mainly remain raw material based. Revenues from exports of a small range of commodities limited to energy resources, metals and some agricultural products, are the key ones for budgetary replenishment in the countries of Central Asia. In fact, the economies of the countries in the region, which are heavily dependent on non-regional markets, exist in parallel modes but do not complement each other. Differences in the legislative regulation of their economic activity are on the increase.

As we know, small and medium businesses play an important role in the effective fully-fledged economic interaction between different countries as the foundation of the middle class, whose interests often predetermine the political activity of the elites. In the countries of Central Asia, small and medium businesses, with few variations, are generally in an undeveloped state and are not able to make a significant impact in terms of
formation of the national agenda, and all the more the regional agenda.

The power-property correlation in the Central Asian countries is predominantly determined by the control of the ruling elites over the key revenue industries: gas-, oil-, metallurgical-, cotton-, grain-, and some other raw-material industries, i.e. by the control of relatively big business, the interests of which are solely focused on the export of raw materials and the servicing of the relevant infrastructure. Existing in parallel and often offering the same range of primary goods in the world markets, big business of the countries in the region and its associated elites are limited by the minimum level of interaction (coordination), sufficient for tactical development of the said industries and the servicing of the relevant infrastructure, without establishing a deeper economic relationship, which could become the basis for closer regional cooperation. All of this determines the major problem – the absence of motivation and the political will of the elites in the countries of the region to develop in-depth inter-country cooperation.

Thus, the relationship between the Central Asian countries has currently undergone significant changes. The regional relations that remained static for so long have taken on new features. Relations with the leading external players and those between the major countries of the region - Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan - remain the key ones for the regional climate. However, the political climate in the region largely impacts on economic cooperation. Furthermore, along with the existing problems, some new ones have emerged that certainly bear new risks for regional stability. The problems of a mutually acceptable distribution of water resources, transit and transport issues, poorly regulated migration processes, which will be on the agenda of bilateral and multilateral meetings, have become chronic.

Under the said conditions, in our opinion, it will be more rational to focus on the most pressing and so-to-speak “urgent
regional problems” affecting the interests of various (economically active, first of all) population groups in the countries of the region. It is clear that the implementation of these projects should be mutually acceptable and mutually beneficial. At the macro level, the water-energy problems, the transport transit issues, the project implementation in the agricultural sector, continue to be the above-mentioned trends with a view to setting up a food consortium.

The effective inter-country cooperation in Central Asia can be achieved by solving such extremely pressing issues as those related to the energy complex and water resource distribution. Transport transit, border control issues and labor migration are among the vitally important problems. From our point of view, it will be possible to talk about a step-by-step building-up of regional cooperation by achieving, first, an effective solution to the key problems in these areas and by creating a stable time-proven mechanism of conflict resolution on the said issues.
Vladimir Paramonov

**Major Problems in the Way of Cooperation in Central Asia to Counter Threats and Challenges to Regional Security: the View from Uzbekistan**

Due to the virtual absence of real, profound and large-scale forms of multilateral cooperation between the countries of Central Asia (CA), including the one to counter common threats and challenges to regional security, the major problems in this area can only be assessed by considering the position of each individual CA country. These positions are determined by a complex combination of factors related to conditions under which these countries exist, their foreign and domestic policies, models and directions of their development, interests and needs, capabilities and resources.

**I. Kazakhstan’s Position**

Kazakhstan’s position to a large extent is explained by:

1. (1) a major reduction in recent years of Astana’s possibilities for external financing, which makes the very task of promoting regional cooperation and integration secondary;

2. (2) focusing on economic and political interaction, predominantly with the main extra-regional forces (Russia, China and the West, that in addition play a key role in the development of strategic branches of Kazakhstan’s economy), which excludes CA countries from the priority areas of Astana’s external strategy;

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10 Conceptually the idea of the approach reflected in this presentation was for the first time delivered at the Conference: ‘Regional Cooperation as a Factor of Peace and Stability in Central Asia’, organized by the UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) in Almaty, Kazakhstan, November 20-21, 2014.
(3) a policy of increasing maneuvering and balancing between the main extra-regional forces, and in general, the economic policy envisaging simultaneous engagement in regionalization and globalization processes. Consequently, all of that dramatically limits the ability of Kazakhstan to pursue a consistent and long-term regional policy, especially under conditions where approaches of other CA countries to regionalization and globalization processes considerably differ, and in a number of cases fundamentally contradict those of Astana.

In this connection, the relations with CA countries are obviously of secondary importance to Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian path itself (except for Uzbek and Kyrgyz ‘segments’) objectively is not part of the external priorities of Kazakhstan, including in terms of a joint response to threats and challenges to regional security.

**II. Kyrgyzstan’s Position**

Kyrgyzstan’s position to a large extent is explained by:

(1) a disastrous social and economic situation in this country, political instability and the increasingly pressing issue of internal integrity, which forces Bishkek to focus on interaction with the main extra-regional forces (Russia, China and the West), as it is only they (and not the CA countries) that are able to provide significant financial aid and guarantees of security;

(2) increasing internal political and inter-clan disagreements in this country which do not allow the Kyrgyz elite to even come close to working on a more-or-less unified vision of further ways of Kyrgyzstan’s development, thereby making it practically impossible to form any integral policy, including regional cooperation issues;

(3) active balancing/maneuvering of various Kyrgyz political groups not only between the major extra-regional forc-
es, but also even between less influential external players (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, international institutions and organizations). This rules out the necessity for Kyrgyzstan to form any distinct regional policy and removes the Central Asian path (except for its Kazakhstani ‘segment’) from any significant priority list.

Under these conditions, within Central Asia itself, Kyrgyzstan will definitely continue to pay most attention only to three neighboring countries, including in the area of joint response to threats and challenges to regional security: to the greatest extent to Kazakhstan, to a somewhat lesser extent to Uzbekistan, and to a quite insignificant extent to Tajikistan.

**III. Tajikistan’s Position**

Tajikistan’s position to a large extent is explained by:

1) deepening economic isolation of this country from other CA states under the conditions of its geographical blockade by the territory of Uzbekistan and, to put it mildly, cold relations between Dushanbe and Tashkent, making it practically impossible for Tajikistan to actively participate in the processes of interaction in the region;

2) focusing on economic and political cooperation predominantly with the three most friendly countries, China, Russia and Iran, which are also capable of rendering regular financial and military aid, which in itself relegates the issues of regional cooperation to the ranks of secondary ones for Tajikistan;

3) growing internal instability, making the Tajik leadership more and more focused mainly on internal problems and tasks, leaving the development of any approaches to the issues of regional cooperation out of the scope of the country’s priorities.
Nevertheless, the focus of Tajikistan’s foreign policy is still on Uzbekistan; and the nature of relations with the latter will, to a great degree, determine the prospects of Dushanbe’s involvement/non-involvement in the processes of regional interaction, and equally, perhaps, also the very future of this country. Although Tajikistan is making certain efforts to develop cooperation with Turkmenistan (as a possible alternative to Uzbekistan as a supplier of gas and electricity during wintertime), with neighboring Kyrgyzstan (as an alternative to the Uzbekistan transport corridor) and with Kazakhstan (as an important supplier of food and oil products), the practical results of it are still nevertheless insignificant. In many respects, this situation is related to the objective fact that economically effective transport communication of Tajikistan with other CA countries is only possible through the territory of Uzbekistan, and as a consequence, only with normalization of relations with the latter.

As a result, finding itself isolated from other countries of the region, Tajikistan will face growing threats and challenges to security. Dushanbe most likely will not be able to counter those threats alone, and by engaging ‘external resources’ will lose its independence (fully or partially). In this connection, the scenario of joining the Eurasian Economic Union or the scenario of economic absorption by China (which is quite probable) are in general relatively favorable for Tajikistan: both can lead to stabilization of the country and to a change in modern policy. The alternative to those two scenarios can only be the scenario of Tajikistan’s destabilization.

IV. Turkmenistan’s Position

Turkmenistan’s position to a large extent is explained by:

(1) Ashgabat’s exclusive reliance on a bilateral format of relations, which negates the very necessity for and possibil-
ity of Turkmenistan’s active participation in the processes of multilateral interaction in Central Asia;

(2) the isolationist and neutral foreign policy of Ashgabat, which implies not only rejection of any close forms of multilateral cooperation, let alone its integration, but also any need for ‘protection from external influence’, including neighboring CA countries;

(3) the pronounced focusing of Turkmenistan on the development of cooperation mainly with major gas consumers (China, Russia and Iran) and at the same time on politico-diplomatic consultations with the EU and Turkey regarding potential gas supply to Europe bypassing Russia. On the one hand, this determines the secondary character of the intra-regional ties themselves, except for the inevitable interaction with the transit countries, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. On the other hand, this suggests Ashgabat’s principal lack of interest to share revenues from selling its gas for the sake of supporting ‘abstract ideas’ of regional cooperation and/or to supply gas to such insolvent countries as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

As a result, with regard to Central Asia, Turkmenistan is seeking to only maintain the already achieved level of cooperation mainly with neighboring countries, which at the same time are the transit countries for Turkmen gas, namely Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. In case the project of constructing Line 4 of the “Turkmenistan – China” pipeline through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is implemented, we should expect a certain revitalization of relations between Ashgabat and Dushanbe and also between Ashgabat and Bishkek. It seems that Turkmenistan would be interested in closer and more profound forms of cooperation with the countries of the region, primarily with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, most likely only in case of direct threat to the country’s security, which is so far unlikely. In this context, Ashgabat undoubtedly would refrain from interfering in relations between other CA
states, including supporting any one of the parties in a real or potential conflict.

V. Uzbekistan’s Position

Uzbekistan’s position to a large extent is explained by:

1. Tashkent’s traditional emphasis on a predominantly bilateral format of relations, which, by definition, does not envisage the development of multilateral ties either in the region itself, or beyond it;

2. Growing focus on strengthening exclusively its own security at the expense of using mainly internal and extra-regional resources, that rejects the very usefulness of having close and profound forms of cooperation with CA countries, and with some of which (half of them) Uzbekistan still has acute disagreements;

3. A strategy of active maneuvering and balancing between the main extra-regional forces (Russia, China and the West), and within that, the desire to maintain an equal distance from all of them. The extra-regional forces understand, project and promote models, schemes, mechanisms and algorithms of regional cooperation in different ways, but essentially are not interested in cooperation, let alone integration, in the CA format. As a result, on the one hand, this suggests that Uzbekistan is not interested in choosing only one of the ‘integration’ projects proposed (‘imposed’) from outside. On the other hand, it determines Uzbekistan’s lack of interest in regional cooperation, let alone integration, because striving for that would mean direct threat or challenge to the interests of all main extra-regional forces, with which Tashkent, obviously, does not want to have confrontation.

Within Central Asia itself, Uzbekistan is relying on the development only of separate elements of bilateral cooperation with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, at the same time distancing itself more and more from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In general, regional cooperation issues are clearly not significant for
Uzbekistan. The Central Asian path itself is considered more and more by Tashkent through the lens of national security threats emanating from the neighboring countries of the region, and to an ever lesser degree, through the lens of joint countering threats and challenges to regional security.

In general, the major problems standing in the way of cooperation between Central Asian countries, regarding response to common threats and challenges to regional security, are first of all explained by their lack of understanding of the benefits of such interaction. Where some elements of such understanding exist, at least at the theoretical level, in practice there are no real mechanisms designed to generate common interests of Central Asian countries and regularly ‘persuade’ them of the necessity for regional cooperation.

First, in the political sphere, where there is no unifying idea/project, the CA countries have no other choice but to develop purely narrow national projects and corresponding mechanisms (for example, to promote ideas of national independence, national identity, national uniqueness), which in their turn lead only to strengthening national egotism. It would seem that to a large extent the forced focusing of CA countries exclusively on narrow national interests predetermines their growing unpreparedness to give up these interests in favor of common interests, namely the interests of regional cooperation, including countering common threats and challenges to security.

Second, in the economic sphere, CA countries are forced to concentrate mainly on extra-regional foreign economic ties that are many times more significant for them than intra-regional ones. It appears that it is the objective, extremely strong dependence of CA countries (commercial, financial, technological) on extra-regional ties, against a backdrop of the absence of a similar dependence on intra-regional ties, that determines very limited opportunities of the regional states (even if they had had this intention) to develop regional cooperation, and the weak-
ness itself of the economic basis to counter common threats and challenges to security.

Third, in the social sphere, where there are no political and economic foundations for regional cooperation, a unified social project of an international character would not take shape. It would appear that, due to the above, in the CA countries, only those ideas and projects would be developed that are related to narrow, national, political projects and narrow, national, economic priorities, which promote only national identity and pride among the population, and in a number of cases, the image of an external enemy (‘guilty of all problems’).

Finally, the main problem, which could be resolved under these complex conditions, is, first of all, the absence of a sustainable mechanism of systemic analytical support and facilitation of the process of regional cooperation, including the process of countering common threats and challenges to security.

During the entire post-Soviet period there were no serious attempts to organize and conduct even isolated significant studies on the topic of regional cooperation, let alone the creation of mechanisms to stimulate cooperation and integration in Central Asia; none of the states of the region ever set such a goal for themselves.

Mainly due to this reason, among the ruling elites and even among the expert circles of the countries of the region, there was no, is no and most likely will be no understanding of precisely which algorithms have to be followed in order to initiate the process of regional cooperation. This problem is also exacerbated by the fact that the CA states do not have their own experience of strategic planning, as during the Soviet time these activities were the exclusive prerogative of Moscow, and national elites merely implemented the directives, and political and other instructions given by the Center.
Delia Rahmonova-Schwarz

OSCE and Afghanistan: Engagement and Strategic Co-operation

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The previous speakers have raised the issue of Afghanistan, and I would like to complement the observations made by others and say a few words about the OSCE’s efforts in this regard.

Kazakhstan’s role in the OSCE’s Engagement with Afghanistan is highly noteworthy. I am honored to be here today in the country which contributed significantly to the implementation of the relevant OSCE Ministerial Council Decisions regarding Afghanistan. Some of you may remember the political and financial support of the 2010 Kazakh Chairmanship for the OSCE Engagement with Afghanistan, throughout its Chairmanship year and beyond. In this regard, allow me to extend sincere appreciation to Kazakhstan for the extra-budgetary contributions to the Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe, the sponsoring of Afghan drug police at the training events in Domodedovo, Russia, and the organization of a number of events here in Kazakhstan involving Afghan participants. We greatly appreciated the participation of Deputy Foreign Minister Ashikbayev as a speaker on the Panel on Afghanistan at the Security Day event of the Secretary General in Washington earlier this year.

Kazakhstan is also the country which hosted the Third Ministerial Council Meeting of the Heart of Asia - Istanbul Process on 26 April 2013 in Almaty, which resulted in a joint declaration. This concluding document called for steadfast support of the international community in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and rehabilitation process. The appeal made to the international community in this document is still relevant today, especially af-
ter the withdrawal of ISAF troops last year and mostly negative developments in Afghanistan’s security situation in the light of major political, military and economic changes.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

This panel is about Old and New Risks and Challenges to Regional Security. Transnational threats stemming from Afghanistan are not a new phenomenon and, indeed, continue to be a major challenge for the region’s stability. The risks of spill-over effects have existed throughout almost four decades of war. Destabilizing factors, however, have taken new shapes and increased in scope over time. In order to address these challenges, the international community needs to join efforts to foster stability and prosperity in and around Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is a strategically crucial Asian Partner for Cooperation. This partnership began in 2003, and in December 2007, at the Ministerial Council meeting in Madrid, where the OSCE participating States adopted a document called the Decision on OSCE Engagement with Afghanistan. This engagement began with an acknowledgement that security in the OSCE region is inseparable from developments in its neighbouring countries. With this landmark document, the OSCE highlighted its strong commitment to intensifying its support to Afghanistan.

The OSCE began by focusing its activities on strengthening the security and management of borders between the Central Asian States and Afghanistan, subsequently expanding into projects related to combating terrorism and trafficking in small arms, light weapons, illicit drugs and human beings. In addition to the politico-military dimension, projects have since taken into account the economic and environmental as well as human dimension aspects of security, including education, empowerment of women and continued assistance to election processes. In her
presentation, Dr. Tadjbakhsh highlighted the importance of carrying out projects in the border areas of Tajikistan and Afghanistan. In response to this interesting proposal, I would like to explain that Afghanistan is not a participating State of the OSCE and hence there is no OSCE field presence there. The OSCE projects are implemented almost exclusively outside Afghanistan. The majority of the projects are funded through extra-budgetary contributions. The OSCE’s activities related to Afghanistan are mainly implemented by the OSCE’s field operations in Central Asia in close co-ordination and co-operation with units in the OSCE Secretariat, notably the Transnational Threats Department. Allow me to mention some of our flagship projects:

- As Tajikistan shares the longest border with Afghanistan, projects focusing on border management and security are of the utmost importance, especially in the context of the current increase of insurgency activities in the areas close to the border. Training events, conferences and round tables sponsored by the Office in Tajikistan take place, which involve Afghan participants; and two large-scale programs should be mentioned.
  - The Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe provides expert-level training for border experts from OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation. Up to now almost 700 Afghans have been trained.
  - The Patrol, Programming and Leadership project on the Tajik-Afghan border focuses on green border surveillance, field medical training, orienteering and other capacity-building activities for operations in the field. The Office in Tajikistan has up to now trained hundreds of Afghans.
  - In Kyrgyzstan, at the Customs Training Centre in Bishkek since November 2013, Afghan customs officers have been receiving training on legislation and enforcement and customs law in Afghanistan, customs tariffs, valuation and intellectual property rights. Up to now a total of 150 Afghan customs officers have been trained.
• The OSCE attaches special attention to the promotion of education. The OSCE Academy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, offers full scholarships to students from Central Asia and Afghanistan to earn Master’s Degrees in Politics and Security and in Economic Governance and Development. Since 2009, over 220 students have graduated from the Academy, including about 20 from Afghanistan. Currently, for the 2015-2016 academic year, eight students (four in each program) from Afghanistan are enrolled.

• Empowerment of women remains of high relevance. Our Gender Section this year in May organized the visit of a high-level female Afghan delegation to Vienna. The delegation with participants representing politics, media and civil society was led by the Afghan Minister for Women’s Affairs who also gave a presentation to the Permanent Council on women’s empowerment and the role of women in the reconciliation process in Afghanistan. In September we also received the Afghan Counter Narcotics Minister in Vienna. She participated at a high-level conference on countering illicit drugs, hosted by the Serbian Chairmanship. We have also been trying to increase the number of female participants at all our training events.

As the security situation in Afghanistan will continue to affect the stability of Central Asia and the OSCE area at large, the Organization will continue to rely on its field presences in the five Central Asian participating States to provide targeted assistance in key areas and to promote regional security, stability and economic development. In so doing, the Organization will work with other international actors such as the United Nations and the European Union, as well as with the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Since Afghanistan’s partnership began in 2003, the country has undergone important transitions. Last year was a year of
significant milestones for Afghanistan ending with the election of a new President, the establishment of a Unity Government and the formal end of mission for the International Security Assistance Force. Afghanistan is currently at the start of its “Transformation Decade” spanning the period from 2015 to 2024. It is widely acknowledged that the future of the country is uncertain, and there are challenges with the international donor support. What is crucial, however, is that the new Afghan leadership has been demonstrating a willingness and commitment to continued co-operation with regional and international organizations and Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors. This has been evidenced by President Ghani’s official meetings with his Central Asian counterparts in recent months.

This year the Afghan Unity Government has been emphasizing regional economic connectivity and combating terrorism as lead topics at high-level events including RECCA VI (Conference on the Regional Economic Co-operation in Afghanistan) and the Fourth Heart of Asia - Istanbul Process Ministerial Meeting in Islamabad on 8 December 2014. The OSCE can assist Afghanistan through its field presences in Central Asia to contribute to strengthening stability in the region. Closer practical and institutional co-operation will be necessary to effectively prevent transnational threats from spreading across the region’s borders. An alarming growth of terrorist networks which are recruiting Central Asian and Afghan combatants is of increasing concern. All of these opportunities and challenges could benefit from greater bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In this context, the OSCE stands ready to enhance its role as a platform for practical, forward-looking regional co-operation and dialogue among all stakeholders, providing targeted support in key areas to promote regional security, stability and economic development.

I would like to conclude with a quotation from the Heart of Asia Ministerial Declaration which was hosted by Kazakhstan
Accomplishments and challenges for the OSCE on the anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Astana Summit (2010)

two years ago, as I believe the message of this Declaration still remains strong and valid:

“6. Our security is indivisible. We believe the region plays a vital role in ensuring a stable, peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan, while long-term stability and prosperity in the region require peace and stability in Afghanistan. The international community, as well as the region, have a shared responsibility and common interest to work together for the sake of Afghanistan and the region as a whole. [...]”\(^\text{11}\)

Thank you for your attention.

Current Problems of Countering Transnational Drug-Related Crime in Central Asia

“The spread of illicit drugs, including opiates from Afghanistan, synthetic drugs ... and the diversion of chemical precursors, continue to be one of the most dangerous and profitable forms of transnational organized crime worldwide and across the OSCE area.” is highlighted in the OSCE Concept adopted in 2012. Now in 2015 it is still of the same relevance.

In my presentation I would like to elaborate on the problems of countering transnational drug-related crime which, being one of the modern global threats, negatively affects the general level of crime, leads to narcotization of society and threatens the genetic pool of each state. As is known, it is one of the main sources of funding terrorism.

Unfortunately, according to assessments of UN analysts, from 15% to 30% of opiates exported from Afghanistan, that is, nearly 90 tonnes, are brought by the so-called Northern Route, which runs through the territory of Central Asian states to Russia and further to Europe.

At the same time, despite the huge funds allocated by the global community for countering the drug threat, we still have not found the answer to simple questions.

Taking advantage of the presence at this authoritative forum of leading academics specializing in security problems as well as taking into account the huge contribution made by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the Central Asian region, I would like to voice the most pressing problems of combating organized drug-related crime.

First of all, as practice shows, we lack science-based methodologies of calculating the drug market demand of Central
Asian countries. What proportion of the smuggled transit stays in the region? How much is needed for drug-users in Russia and how much goes further to Europe?

Moreover, there has been no methodological development of criteria for assessing the drug situation in the region.

Another problem logically follows. Currently, in our opinion, there is a need for introduction of drug-threat assessment criteria, similar to the levels of terror threat. In other words, there is a real need for an integrated approach to establish uniform standards of the drug-threat level.

It is encouraging to note that the OSCE mandate has already, long ago, gone beyond Europe, and this authoritative Organization brings together 57 countries located in North America, Europe and Central Asia. In this connection, using the opportunity, I would like to draw your attention to the following salient issues that require joint efforts both on the part of the countries in the region and the global community.

In recent years, the problem of the spread of synthetic narcotics has caused the greatest concern worldwide, including the Central Asian region. There has been a rapid increase in the use of the so-called smoking blends (mixes, bath salts, spices and so on), which have more severe consequences even compared to heroin and cannabis, due to their legality and immediate negative impact on people, as well as the impossibility of timely legislative response to new challenges.

For example, in the autumn of 2014 in Russia there were recorded mass poisonings from smoking blends, with a fatal outcome. During the course of two weeks in September, over 700 cases of poisoning with a new, dangerous kind of ‘spice’ were registered; from this number, more than 25 young people died. In July this year in Poland, 317 teenage boys and girls were hospitalized after smoking mixes.

In terms of practical assistance for the region, CARICC proposes that a regional drug laboratory be established, possibly
under the aegis of the OSCE. This laboratory could not only provide expert evaluation of synthetic narcotics seized in Central Asia, but also perform the functions of an information and research center aimed at the prevention and forecasting of the situation in this area. For our part, we could provide real assistance both in organizational and practical terms.

As is known, apart from the Afghan drugs, the drug situation in Central Asia is noticeably influenced by the existence of huge areas of wild-growing cannabis in the Chu Valley. According to experts, focal areas of cannabis growth cover over 140,000 hectares in the Chu Valley, which is located in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

Furthermore, there is no coordinated program for cannabis between the states in the region. In our view, it is necessary to continue the work on detailed mapping and expanding the zone of coverage of the whole area of wild cannabis and ephedra growth in Central Asian countries, in order to be able to present proposals to governments on their legal use, for example, in medicine, cosmetics and the textile industry.

Everything listed above is just a thesis-type statement of the most pressing problems requiring joint efforts of competent bodies of the states in the region, intellectual capacity of the academic community, as well as elaboration of a common strategy of action from the perspective of such authoritative international organizations as the UN and the OSCE.

However, for a radical resolution of the stated problems we should not rely solely on state support - it is important to have wide involvement of international and non-governmental organizations.

In this connection it is difficult to overestimate the timeliness of the establishment of the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors (CARICC), under the aegis of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.
The main purpose of its creation is the coordination of efforts of competent bodies of member states in countering transnational drug-related crime. Seven states, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, are members of CARICC.

Our possibilities of rendering practical assistance to competent bodies of member states and other CARICC partners have been significantly expanded, due to fruitful cooperation of the Center with competent bodies of observer states and competent international organizations.

At present, fourteen countries of Europe, Asia and North America (Austria, Afghanistan, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Canada, China, Pakistan, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine, France, Finland and the USA) and two competent international organizations (Interpol and SELEC) have observer status with CARICC.

As a result of interaction between competent authorities of CARICC member states and other partners with the coordinating role of the Center, 32 international channels for supplying drugs and precursors to Central Asia, Russia, countries of Europe, China, Malaysia, Canada, Turkey and Afghanistan have been exposed. Over 6,286 kilograms of illicitly trafficked narcotic substances have been seized; 71 drug lords and active members of transnational drug-related criminal groups have been arrested.

I would like to briefly mention the unique nature of CARICC as compared to the other international structures of the CIS and competent bodies of Central Asian states:

1. The international status of the Organization enables us to contact, without restriction, our partners throughout the world (officially: 7 member states, 14 observer states and about 20 international organizations).

2. The existence of a Centralized Data Bank means the possibility of being able to accumulate the bulk of information from open and closed sources.
3. The accumulated experience in conducting international operations, including ‘controlled deliveries’ of a bilateral and multilateral format, both short- and long-term.


5. The existence of the institution of Duly Authorized Representatives – liaison officers – is a great opportunity to promptly resolve the issues of interaction with our partners, including online.

6. We are actively using several encrypted channels to transfer information; Interpol I/24/7, WCO ‘Cencom2’, CARICC’s own closed communication channel and other cryptographic modules.

7. Over a relatively short period of time, a positive image of the Organization has been developed.

Today, CARICC’s potential allows the resolving of larger-scale tasks. This has also been made possible by excellent conditions created by the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the availability of high-quality equipment and competent personnel, which has undergone a variety of training and, is ready to move forward.

Taking into account that drug-related crime is acquiring increasingly more organized forms and has a transnational character, effective interaction between the states in the region and the authoritative international organizations is a prerequisite for successful countering of the illicit trafficking of drugs.

In my turn, I would like to assure you that any useful initiatives in combating drug-related business will always be met with due understanding and all-round assistance on our part.

Thank you for your attention.
The Eurasian Economic Union Against Afghan Drug Trafficking

The problem of drug trafficking from Afghanistan is not new; it emerged at the beginning of the 1990s. The jump in the manufacturing of narcotic substances caused a real shock at that time, and the states in the region were absolutely not prepared for that. It was a mass phenomenon that involved practically the entire population of Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan). The region fully depended on supplies from Moscow (in Soviet times it was a subsidized zone) and suddenly it became hungry and poor. Hundreds of trucks with all the necessary supplies for the Badakhshan people moved every day along the high-mountain Osh-Khorog road to support them. However, the Soviet Union collapsed and the center, together with the so-called ‘Moscow Procurement’, ceased to exist.

Without its own industry or even more-or-less developed agriculture, the people of Badakhshan were feverishly looking for a way out of a situation aggravated by the start of the Civil War and streams of refugees. They had no choice but to turn to Afghanistan; however, their neighbors could give them nothing but opium and wild barter through Pyanj started. Everything was used for trading: old bicycles, cooking pots, a pair of boots could be exchanged for 3 kilos of opium. The part of Badakhshan on the Afghan side was even poorer.

Virtually the whole of the population of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) was involved in smuggling. The field commanders that I met at that time in Pamir said: “If we get help we will sort it out; today we still can control the drug traffic but tomorrow we will not be able to do it”; and that is exactly what happened. For well-known reasons neither Bishkek nor Dushanbe could provide substantial assistance to the region.
When, after a couple of years, opium was replaced by heroin, there was not such a mass involvement, all the small players were removed, but organized crime emerged. With the increasing volume of drugs trafficked along the entire Afghan-Tajik and Tajik-Afghan borders, it was replaced by transnational crime in the shape of a serious system actively confronting the state. A money laundering system developed, for example, through the gambling business, construction of elite housing and other areas.

Now, Afghan drug trafficking still dominates the region. The reality is such that heroin constitutes the basis for the region’s black market, and drug trafficking along the so-called Northern Route through Central Asia is targeting Russia.

Afghan drug manufacturing and drug trafficking vary according to their remoteness from the source and country’s counter-measures, and have a negative impact on most of the social and political processes in the region:

- causing and supporting the growth of transnational organized crime;
- feeding terrorism;
- creating and strengthening drug corruption, for example, the so-called “red heroin”, which exists to some degree or other in all the countries in the region, that is, a narcotic in the possession of employees of law-enforcement bodies. However, some countries such as Kyrgyzstan declare the problem openly and are looking for solutions; others prefer to keep silent about it.
- determining the growth of a shadow economy and narconomics (economy based upon drug manufacturing and drug trafficking)
- causing an increase in the mortality rate and socially significant infections (HIV, hepatitis C)

The intensity and long-term character of drug supplies and their cynical nature allow the introduction of a new term, ‘narcocoaggression’, a phenomenon causing significant damage to the
very idea of statehood and sovereignty of the majority of the states of the Central Asian sub-region.

At its initial stage, at the very beginning of the 1990s, every country was looking for its own response to this challenge. This was mainly manifested in strengthening power structures and security agencies; but soon it became clear that it was not at all enough.

Then, on integrating into the international drug-combating process, regional states joined the three existing UN anti-drug conventions, and concluded unilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements both at agency and at intergovernmental level. The first action was the deployment, upon request of the Tajik Government, of special battalions from Kazakhstan and, subsequently, from Kyrgyzstan in the territory of GBAO.

At present, the SCO and the CSTO also play a significant role in the anti-drug cooperation process. Along with exercising combat shakedown, the Collective Security Treaty Organization should also make the following tasks top priority: detailed elaboration of interaction between the army, the border force, customs, power structures, local authorities and population in the high-intensity drug trafficking areas, coinciding, as a rule, with the potential insurgency routes.

Another two organizations, whose level of efficiency in countering the drug threat may become very high indeed, have recently emerged on the sub-regional political arena. I am speaking about the Customs Union (CU) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).

Unfortunately, after the accession of Kyrgyzstan to these Organizations, myths appeared (by the way, not substantiated) that drug trafficking through the Kyrgyz-Kazakh border had become even more intense due to the elimination of customs inspections. Certainly, the Kyrgyz border force should immediately place eradicating drug trafficking among its top priorities; but again, statistics do not show its increase.
On the other hand, the existence of the problem and its potential aggravation are dictating the necessity to improve the protection of the southern border of the CU and the EEU from smuggling in general, and drug trafficking in particular, from illegal migration, arms trade and, last but not least, incursion by armed gangs.

I want to emphasize: NOT the state border of the Kyrgyz Republic, but the southern borders of the Customs and Eurasian Economic Unions... The difference, as we see it, is significant.

When only preparing for accession to the said unions and developing the ‘Road Map’, we suggested, as one of the conditions, that we should insist not on the joint physical border protection but on strengthening it with appropriate technical equipment, and the training of contracted border guards to operate highly complicated and rather expensive equipment.

Unfortunately, we were not heeded at that stage. Probably today, even if post-factum, it would make sense to come back to the consideration of this proposal. I am absolutely convinced that its relevance has not only not diminished but, on the contrary, has increased.

Thus, in mid-October 2015 Kazakhstan hosted the Summit of the CIS heads of State that discussed the issues of countering the threat of destabilization of Central Asia and Kazakhstan by terrorists, radical Islamists and other forces interested in destabilizing the region. As already highlighted earlier, all of them consider the narcobusiness to be one of the main resources for their activity.

The general context of most of the presentations at the Summit, one way or another, boiled down to the fact that at present Central Asia and Kazakhstan are seen as security outposts. In case of escalation of the situation and conflict potential spiraling out of control this will result in a genuine humanitarian disaster that will affect not only Central Asian republics themselves but also their close neighbors, including Russia and China.
“Terrorists of all sorts are becoming increasingly more influential and do not conceal their plans for further expansion. One of their goals is to break into the Central Asian region. It is important for us to be ready to respond to such a scenario in a coordinated manner”, - such was the thrust of almost every second presentation made at that representative event.

The main documents adopted at the Summit included the ‘Concept for military cooperation of CIS Member States until 2020’, the ‘Program for strengthening border security on external borders’ and the ‘Decision to establish a group of border and other power agencies to resolve the crisis situation on external borders’ (first of all, apparently, on the Tajik-Afghan border). According to the Russian President, these documents will “significantly increase the effectiveness of our joint efforts in combating transnational crime and drug-trafficking”.

Such an approach encourages optimism...
New Context, New Threats and New Risks to Security in Central Asia

At the time when the Helsinki Final Act was signed on our behalf and when the entire Soviet nation was welcoming home its architect of peace, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, we did not understand the essence of that Act very well. At that time, we talked a lot about it, but could only guess the importance of its role in the stabilization of Europe and part of Asia. However, forty years later, when we begin to analyze the process against the background of changes in the geopolitical situation, confrontation of world powers, great ambitions of multifarious states, we understand that the people who had developed this document and launched this process were ingenious, and in their time did not allow the situation to aggravate, by using different methods, including by such measures as the signing of the Final Act, declaring state leaders as architects of peace, and so on.

As always, the Central Asian community expected a lot from such important events as, first of all, the implementation of the Final Act; second, the OSCE Chairmanship by the first Central Asian state, Kazakhstan; and third, the long-awaited summit in Astana. Despite great efforts on behalf of Kazakhstani diplomats and the OSCE, the holding of the Summit in Astana after ten years of inaction caused a storm of misunderstandings. It is indicative of the fact there were and still are many unresolved problems in the OSCE space.

In the Eurasian space, there is such an accumulation of problems that it is pointless to count them. We need a new way of thinking, new approaches, and new methods for their resolution. We need new principles of conflict resolution and a new strategy to maintain a fragile peace and the barely established stability in the Central Asian region. We are skating on thin ice
Accomplishments and challenges for the OSCE on the anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Astana Summit (2010)

and understand what threatens us but not everything depends on us. There are states that are more led, and this creates a certain atmosphere around us. Consequently, no matter how hard we try and sacrifice ourselves on the way to maintaining stability, it is still very difficult to stand up to those evil forces, mentioned before. Europe itself does not know what to do either. However, we all need to know that we have to go back to where we started, namely, when all of us in Europe united against evil. We created the CSCE, then the OSCE for the sake of peace and stability in Europe. At present, we need the same stance on Asia, Africa and America. We need to have a global vision of peace and stability to rely upon the concept of indivisible security. We need to understand that if the situation is bad in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Iran or anywhere else, it will not be better in Europe. Even the quite successful experience of peaceful settlement in Tajikistan, already known to us, will not help. This is because there is an ongoing overall radicalization of Islam due to certain geopolitical projects, and in Tajikistan, those, who were connected with such forces in the Middle East, are also being radicalized. Furthermore, no dialogues with them will help us. This is because they are pushed towards war, and not to resolution of social and economic problems of modern society. They should revive the fundamentals of religion despite the changed conditions, leading to radicalization of the other side against them.

The secular regimes will have to take steps for their protection and provision of security. However, the result will be a bloodbath, destruction of cities, towns and villages, schools and hospitals, infrastructure, loss of historical monuments, deterioration of health of entire nations, limitation of the right to development, to democracy, to implementation of laws, violation of the rights of man and citizen and similar. The OSCE model helped us at the end of the last century because at that time there was no such extensive network of religious terrorist organiza-
tions, some political groups were not so active and aggressive, there was no such impudence and betrayal of Motherland and the oath to be faithful to one’s own state, there was no such parallel existence of ideologies with equal powers of influence, and certain groups of citizens did not have the psychology of corruption. At present to give in to terrorists because they are your fellow countrymen means to burn your own house with your own hands. We need to clearly differentiate a criminal from a citizen. Showing leniency to those who are corrupt means destruction of the state and of trust of the population in authorities. The experience of our country has confirmed this several times. During the years of independence, there has hardly been a year when in Tajikistan either radicalized elements, or drug mafia, or criminals have not raised their heads in this or that form. Every time it caused concern for the authorities, the people of Tajikistan, and our friends and allies. The state spent huge resources on counter-organized crime, terrorism, separatism, the drug mafia, corruption, and threats related to those on the other side of its borders. The fact that Tajikistan has become one of the safest countries not only in the post-Soviet space, but also in the whole world, and its capital is among the top ten such cities, is the result of the successful policy of the state and the professional actions of law-enforcement agencies of Tajikistan.

If then the whole region is turned into a raging cauldron, even the aerospace forces of developed countries will not help us. This will be like having a fire-breathing dragon inside our own house. This horror will shock everyone to the extent that it will take a long time for people to recover. We must not promote the development of terrorism; we must destroy this phenomenon by any means available to us. Those who nurture serpents in their bosoms will one day be bitten by them. However, then there will be a much higher price to pay. We should unite before these events happen, and we should not turn allies into enemies. This particularly concerns post-Soviet states, which have some-
Accomplishments and challenges for the OSCE on the anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Astana Summit (2010)

thing to be proud of and on the basis of which they can unite for the sake of maintaining peace and stability.

Tajikistan has wide-ranging cooperation with the OSCE on the issues of further interaction in strengthening borders, combating drug trafficking and cooperation in human, environmental and economic dimensions. As a member of the Organization, Tajikistan always supported the initiatives of Kazakhstan, especially on those issues directly concerned with the interests of our Republic and the region in general. Our Strategic Research Center under the President of Tajikistan, jointly with the Embassy of Kazakhstan, carried out a series of events, both prior to and in the course of Kazakhstan’s Chairmanship, which became important milestones in the political life of the Republic.

Independent states need support to preserve their sovereignty. International organizations, like the OSCE, can play a significant role in that. With the growth of interdependence of modern states, the international and internal aspects of their policies are becoming intrinsically more and more interconnected.

Of course, we believed that Kazakhstan’s Chairmanship of the OSCE should, first of all, have focused on the resolution of the problems of development of the Central Asian region.

Unfortunately, the region is steadily being transformed into a zone of spreading traditional and non-traditional threats of, first of all, terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking and illegal migration, which have been going on for a long time in Central Asia. During the course of one year, Kazakhstan was not able to have any great influence on their resolution. The reasons for that lie, on the one hand, in the incompleteness of the process of political reform and of the development of new independent states, of the process of formation of the new political democratic culture and national identity and in the complicated social and economic situation in the countries of the region, and, on the other hand, in the geographic proximity with the areas of political instability and latent and local conflicts.
Well-justified is the thesis of President Nursultan Nazarbayev, that the Central Asian countries, developing as a single united space, will be able to create a ‘belt of economic prosperity’, which will form a reliable barrier against international terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking and illegal migration. Indeed, the huge potential of the region remains unutilized because of a lack of understanding between the countries. Strategic plans remain unfulfilled, although everybody could benefit from them. First of all, it is necessary to realize the common interests of the region and tie them to national interests.

However, the interaction of the countries of the region can only be developed when common problems of the region are recognized, both in the area of trade and economic ties, and in the area of security provision. Security, as an internal and external problem for the Central Asian states, depends on the actions of all neighboring countries, as we are culturally, religiously and economically interconnected, and even interdependent. Similarly, our security also depends on many factors, levels of interconnection, interdependence of our conditions, our interests and our strategic plans. The same idea was stated in the third Paragraph of the Declaration:

“The security of each participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others. Each participating State has an equal right to security. We reaffirm the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve. Each State also has the right to neutrality. Each participating State will respect the rights of all others in these regards. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States. Within the OSCE no State, group of States or organization can have any pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence. We will maintain only those military capabilities that are commensurate with our legitimate
individual or collective security needs, taking into account obligations under international law, as well as the legitimate security concerns of other States. We further reaffirm that all OSCE principles and commitments, without exception, apply equally to each participating State, and we emphasize that we are accountable to our citizens and responsible to each other for their full implementation. We regard these commitments as our common achievement, and therefore consider them to be matters of immediate and legitimate concern to all participating States.”

So far, contrary to our various declarations, including the Astana one, the joint projects are faltering, even despite the signed agreements and mutual assurances on geographic, transit, resources and human potentials of integration, as well as on cultural, language and confessional community, closeness, friendship and brotherhood.

It is this lack of coordination in the policies of the countries of the region, their constant unhealthy competition and pre-conflict condition that inspire various external groups to try to destabilize the region. International terrorist and extremist groups are becoming ever more active in the territory of the states of the region. The activities of various extremist groups are becoming increasingly more visible. These groups, based on false and distorted interpretation of the Islamic faith, are trying to attract young people into their ranks, to impose on secular regimes new ideological trends and values, which do not have their roots in the Central Asian region and thereby causing conflict between generations, regions and even members of the same family.

Kazakhstan also paid close attention to the issues of the “third basket” (human dimension), which traditionally occupy a strategically important place in the activities of the OSCE. As President Nazarbayev stated at the opening of the OSCE high-level conference on tolerance and non-discrimination: “The lack of old mechanisms of problem resolution and lack of experience in new ways of regulation, complexity of ethnic composition, un-
resolved problems of the past, the weakness of civil society – all that makes the issues of tolerance in the Eurasian part of the OSCE especially pressing.”

Taking into account the existing problems in interethnic and interconfessional relations across the whole space of the Organization in the human dimension, we should give priority to the issues of tolerance and intercultural dialogue. Our countries, especially Kazakhstan, have been rather successful in resolving these issues. This was demonstrated by the recent events in Tajikistan’s Badakhshan, the events in the Rasht region, and the recent events in the city of Dushanbe, where certain forces were testing our state for resilience using all kinds of ground and informational influence on our citizens. Such testing has been going on already for seven years, since 2008. The state, of course, has shown its capability to protect the security of not only its own citizens, but has protected its neighbors from destabilization of their borders. Despite the fact that there was clear misunderstanding on the part of analysts, such great powers as China and the USA approved of these events and the actions of the law-enforcement agencies of Tajikistan. They rated highly the state’s counteractions against criminal groups, religious extremists and separatists.

One more peculiarity of Kazakhstan’s Chairmanship was that Kazakhstan was consistently promoting the principle of the balance of the three OSCE dimensions. The Republic of Kazakhstan as Chair was actively putting forward initiatives in the economic and environmental spheres. Especially attractive were the initiatives on activation of discussions on the economic and environmental sets of problems, on lessons learnt from the world economic and financial crises, on reforms in the world financial system, and also on the model of post-crisis development.

In this connection, the formation of a single anti-crime space acquires special significance. The growing globalization of the economy, freedom of movement of capital, goods and servic-
es make interstate borders more and more transparent, which makes it significantly easier for criminals to move from one state to another, while law-enforcement agencies, acting strictly within the framework of a sovereign territory, are limited in means and powers.

Tajikistan, like other Central Asian states, has strong ties with Russia, not only because of historical and cultural roots, but also because of economic and political ones and in the long run in the provision of regional security.

The concept of ‘security’ is extremely complex and eclectic, with a significant range of variants depending on the entity perceiving and on the regional, country, political and cultural affiliation of that entity.

The concept of ‘security’, which can be applied to a huge number of areas, such as international, regional, national, global, food supply, financial, economic, energy, informational, and so on, has two aspects: security as a state of protection or as a system of measures to ensure such a state.

The perception of security is inseparably connected with the perception of interests as a system of priorities, as well as with perception of threats, which are able to cause harm to these interests.

Without going into detail of perception of security by the West, Russia and Tajikistan, we note that regarding both perception and reality, our security is indivisible not only as a phenomenon and perception, but also as a condition of ensuring security.

Therefore we need to contemplate on the issues of a common understanding of the concept of ‘security’ and everything related to it, since global security is too broad for perception and is interpreted differently. We need to think at least within the framework of the theory of multiple centers of power or multipolarity about the provision of our security and its economic basis, to develop a new concept of security within the framework of the Eurasian cultural and legal space. Currently all aspects
of security have become important for us and we cannot separate one from another. They are as interconnected as our economies, conditions of life, culture, and history are interconnected. According to a well-known Russian analyst, Aleksey Arbatov: “Russia is not one single player but a totality of various political forces, between which constant discussions and even heated debates are taking place. Unlike the USA, with which we can have cooperation in a number of areas, Europe is our long-term focus. We must go back to Europe, from where we were pulled out for a hundred years by objective events in the twentieth century. However, we should do it with dignity, not begging but with our own funds and resources try to become a leading European country, and together with Europe try to become a global center of power. Combining our resources can ensure our influence as a global and influential center of power, even more powerful than America and China. Separately the EU and Russia will always remain regional, at best, transregional centers of power, but not global ones.”

The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR, the disappearance of the entire system of international relations, deepening and widening of the globalization process leading to strengthening of interdependence of states and putting the world in a position where it has to resolve problems it is facing by joint efforts of the entire global community: all this nevertheless does not mean the complete resolution of security issues.

Beside the aspects indicated by us, security can also be considered on the global, regional and state levels, and on the level of a separate nation, ethnic group, clan, family and individual, on the level of separate branches of economy, culture, food supply, health of nation and many others, including space problems. What is more, in any case, the provision of security depends on a set of various factors. Along with that, the provision of security remains a key problem of the modern world and requires care-

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ful attention of all states and international and regional organizations.

In general, there are dozens of factors that influence both the security of the state and the security of each individual. At present, the approaches to the problem of provision of international and regional security are also changing. This of course is related, first of all, to the qualitatively new stage of development of the system of international relations. After the collapse of the USSR, the unipolar world began to take shape very quickly. However, it also turned out to be unstable, and the formation of the multipolar world imparts certain new features to the system of security provision. “The relations between Russia and the USA are cooperation, the relations between Russia and Europe are gradual integration. These are two cardinally different types of relations. For example, our relations with China are cooperation, but there cannot be at all talk about any type of integration. If such integration happens, very soon there will be nothing left of Russia. There is a different situation with Europe: here there is a long-term course of cooperation. Russia is part of Europe; this does not require any proof. The most important factor is culture. In this regard, Russian culture is an integral part of European culture. European culture cannot exist without Tolstoy, Chekhov, Tchaikovsky, inter alia. Similarly, Russian culture cannot exist without Shakespeare, Mozart, Bach, Leonardo da Vinci, and so on. All this is one single culture”.

The countries of Eastern Europe, adopting the requirements in the sphere of human rights, did not foresee the explosive potential of the obligations taken by them for their internal establishment, although they felt their otherness in relation to their own systems.

Today the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is frequently criticized for lack of efficiency and tardiness in making decisions but we should not forget that the choice in fa-
favor of constant dialogue, resulting in signing agreements adopted by everybody, was not an easy path but a long and tiring one, and that the commenced processes uniting everybody around one table contribute to building a lasting peace. New processes, new conditions, new risks, new challenges and threats make the European countries in particular change their foreign and domestic policies, become more flexible and pragmatic and take reality into account.

Summing up everything that has been said, we proceed from the following:

First, despite the existence of various contradictory concepts between the great powers, conflict between the Russian Federation and the USA is impossible since they are facing the most important problem of humankind, namely, the provision of its security. These relations, with great difficulties, with peaks and troughs, are still progressively moving towards the competition for spheres of influence, in the direction of geopolitization of relations. However, there are new interests, more important than geopolitical interests, such as salvation from international terrorism and religious extremism.

Second, in any event, a unipolar world is after all too big a threat for the USA. The USA’s possibilities, after all, are limited, and the USA alone is not capable of resolving all the problems complicating the process of security provision on the global or regional level. The new situation, first of all, concerns the countries of Asia and, primarily, of course, Central Asia.

Each of the great powers in this competitive struggle needs allies from the standpoint of geopolitics, geoeconomy, geostrategy and the military sphere.

If we proceed from the theoretical position that security is indivisible, and since the regional and national security in the long run are part of global security, then the policy should be constructed in such a way for it to ensure national security within the framework of both global and regional security.
Some 100 experts gathered for the plenary session of the international conference “Accomplishments and challenges for the OSCE on the anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Astana Summit (2010)”, Astana, 23 October 2015.
The opening session of the conference, Astana, 23 October 2015.
Ambassador Natalia Zarudna, Head of the OSCE Program Office in Astana, and H.E. Kairat Sarybai, Ambassador of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Republic of Austria and Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the international organizations in Vienna, Astana, 23 October 2015.
Dr. Daniel Warner and Ambassador Natalia Zarudna during the conference, Astana, 23 October 2015.
Third, to this end there should exist several centers of power, which are tied to each other by common connections within the frameworks of single complexes of security (like countries which are members of NATO, CSTO and SCO).

Tajikistan has already determined its position in this issue and has a reliable strategic partner despite what some misinformers and analysts say and write in the mass media.

Fourth, a single Eurasian geopolitical complex should be formed, based on energy, where Russia with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan so far occupy a core place. According to the President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rakhmonov, the start-up of the first block at Sangtudin hydroelectric power station is a landmark event in this important strategic area. The completion of the construction of the South-North power line in Tajikistan, connecting it with Kyrgyzstan and with CASA-1000 in the South, is the first important brick in the foundation of strategic assistance in turning Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan into key states in the energy system of this complex.

Fifth, Tajikistan needs support in strengthening its independence in the system of international relations, which is happening through the CIS, SCO, CSTO, and the Eurasian Economic Union via involvement in the integration processes of this single geopolitical complex.

Based on that, the following are the priority tasks for our countries to provide security within the framework of implementation of the 40-year-old Final Act (European) and the 5-year-old Astana Declaration (Asian):

1. Strengthening the independence of the Central Asian states within the system of international relations.

2. Provision of constant, systemic and effective mutual relations with the structures of Central Asia and the Eurasian system of security provision, including the South-Asian security system, which has remained unnoticed so far.
3. Development of the most effective mechanism of mutual relations with all countries interested in provision of global and regional security.

4. Deepening the process of specifying mutual relations between partners in the provision of a common complex of security in the military, social, environmental, food supply, energy and other spheres.

Unfortunately, the European community is moving by inertia, from the same charge received in the last century. The European community is thinking about those values, which new forces, new threats, new groups use and immediately destroy. This process will become irreversible if the secular states of Central Asia are defeated. That is why the implementation of both the Final Act and the Astana Declaration in the direction of supporting secular regimes is in itself a part of European security and is becoming the most important task for both national states and international organizations in the region.
The concept of European security nowadays goes far beyond the boundaries of Europe, covering the vast Eurasian space. Consequently, the solution to many global security problems, including the provision of stability of the European continent, depends on a constructive dialogue between Europe and Asia.

In recent decades the determining factors influencing the development of the situation in the Central Asian region, have included close proximity to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan with its complex military and political situation, concentration of ideological centers and terrorist combat forces, religious extremism and drug-related crime.

However, increasing confrontation in Syria is currently becoming another source of escalation of terrorist tension in the world. As emphasized by the Head of our State, N. Nazarbayev, at the meeting of Presidents of Kazakhstan and Russia held on 15 October 2015 in Astana: “What is happening in Syria is a common threat for all of us, especially for the Central Asian region”.

The war in Syria aggravated terrorist activity not only in the Middle East; it negatively affects the broader region. Observed during that time: strengthening of economic and military components of the Islamic State (DAESH), reinforcement of positions of the so-called Syrian rebels, tough counter activity by Kurdish militants caused mass migration streams to Europe and triggered the recent terrorist act in Turkey that claimed the lives of 95 people.

Consequently, negative development of the situation in the north of Afghanistan in connection with the seizure of Kunduz and demonstration of the military might of the Taliban against a background of expert forecasts on aspirations of the Islamic
State towards Central Asian countries, as well as reports on the attempts to destabilize the situation in Tajikistan, can contribute to activating destructive forces in the territory of the Central Asian region.

Along with external threats, a tendency is developing in the region to create local autonomous groups of a ‘jihadist’ nature and a tendency to their self-radicalization, under the influence of radical religious teachings. Noted is the activity of nationalistic separatist groups linked with the combatants of international terrorist organizations. These groups show an interest in the changing social and political situation in the states of the region. Their leaders make attempts to attract to their ranks new members from amongst the Central Asian citizens who travel outside their countries and who, after having undergone combat training, will be used in potential terrorist attacks.

Based on the above-mentioned, I would like to note that the listed facts and circumstances once again confirm the large-scale and a persisting nature of terrorist activity in the region. Moreover, experience shows that in carrying out anti-terrorist activities, power and other state structures often lack a systemic character and coordination of efforts.

As is known, drug-related business is one of the major sources of funding terrorism. Therefore, in our view, the efforts of the global community must not be one-sided. It is necessary to consider global threats in their totality, and to take appropriate decisions accordingly.

In my presentation, I would like to briefly speak about those aspects, which have common roots, both in countering drug-related business and terrorism.

For specialists present here it is not a secret that the same financial mechanisms for transferring funds are often used for obtaining proceeds of illicit trafficking in weapons and drugs. However, it is necessary to take into account that if the transfer
of money via the HAWALA system is very difficult to detect, other official systems could be tracked using risk indicators.

Certain experience in this area has been gained from the CARICC perspective in the course of conducting operative analysis to detect suspicious bank transactions including those using Golden Crown, Western Union and other money transfer systems.

Another common problem is control over the illicit trade in precursors used in the manufacturing of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and narcotics. Thus, in November 2010, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the World Customs Organization and Interpol, initiated the international operation ‘Project Global Shield’ aimed at combating the illicit trafficking of precursors used in the manufacturing of IEDs. Initially, the proposed duration of the operation was 6 months (from 1 November 2010 to 31 April 2011). However, taking into account the increased relevance of combating international terrorism, the participants and organizers of the operation took the decision for the ‘Project Global Shield’ to become a long-term program. Over 90 countries of Europe, Africa, America and Asia are participating in the operation. In this operation, CARICC is given the role of the Central Asian Regional Communication Hub.

The competent bodies of Central Asian states have been conducting systematic work to identify persons involved in storing, manufacturing and transporting IED components, including explosive chemical precursors (ECP). In total, since the beginning of the operation, according to available data, the competent authorities of the Central Asian region have seized over 2.7 tons of illicitly trafficked ECPs. Furthermore, it is clear that there will be an increase in similar seizures in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

Investigation of tragic events in Kazakhstan (Atyrau and Aktobe) showed that the main IED components had been obtained by terrorists in local construction markets and pharmacies. Free
access to ECPs has been also noted in other states of our region that have first-hand knowledge of terrorism.

Examples of recruiting and movement of drug mules and terrorists also have much in common: starting from tracking potential perpetrators in social networks to application of conspiracy measures used in making contacts, developing and mapping routes of movement to the venue of a terrorist act or to the drug consumer.

Before trying to forecast further development of the situation in the region, which, based on what is mentioned above, can also turn into a negative scenario, I would like in particular to emphasize the acute necessity for the countries of the region and the global community to combine their efforts in countering the threats of terrorism, religious extremism and drug-related crime.

In this connection, I would like to mention the huge potential of such authoritative international organizations as the UN and the OSCE, which are capable of playing a consolidating role. One good example of such experience is the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center for Combating the Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors (CARICC), created under the auspices of the UNODC. I was fortunate enough to set up and head CARICC over a number of years.

Having previously gained excellent experience working for 6 years as the First Deputy Head of the CIS Anti-Terrorist Center, I can state categorically that terrorism and the narcobusiness are links of the same chain.

To sum up, I can state that real models to resolve one of the most complicated tasks of international cooperation – to overcome inter-agency and inter-state barriers between competent bodies - already exist and, consequently, all the conditions are in place to form a united mechanism for countering terrorism, extremism and the narcobusiness.
In this connection, I consider it appropriate to support the proposal by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, voiced in the course of the 70th session of the UN General Assembly, to create the Global Anti-Terrorist Coalition under the auspices of the United Nations.

Thank you for your attention.
Presentation of Recommendations and Comments by Moderators

Marat Sarsembayev

Dear colleagues!
Ladies and Gentlemen!

Thanks to efforts of the OSCE Program Office in Astana represented by Natalia Zarudna and Ambassador of Finland to Kazakhstan Ilkka Raisanen the members of the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan in order to share experiences recently visited Helsinki – OSCE homeland, homeland for adoption of the Helsinki Final Act on Security and Cooperation in Europe dated August 1, 1975, the 40th anniversary of which we celebrate today. We thank them for excellent organization of this event.

Conflicts in Ukraine, conflict situations between Azerbaijan and Armenia regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, conflicts related to formation of Transnistria, Georgian issue, statements of certain persons about Kazakhstan’s northern territories, water and river issues in Central Asia and other conflicts in OSCE space are in the area of interest of the OSCE. These conflicts should be dampened down as far as possible, as they are dangerous because they can really threaten the security in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space.

In my opinion, it is necessary to prepare conflictologists at the universities of all 57 participating states of the OSCE as much as possible, develop alternate solutions to the problems of interstate conflicts on the basis of scientific developments of theory and history of international relations, international law with their assistance. If there are many such experts as speakers – respected Dr Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, respected special-
ist Wolfgang Zellner across the OSCE space, it will be one of the factors that can contribute to resolution of interstate conflicts.

Here our colleagues Vuk Žugić, Marcel Pesko addressed the issues of confidence-building measures to strengthen security in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space. It is reasonable to pay attention to confidence-building measures, which are the basis for activity of CICA – Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia. It may be worthwhile to take closer look to tried and tested confidence-building measures within CICA and try to attach them to the conflicts in the OSCE space with the purpose of their possible resolution.

Principle of territorial integrity of state and principle of inviolability of borders have become universally recognized and embedded in international relations by principles thanks to the Helsinki Final Act and they have worked well over the last 40 years. However in recent years they are not quite observed in the OSCE space and on other continents. Potential of the Helsinki Final Act in respect of these principles began to run short. Therefore, it would be appropriate to introduce these two principles in UN Declaration on Principles of International Law of 1970. Their transfer to higher universal level would give these principles more global and more rigid character in terms of their compliance.

Our states are participating members of the OSCE and at the same time the UN members, so they could initiate the inclusion of principles of states territorial integrity and inviolability of borders to the system of international and legal principles at the UN level. And at this level the OSCE as an observer of the UN could initiate transformation of the UN Declaration on Principles of International Law to Convention or Protocol of the United Nations with norms on individual responsibility for their violation. The OSCE could fix such approaches in its current documents.
It would contribute to significant observance of international and legal principles of territorial integrity of states and inviolability of state borders in the OSCE space.

Tajik colleague Sayfullo Safarov touched on issues of fight against terrorism, religious extremism. I feel like that our conference would have benefited, if our colleagues would make separate reports on issue of fight against ISIS, as well as on issue of resolution of water problems in Central Asia.

Thank you for attention.
SESSION III
RULE OF LAW AND CIVIL SOCIETY
DEVELOPMENT AS A PREREQUISITE
FOR SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH

Nurlan Abdirov

Legislative Initiatives for Extension
of Civil Society Opportunities in Solution
of Socially Important Issues

Over the last few years Kazakhstan has done much to expand participation of civil society in solving socially significant issues.

First of all, this is dictated by the essential strategic documents of Kazakhstan. In the developed state policy, this issue is given unconditional priority, and it is being consistently put into effect. In this regard, President Nazarbayev’s Strategy “Kazakhstan-2050” and the OSCE Summit in Astana have to be mentioned first. These, now already historical, and many other facts create the necessary strong foundation for further evolutionary transformations in the civil society sector.

It is therefore quite natural that a significant number of transformations specified in the President’s “100 Concrete Steps - Plan of the Nation” are aimed at reforms in the civil participation sector. It is the fifth institutional reform of President Nazarbayev that should help to implement the task of building an accountable state.

We understand that this task cannot be solved without ensuring more transparency and openness of state authorities’ performance, and broader involvement of citizens in the process of making decisions of national importance that affect their interests. This refers to the issues of providing access to informa-
tion, participation in the process of setting the budget and discussing the report on the performance of the budget, drawing up strategic development plans, and the systematic combating of corruption inter alia.

We understand that this, on the one hand, requires introduction of innovative mechanisms and procedures for the state authorities themselves, and, on the other, new approaches to institutionalization of civic engagement that would allow the unlocking, to the fullest extent, of the constructive potential of civil society. The combination of these two components and their harmonization, in my opinion, could bring a significant positive result and a new multiplier effect.

For the purpose of implementing Concrete Steps in this area, a group of Parliament Mazhilis MPs, members of a faction of the Nur Otan party, including myself, developed the draft laws “On Public Councils”, “On Access to Information”, “On Countering Corruption”, and related draft legislation.

It should be noted that the work on these laws started much earlier. Our own practice was analyzed, and the experience of many developed countries studied. Within the last few years with the support of UN institutions, the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, Ms. N. Zarudna personally, a number of foreign embassies in Kazakhstan and our other partners, we conducted a number of expert meetings and round table discussions with the participation of international and Kazakhstani specialists. Speaking about dates, in the current year alone we organized detailed targeted discussions of the texts of these draft laws twice - on February 27th and September 25th.

Taking into account the topics covered by this panel, let me briefly comment on the specific, most important in my opinion, advantages and significance of each of these laws. I will start with the Law on Public Councils. On the one hand, it did not emerge out of nowhere, since various structures are operating in the Republic at different levels – commissions and councils,
Accomplishments and challenges for the OSCE on the anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Astana Summit (2010)

whose activities involve representatives of civil society. For example, under the aegis of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan 1,470 public accord councils operate in all regions at oblast, city, district and village levels as well as within large enterprises. Public councils have been established with the General Prosecutor’s Office, Ministry of Interior and some other central executive bodies. 19 councils and commissions were set up with the Almaty City Akimat: the Business Council, the Public Council for Resolving Social Conflicts, the Urban Development Council and others. Seven councils were opened with the Astana City Akimat: the Youth Affairs Council, the Healthcare Coordination Council, the Council for Cooperation and Interaction with NGOs and others.

On the other hand, as we can see, their goals and objectives are absolutely different and they can be called “single-pointed”, strictly limited, as a rule, to only one specific subject. At the same time, the status and powers of such councils are not defined by law.

Studying this issue made it possible to arrive at the conclusion that despite the diversity and large number of these councils they have not become full-fledged institutional structures able to represent the interests of society in its interaction with state authorities and ensure communication, and to organize up-and-running systemic public control. Consequently, the councils are often decorative in nature and their status and powers depend on the will of the head of a state authority.

In brief, time requires qualitative changes in this very important sphere. There is a need for an institution that could express the views of civil society on all the socially important issues. We need a powerful institutionalized forum for the authorities and public to discuss all these issues jointly and make justifiable decisions. This could be a forum for seeking a consensus of interests but not for confrontation. All this could contrib-
ute to the development of interaction between the authorities and society and ensure transparency of state bodies’ activities.

At the same time, we proceed from the fact that the institution of public councils in itself, for example, at the local level, can and should in no way be put against local representative authorities – maslikhats – or try to replace them, but, on the contrary, it will support them. I will not further elaborate on this. I can only say that some concrete measures to strengthen local self-governance have been developed within the framework of Steps 98 and 99 of the Plan of the Nation, including establishment of the new institution of public councils.

I believe we managed to provide for several mechanisms in the text of the law that would make it possible to ensure the democratic character of formation and functioning of such councils. Suffice it to say that public councils, as consultative, advisory and monitoring bodies, will be established by state authorities together with non-commercial organizations and citizens. In doing so, the representation of civil society in a public council should constitute not less than two thirds of the total membership.

Recommendations by public councils are obligatory for consideration by state authorities that take decisions provided for in law and give substantiated responses.

It is important to mention the main powers of public councils as envisaged by the legislation, which include the powers to:
- discuss the draft budget programmes, draft strategic plans, territorial development programmes, draft state and governmental programmes;
- discuss the reports on the implementation of these important documents;
- discuss the reports of executive bodies on the achievement of targeted indicators;
- participate in the development and discussion of draft regulatory legal acts concerning the rights, freedoms and obligations of citizens;
- consider submissions by physical and legal persons on the issues of improving the state apparatus and ensuring its transparency;
- develop and submit proposals to the state authorities to improve the legislation of Kazakhstan;
- exercise other forms of public control.

We considered it important to limit the term of office of such a council to three years, after which new elections should be held. The Chair of a council shall be elected from among well-known public figures, who should not be civil servants. According to the draft developers, such a rotation mechanism with the correct organization of council activity will make it possible to turn this institution into a real school to train competent public activists, from amongst whom subsequently could be produced future members of local authorities and the Republic’s parliament, and well-known public and state figures, that is, people useful for their country.

I would like to add that all those numerous, various councils and commissions that I mentioned at the beginning of my presentation, can continue their activities after adoption of the law. The provisions of the law do not regulate their activities and, therefore, they do not have the status and powers of public councils.

Now, a few words about the Law “On Access to Information”. This law has probably attracted the greatest volume of discussion. This is not surprising taking into account that Great Britain, for example, had been discussing a similar draft law for a full 30 years and the Ukrainian Parliament spent 8 years discussing it.

For my part I can say that the problem lies not in the complexity of developing legal formulations but in the lack of under-
standing and, as a consequence, in the reluctance of officials to disclose information and make socially important information public. At the same time, there is a provision in Article 20 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan that explicitly states: “Everyone shall have the right to freely receive and disseminate information by any means not prohibited by law. The list of information constituting state secrets of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be determined by law” (end of quotation).

Speaking about the peculiarities of the new law, it should be primarily noted that for the first time it establishes the expanded list of information not subject to restriction. It includes information on:

- the state of fire safety, sanitary and epidemiological and radiation situation, food safety;
- emergency situations and disasters threatening the safety and health of citizens, and consequences thereof, as well as on natural disasters, their official forecasts and consequences;
- facts of violation of rights and freedoms of man and citizen;
- facts of commitment of acts of terror;
- budgeting and expenditure of funds at national and local levels with the exception of information disclosing the provision of national security;
- as well as other information specified in the law.

All this information, due to its social importance, must be open and accessible in its entirety to the public.

In accordance with the law, all individuals and legal entities shall be considered users of information.

Holders of information are:
- bodies of legislative, executive and judicial branches of power, local government and self-government;
- state institutions;
- subjects of quasi-governmental sector, i.e. national companies;
Accomplishments and challenges for the OSCE on the anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Astana Summit (2010)

- legal entities, recipients of budget funds irrespective of the form of ownership, with regard to the use of budget funds;
- market entities in a dominating or monopolistic position;
- legal entities in possession of environmental and other sensitive information;

This list of entities best corresponds to current international approaches.

The ways of access to information are regulated in detail. In particular, it is proposed that the access to information be provided by means of:
- requests – written (in the form of a paper or an electronic document) and oral;
- placing information in premises occupied by information holders;
- providing access to board sessions of state authorities;
- webcasts of open sessions of the RK Parliament, maslikhats as well as meetings of state authorities held on the results of the year;
- posting information in the mass media, including web resources of information holders;
- hearings and discussions of reports by the heads of central executive bodies, Akims and rectors of national universities;
- posting information in the relevant sections of the e-government web portal;
- other ways not prohibited by the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The law provides for the establishment of a “single window” for obtaining information of public importance through the e-government web portal.

For this purpose it is proposed that four key components be created on the e-government web portal:
- Open Data portal;
- Open Regulatory Legal Acts portal;
- Open Budget portal;
- State Authorities’ Performance Assessment portal.

These web resources will contain open data, statistics, information pertaining to the use of budgetary funds, regulatory legal acts and other information.

In addition, these portals will provide for a mechanism for public discussion of draft regulatory legal acts and draft budgets. This will enable broader participation of citizens in elaboration of decisions important for the state and society.

Creation of a “single window” for information users may become a Kazakhstan’s “know-how” in this area.

The law provides for the establishment of a public Commission on the Issues of Access to Information to deal with monitoring access to information and prepare proposals for implementation of the state policy in this area.

Difficult work was carried out on the draft law “On Countering Corruption”. As a result, the Parliament was presented with a draft law radically different in its spirit and letter from the law “On Combating Corruption” which has been in existence for nearly 20 years. However, it must be admitted that over that period it underwent numerous changes.

I would say that one of the indisputable advantages of the new law is the fact that it targets the elimination of corruption in society through:

- building an atmosphere of intolerance to corruption in society;
- identification of causes and conditions facilitating corruption, and elimination of their consequences.

In brief, prevention and avoidance of corruption is definitely the major focus of the anti-corruption activities.

In this connection, the following new concepts have been introduced in legal practice:

- “anti-corruption policy”,


- “countering corruption”,
- “anti-corruption standards”,
- “anti-corruption restrictions”,
- “anti-corruption monitoring”,
- “conflict of interests”,
- “risk of corruption”,
- “building an anti-corruption culture”, inter alia.

The time limit does not allow me to elaborate on them. However, I should say that each of these terms, new to our legislation, is explained in the law, as well as through specific mechanisms aimed at realizing their potential.

I also would like to draw your attention to the fact that among the basic principles of countering corruption the law specifies the following:

- openness and transparency;
- interaction of the state and civil society;
- prioritized application of corruption prevention measures;
- rewarding persons who assist in countering corruption.

For the first time the quasi-governmental sector is covered by the anti-corruption law.

The competence of the authorized body has been specified in the law. There is a new provision that this body shall annually submit the National Report on Countering Corruption to the Head of the State for consideration.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In conclusion, I am pleased to inform you that the Laws “On Public Councils” and “On Access to Information” have been already approved by the Parliament and will be submitted to the President for signature in the very near future. The discussion of the draft law “On Countering Corruption” is scheduled for next Thursday. It is expected that the new laws will come into force on January 1, 2016.
Implementation of these laws will provide new opportunities for expanding participation of civil society in resolving socially significant issues.

Speaking in general, these three laws in their totality create a new legal architecture. Moreover, I am convinced that the implementation of these laws in the near future will influence further development of our legal system in the direction of building an accountable state.

Thank you for your attention.
Developed Civil Society as a Prerequisite for Democratic Development in Kazakhstan

Let me welcome all the participants and extend my appreciation to the guests who expressed interest in this conference. I would also like to thank the organizers for having the opportunity to provide information regarding the process of formation and development of civil society in Kazakhstan. Yesterday the OSCE ambassadors had a chance to familiarize themselves with the operation of one of the discussion platforms and see for themselves what this forum for dialogue is. There are many of them in Kazakhstan, and they reflect discussions on various spheres and interests. However, human rights organizations themselves assessed it as a unique one, since it provides the opportunity to discuss the most pressing problems in dialogue mode within the framework of the human dimension.

Its establishment was initiated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This is a new approach and experience for Kazakhstan that is promoting the culture of adhering to and introducing the ‘Listen and Hear’ principle. You were able to witness the debates and learn in detail about the forum’s activities and the fate of recommendations elaborated in the debates, as well as the role played by the Members of Parliament in the structured dialogue between the state authorities and human rights organizations. The discussion also covered the draft Law ‘On NGOs’ that specifies the legal, economic and organizational bases for encouraging socially useful activity and anchors the principle of ‘Conditions for Participation’.

The topic of today’s conference, “Accomplishments and Challenges for the OSCE on the Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Astana Summit (2010)”, allows us to share relevant information on the situation in Kazakhstan and OSCE
countries in the sphere of external challenges and domestic reforms implemented in our country. The whole range of issues occupies an important place on our agenda as it is seriously and carefully analyzed and studied by all the stakeholders and members of civil society.

Kazakhstan was able to implement not only serious transformations in the social and economic sphere but also achieved significant success in dealing with issues that concern human rights and freedoms in a broader sense. Our country is proceeding in this direction, and an important impulse for activation is the launch of the ‘Kazakhstan-2050’ Strategy and the five institutional reforms initiated by the President, where one of the priorities is a “transparent and accountable state”. The Plan of the Nation ‘100 Concrete Steps: Modern State for Everyone’ is proposed within this modernization and is being implemented fully by all branches of power. Today my colleagues spoke about the activities and contribution of Parliament. However, considering the fact that all these steps aim at transparency and public participation, the transformation of the third sector into significant participants of political, social and economic life in our country is acquiring paramount importance. Kazakhstan is greatly interested in dialogue with the OSCE countries and the European Union and in their successful experience in the sphere of building democracy, ensuring the rule of law and protection of human rights and freedoms.

Gaining sovereignty enabled our country to set a course towards building a democratic and secular state where civil society is given an important role. The non-governmental sector came into being at the beginning of the 1990s, and it is fair to consider it a contemporary of Independence. In its evolution, it passed through several stages, from establishment and accumulating experience in targeted activities, to a certain degree of achievements both within qualitative and quantitative parameters.
The Concept and Programme of State Support of Non-Governmental Organizations for 2003-2005 formed the basis for such development. The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, ‘On State Social Ordering’, adopted in 2005, served as the basis for earmarked state financing of NGO projects. Having successfully overcome the period of differentiation by type of activity, development of cadre potential and upgrading their professional level, NGOs started to introduce the principles of specialized and project activities.

The Concept of Civil Society Development in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2006-2011 also played its key role in terms of its subject matter and coverage of various social institutions. Its scope and significance gave impetus to determination of basic principles and areas for the implementation of civic initiatives and functioning of civil society institutions for the purpose of social partnership of the government, business and NGOs. The current stage provides for the acquisition of a systemic nature by the third sector and optimization of their interaction, representing a permanent process based on changes in public needs, trends in global development and present-day challenges.

According to official statistics, over 30,000 NGOs have been registered in the country, which points to their dynamic growth. The spheres of their activities are well spread, about 8% of them are human rights and 15% are environmental ones. More than two thousand mass media outlets of different forms of ownership are operating in the Republic. 254 publications are owned by non-governmental organizations and together with private ones constitute 84% of the total; and public-sector publications account for the other 16%. Censorship is prohibited in our country.

The basic law of our country possesses the features and legal properties of constitutions of ‘developed democracies’, and one-third of it is devoted to the rights and freedoms of man and citizen. The role of the state in the political system of society has
been defined as that of an active player and social regulator, capable of relieving various tensions and conflicts in society. The very first articles of the RK Constitution ‘set the tone’ for its other provisions and take their lead from the democratic nature of Kazakhstan’s statehood, declaring these principles above the state. The priority of international treaties and covenants reflected in the Constitution allows the regulation of relations between individual and state, with clear establishment of the status of citizen and recognition of his/her autonomy and independent sphere for his/her activity. The proof of Kazakhstan’s dedication to comply with the comprehensive principles of human rights and freedoms is the ratification of major international agreements with regard to this context. As a participating State, our country not only agreed to but also committed itself to guarantee their provision by means of laws and other related measures for their practical implementation. Optional protocols to these conventions, signed by Kazakhstan, state the competences and determine the procedures for exercising these rights, providing the participants of this process with potential opportunities for proper filling the humanitarian ‘basket’.

Direct interdependence between them is evident since the rights to development, health, education, labor and security both in everyday life and during armed conflicts are viewed from moral, political and legal standpoints. The rights of the child and disabled persons, empowerment of women, human dignity, access to information, housing and clean drinking water as well as social rights form the basis for common perception of comprehensive values. These are anchored in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and Kazakhstan has become the first state in the region to set for itself enhanced obligations to achieve them, and today it has started to implement the MDG plus agenda.

Drawing upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and specific guidance on education in this area entitled ‘UNDER-
STANDING HUMAN RIGHTS' attests to the fact that the chosen path is the right one. Seventeen of the twenty priorities specified by them refer to the above-mentioned, including freedom from poverty, prohibition of torture and discrimination, fair trial and rule of law.

In accordance with the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action on the elaboration of specific and universal activities for effective and long-term improvement of the human-rights’ situation approved by The United Nations General Assembly, Kazakhstan adopted the National Action Plan in the area of human rights. Human-rights organizations of the country were directly involved in its formation and development. Upon their initiative, the Plan was significantly expanded; it is subject on a regular basis to expert evaluation by the third sector.

The OSCE ODHR, being a major institution on democracy and human rights, for many years has been organizing the largest conference in Europe, the most significant peculiarity of which is the openness for participation of NGOs on equal terms with governments. This only enriches the discussion since they are not restricted in the opportunity to express ‘uncomfortable’ opinions. They are provided with a platform to be heard by an international audience and, as a result, it promotes their behind-the-scenes activity. Kazakhstan’s NGOs use their opportunity to the full, and such a format is widely spread in the country.

According to expert opinion, the most problematic issue is the lack of experience and traditions in adapting the world human rights conceptual and methodological thinking to our reality. They also point to the lack of legal education of people. In my opinion, there is a vast area for cooperation and interaction with the European Union and OSCE countries through the infrastructure created by them in order to avoid confrontation, described in Kipling’s well-known ‘Ballad of East and West’. Only a productive and intensive exchange of views, experience and ideas, together with joint actions, will serve as a reliable chan-
nel for aligning social and cultural-and-historical roots inherent in them and different from each other. The creation of a systemic, coordinated and secure human-rights complex will allow the removal of the line that “never the twain shall meet” from our communication. The prelude to strengthening the chance not to find ourselves “…face to face … from the ends of the earth” like Kipling’s famous characters, was the brave and ingenious initiative by the President of our country, N. Nazarbayev to hold the OSCE Summit in Astana. The Astana Declaration “Towards a Security Community” is permeated by the spirit of a categorical and irrevocable message that commitments made within the humanitarian ‘basket’ are a matter of immediate and lawful importance, starting from the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and the Charter for European Security, to all the other OSCE documents. Against the backdrop of the current conflicts and confrontations, for the sake of preserving values, all the countries of the world can and must assess from within the indivisibility of the community, without dividing lines. The values declared by the President of Kazakhstan and voiced at the global-level meetings and at the UN 70th Session are based on the principles of mutual respect, tolerance, non-discrimination and evolutionism. Therefore, they require, and are the subject of, careful consideration and in-depth study of the processes taking place in the region.
Shigeo Katsu

Rule of law and civil society development as a prerequisite for sustainable economic growth

Table 1: Analytic Framework for governance and institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Issue</th>
<th>Actors and instruments</th>
<th>Good principles</th>
<th>Bad principles</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who leads the public sector?</td>
<td>Government through economic and social policies</td>
<td>• Growth-oriented</td>
<td>• Lack of clarity of direction</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Inclusive</td>
<td>• Exclusive</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Sustainable development oriented</td>
<td>• Rent-seeking oriented</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Accountable</td>
<td>• Not accountable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How are policies applied?</td>
<td>Through a clear legal, institutional and regulatory framework and related agencies</td>
<td>• Rule-based</td>
<td>• Ad-hoc</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Equitable (law applies equally to everybody)</td>
<td>• Selective, captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Accountable</td>
<td>• Not accountable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How are policies implemented?</td>
<td>Through/by the civil service and other service providers</td>
<td>• Competent</td>
<td>• Incompetent</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Merit-based, competitive</td>
<td>• Nepotism-based and/or captured</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Efficient</td>
<td>• Inefficient</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Accountable</td>
<td>• Not accountable</td>
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<tr>
<td>How are resources allocated?</td>
<td>Through the budget process</td>
<td>• Transparent</td>
<td>• Non-transparent</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Competitive</td>
<td>• Arbitrary and/or interest-group oriented</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Accountable</td>
<td>• Captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How are public oversight functions carried out</td>
<td>Through multiple actors:</td>
<td>• Accountable</td>
<td>• Non-effective</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Parliament</td>
<td>• Demand for public accountability</td>
<td>• Laden with conflict of interest</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Media</td>
<td>• Access to information</td>
<td>• Captured</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Civil society</td>
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<td>• NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are there redress mechanisms?</td>
<td>Through sundry appeals and conflict resolution systems (e.g. ombudsmen)</td>
<td>• Yes</td>
<td>• No</td>
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</table>

Source: Asia 2050, Realizing the Asian Century (2011), Chapter 13: Transforming Governance and Institutions p. 223 (Centennial Group/Asian Development Bank)
Governance
(from a 2011 presentation for CAREC)

Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators; World Bank Group; 2009.
Asia 7 -- includes the People’s Republic of China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand as engines of the Asian Century (from “Asia 2050” (2011))

Principles and Priorities for Institutional Reforms
(from “Asia 2050”) – (1)

Emphasize welfare gains for the middle class through reforms:
1. Focus on building strong transparent institutions – they define success:
   – Build a legal system with clearly articulated and enforced property rights, integrity-based education and health systems, merit-based civil service, and solid financial system;
   – Create opportunities and incentives for citizen to invest in themselves => rule of law and skills development, including entrepreneurial and scientific skills, should be top priorities;
2. Corruption cannot be left unchecked; failing this, it will eventually suffocate rule-of-law institutions:
   – Be mindful of the corrosive effect of corruption on the state’s (system’s) legitimacy;
3. Devise participatory approaches to policy making and build accountability mechanisms:
   – Demands for new forms of accountability and transparency will rise; managing expectations of an increasingly vocal citizenry will pose complex challenges to governments;
Accomplishments and challenges for the OSCE on the anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Astana Summit (2010)

Principles and Priorities for Institutional Reforms (from “Asia 2050”) – (2)

4. Designing policies (and measures) is only a start; implementation is what matters:
   – Policy reforms all too often remain on paper; where the gap between paper and reality is too great, the disconnect threatens the credibility of governments
   – Governments should actively seek and not merely tolerate feedback from non-state actors that monitor implementation and provide public oversight

5. Ensure that the rule of law applies equally to everyone:
   – An emphatic premium must be placed on building a judiciary and law enforcement that are seen as honest, fair and acting with integrity
   – The elite must understand that the rule of law applies to everyone, and the public must be convinced of that; these are vital elements to ensure long-term stability

6. Build a merit-based civil service:
   – A common feature of countries that have joined the ranks of developed countries is that their civil service is perceived as honest and highly competent; they have been able to attract the best and the brightest, and successfully institutionalize meritocracy

Principles and Priorities for Institutional Reforms (from “Asia 2050”) – (3)

7. A healthy relationship between authorities and citizens is a function of trust:
   – Trust is built through consistent, transparent, accountable and verifiable results, accompanied by built-in mechanisms of recourse;
   – Governments should recognize citizens as the country’s real sovereigns and put into place effective oversight and accountability mechanisms. These include replacing governments through contestable elections anchored in constitutional rights;

8. Best practice approaches will not suffice; countries have to adapt for “best fit”:
   – Global reform experience shows that not enough attention has been paid to country-specific institutions, relationships, and interests that underpin formal arrangements. Countries must select models that best fit their circumstances. A new national consensus must be established based on rigorous analysis and combined with soul-searching. In some countries this means addressing uncomfortable truths.
Kazakhstan: Toward a Modern Society for All

Based on a presentation at a book launch event during the Asian Development Bank Annual Meetings, Astana, May 2014

J. Linn/S. Katsu/A. Aitzhanova

Kazakhstan Strategy 2050

“I am strongly confident that Kazakhstani citizens of 2050 represent a society of educated, free people speaking three languages. They are citizens of the world. They travel. They are open to new knowledge. They are industrious. They are patriots of their country.

“I am convinced that Kazakhstan of 2050 is a society of universal labor. It is a state with a strong economy, with everything devoted for a person. With a strong education, a great health care. With peace and serenity. With citizens who are free and equal, and the authority is fair. With supremacy of the Law.

“We must work with dedication and inspiration, not losing sight of our primary objectives:

- Further developing and strengthening statehood.
- Transitioning to new principles of economic management.
- Comprehensive support for entrepreneurship will be a leading force for the national economy.
- Forming the new social model.
- Creating modern and efficient education and health care systems.
- Increasing accountability, efficiency and functionality of the state apparatus.
- Setting adequate international and military policy that is responsive to the new challenges.

“The only way to modernize our country and make it competitive is to progressively follow the path of political liberalization.”

(Nursultan Nazarbayev, Dec. 14, 2012)
Convergence can boost Kazakhstan’s growth

Kazakhstan has to diversify from oil to non-oil economy
Seven priority areas for action

Effective institutions and good governance

### Actions
- Reverse trend towards a higher state involvement in the economy
- Continue/complete meritocratic civil service reform
- Implement anti-corruption action
- Promote accountability, transparency, civil society, and rule of law
- Pursue reform of economic and political institutions in tandem

### Challenges
- How to overcome severe implementation issues?
- How to manage strong special interests and rising public expectations?
- How to assure stability in short term v. benefits of broader participation, accountability and predictability in long term?
Eight principles to help guide action

Accelerating institutional reforms: National Plan based on 100 steps

Establishment of a high-powered National Commission for Modernization to spearhead institutional reforms in five key areas, now also known as the “100 Steps Program” (May 2015):

- Establishment of a meritocratic professional career civil service model with strong anti-corruption ethics
- Strengthening Rule of Law
- Renewed commitment to structural reforms in the economy and human development
- Continued state-building based on national identity rather than ethnic allegiance
- Creation of an open, transparent, and accountable state

Five WGs were created, supported by numerous sub-WGs involving hundreds of contributors including MPs, members of government and heads of agencies, civil servants and other public sector officials, the business community, and other non-state actors

An International Peer Review Group was set up to peer review the WG proposals (“100 steps”)
Some Observations

The positives

Some concerns

Implementation challenges and suggestions:

– applying “filters”
– Robust M&E system for learning: experiment and try again
– Strong role of legal tradition

Applying a system of “filters”

Filter 1. Internal cohesion
Are the measures coordinated?

Criteria:
- Internal cohesion of measures within and between the five institutional reform platforms
- Introduction/reflection of good international practices
- Reflection of Kazakhstan-specific features

Filter 2. Prioritization
How important? (i.e. not all measures are “born” equally)

Criteria:
- Systemic measure
- Technical measure

Filter 3. Implementability
What is the capacity to implement?

Criteria:
- Political will
- Public support (do citizen understand the set goals and measures?)
- Readiness of the measure and implementation capacity (by administration)
- Vested interest (existence and strength)

Filter 4. Timeline
When can measures be implemented?

Criteria:
- Short-term (within 12 months)
- Mid-term (not earlier than in 2-3 years)
- Long-term (to be implemented in years 4-5)

Practice shows that only a few number of measures will yield early wins owing to a combination of public support, readiness of the particular measure, implementation capacity and absence of vested interests. A few will be at the opposite end of the spectrum, i.e. very difficult to implement. The majority of measures fall in between.

How to sequence for implementation?
The EU Strategy for Central Asia: Rule of Law and civil society development for sustainable economic growth

Members of the Parliament,
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Guests,

It is a great pleasure for me to discuss with the distinguished audience the outcomes and future potential of the OSCE activities, notably in the field of the sustainable development dimension. This year, the anniversary year for the OSCE, is an excellent opportunity for us to evaluate the practical achievements of the Organization within the Helsinki+ 40 process.

This discussion comes very timely since the EU updated the EU Central Asia Strategy in June this year by adopting relevant Council Conclusions, reflecting on lessons learnt and the changes in the region as well as the altering geopolitical situation around it. The updated Strategy emphasizes Central Asia as a region of strategic importance for the EU. The Council also welcomes the increase in the global envelope for EU bilateral and regional cooperation with Central Asia for the programming period 2014-20 with more than EUR 1 bn, which is a 56 % increase compared with 2007-2013.

In this regard, the EU Strategy for Central Asia calls for reinforcing the EU development goals in the region, and further promoting the areas of education, rule of law, environment and water.

I am particularly pleased that the rule of law and human rights have been highlighted as a flagship of our cooperation with Cen-
Central Asian countries. From the start, the engagement of both sides has indeed demonstrated the need for dialogue and interest in advancing reforms. We will engage in the next session of the Human Rights Dialogue soon, next month. The Rule of Law and laws that reflect best standards and lessons learnt are indispensable for creating a good business climate and creating new job opportunities, thus combating poverty and facilitating economic growth in Central Asian countries. It is a crucial element for building a peaceful, democratic country and a stable, fair and open society, where civil society plays its vibrant role.

The Rule of Law Platform II for 2015-2018, which covers all five Central Asian states, contributes towards the development of a stable and democratic political framework in the region. In this way, it improves the capacity of Central Asian countries to contribute to the modernisation and reform of their legal and judiciary systems, by developing legislation and practices in line with internationally accepted standards and fostering dialogue with neighbouring countries.

Kazakhstan has already substantially reformed its Criminal Code and its Criminal Procedure Code. The need to promote the right to a fair trial and defence rights still need to be tackled in order to align the criminal justice system with international standards. The need to reinforce procedural safeguards at the pre-trial stage is perceived as a priority. In order to complement other initiatives of the EU in Kazakhstan, the Platform will focus its national activities on Administrative Law and Criminal Procedure.

The Council also calls for a deeper involvement of civil society in the dialogues and programmes related to the implementation of the Strategy. We are keen to reinforce our common wish on these issues and intensify interaction of experts through the existing platforms and projects. In particular, the recent EU-Central Asia High-Level Conference on Water and Environment that took place in Milan on 12-13th October, showcased the potential for a common regional solution regarding water management issues.
As for the regional security aspects, the European Council proposed strengthening cooperation on security matters of common concern with Central Asia through the establishment of a regular EU-Central Asia High Level Security Dialogue in a regional format and strengthening cooperation on counter-terrorism and border security.

It is worth noting that the updated Strategy introduces the principle of differentiation, reflecting the eagerness of Central Asian partners to distinguish themselves from their neighbours, as well as a difference in ambitions of individual Central Asian countries to take forward our bilateral relations and their relations with us.

However, the right combination of individual and regional approaches should be sought. Many of the challenges the countries of the region are facing - water, degradation of the environment, the rising threat of radicalisation, limited international trade, and so on - require a common solution. The EU’s regional approach has proven to be successful, especially in areas of interest to all the Central Asian countries, and the OSCE offers an excellent platform for dialogue where such a success could be capitalised on.

The renewed Strategy also underlines the importance of a reliable investment climate, together with stability of the legal framework, fight against corruption, interconnections with the international business community and further regional integration.

In this respect, the EU wants to continue its strategic cooperation in the sector of human rights and good governance, and to continue providing extensive support for reforms that would help to develop a stable investment climate.

Moreover, the newly appointed EU Special Representative for Central Asia, Ambassador Peter Burian, will play a key role in increasing dialogue with the relevant regional and international organisations, such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the UN, the WB, as well as neighbours of the Central Asian countries and other states active in the region (notably China, the US, Russia and Tur-
key, but also, in the future, Iran and Afghanistan (with the EUSR for Afghanistan)).

I should like to note that the conclusions on the renewed EU Central Asian strategy resulted from a broad consultation process, not only with the Central Asian governments and the EU Member States, but also with the think-tank community and civil society, and we appreciate the contribution of Kazakhstan to this consultation.

The recent activities and decisions of the EU in its relationship with the Central Asian states has built a momentum, which needs to be used for achieving better, more active and more result-oriented EU cooperation with Central Asia and contributing to the general goals of the Helsinki+40 and Astana+5 processes.

Coordination of activities with the EU member states and international organizations active in Central Asia and sharing the same goals for stability and prosperity of the region is important. We need to further strengthen our interaction to achieve a better synergy and avoid unnecessary duplications when implementing various programmes.

The Astana Summit legacy clearly indicated the future development path of the OSCE in the framework of ‘indivisibility of security’. That means building an undivided security community, truly integral and pursuing common goals on the way to sustainable growth and prosperity, rule of law and democracy.

I should like to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, the OSCE Programme Office in Astana and the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies for hosting this Conference in Astana and for the opportunity to exchange our views.

Thank you.
Asset Declarations as a Tool to Enhance Transparency

Introduction

This article provides a brief overview of modern asset disclosure systems around the world and how they can help to deter corruption in public services. In today’s ever-changing world of digital technology and media, the room for corrupted and dishonest public officials is gradually shrinking. Online platforms in the public service, such as e-procurement, e-recruitment, e-declarations, e-tax etc., are forever changing public officials’ behavior. Electronic transactions simply do not provide room for bribe-taking or other misuse of power. Asset declaration systems are rapidly becoming a crucial part of government transparency architecture worldwide. Swift development of technologies pushes governments to open up their data for public scrutiny. E-declarations are relatively novel in most parts of the world. Countries either have: (a) paper-based declarations, (b) e-declarations or (c) no disclosure procedures at all. Here we might recall the United Kingdom parliamentary expenses scandal of 2009, which resulted in resignations, retirement announcements, sackings, public apologies and the repayment of expenses. Several members of the House of Commons and House of Lords have been prosecuted and sentenced to imprisonment. Now, the question we all ask in this situation is as follows: how was it possible that well-established British Parliamentary democracy and open data policies nurtured a scandal of this scale and nature? Well, the answer is very simple: British legislation did not provide for full disclosure and online access to the UK MPs’ asset declarations. Moreover, the UK is not the only country within the ‘Western World’, which does not provide
for easy access to public officials’ asset declarations. There are several reasons for that: one of them is privacy concern and another one - ever-growing security threats. For example, because of security concerns, in 2010 the U.S. Congress passed a bill to limit access to financial declarations of most public officials, but the President, members of the Congress, federal judges, presidential appointees, and other officials and employees earning at or above a specified pay-scale or with policy-making responsibilities.

There are several questions we need to ask while discussing asset declarations:

1) Who are the declarants?
   As a rule, these are elected and appointed officials, such as presidents, MPs, ministers, judges, mayors, heads of agencies and other senior staff. However, in many countries this list also includes ALL civil servants (for example, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania (80%)). The main question we have to ask while selecting this list is the following: which officials have the most decision-making powers, and what are the risks of corruption? Based on these two criteria, countries can form the most optimal list of filers, as having too high a number of declarants can be counter-productive for asset verification purposes.

2) How do they declare?
   There are three main models of registering assets: online (Georgia, Estonia, Rwanda, Bhutan), online and paper (Argentina), or paper (Ukraine, Uganda, Ethiopia). Online registration only started in the 2000s and is growing rapidly. It allows better capture, processing and disclosure of submitted data. The process of moving from paper to electronic disclosure is associated with change-management, IT costs, security risks and change of legislation. However, it is a simple fact that those countries, which have invested in transiting from paper to electronic, have substantially saved financial resources in the long run.
3) How often do they declare?

The frequency of asset registration is also a very important aspect of the process. Generally, there are four main registration times: upon entry, annual, upon exit and post-exit. Registering assets with regular frequency is vital in order to detect any suspicious wealth-variation or conflict of interests.

4) What is declared?

As a rule, filers declare not only their own assets and interests, but also the ones belonging to their immediate family members. Each country determines the list of declarable assets individually. However, there are some common trends as well: real estate (house, land etc.), cars, jewelry, expensive paintings and other movable property above a certain price tag, income, expenditure, debts, contracts, memberships, shares and dividends.

5) Are the declarations checked (verified)?

Registering asset declarations is not an end goal itself. The main idea is to prevent or detect any illegal wealth variation or conflict of interests. There are several methods of selection of declarations to be verified: corruption-risk based approach, random selection, routine check of all declarations and initiation of verification procedures only based on written request or news disseminated in the media. The resources of asset verification agencies are limited, that is why it is vital to select an optimal number of filers and to implement electronic asset registration. Having a digital database of declarations helps asset verification agencies to quickly detect any suspicious activities in the declarations using various “red-flag” systems. Countries such as Rwanda use a mixed method of declarations to be verified (random selection and risk-based approach). Verification agencies in Albania and Romania routinely verify every single declaration.

6) Does the public have access to submitted declarations?

Access to submitted declarations is vital for the transparency of assets and interests of public officials. This component is crucial because NGOs and journalists can easily detect any suspi-
cious activities in the declarations and they can write a request to a verification agency to start investigations based on specific information. Openness of asset declarations also increases the level of government transparency and accountability. There are several ways as to how countries are disclosing asset declarations. For example, in Georgia all asset declarations are submitted online and are publicly available on the website. In Ukraine and Ethiopia, where filers submit their declarations on paper, the public can get a copy of the declaration based on written request. In other countries, they simply scan, tag and upload paper declarations on the website.\textsuperscript{14} It is not enough to simply upload the declaration on the website – it is crucial to also provide meaningful search tools and access to databases in popular electronic formats (XML, CSV, etc.).

\textsuperscript{14} www.declaration.gov.ge
The Role of Civil Society in the Development of the Country’s Investment Climate

Over recent years, civil society has been playing a significant role in forming the investment and competitive image of countries. Independent assessments, reports and analytical reviews provided by representatives of the civil sector are perceived and considered by the international community as information on the current state of the country along with official state information.

Moreover, the task of states is, first of all, not to downplay this role but to perceive the civil sector as a serious opponent in this process. This requires the states to analyze this information and take it into account in further developing the state policy in different areas. Such an approach will demonstrate the country’s political and economic maturity and increase its investment attractiveness.

Civil society plays a critical role in the issues of collecting, analyzing and disseminating information on social and environmental rights. In this regard, the World Bank, the largest international investor, relies amongst other things upon the civil sector’s opinion. Social and environmental standards of the World Bank’s “protection policies” have been being scrupulously revised since 2012. The Revision is supplemented by holding global consultations with stakeholders. These consultations at regional and local levels are conducted regularly with the involvement of civil society organizations operating in Central Asia. Such consultative meetings represent an important opportunity for civil organizations to contribute to the development of the World Bank’s Framework Document for the years and decades ahead.
Over the last few years, there have been clear trends in expanding relations between the Bank and civil society representatives. This is reflected in the growing number of civil society organizations participating in the Annual and Spring Meetings and a number of meetings on policy issues during the Civil Society Policy Forum.

The influence of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) on shaping the country’s investment image should be specifically noted. Kazakhstan is an EITI Compliant country and has been adhering to the Initiative since October 17, 2013. Participation of civil society is the principal factor in achieving the EITI goals to ensure that transparency created by EITI leads to better accountability. The main purpose of implementing the EITI Standard is the desire to obtain more adequate, credible and useful information and ensure an effective link between such information and broader management reforms in the extractive sector and with the public accounting and revenue management. Therefore, the opportunity for citizens to actively use information obtained from EITI is a critically important component of EITI implementation and civil society participation in the EITI process.

Civil society participation in the EITI process is formally assessed at two stages of EITI implementation – during the candidate country assessment and during the validation process. Kazakhstan will undergo validation in the coming year. Civil society participation can also be assessed in certain cases as a response to specific problems presented to the Board regarding situations in certain implementing countries. The civil sector assessment is conducted in six areas that include about 12 factors to be taken into account.

It should be noted that the RK draft Law ‘On Introduction, Changes and Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts on the Issues of NGO Activities’, the so called ‘NGO draft Law’ submitted to
Accomplishments and challenges for the OSCE on the anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Astana Summit (2010)

Parliament, can significantly influence Kazakhstan’s EITI validation process. In particular, the draft Law proposes that additional monitoring on the part of state authorities regarding NGOs, and additional reporting for NGOs be introduced, and provides for the possibility to suspend NGO activities, up to closing them down. Thus, the RK draft Law has some points in common with the Azerbaijani NGO Law. Why am I talking about Azerbaijan? The fact is that a number of monitoring mechanisms regarding NGO activities have also been introduced in Azerbaijan. This fact was assessed by the International Secretariat as a potential possibility for abuse by state structures, and, as a result of EITI validation Azerbaijan was downgraded in its status to an EITI candidate country.

Recently the draft law on NGOs has been negatively assessed by representatives of the RK non-governmental sector. The arguments, inter alia, include non-compliance of the draft Law with the EITI Civil Society Protocol. In this regard, the recommendation was made to synchronize legislative initiatives with EITI implementation goals as an instrument of improving the investment attractiveness of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

However, the draft Law has already passed the first reading in the Senate and we are given to understand, will be finally adopted in the near future.

It should be noted that there is a number of country, regional and thematic indices and ratings, in which Kazakhstan is taking part or will be able to take part in the near future, and which take into account the state of the political system, civil society and the rule of law. These indices are the indicators of a country’s current situation. The analysis of these indices provides countries with an opportunity to develop strategic plans and ‘road maps’ to implement reforms in various sectors of public relations and increase their competitiveness as compared with other countries of the world.
At the same time it is important to understand that the users of the international indices and ratings, apart from central state authorities and national governments, are also representatives of other stakeholders, such as business associations, investment companies, large international institutions and organizations.

Among the variety of indices, I would highlight those that can have an impact on the investment attractiveness of a country.

1. Business Environment Rankings measure the quality and attractiveness of the environment for conducting business in 82 countries of the world and are produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit. This rating envisages the criteria, which companies use to formulate their global business strategies and forecast the prevailing development factors for the next five years. The rating includes ten criteria or categories covering political environment, macroeconomic situation, market opportunities, policy regarding enterprises and competition, foreign investment policy, international trade, taxation and finance, labor market and infrastructure. Kazakhstan ranks 65th out of 89 countries.

2. Worldwide Governance Indicators — this global index is calculated using the World Bank methodology based on several hundred variables obtained from different sources (statistical data provided by national institutes and international organizations, results of surveys conducted regularly by international and non-governmental organizations). This composite index consists of six dimensions that consider, in one way or another, the state of civil society:
   - Voice and Accountability – 14.22 (out of 100)
   - Political Stability and Absence of Violence – 34.6 (out of 100)
   - Government Effectiveness – 35.41 (out of 100)
   - Regulatory Quality – 36.84 (out of 100)
   - Rule of Law – 30.81 (out of 100)
   - Control of Corruption – 20.1 (out of 100).
3. Open Budget Index is produced by the International Budget Partnership with the participation of national experts in the sphere of public finance on 100 countries. Kazakhstan scored 48 points out of a possible 100 in 2012. The Index consists of the following parameters: 1) public involvement (14 points), 2) role of the legislature in the budgeting process (67 points), 3) role of the supreme body of the external financial audit (33 points).

4. Revenue Governance Index has been developed by the Natural Resource Governance Institute and covers 58 resource-based economies of the world. In 2013 Kazakhstan ranked 19th with 57 points out of a possible 100. The Index is composed of the following components: 1) institutional and legal framework (28th place), 2) reporting practice (21st), 3) social security and quality control (9th), 4) environment (32nd).

5. Democracy Index is compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit in 165 countries. According to the 2014 survey Kazakhstan ranks 137th with a total score of 3.17 out of 10 and belongs to the group of authoritarian countries. The Index is composed of: 1) electoral process and pluralism (0.50 out of 10 possible); 2) government functioning (2.14); 3) political participation (4.44); 4) political culture (4.38); 5) civil liberties (4.41).

6. Corruption Perception Index is published annually by Transparency International for 175 countries and measures the extent of corruption at the country level. In 2014, Kazakhstan scored 29 points out of 100 possible and ranked 126th. This Index has an indirect impact on the other international indices as well. We hope the state policy of Kazakhstan regarding the fight against corruption that was reflected in the adoption of the new RK law “On Combating Corruption” and a number of other initiatives specified in the ‘100 Steps National Plan’ will raise the country to a higher level.

7. Global Right to Information Rating, compiled by Access Info (Spain) and the Centre for Law and Democracy, measures legislative provisions protecting the right of citizens to access to
information in 102 countries of the world. However, the rating does not assess the law enforcement practice. The index takes into account such factors as securing the right to information, determining the limits for access to information, procedures on requesting information, exceptions, appeals, sanctions and disputes, and promotional measures. LPRC conducted two assessments of the RK draft Law ‘On Access to Information’ that was adopted by the Mazhilis of Parliament yesterday. One of the assessments was prepared for us by Toby Mendel, RTI index author. According to his assessment, the score was 74 points out of 150. This score puts the draft Law in 68th place among 102 countries of the world, which have national laws on the right to access to information, assessed on the basis of the RTI rating.

8. Good Country Index is a composite index, compiled by the Good Country Party in cooperation with researchers from various institutes, universities and analytical centers. Although most of the data is based on information for 2010, more recent data are used where available. The Index covers 125 countries of the world in seven aspects, including prosperity and equality (Kazakhstan ranks 48th), and health and well-being (Kazakhstan ranks 23rd).

9. Better Life Index was developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and includes 34 OECD member countries, which brings together most of the world’s developed economies and a number of emerging economies as well as main partners, Brazil and Russia. Over time the Index will expand to cover the OECD’s four other key partner countries: India, Indonesia, China, and the Republic of South Africa. In recent times, the issue of measuring the wellbeing of society has been actively discussed - whether measuring wealth is enough, or whether other aspects, such as optimal combination of work and leisure, should be taken into consideration as well. The purpose of the Index is to involve citizens in this discussion, give them the opportunity to raise their awareness and expand
their participation in the process of shaping the political course that determines our life. Last time, the Index was compiled in 2013 and so far does not include Kazakhstan. However, taking into account the aspiration of Kazakhstan to become a member of four OECD Committees, the situation may change in the near future.
Examples of Sustainable Economic Growth and What Lessons Can be Learned

Content

1. What is sustainable economic growth?
2. Major Kazakhstani trends and policies
3. The role of education

What is sustainable economic growth?

source: UCLG
To move away from ....

Volatile Kazakhstan economy due to dependence on commodity prices:

- More than 50% of the economy related to natural resources, extraction and exports

Oil price: $50 per barrel is maybe low compared to prices of the last 10 years but not in historical perspective!

To move towards .....

Priority: increase role of SMEs in Kazakhstan economy (e.g. DAMU):

- Aim of Kazakhstan: increase from 20% of GNP in 2015 to 50% of GNP by 2050
- E.g.: The Netherlands: 60% of GNP, South Korea: 40% of GNP
- However, share remained 18 to 20% of GNP last 7 years
- Need for finance, entrepreneurship, training and adequate regulatory environment

Source: Tengrinews 2014
And ....

Transformation Samruk Kazyna + subsidiaries:
  • Big proportion of Kazakhstani economy
  • Focus on adding value, better management and corporate governance

*All about implementation of good plans and how to direct financial programmes to generate the intended effect*

*Need for cohesive regulatory framework and the right skills*

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**The role of education (lessons learned)**

- Development of relevant skills (involve future employers)
- Development of critical thinking skills (prerequisite for civil society development)
- Ethics, norms and values (rule of law within university – e.g. tackle cheating, plagiarism)
- Life long learning
- Regional development (distance learning)
- Best practices through international partnerships
Assessment of Public Opinion regarding the Development of Local Self-Government in the Republic of Kazakhstan

The current phase of development of Kazakhstan’s society is characterized by dynamic processes aimed at improvement of the country’s social, economic and institutional environment in order for the country to be included in the list of the top 30 most developed world states by 2050. In this regard the issues of ensuring coordination of interests of the state, society and the individual acquire great relevance. In countries with a developed democracy, an important role in this area is given to local self-government.

The Concept of Development of Local Self-Government in the Republic of Kazakhstan, elaborated in conformity with the January 27, 2012 Address by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Nation, entitled “Socio-Economic Modernization - the Main Thrust of Kazakhstan’s Development”, emphasizes the multi-stage and dynamic character of the process of development of local self-government in Kazakhstan.

However, this process is hampered by many unresolved issues, insufficient legislative regulation, as well as by the fragmented nature of the study of this problem.

This article deals with the issues of local self-government development, viewed through the lens of awareness of the institution of local self-government itself, the assessment of effectiveness of local self-government (LSG) bodies, the awareness of current socio-political events of local importance, the involvement and strong civic responsibility of the public.

In this connection, the Center for Regional and Sociological Studies JSC “Institute of Economic Research” conducted a sociological survey, aimed at obtaining information on the problems
of development of local self-government in towns and cities that prevent the population from exercising its rights and opportunities in the local self-government system.

Of the 1,556 individuals participating in this sociological survey, 64% of the respondents live in cities, and 36% in rural areas.

The largest proportion of respondents were employees of private companies (19%) and public servants (18%). The smallest proportion were vulnerable groups of the population, 6% of respondents (Figure 1).

![Figure 1. Breakdown of respondents by category, n=1,556; % of respondents](image)

The survey included questions aimed at eliciting the respondents’ understanding of what local self-government is. This section looked at such questions as what the public understands by local self-government and who carries it out.

Answering the question regarding the participants’ understanding of what local self-government is, most of the respondents chose the answer corresponding to the definition from the Law on Local Government and Self-Government in the Republic of Kazakhstan (43%). Almost one third of those surveyed (27%) said that local self-government was the activity of representative and executive bodies of local self-government (LSG) with the participation of the public in their election. 11% think that LSG is the extension of
Accomplishments and challenges for the OSCE on the anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Astana Summit (2010)

state authority at local level. Significantly, nearly 1/5 of the respondents found it difficult to answer (Table 1).

Table 1. What is your understanding of local self-government?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options to choose from</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activity carried out by citizens directly, and also through the maslikhats and other local self-government bodies, aimed at independent resolution of issues of local importance on their own responsibility, regulated by the Law, and other legislative instruments.</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity of representative and executive bodies of local self-government with participation of the public in their election.</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension of state authority at the local level.</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to answer</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,545</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The largest proportion of respondents with a correct understanding of LSG was in Atyrau oblast (59%) and West Kazakhstan oblast (58%).

The respondents in Akmola oblast (34%) and North Kazakhstan oblast (17%) most frequently understand LSG as an extension of state authority.

In most of the regions such an opinion is held by approximately 1/10 of the respondents (Table 2).
Session III. Rule of law and civil society development as a prerequisite for sustainable economic growth

Table 2. **What is your understanding of local self-govern-ment? Breakdown by region, % of respondents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Activity carried out by citizens directly and also through the maslikhats and other local self-government bodies...</th>
<th>Activity of representative and executive LSG bodies with participation of the public in their election</th>
<th>Extension of state authority at the local level</th>
<th>Difficult to answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Astana city, n=96</td>
<td>40 29 12 20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almaty city, n=106</td>
<td>31 26 13 29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akmola oblast, n=91</td>
<td>40 18 34 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aktobe oblast, n=94</td>
<td>39 22 11 28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almaty oblast, n=95</td>
<td>27 32 12 30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atyrau oblast, n=94</td>
<td>59 21 6 14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhambyl oblast, n=100</td>
<td>40 27 9 24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kaz. oblast, n=98</td>
<td>58 15 12 14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaganda oblast, n=99</td>
<td>41 40 12 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kostanay oblast, n=100</td>
<td>44 34 9 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyzylorda oblast, n=91</td>
<td>48 28 8 17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangystau oblast, n=99</td>
<td>48 15 7 30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kaz. oblast, n=101</td>
<td>45 24 11 21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pavlodar oblast, n=96</td>
<td>46 30 5 19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Kaz. oblast, n=85</td>
<td>33 32 17 19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kaz. oblast, n=100</td>
<td>44 36 7 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The next question to check the public’s understanding of LSG is the question of who carries out local self-government (Figure 2).

According to the respondents, local self-government is carried out by the akim (67%), and a quarter of respondents (26%) attribute this function to the head of the akim’s administration.

Every third respondent thinks that local self-government is carried out by members of the local maslikhat, and every fifth, by the local residents.

* The total number of responses is over 100%, since respondents could choose several answers

Figure 2. **Who carries out local self-government? n= 2,194***

The breakdown by region shows that the majority of respondents, who think that local self-government is carried out by local residents, are from the East Kazakhstan oblast (40%). Somewhat fewer, but still a significant number of respondents, are of the same opinion in Kostanay, Karaganda and North Kazakhstan oblasts (Table 3).
### Table 3. Who carries out local self-government? Breakdown by region, n= 2194, % of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Akim of region/rural district/village/aul</th>
<th>Head of akim’s administration</th>
<th>Members of local maslikhat</th>
<th>Local residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Astana city, n=145</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almaty city, n=155</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akmola oblast, n=134</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aktobe oblast, n=128</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almaty oblast, n=129</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atyrau oblast, n=134</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhambyl oblast, n=118</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kaz. oblast, n=133</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaganda oblast, n=152</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kostanay oblast, n=153</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyzylorda oblast, n=108</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangystau oblast, n=146</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kaz. oblast, n=140</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pavlodar oblast, n=156</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Kaz. oblast, n=121</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kaz. oblast, n=142</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The public has an unclear understanding of local self-government; most of the respondents attribute authority to executive and representative bodies rather than to the public. Only every fifth respondent understands LSG as governance by the public. The most correct understanding of LSG prevails in the northern and eastern regions of the country (East Kazakhstan oblast, North Kazakhstan oblast and Kostanay oblast).

The performance of LSG bodies was assessed based on the answers to the questions:

Do you trust the LSG bodies? Problems of which area are poorly addressed by LSG bodies? What factors hamper their effective work?

The general assessment of LSG bodies’ performance based on the conducted survey, is mostly positive, although quite often the respondents mention the formal approach and ineffectiveness of their work. 30% of respondents said: “They try to solve problems; on the whole they tend to be effective”. 11% of residents think that LSG bodies fully discharge their duties and actively resolve issues of local importance. Nevertheless, the percentage of skeptical citizens remains high: 15% of respondents noted that the activity of LSG bodies is formal in nature; the same number of respondents believes that most often they do not resolve the issues and their work is of low efficiency. Nearly one third of respondents found it difficult to assess (Figure 3).
The activity of LSG bodies is formal in nature; their work is ineffective; 15%

Most often they do not resolve the issues; their work is of low efficiency; 15%

They try to solve problems; on the whole tend to be effective; 30%

They fully discharge their duties and actively resolve issues of local importance; 11%

Difficult to answer; 29%

Figure 3. **Assessment of local self-government bodies’ performance, n=1,556; % of respondents**

About a quarter of respondents in South Kazakhstan oblast (27%), Astana city (24%) and Zhambyl oblast (23%) believe that the activity of the local self-government bodies is formal in nature, and their work is ineffective. Only in Atyrau oblast 28% of respondents are satisfied with LSG bodies’ work; in other oblasts this figure does not exceed 16%. The percentage of respondents who had difficulty in answering this question remains very high in Astana (40%), Aktobe and Pavlodar oblasts (39% each). 36% of residents in Mangystau oblast could not assess the work of LSG bodies (Table 4).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assess the performance of local self-government bodies in your region</th>
<th>The activity of LSG bodies is formal in nature; their work is ineffective</th>
<th>Most often they do not resolve the issues; their work is of low efficiency</th>
<th>They try to solve problems; on the whole they tend to be effective</th>
<th>They fully discharge their duties and actively resolve issues of local importance</th>
<th>Difficult to answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Astana city, n=96</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almaty city, n=106</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akmola oblast, n=91</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aktobe oblast, n=97</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almaty oblast, n=95</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atyrau oblast, n=100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhambyl oblast, n=100</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kaz. oblast, n=98</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaganda oblast, n=99</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kostanay oblast, n=100</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyzylorda oblast, n=93</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangystau oblast, n=99</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kaz. oblast, n=101</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pavlodar oblast, n=96</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Kaz. oblast, n=85</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kaz. oblast, n=100</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Looking at the categories of the respondents, their opinion is unanimous - only public servants assess the performance of LSG bodies higher than the others (63%). The vulnerable groups and unemployed consider LSG performance the least effective (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Assessment of local self-government bodies’ performance, \(n=1,556\); % of respondents

The majority of the population (61%) has either full or partial trust in local self-government bodies. 21% of respondents found it difficult to answer. 3% of respondents do not trust LSG bodies; 16% lean towards no trust (Figure 5).
Accomplishments and challenges for the OSCE on the anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Astana Summit (2010)

Figure 5. Do you trust local self-government bodies? n=1,556

Looking at regions, the greatest trust in LSG bodies was shown in Kyzylorda, Atyrau, West Kazakhstan, South Kazakhstan, Mangystau, Pavlodar, North Kazakhstan and Karaganda oblasts. The lowest level of trust was recorded in East Kazakhstan, Akmola, Kostanay, Zhambyl oblasts and Astana city (Table 5).

Table 5. Do you trust local self-government bodies? Breakdown by region, n=1,556; % of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you trust local self-government bodies?</th>
<th>Yes, fully</th>
<th>Yes, partially</th>
<th>Lean towards no trust</th>
<th>Absolutely not</th>
<th>Difficult to answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Astana city, n=96</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almaty city, n=106</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akmola oblast, n=91</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aktobe oblast, n=97</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almaty oblast, n=95</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Do you trust local self-government bodies?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Yes, fully</th>
<th>Yes, partially</th>
<th>Lean towards no trust</th>
<th>Absolutely not</th>
<th>Difficult to answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atyrau oblast, n=100</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhambyl oblast, n=100</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kaz. oblast, n=98</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaganda oblast, n=99</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kostanay oblast, n=100</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyzylorda oblast, n=93</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangystau oblast, n=99</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kaz. oblast, n=101</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pavlodar oblast, n=96</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Kaz. oblast, n=85</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kaz. oblast, n=100</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All categories of respondents mainly partially trust LSG bodies; vulnerable groups (43%) and entrepreneurs (41%) chose this option most frequently. The largest group of respondents who fully trust LSG bodies is public servants (41%) (Figure 6).
According to the results of the sociological survey, the problems are rated as follows (Figures 7 and 8):

1) in first place there is the problem of the condition of roads (49%). This problem is important both for rural (52%) and urban residents (48%). In all the surveyed oblasts of Kazakhstan the percentage of those, who noted that LSG bodies poorly address the problems related to the condition of roads, is high. Residents in Zhambyl (75%), Karaganda (70%), Akmola (66%) and Kostanay (61%) oblasts are concerned more than others about this issue. Employees of state-funded organizations (61%) and private companies (53%) are more worried than others about the resolution of the issue of condition of roads. Socially vulnerable groups of the population are concerned less than others about this problem;

2) the second important problem that is poorly addressed by LSG bodies is the state of the housing and utilities infrastructure, HUI (35%). In urban areas 40% of the population are concerned about the resolution of HUI problems, while in rural areas this issue worries only 26% of respondents. In the regional context this problem is also rather acute; residents in Akmola oblast (47%), East Kazakhstan oblast (44%), Almaty city (42%) and South Kazakhstan oblast (41%) are more worried than others about the non-resolu-
tion of HUI problems. All the categories of respondents (over 30% of all those surveyed) equally consider this problem important.

Apart from the above-mentioned major problems, 32% of respondents are concerned about the solution of problems of social aid to the population. The problem of social aid to the population is felt more in urban areas; this problem concerns 35% of urban residents, especially in administrative centers, Astana city (53%) and Almaty city (39%). In rural areas 27% of respondents think that LSG bodies do not resolve the problems of social aid to the population.

In oblasts, except for the cities of Astana and Almaty, the picture is approximately the same: residents of all RK oblasts are concerned about the low level of resolution of problems of social aid to the population.

Looking at categories, this issue is of most concern to socially vulnerable groups of the population which are the active recipients of social benefits: 42% of surveyed mothers with many children, disabled persons and 36% of the unemployed with sporadic earnings.

On a par with the problems of social aid to the population, respondents single out healthcare problems (30%) and employment (31%).

In Zhambyl (41%), West Kazakhstan (38%) and Akmola (38%) oblasts, respondents state that employment problems are poorly addressed by self-government bodies. 40% of respondents in Akmola oblast, 38% in Aktobe oblast and 35% in Almaty city are concerned about the resolution of healthcare problems.

Residents are equally concerned about other issues of their local area:
- environmental protection (Pavlodar and Atyrau oblasts, and Almaty city),
- maintenance of schools and kindergartens (Astana city, Kyzy- lorda and North Kazakhstan oblasts),
- maintenance of public order in their local area (East Kazakhstan, Mangystau, South Kazakhstan oblasts and Astana city).

Figure 7. Problems of which area are poorly addressed by LSG bodies, or not addressed at all? n=1427

Figure 8. Problems of which area are poorly addressed by LSG bodies, or not addressed at all? urban/rural, n=1427
According to the respondents, the most significant obstacles to effective work of local self-government bodies are:

- inactivity, lack of initiative of the population, reluctance to participate in public life (34%);
- corruption (30%);
- lack of citizens’ awareness of legislative changes (25%) (Figure 9).

![Bar chart showing percentages of obstacles to effective work of local self-government bodies]

**Figure 9. What, in your opinion, is the obstacle to effective work of local self-government bodies? n=1,416**

The following conclusions can be made, based on the results of the survey:

- the public has unclear understanding of local self-government and usually does not differentiate between local self-government bodies, and representative and executive bodies;
- in the regions, akims regularly present reports on work done and budget allocation, and gatherings and meetings are regularly held to solve various issues; however, a considerable proportion of the population is not aware of such events or is
not interested in them. These events are formal and do not play any role in the development of the LSG bodies’ system;
- the reasons for low effectiveness are lack of initiative of the population, corruption, and low public awareness of legislative changes, resulting in a poor legal framework of the respondents themselves;
- it is necessary to expand the powers of LSG bodies;
- the population cannot influence the authorities;
- the population has only a general idea of the laws regulating the activities of LSG bodies;
- the legislative framework regulating the activities of LSG bodies, as well as the concepts of gatherings and meetings, have not been explained to the population; hence the public has an unclear understanding of these;
- the main sources of information regarding LSG activities are the mass media where TV influence dominates;
- according to the results of the survey, the majority of respondents with a correct understanding of LSG, showing greater activity regarding the issues of local importance, live in the Atyrau, Karaganda, South Kazakhstan and East Kazakhstan oblasts.

In South Kazakhstan and Karaganda oblasts there are more respondents who criticize the areas and tendencies of LSG development in Kazakhstan, while in Atyrau and East Kazakhstan oblasts respondents tend to be more supportive. A high level of critical perception is observed among the residents of Astana city; however, it is they, who are apolitical and passive and trust LSG bodies less, which is most likely due to the peculiarity of the capital of Kazakhstan being a city of functionaries.

In Karaganda oblast people are not only actively interested in the issues of local importance and can analyze the situation regarding LSG development in the region, but can also influence the decisions of public authorities. In this region the most effec-
tive form of exercising local self-government are gatherings and meetings. All the above-mentioned factors point to the fact that the best practices of LSG development in Kazakhstan are to be found in Karaganda oblast.

To resolve the problems identified through the sociological survey, it is first of all necessary to pay attention to:

- the development of openness and transparency of state bodies regarding the public;
- the development of measures aimed at increasing the authority of akims and members of maslikhats and the degree of trust in them;
- the development of initiative of the population through public discussion of legal acts, holding of referenda and engagement of young people;
- the improvement of a legislative framework with clear indication of the role, objectives and functions of LSG;
- the expansion of powers and rights of the population, as well as transparency of public opinion;
- the improvement of the system of direct elections of akims that will allow candidates, supported by the public and local elite, to become leaders of regions, as well as increase the political weight of akims in the eyes of the public and local elite;
- combating corruption;
- increasing “informational and promotional activities to explain the role and place of self-government to the public”, popularizing this issue through the mass media, special events, gatherings and meetings;
- the development of gatherings and meetings as an effective instrument of local self-government through resolution of problems and issues discussed at these events;
- a reduction in the influence of akims;
- the setting of locality-owned budgets, expansion of the locality taxation base and increase of locality revenues. This will help to resolve the problem of the limitation on the akims’ rights.
regarding “owning and disposing of their own funds, property and other resources” 15, due to which they are not able to effectively resolve issues of local importance.

Therefore, summarizing the results of the survey, it is possible to say that one of the imperatives of the development of Kazakhstan’s political system is strengthening the authority of LSG as the most citizen-oriented. With a comprehensive approach, the development of LSG must be carried out simultaneously in several areas:

- expansion of powers of the public and LSG;
- expansion of a locality taxation base, an increase of locality revenues and setting of locality-owned budgets;
- an increase in the role of local authorities in the regional political process;
- ensuring that akims and members of maslikhats are elected and are accountable to the public on a regular basis;
- informational promotion of the role and objectives of LSG;
- improvement of a legislative framework.

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Information about
the OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The OSCE Programme Office in Astana started working in Kazakhstan in 1999. According to its mandate, the Office:

- promotes the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments as well as co-operation of Kazakhstan in all three OSCE dimensions within the OSCE framework approach to cooperative security and in the regional context;
- facilitates contacts and promotes information exchange between the authorities of Kazakhstan and the Chairman-in-Office and OSCE executive structures and institutions, as well as cooperation with international organizations;
- establishes and maintains contacts with central and local authorities, universities and research institutes of the host country, as well as representatives of civil society and NGOs;
- assists in arranging OSCE regional events, inter alia, regional seminars and visits to the area by OSCE delegations, as well as other events with OSCE participation;
- provides assistance to the Government of Kazakhstan, such as raising awareness on OSCE activities, training of designated Kazakh officials, and providing advice on the OSCE to relevant official structures, facilitate information exchange between OSCE institutions and relevant state agencies on OSCE activities.

Following the mandate, the Office conducts its programmatic activities based on Annual Program Outlines developed under close consultation with the host country and the OSCE Institution. The Office supports Kazakhstan in promoting OSCE values and principles, facilitates security and confidence building measures within the OSCE area, transparent economic and environmental policy and the implementation of human rights in line with the OSCE commitments.

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Information about the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under President of Republic of Kazakhstan (KazISS) was established on June 16, 1993, by the Decree of the President of Republic of Kazakhstan.

Since its foundation the mission of the KazISS as the national research institution is to provide analytical support to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The KazISS enjoys a reputation of the leading think tank of Kazakhstan as it employs a highly professional pool of experts; at present it includes nine doctors and eight candidates of sciences, who specialize in political science, history, economics and sociology.

During the twenty-three years of functioning the KazISS have published more than 250 books on international relations, global and regional security. The Institute publishes three journals: the Kogam zhane Dayir in Kazakh, the Kazakhstan-Spectrum in Russian and the Central Asia’s Affairs in English. The KazISS has a trilingual website; in Kazakh, Russian, English.

The KazISS holds a great number of international conferences, seminars and round tables, including the Annual Conferences (regularly held since 2003) on the issues of security and cooperation in Central Asia with participation of the experts from Kazakhstan, Central Asia as well as Russia, China, Germany, France, India, Iran, Turkey, Japan, the U.S. and other countries.

The KazISS is the basis for both professional practice work of students from the leading Kazakhstan universities and fellowship of experts representing foreign research institutions.

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