



Chairmanship: Lithuania

## 723rd PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM

1. Date: Wednesday, 3 July 2013

Opened: 10.05 a.m.

Closed: 12.05 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador G. Čekuolis

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: SECURITY DIALOGUE

*Presentation on the new French defence strategy: White Paper on Defence and National Security, by General G. Maire, Deputy Joint Chief of Staff in Charge of International Affairs, National Defence Staff of France: Chairperson, General G. Maire (FSC.DEL/119/13/Rev.1 OSCE+), Belgium, United States of America, United Kingdom, Spain, Turkey, Germany*

Agenda item 2: GENERAL STATEMENTS

(a) *Destruction of stockpiles of conventional ammunition in Belgium:* Belgium (Annex 1)

(b) *The future of conventional arms control in Europe:* Russian Federation (Annex 2), United States of America

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

(a) *Donors' visit to Georgia (FSC.DEL/116/13), to be held from 11 to 12 July 2013:* FSC Co-ordinator for Projects on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Hungary)

- (b) *Matters of protocol*: Sweden, Chairperson, United Kingdom, United States of America

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 17 July 2013, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/729

3 July 2013

Annex 1

Original: ENGLISH

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**723rd Plenary Meeting**

FSC Journal No. 729, Agenda item 2(a)

**STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF BELGIUM**

Mr. Chairperson,

Belgium would like to inform the Forum for Security Co-operation that, after an audit of the management and stockpiling of operational stocks within its armed forces, its Ministry of Defence has decided to destroy 15,300 tons of ammunition, or 57 per cent of its current stockpiles. It is mainly artillery shells, mortar bombs, anti-tank mines, grenades, rockets, pyrotechnical ammunitions and explosives that are concerned.

Of the total, 11,700 tons will be destroyed between 2013 and 2017 under demilitarization contracts with the NATO Support Agency, while the remaining 3,600 tons will be destroyed between 2013 and 2019 by the Belgian Military Ordnance Services. All destruction operations will be nationally funded.

This decision shows clearly that Belgium takes the OSCE commitments and best practices in the field of stockpiles of conventional ammunition most seriously, with the aim of contributing to the security of our continent.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson,

May I also kindly request you to attach this statement to the journal of today's meeting?



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/729

3 July 2013

Annex 2

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

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**723rd Plenary Meeting**

FSC Journal No. 729, Agenda item 2(b)

**STATEMENT BY  
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Mr. Chairperson,

As we have already mentioned on several occasions in this room, Russia has consistently advocated a reduction in the role of force in international relations and a simultaneous strengthening of strategic and regional stability, and the neutralization of possible military dangers and threats by political, diplomatic and other non-military means, among other things with the aid of instruments for arms control and confidence-building in the military sphere. We are involved in the drawing up of new agreements in these areas on the basis of the principles of equal rights and indivisibility of security on the understanding that these agreements are in keeping with our national interests and take into account all the factors affecting strategic stability.

In particular, as part of the efforts to strengthen regional stability in Europe, Russia will endeavour to bring the European conventional arms control regime into line with the present-day realities and also secure unconditional compliance by all parties with the agreed confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).

The relevant provisions are set out in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation recently approved by the President of Russia.

We take the position that considerable experience has been gained – both positive and negative – during the many years of negotiations on this subject within the framework or under the auspices of the CSCE/OSCE and this must be taken into account. At the same time, significant changes in both the political and the military-technical sphere require a critical assessment of previous achievements and the elaboration of new approaches.

In recent months, we have seen increased discussions of the problems of conventional arms control in Europe and CSBMs in various formats. We trust that in due course our partners will, once they have abandoned their counter-productive stereotypes, manage to form a realistic official position that will make it possible to begin to search for mutually acceptable solutions without preconditions.

Like our partners, we do not as yet have any patent recipes for future agreements. We believe that joint reflection on some of the key questions will help to advance this creative endeavour. In that context, our delegation would like to return once more to the International Conference on Political and Military Aspects of European Security recently held in Moscow. We might be wrong but we would venture to state that a number of the ideas of direct relevance to our work put forward at that event by Russian participants will provide good food for thought and may be of practical interest to our distinguished colleagues. I shall endeavour to outline them briefly in general terms.

First, over the last two decades, the military balance of forces between different States and their alliances has changed noticeably, and the North Atlantic alliance has acquired superiority in conventional armaments. The desire to build up and modernize offensive capabilities, create and deploy new weapons types and enlarge NATO and its military infrastructure has violated the principle of equal security and eroded the security structure, which had previously been cemented by a system of arms control treaties and agreements. One of the natural consequences of that process was the collapse of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Second, we see no real alternative to the creation of a fundamentally new conventional arms control mechanism adapted to the needs of the present day, ruling out the possibility of solving international problems by force and based on the principles of equal and indivisible security and a balance between the rights and obligations of the parties. We are ready to search together for new formulas for solving the problems of conventional arms control in Europe taking an equitable and respectful approach to the national security interests of every European State.

Third, it can hardly be claimed today that everything can be solved simply by limiting the number of tanks, armoured vehicles or artillery systems. It is impossible to ensure an adequate level of security if we do not take into account all the weapons that could be used in combat missions in Europe. For example, why should the artillery of ground forces be strictly controlled while naval missile and artillery systems, which have no less firepower and can hit targets on land, are not subject to control?

Fourth, rapid development in terms of scientific and technical progress means that precision weapons, non-strategic missile defence systems, drones, robotic warfare devices and other devices not covered by the existing mechanisms for ensuring military security are beginning to play an ever greater role. For example, precision weapons, which are not subject to any kind of quantitative, qualitative or territorial restrictions, may be used in attacks on strategic facilities.

Fifth, apart from the technical characteristics, the geographical deployment of armaments plays a significant role in ensuring security. All too often the discussion of this question has so far simply boiled down to the notorious flank limitations. However, it is worth looking at the "geography problem" from a broader perspective. For example, forward deployment units or compact special units may be of greater significance today than the number of tanks assigned to a particular military district.

Sixth, it would probably be useful prior to the start of negotiations on conventional arms control in Europe to try to formulate a matrix of some kind, in which the

interrelationship between specific weapons types and the degree to which they influence combat operations would be determined. Quantitative characteristics devised on an agreed basis, involving among other things the participation of non-governmental experts, and comprehensible to all could be of help to the official negotiators as well.

Seventh, let me say a few words about the Vienna Document 2011. According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, the set of political and military measures provided for in that document ensures openness and predictability in the military activities of the OSCE participating States, strengthens confidence between them and reduces the likelihood of armed conflicts arising in Europe. Nevertheless, the Vienna Document mechanisms must also take into consideration the changes that have occurred in the armed forces of many European States, including the appearance of new weapons types that are not covered by this instrument but likely to have a significant influence on the military capabilities of States.

Eighth, in a broader context, the question arises as to whether we need control for control's sake. After all, the information obtained during the implementation of international arms control treaties is so complete and sufficient that it is able to provide an indication of the deployment of troop units and an assessment of their real status and their armaments and military equipment. Perhaps it would make sense to focus verification activities on really sensitive aspects, for example, a build-up of forces or troop movements.

Ninth, thought should also be given to the contribution of military co-operation in ensuring the transparency of military activities. At times joint exercises or training exercises are more effective and yield more information than inspections. This is of no small importance at a time of cost-cutting in defence spending. We believe there is a need for joint projects, which could compensate for the lack of trust.

We are confident that these preliminary considerations will provide a basis for further lively discussion.

I thank you, Mr. Chairperson, and ask that this statement be attached to the journal of today's meeting.