

Towards Reconciliation:

Joint Irish Response
of International Organizations


**Current budget
of the UN operations
in conflict areas
is 7 billions USD**

**But this is just 0,5%
of the world annual
military spending**

**Russia occupies only 51st
place among 115 suppliers
of PK contingents**

**Russia provided 225
peacekeepers to UN in 2011
(135 – military,
68 – military observers,
22 – policemen)**

Contributions of Uniformed Personnel to UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2000-2011



**Russian contribution to
UN PK finances in 2011 -2012
is 160 million USD**

**Russia is second biggest in
UN purchases for PK sector
(382 mln USD = 14% of all
UN PK purchases contracts)**



Return of global power
or even «super-power» mentality

Multi-polarity.

«To balance» other super-powers.

Global role and mission for Russia.

New integration: Eurasian Union



Pragmatic Self-Affirmation of Russia

**requires to interface with
International organizations
like UN and OSCE**

**New Instrument (2011-2012):
CSTO' Collective Peace-Keeping
Forces
(4.000 military from 7 states)**

**"Operations by own Decision
(CSTO mandate)**

**"Operations by UN
Mandate**

**CSTO has a problem
with coercive operations
on its own territory :**

**Kirgyzian crisis showed that
CSTO Presidents are afraid
to create a precedent
of collective interference
into internal affairs**

**If you wait for a formal request
from «legitimate authorities »
you may support only
Old regimes.**

**The West created a precedent:
international support
to illegitimate self-proclaimed
Benghazi opposition in Libya.**

Moscow's view:

UN mandate (Res. 1973)

**Was strongly misinterpreted and
artificially expanded:**

**“No Fly Zone” was converted
into coercive “Regime Change”
in Libya.**

**To freeze serious armed conflicts
one requires not just any
combination of national forces ,
but interoperable
and jointly trained forces .**

Precedent:

**UN forces failed in 1995 in Bosnia
And UN applied to NATO for
heavier interoperable contingent**

Precedent:
EU CJTFs are
assigned to concrete states
responsible for their
interoperability and
adequate joint training

**The only attempt of
OSCE peace-keeping
operation with
military component
took place in Post-Soviet space:
OSCE mandate in 1993
for abortive operation
in Karabakh**

**Russia undertook in 1992 -2012
several operations
in conflict areas :**

**Both under UN mandates
Regional CIS mandates
and inter-state agreements**

11000-12000

1430 + 1100

1752

460

6592

= 11800

462

Bosnia

Moldova

Kosovo

Abkhazia

Ossetia

Tadjikistan



**Regional reconciliation
and joint crises response efforts :**

Tajikistan- CIS mandate

Abkhazia – CIS mandate

South Ossetia – inter-state

Agreement 1992

Transnistria – inter-state

Agreement 1992

Central Asia



RUSSIA

KAZAKHSTAN

UZB.

KYRG

TURKMEN

CHINA

Tajikistan-

130 UN observers,

But real regional operation


was done by

7500 CIS peacekeepers


from 4 CIS states

Tajikistan-
Positive reconciliation
Experience:
Tajik Peace Accords
of 1997 –
implemented till 2000

ETHNIC STRUCTURE OF TAJIKISTAN



MIXTURE OF ETHNIC GROUPS



Central Asia

MULTI-LAYER CHARACTER OF OPERATIONS

KAZAKHSTAN

CIS Forces

RUSSIAN BORDERGUARDS

**CIS Borderguards
93, 94, 98**

UN observers

**RUS-TAJ
Bilateral
Military
Treaty**

CIS Peace Talks



Trends and Problems of Russian/CIS Regional Peace-keeping

- “ CIS delegated authority to Russia or 3-4 states, same way as UN delegates it to coalitions**
- “ «Impartiality» not at all stages**

Tendencies and Problems of Russian/CIS Regional Peace-keeping

“ Contingents of conflict sides themselves were involved into PK forces (never applied in UN PK)

“ Elements of Enforcement were present in Peace-keeping operations

Trends and Problems of Rus/CIS Peace-keeping

- “ **Mandates: CIS or interstate agreements, but no UN mandates**
- “ **Military stage has been successful, but political conflict resolution was far behind**

“Instead of one UN-led system
Peace operations have split
onto not always compatible
and sometimes confronting
reconciliation practices based
on different standards

“ Coordination mechanisms designed for **joint crises response** (like NATO-Russia Council, etc.) do not work in times of crises

- (- Iraq,
- Russian-Georgian war,
- ‘color revolutions’,
- ‘Arab spring’, Libya, Syria)



**‘Ad Hoc’ personal deals
between presidents
(G-8 type of coordination)
is not a reliable solution.**

**International community needs
stable mechanisms
of Joint Crises Response**

Crisis Response Forces

NATO

**NATO
Response
Forces**

**2006-2012:
20.000**

EU

**Rapid
Reaction
Forces**

~~**60.000**~~

**2012:
CJTFs of
1.500 size**

CSTO

**Collective
Operational
Reaction
Forces**

2012:15.000

**CPF:
2012: 4.000**

**We need to develop practice
of Joint Missions**

(UN+EU+OSCE+CSTO...)

in conflict regions

(observation,

mediation,

humanitarian missions)

New military “crisis response instruments” are formed:

NATO NRF, but also

EU RR,

CSTO CPKF

NATO NRF and CSTO CPKF

should exercise together and

develop interoperability

(at least in Central Asia

re: Afghan borders)

**Problem for the OSCE:
whether Joint Crises Response
in all crises in OSCE area
is a doctrinally approved task?**

Combination of mechanisms

UN-level conflict resolution

**Multi-layer regional conflict resolution
Mechanisms (role for OSCE)**

**Coordination Council of
International Organizations
is needed !**

