



**Permanent Representation of the  
Kingdom of the Netherlands to  
the Organization for Security and  
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)**

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**NOTE VERBALE**

The Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe presents its compliments to all Permanent Missions and Delegations to the OSCE and to the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, and has the honour to provide the Netherlands response to the questionnaire on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security for 2022. The response also includes information on Women, Peace and Security (Annex II).

The Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe avails itself of this opportunity to renew to all Permanent Missions and Delegations to the OSCE and to the Conflict Prevention Centre the assurances of its highest consideration.

Vienna, 18 April 2023



To: all Delegations and Permanent Missions to the OSCE  
Conflict Prevention Centre of the OSCE

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# QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY 2022

## THE NETHERLANDS

### Section I: Inter-State elements

#### 1. Account of measures to prevent and combat terrorism

- 1.1 To which agreements and arrangements (universal, regional, sub-regional and bilateral) related to preventing and combating terrorism is your State a party?

See Annex

- 1.2 What national legislation has been adopted in your State to implement the above-mentioned agreements and arrangements?

The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Ministry of Justice and Security report on progress made to Parliament on a regular basis.

- 1.3 What are the roles and missions of military, paramilitary and security forces and the police in preventing and combating terrorism in your State?

The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) plays a central coordinating role in preventing and combating terrorism. NCTV coordinates the efforts of the responsible ministries (mainly Interior and Kingdom Relations for the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and Justice & Security the National Police). Within the Netherlands, the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces have a supporting role in this area.

The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) investigates threats to national security, including terrorism. The AIVD identifies these threats and advises others, including policymakers and public officials at both national and regional level, as to how they might act upon the intelligence received. The AIVD is not a police service and has no mandate to investigate criminal acts.

Combating terrorism is one of the main tasks of the Central Unit of the Netherlands Police. It includes many divisions and teams who play an role in fighting terrorism and radicalization. The unit carries out policing support tasks and independent, specialist tasks. Independent tasks include serious crime, terrorism, security and protection, and infrastructure security. Independent tasks focus on specialist investigative and forensic support, intelligence and information provision, international cooperation, special interventions, air support, operational support, and coordination of operations at the national level. The Central Criminal Investigation Division of the Central Unit of the National Police plays a crucial role in combating terrorism inter alia in the field of foreign

terrorist fighters. This division provides the Netherlands police with high-quality technical, legal and strategic support related to combating organized crime and terrorism. The Central Intelligence Division of the Central Unit is responsible for the five information channels (Europol, Interpol, Sirene, Liaison Officers, Foreign Liaison Officers) through which CTER-related information flows.

Based on the Police Act, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (RNLM) has a number of civil police tasks to prevent and combat terrorism. Civil authorities have the possibility to request support from the armed forces as a structural partner for military assistance in the event of a terrorist threat or attack. Upon request from civilian authorities and if needed, the Netherlands Armed Forces can support civil authorities with specific tasks, such as providing intelligence, protection and security, and/or with specific military capabilities. The RNLM plays a prominent role in this area.

The RNLM has permanent responsibility for security and protection of specific civilian infrastructure and persons (including royal palaces and residences, official residence of the prime minister), high risk objects, for regular police tasks at designated civil airports as well as civil aviation security. The unpredictable and persistent character of nowadays terrorism and the ongoing polarization in society asks for a flexible operating counter terrorism service to serve the full range of expected violence. For this cause the RNLM provides civil services with a High Risk Security squadron (HRB) and the RNLM is specializing in behaviour detection in relation to terrorism. In the event of an increased terrorist threat level, civil authorities can request assistance and reinforcement from the RNLM units for additional protection of infrastructure and persons, namely the aforementioned High Risk Security squadron, the National Assistance Unit (LBO) and the Special Security Missions Brigade (BSB).

In the field of civil aviation security, the RNLM is responsible for so-called ‘high-risk security’. This involves internal armed surveillance of check-in counters, security filters, terminal buildings and external armed surveillance on the platform and perimeter. It also includes taking anti-terrorism measures and providing adequate response capability for incidents and security breaches.

Regular safety and security procedures regarding boarding passengers, crew and cargo and the admittance of airport personnel remain within the responsibility of the airport operator. Airport operators have outsourced these tasks to civilian security companies. By law, the Commander of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is tasked with supervising and examining (by spot-checking) the security companies’ performance.

The Netherlands’ organization to combat terrorism includes the special interventions teams (BSB for the RNLM and for the police Special Interventions Team), the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and the Air Marshals’ Program. A combined police/military Special Intervention Service and an Intervention Unit Marines are permanently on standby for combating terrorism, dealing with hostage situations, combating organized crime, etc. Additionally, the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAf) provides two aircraft on Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) to respond to ‘renegade’ situations (the use of civilian aircraft to commit terrorist acts), under the authority of the Ministry of Justice and Security. As of 1 January 2017 the QRA task is conducted together with the Belgian Air Force according to a four month alternating schedule.

All EOD support to civilian authorities is provided by the armed forces. Deployment of the armed forces to counterterrorism operations within the Netherlands always takes place under the direction of the civilian authorities. The National Coordinator for

Counterterrorism and Security advises on the use of military units in support of security forces in the event of a terrorist threat.

Acting in a timely and lawful manner, the Public Prosecution Service and the police will investigate and prosecute persons suspected of preparing or carrying out terrorist or extremist offences, including cybercrime.

Focus will therefore continue to be on:

- The criminal justice system's ability to investigate, prosecute and try persons suspected of extremist or terrorist offences and to place those who have been convicted of such offences in special detention, if need be. Even if the threat should decrease, the required capacity and knowledge will be maintained. That way they can be rapidly redeployed if the threat flares up again;
- Making use of the full range of possibilities offered by the law, disrupt extremist and terrorist acts – including preparatory acts – and to prosecute those suspected of committing them;
- Investigating and prosecuting persons suspected of financing terrorism.
- Increasing and retaining knowledge and expertise within the criminal justice system regarding extremism and terrorism;
- Further strengthening information-sharing practices and cooperation between intelligence and security services and investigative agencies.

1.4 Provide any additional relevant information on national efforts to prevent and combat terrorism, e.g., those pertaining *inter alia* to:

— Financing of terrorism

The Netherlands implements all relevant UN resolutions and EU regulations on combatting the financing of terrorism in its national legislation and regulations. Financing terrorist activities is sanctioned and criminalized through the Dutch Penal Code and the Sanctions Act (*Sanctiewet 1977*). More than ten government agencies are involved. These include the Public Prosecutors Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice and Security and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. In order to combat the financing of terrorism more efficiently and effectively the Netherlands introduced a successful public-private initiative: the TF Task Force. Public parties and private parties (commercial banks) share subject-based information within statutory frameworks. This helps financial institutions to search more specifically for the financing of terrorism.

— Border control

In the context of border control, the RNLM helps fight terrorism, *inter alia* by providing information relevant to other organizations such as the AIVD or the NCTV. The RNLM is only authorised to act on the basis of information related to terrorism provided by the organizations mentioned above.

The RNLM monitors the borders of the Netherlands and checks for persons who are identified as “undesirable aliens” and also checks whether a passenger poses a threat

to public order and security. At the border control the passport number of every passenger is checked against databases like the Schengen Information System and Interpol's Stolen and Lost Travel Documents to find out whether the passport is registered as stolen, lost, or revoked.

During the Identification and Registration process of asylum applicants special attention is given to signs of terrorism. If signs are identified they will be shared not only with the AIVD but also with other parties involved in border management.

— Travel document security

No specific measures on travel document security are taken. In general, every five years a new passport model is issued in order to prevent document forgery. Furthermore the passport issuing authorities must check the identity of every applicant of a travel document. Since March 2014 passports are valid for 10 years (before March 2014 five years only). Passports of potential foreign fighters can be withdrawn or withheld. In addition legislation is under consideration to prohibit travel outside the Schengen area for potential foreign fighters.

Jihadists are known to make use of other people's passports, thereby complicating the identification process. Evidence of this was uncovered during the raid in Verviers, where a passport belonging to a Dutch national was found. The fraudulent use of other people's passports or ID cards for travel purposes is nothing new. The loss of identity documents should always be reported to the authorities so that this information can be included in the databases that are consulted at the border. But of course, missing documents will not be reported if their loss is the product of criminal intent. Passports are sometimes misused by people known to the criminal justice authorities in order to remain under the radar.

Maintaining sound verification practices for identity documents is the best way of preventing people from travelling under a false identity with a valid travel document. Such official checks, which occur not only at the border, but also during police inspections and at municipal offices that issue passports, are a prerequisite for identifying misuse. In exercising its border control duties the RNLN is responsible for confirming travellers' identities. An important aspect of this is spotting forged and falsified documents. They also consult systems to determine if a given document has been flagged as stolen, revoked or missing. Furthermore, special attention is being given to recognizing 'lookalike fraud', whereby an individual makes use of a genuine document belonging to someone else. In this way the Dutch authorities do their utmost to make it difficult for people to travel under another identity.

— Container and supply chain security

In accordance with the *'Accord Europeen relatif au transport international de marchandises Dangereuses par Route'* (ADR) the Netherlands has adopted legislation to ensure the secure transport of dangerous goods. Transporters that are allowed to transport dangerous goods are obliged to take the necessary precautions against misuse and theft. Inspections are carried out to ensure compliance with all relevant regulations.

Activities of the Netherlands related to cargo aviation security are described in European legislation on cargo aviation security (EU-Regulation nr. 300/2008). Recently new legislation came into force with a focus on improving the security status of cargo coming from third countries. The Netherlands is implementing the new obligations.

— Security of radioactive sources

The Netherlands has national legislation with security requirements for radioactive sources. International cargo at main ports is checked for radiation. The Netherlands participates in the WCO Global Shield programme on explosives precursors and is implementing EU regulation 98/2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors (including customs checks).

The security of radioactive sources is regulated in Chapter 6 of the Implementation Act. This chapter entered into force in April 2013. The Implementation Act determines which radioactive materials and sources must have additional security measures in addition to the regular normal security measures. Chapter 6 was evaluated and expanded in the autumn of 2015.

With a view to public access to sensitive information, the accessibility of data regarding radioactive sources on the internet will be reviewed and evaluated.

— Use of the Internet and other information networks for terrorist purposes

a) On a national level the Netherlands works on a multidisciplinary approach of countering extremist and terrorists' use of the internet, which is coordinated by the NCTV.

b) The AIVD attempts to counter the threat generated by online terrorism by investigating virtual and physical terrorist activities. In view of the transnational nature of online terrorism, the AIVD works closely together with foreign intelligence and security services.

c) Article 21 of the EU Directive on combatting terrorism has been incorporated into criminal law. In Dutch criminal law the terrorist content (both online/offline) is linked to the (criminal) behaviour of a suspect. As a result, persons in the Netherlands who post extremist statements on the internet can be criminally prosecuted and the content can be removed.

These include:

- Statements that threaten people;
- Statements that incite to commit violent hatred;
- Expressions that incite to commit criminal acts;
- and statements that recruit.

d) The "terrorist content" in itself (for example a photo of an IS flag) is difficult to criminalize independently of the context or the behaviour and therefore the criminal law approach is not well suited to removing such material.

e) Upon suspicion of a crime the Public Prosecutor is authorized, besides prosecution, to order an internet provider to immediately take all measures to make certain data inaccessible (Art 54a Criminal Code; 125 p Criminal Procedure Code).

f) The National Police's Internet Referral Unit, IRU, may identify extremist content and request internet companies through Europol to remove it voluntarily. This is the

Notice and Take Action procedure. Here the purpose is not prosecution, but to keep the internet clean by removing extremist expressions.

g) The Netherlands implements the EU Regulation on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online (TCO). The aim is to enable swift and effective removal of terrorist content online within one hour and with full respect of fundamental rights, such as the freedom of speech. The Netherlands is setting up an independent administrative body as competent authority, called Authority for Online Terrorist and Child Sexual Abuse Material to exercise the obligations of the EU regulation in a manner that is objective, non-discriminatory and in full respect of fundamental rights. Non-compliance can be penalized by the authority. The IRU will transfer its content moderation responsibilities to this new authority once it is fully operational. The Netherlands emphasizes the importance of an independent competent authority, i.e. independent from ministerial decision making, since the removal of online content affects fundamental rights, in particular the freedom of expression and information.

h) On an international level the Netherlands actively participates in the EU Internet Forum, in which the EU institutions and agencies, EU Member States, and the internet industry meet to discuss cooperation on countering terrorist and child sexual abuse material online. Developments on the internet change rapidly, therefore it is crucial to cooperate with (inter)national partners in countering the dissemination of terrorist content online.

— Legal co-operation including extradition

The Netherlands is party to various bilateral and multilateral treaties, including UN conventions relating to mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and extradition, which provide a basis for rendering assistance to other countries in criminal cases (for instance relating to terrorism). These treaties have all been implemented in national legislation and can serve as a legal basis for extradition and mutual legal assistance. For extradition, the relevant treaties are the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (<http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm>). If a foreign request for assistance is based on one of these treaties, the Netherlands can provide legal assistance in broad terms. Extradition is also possible based on these treaties.

Other treaties containing provisions on extradition include the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (adopted by General Assembly Resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000) and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (adopted by General Assembly Resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003).

## **2. Stationing of armed forces on foreign territory**

- 2.1 Provide information on stationing of your State's armed forces on the territory of other participating States in accordance with freely negotiated agreements as well as in accordance with international law.

The Netherlands is a party to the Agreement by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the Status of their Forces (1951) and the supplements thereto. The Netherlands is also party to a number of treaties with Germany and Belgium.

Belgian-Netherlands naval cooperation has a common operational HQ in Den Helder, The Netherlands (ADMIRALBENELUX). Both navies make use of each other's facilities in the Netherlands and in Belgium for educational and logistical purposes. Around 40 Netherlands Navy personnel are stationed in Belgium for maintenance and operational support of the MCM (Mine Counter Measures) vessels in Zeebrugge to support the Belgian-Netherlands Naval Mine Warfare School (EGUERMIN) and the Naval Mine Warfare Centre of Excellence (NMW COE) in Oostende.

On 1 November 2013, the Benelux established a common Benelux Arms Control Agency (BACA). The arms control agency for the Netherlands was merged with those of Belgium and Luxembourg. BACA carries out its activities from Peutie in Belgium. BACA implements the conventional arms control treaties for the entire Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg armed forces. 5 Netherlands military personnel are stationed at BACA, which operates under Belgian command since August 2022.

A Benelux Para Training Centre was established in Schaffen, Belgium, in the same year. 2 Netherlands officers are stationed there.

Some 576 NLD military are stationed in Germany. Most of them (around 264) are stationed at Headquarters 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps which was established in 1995 and is located in Münster; it is one of the NATO High Readiness Forces (Land) Headquarters. Most of the Corps positions (circa 440) are divided equally between Germany and the Netherlands; about 70 positions are reserved for military personnel of other NATO and EU member states. Another main location is Bergen (Lower-Saxony), where the fully integrated German-Dutch 414 Armoured Battalion is located with 91 military. Furthermore Dutch military personnel are stationed at NATO positions in Ramstein (39) and Geilenkirchen (38).

In each of the following nations, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, the Netherlands have permanently stationed 2 Netherlands military personnel as part of NATO's Force Integration Units, following a decision taken at the Wales Summit in September 2014 as part of NATO's Readiness Action Plan, a comprehensive package of measures designed to respond to the changed security environment on the Alliance's borders. The Netherlands also provide input to NATO's Enhanced forward Presence by contributing to the strengthened military presence in Lithuania. This NATO presence in the Baltic states and Poland serves as a reassuring measure for these countries. The Netherlands supplies 270 soldiers for a multinational battle group, steadily growing to 350 personnel in 2022.

At the request of NATO, the Netherlands has deployed eight F-35 fighters to Poland for Air Policing and Air Defence missions. As of 1 January 2023 the aircraft and associated 150 – 200 personnel have been deployed to protect the eastern flank of the NATO treaty area until the end of March.

Also at request of NATO the Netherlands has deployed a Patriot surface-to-air guided missile system to Slovakia which can neutralise fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters and ballistic and cruise missiles up to an altitude of 20 kilometres and a range of 60 kilometres. The deployment of the system was from April 2022 till October 2022. It was



integrated with a German unit and the personnel strength of the Netherlands unit was around 150 persons. There are still 4 persons integrated in the German unit after the Dutch Patriot system left in October.

In Poland the Netherlands has stationed 2 persons within the logistic hub in Rzeszow. This for handling all the weapons systems, ammunition and other goods donated by the Netherlands to Ukraine. This is started shortly after the start of the war on 26 February and will be done until further notice.

In Romania there is an eFP BG established under the lead of the French Armed Forces. Engineers of the Netherlands Armed Forces started to build a camp together with the French and the Romanian Armed Forces in April till October 2022. In June the Netherlands also contributed with a airmobile company and in October also with a counter UAV unit. In total there are around 150 persons. This contribution will last till summer 2023.

In September 2008 a Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) was established, now comprising of 10 NATO member states including the Netherlands and 2 Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations, in total 12 nations. The operational organization of SAC is the Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW), stationed at Pápa Air Base in Hungary. The HAW operates three C-17 aircraft. The Netherlands contributes 25 military personnel to this multinational consortium.

302 Squadron of the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAf) is based in Fort Hood (TX), USA, employing approximately 30 RNLAf and Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA) personnel; it operates seven AH-64D and 4 AH64E Apache attack helicopters and five CH-47F MYII Chinook transport helicopters. Through 2023, the AH-64D will be phased out and the number of E variants will rise to six (ultimately eight in 2025). 302 facilitates joint air assault training for RNLA AASLT infantry and RNLAf helicopter crews in order to prepare for future combat deployments. In addition, 302 Squadron is responsible for Mission Qualification Training (MQT) for both Apache and Chinook helicopter crews. Fort Hood will be renamed Fort Cavazos in May 2023.

The RNLAf 323 Test & Evaluation Squadron (TES) is based at Edwards Air Force Base (CA), as part of the Joint Operational Test Team (JOTT), directed by the Director Operational Test and Evaluation, employing eight RNLAf personnel and currently without aircraft to wrap up the initial Operational test and Evaluation.

A RNLAf Detachment is based at Luke Air Force Base (AZ), that employs 14 RNLAf personnel and operates eight F-35 fighter aircraft, maintained by the Luke Air Force Base contractors. The detachment is part of the 308th FS and provides F-35 type conversion for new F-35 pilots and an F-35 Instructor Pilot Course.

Various numbers of military personnel are assigned to (multinational) military staffs in different countries, in addition to the deployment of various units participating in UN and other military operations pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions or at the request of the host nation concerned. At one NORDEFCCO and fourteen NATO accredited Centres of Excellence the Netherlands have military personnel. These Centres of Excellence cover a wide variety of areas of interest. The NATO Centres of Excellence work under the overall coordination of Allied Command for Transformation.

Four Royal Marechaussee personnel are stationed in Vicenza, Italy with the European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR) staff, the multinational rapid deployable intervention force, comprising of elements of several European police forces with military status.

### **3. Implementation of other international commitments related to the Code of Conduct**

- 3.1 Provide information on how your State ensures that commitments in the field of arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building as an element of indivisible security are implemented in good faith.

The Netherlands is party to and has implemented all international Treaties and Conventions in the field of arms control, disarmament and confidence and security building measures. The Netherlands pursues greater transparency for the international imports and exports of arms and therefore values and reports to UNODA, the OSCE and the UN Arms Trade Treaty.

- 3.2 Provide information on how your State pursues arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building measures with a view to enhancing security and stability in the OSCE area.

In the field of conventional arms control, the Netherlands is party to the UN Arms Trade Treaty, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the EU Common Position on Arms Exports 2008/944/CFSP. It takes an active part in the Council Working Group COARM to promote harmonization of export controls between EU partners. The entry into force of the UN Arms Trade Treaty was an important step forward in strengthening export controls at the global level. The Netherlands supports the universalization and sound implementation of the treaty.

The Netherlands is a State Party to both the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and the Treaty on Open Skies and is a participating State to the Vienna Document and other OSCE agreements on CSBMs. The Netherlands Permanent Representation to the OSCE takes an active part in the various negotiating forums within the OSCE framework. On the basis of these treaties and agreements, the obligation exists to accept inspections, evaluations, observation flights by the other contracting states on and above Dutch territory, as well as Dutch forces on the territory of other parties. In addition, based on some of these treaties and agreements, the Netherlands has the right to carry out inspections, evaluations and observation flights on and above the territory of the other contracting states. These flights are coordinated and carried out at BENELUX level. In addition to the multilateral arrangements mentioned above the Netherlands has reinvigorated the bilateral INCSEA agreement with the Russian Federation in order to raise awareness and aim at increasing the safety on and above the high seas.

## **Section II: Intra-State elements**

1. **National planning and decision-making process**

- 1.1 What is the national planning and decision-making process in determining/approving military posture and defence expenditures in your State?

The planning and decision-making process within the Netherlands is called the Policy-Plan-Budget cycle in which means are allocated to and within the Ministry of Defence in accordance with plans and priorities. Planning priorities in national defence planning are the result of the relationship and interaction between political and organizational ambitions, tasks, capabilities and means. In order to improve this national defence planning, a methodology has been developed that reflects a joint interaction between the services and directorates and which integrates NATO and EU priorities. This methodology is the leading principle for the national planning system.

The Policy-Plan-Budget (PPB) cycle is an annual cycle with a budgetary outlook of five years based on initial political guidance at the beginning of a legislature and is updated yearly. At the beginning of a legislature, the Netherlands government produces its Policy Directive, which is the leading policy document for government departments including the Ministry of Defence and is valid for a period of four years (or the length of the legislature). The Policy Directive provides political and policy input for the Defence Plan. The Policy Directive is translated into a Defence Plan issued by the Defence Staff which represents a more detailed outline of defence plans and policy for the period of the legislature. The document Defence Vision 2035 “fighting for a secure future” provides 10 design principles for the Ministry of Defence. These principles provide guidance in the choices that have to be made in determining the appropriate military posture and capabilities which will be incorporated in the Defence Plan. The Defence Plan explains the relationship between policy, planned expenditures and capability development versus activities, personnel and equipment. This document serves as the basis for the annual budget plan and PPB-cycle. The Chief of Defence, as the corporate planner and allocator, formulates this integrated proposal, which is then submitted to the Minister of Defence.

- 1.2 How does your State ensure that its military capabilities take into account the legitimate security concerns of other States as well as the need to contribute to international security and stability?

According to article 97 (1) of the Constitution of the Netherlands the armed forces of the Netherlands exist to defend and protect the interests of the Netherlands and promote the international legal order.

## **2. Existing structures and processes**

- 2.1 What are the constitutionally established procedures for ensuring democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces, intelligence services and the police?

The Constitution states that the Government has supreme authority over the armed forces (article 97, paragraph 2). The government’s policies and decisions regarding security and defence forces are subject to parliamentary control. There are no paramilitary forces in the Netherlands and civilian security companies are subjected to specific legislation. The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and the Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) are integral parts of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Ministry of Defence, respectively. As such, they fall within the normal

constitutional framework for government institutions. In addition to the constitutionally established procedures, the intelligence and security services have their own legal framework (Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017).

Article 100 of the Constitution requires that Parliament is informed about the use and deployment of defence forces in support of the international rule of law.

2.2 How is the fulfilment of these procedures ensured, and which constitutionally established authorities/institutions are responsible for exercising these procedures?

The Minister of Defence is politically accountable to Parliament with respect to the implementation of the outlined policy priorities and the operational objectives and with respect to the Defence Intelligence and Security Service. The Parliament allocates funds for the annual budget of the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces.

The organizational structure of the police is laid down in the Police Act of 2012. It describes the responsibility for the organisation and its actions of the Minister of Justice and Security. The Minister of Justice and Security is politically accountable to Parliament. Concerning the upholding of criminal law, the police acts under subordination of the Public Prosecution Service, and under subordination of the local mayor where it concerns the upholding of public order and security. The mayor is politically accountable to the city council.

The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations is responsible for the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), which investigates threats to national security. The Committee on the Interior exercises parliamentary oversight over unclassified issues pertaining to the AIVD. Regarding classified issues, parliamentary oversight takes place in a confidential House Committee consisting of the leaders of the five biggest political parties represented in the Lower House (Tweede Kamer).

Additionally, the independent Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) assesses whether the AIVD and the MIVD abide by the law and, in particular act in accordance with the Intelligence and Security Act 2017 and the Security Screening Act.

2.3 What are the roles and missions of military, paramilitary and security forces, and how does your State control that such forces act solely within the constitutional framework?

The Constitution lays down three principal missions for the armed forces:

- to defend national and allied territory, including the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom, and the national interests of the Kingdom of the Netherlands;
- to promote the international rule of law;
- to support and assist civilian authorities in maintaining law and order, providing disaster relief and humanitarian aid, on a national as well as an international scale. This task is based on a number of different laws such as the 2012 Police Act. These activities are always performed at the request, and under the authority of the civilian authorities and within the legal framework for such activities.

See also 2.1 and 2.2. Apart from individual criminal responsibility of military personnel, the overall political control for ensuring that the armed forces act within the constitutional framework lies with the government, which is in turn subject to (public) review by Parliament. The minister of Defence is politically accountable to Parliament and has to inform Parliament on any relevant development related to the armed forces, in accordance with procedures laid down in the Constitution.

### **3. Procedures related to different forces personnel**

#### **3.1 What kind of procedures for recruitment and call-up of personnel for service in your military, paramilitary and internal security forces does your State have?**

The personnel system of the Netherlands armed forces is based on professional voluntary staff. The Netherlands suspended military conscription in 1997 and legislation has been changed accordingly. However, the registration system is still in place and if the military necessity were to arise, conscription can be resumed and reservists can be drafted. On a voluntary basis, Netherlands residents can serve as reservist in non-operational posts and be deployed in peace support operations.

#### **3.2 What kind of exemptions or alternatives to military service does your State have?**

Since the Netherlands has suspended military conscription, offering alternatives to compulsory military service is no longer applicable.

#### **3.3 What are the legal and administrative procedures to protect the rights of all forces personnel as well as conscripts?**

The military law and disciplinary rules are almost entirely shaped according to civil law and do not infringe upon the civil rights of military personnel. These civil rights can only be limited in the event of military operations in times of war or during peace support operations. The Inspector-General for the Armed Forces serves as *Ombudsman* for all personnel.

### **4. Implementation of other political norms, principles, decisions and international humanitarian law**

#### **4.1 How does your State ensure that International Humanitarian Law and Law of War are made widely available, e.g., through military training programmes and regulations?**

All military personnel receive instruction in international humanitarian law, which is also included in annual basic training refresher courses. In addition, lessons incorporating other relevant international conventions and commitments are provided, for instance those within the framework of the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Particular attention to international humanitarian law is given in the Soldiers' and Officers' Handbooks. Finally, a specific Humanitarian Law Handbook is available and updated as required.

#### **4.2 What has been done to ensure that armed forces personnel are aware of being individually accountable under national and international law for their actions?**

The training of all military personnel contains classes on military law, international humanitarian law and criminal law. Additionally, attention is given to humanitarian law and human rights in the training prior to any deployment.

- 4.3 How does your State ensure that armed forces are not used to limit the peaceful and lawful exercise of human and civil rights by persons as individuals or as representatives of groups nor to deprive them of national, religious, cultural, linguistic or ethnic identity?

The legal framework for the use of the armed forces in domestic operations contains a number of checks and balances, including legal review of any request or intention to deploy the armed forces for such operations. Furthermore, any such deployment is conducted under the authority of the civil authorities. Additionally, attention is given to human rights in the training prior to any international deployment (see 4.2, above). There is also parliamentary oversight through the means of the Article 100 obligation (see II.2.1) to inform Parliament on missions in support of the international legal order, periodic updates on missions sent to Parliament and a formal evaluation at the end of all missions.

- 4.4 What has been done to provide for the individual service member's exercise of his or her civil rights and how does your State ensure that the country's armed forces are politically neutral?

Individual service members have the same rights as other citizens, which may only be limited by law and out of operational concerns. Personnel are allowed to organize themselves into unions and have recourse to legal means if they consider themselves unfairly treated. Furthermore, a system of integrity advisors is present throughout the armed forces.

Political neutrality is ensured through the civilian control of the armed forces.

- 4.5 How does your State ensure that its defence policy and doctrine are consistent with international law?

Legal advisors are available within the ministry of Defence and are consulted on most policy documents, including the Netherlands Defence Doctrine. The Director of Legal Affairs may also provide advice *ex proprio motu* on any (policy) issue he/she considers relevant. Under the obligations derived from Article 36 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, states are obligated to ensure that their means and methods of warfare are in accordance with international law. The Netherlands has an advisory committee which ensures such adherence. Finally, legal advisors are present at various levels of command to advise commanders on international law in accordance with Article 82 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.

### **Section III: Public access and contact information**

#### **1. Public access**

- 1.1 How is the public informed about the provisions of the Code of Conduct?

The Code of Conduct is not explicitly mentioned, but the way it is implemented in the Netherlands Armed Forces is made public through means as described in 1.3.

- 1.2 What additional information related to the Code of Conduct, e.g., replies to the Questionnaire on the Code of Conduct, is made publicly available in your State?

The Netherlands' replies to the Questionnaire are publicly available on the OSCE website [www.osce.org/fsc](http://www.osce.org/fsc). No additional information directly related to the Code of Conduct is provided.

Through the Netherlands Ministry of Defence's Directorate of Communication, press and individual citizens are free to request all information regarding the Netherlands Armed Forces.

- 1.3 How does your State ensure public access to information related to your State's armed forces?

The government informs the public in an active way on matters related to the armed forces, using all possible means for this purpose, such as websites (<http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/>), (<http://www.defensie.nl/>), social media (<https://www.youtube.com/user/defensie>), audio-visual materials, briefings and publications. In addition Furthermore, the press and the public have the opportunity to put forward questions related to the armed forces. They can request an inspection of any non-classified defence document under the Open Government Act (WOO) of 1 May 2022.

The Ministry of Defence strives for enhanced transparency about what the organisation does. Connection with the region or environment in which it operates is also increasingly important. Defence actively informs the local environment and region in the event of exercises planned or taking place, activities in national airspace and involves its environment as much as possible about developments that have a local or regional impact such as real estate, airspace review, radar systems.

## **2. Contact information**

2.1 Provide information on the national point of contact for the implementation of the Code of Conduct.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Security Policy Department  
Security and Defence Policy Division  
P.O. Box 20061 500 EB The Hague  
Tel. +3170348 5814  
E-Mail: [dyb-vd@minbuza.nl](mailto:dyb-vd@minbuza.nl)

2.2 To request documents under the Open Government Act (WOO):

Ministry of Defence  
Directorate of Communications/WOO  
P.O. Box 20701  
2500 ES The Hague  
E-mail: [wob@mindef.nl](mailto:wob@mindef.nl)



ANNEX  
**to Question 1 of the Information exchange on  
the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security**

1(a): *List of international agreements, including all United Nations conventions and protocols related to terrorism, to which the participating State is a party*

- 1) Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft  
14 September 1963, Tokyo (entry into force for the Netherlands: 12 February 1970)
- 2) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft  
16 December 1970, The Hague (entry into force for the Netherlands: 26 September 1973)
- 3) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation  
23 September 1971 (entry into force for the Netherlands: 26 September 1973)
- 4) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 14 December 1973, New York (entry into force for the Netherlands: 5 January 1989)
- 5) International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 17 December 1979, New York (entry into force for the Netherlands: 5 January 1989)
- 6) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 3 March 1980, Vienna (entry into force for the Netherlands: 6 October 1991) and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 8 July 2005 (entry into force for the Netherlands 8 May 2016)
- 7) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 23 September 1971, Montreal, 24 February 1988, Montreal  
(entry into force for the Netherlands: 10 August 1995)
- 8) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 10 March 1988, Rome (entry into force for the Netherlands: 3 June 1992)
- 9) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf, 10 March 1988, Rome (entry into force for the Netherlands: 3 June 1992)
- 10) Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 1 March 1991, Montreal (entry into force for the Netherlands: 3 July 1998)
- 11) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 15 December 1997, New York (entry into force for the Netherlands: 9 March 2002)
- 12) International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 9 December 1999, New York (entry into force for the Netherlands: 10 April 2003)

*1 (b): Accession to and participation in other multilateral and bilateral agreements or measures undertaken to prevent and combat terrorist activities;*

- 1 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 27 January 1977, Strasbourg  
(entry into force for the Netherlands: 19 July 1985)
- 2 Agreement concerning the application of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism among the member States of the European Community, 4 December 1979, Dublin  
(accepted by the Netherlands, treaty not yet entered into force)

## ANNEX II (NLD year 2022)

### INDICATIVE LIST OF ISSUES PERTAINING TO WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY TO BE PROVIDED IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE OSCE CODE OF CONDUCT

#### **Legislation and policy framework**

1. *Have there been any specific policies and/ or legislation (including secondary legislation) related to women's services in the Armed Forces adopted in the last 10 years (or under discussion now)? If so please provide details.*

The Netherlands Armed Forces follow NATO policies (Gender in military operations). In December 2020 the fourth National Action Plan 1325 (NAP 1325) has been launched, which will run from 2021 until 2025. Due to the growth of signatories on the NAP 1325 over the past years<sup>1</sup>, the international focus is along sided with a national focus. Coordination of the NAP remains a co-operation of The Netherlands Gender Platform "WO=MEN" (pronounce: Women equals Men) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Also, in December 2020 a new Defence Action Plan 1325 (DAP 1325) for 2021-2025 was launched. This new DAP 1325 (2021-2025), which is related to the new NAP 1325 (2021-2025), is more comprehensive and includes goals and concrete actions and encourages active involvement of the different components in the Dutch Armed Forces.

Within the Armed Forces all services are developing their own Action Plan related to the DAP 1325.

In March 2022, the Programme of Diversity & Inclusion (D&I) announced an ambitious set of measures and goals for 2030. For example, a structural embedding of D&I in different training and courses in which ethnic diversity is an important issue. DAP 1325 and the D&I programme are making progress and are working together closely. Mixed Gender in Military Operations and D&I Focal Point trainings are organised regularly.

#### **Positions and courses on Gender in Operations**

The Gender Unit has been expanded with a temporary Gender advisor and 2 interns from the Netherlands Defense College. The main task will be the execution of DAP 1325.

Since 2022 an online module Gender in Military Operations is operational within the learning environment of the Netherlands Defense Academy (NLDA). This module is open to all personnel of the Dutch Armed Forces and often serves as a basic requirement for participation in other gender related training and workshops.

In September 2022 an online Gender Focal Point training was organised. Personnel from all services within the Armed Forces participated.

The Dutch Armed Forces continues to support the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM)<sup>1</sup>

Since 2015 the Dutch Armed Forces seconded a gender expert to the NCGM in Sweden in order to support the development and capability building of gender in military operations. In May 2022 a new GENAD took position for 3 years.

The Dutch Armed Forces are also a member of the NCGM Steering Committee.

A Gender Advisor from the Gender Unit is deputy chair to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP) to promote the implementation of UN Resolution 1325 within NATO.

Additionally, the course ‘A Comprehensive Approach to Gender in Operations’ organized by the Spanish-Dutch initiative under the umbrella of the ESDC (European Security Defense College), continues to be offered to civilian and military personnel who work within the area of Gender in operations. These events took place in Spain (June 2022) and in the Netherlands (December 2022).

Next to these events support was given to the UN FMOC (Female Military Officers Course) which took place in the Netherlands in November 2022. The purpose of the course is to increase the number of female military officers deployed to peacekeeping missions by providing a space where women in the armed forces can gain exposure, additional training, and opportunities for professional advancement and networking with military women from other countries.

*2. Does national legislation concerning gender equality, sexual discrimination or equal pay apply without restriction to the Armed Forces? If there are restrictions, please describe them.*

Yes, national legislation concerning gender equality, sexual discrimination and equal pay fully apply to the Netherlands Armed Forces. There are no restrictions.

*3. Are there any restrictions on the inclusion of women in the Armed Forces? Are there positions or units women are excluded from?*

No, women are free to apply to all positions within the Netherlands Armed Forces.

*4. If women are excluded from any positions or units, what are the reasons for this?*

Not applicable (see answer 3).

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<sup>1</sup> NCGM is the department head for the discipline gender in military operations for NATO. Given their role of educating and facilitating training courses (such as the NATO Gender Advisors Course and NATO Gender Focal Point course), it is an expert centre for gender perspective integration in military organisations

## **Recruitment and advancement**

5. *Are enlistment requirements in the Armed Forces different for women and men; for example as regards physical fitness requirements or physical characteristics?*

Basic physical and psychological enlistment requirements for military personnel are equal for women and men. We are obliged to do so according to Dutch Law (Medical examination Law). There have been no change in requirements from last year..

6. *Please give the percentage of female and male applicants to the Armed Forces – received and recruited.*

Numbers and percentage of applicants					
		Male	Female	Male %	Female %
2018	12.549	10.565	1984	84	16
2019	14.847	12.162	2685	82	18
2020	16.293	13.263	3030	81	19
2021*	14.277	11.890	2387	83	17
2022	21.409	18.092	3317	85	15

\*The number of applicants as of 2021 is based on the amount of applicants before 01-10-2021. After this date the registration of applicants took place in a new system and the reporting mechanism for this system is not fully operational yet.

7. *Are there any laws or policies that set minimum or maximum targets for recruitment of women in any positions or units?*

Since 2022 there is the Programme of Diversity & Inclusion (D&I). In March 2022 a target for 2030 was presented. This target aims to have 3 out of 10 (30%) staff members being a women both in military and civil. This aim differs for the different services.

In March 2023 women military and civil make up 16% of the workforce.

A target of 30% women is also set for the management of the Department and will be guided by the Secretary General. This plan aims to achieve an increase in the number of women at both the civilian and military top in the coming years, in accordance with the Cabinet policy as described in the Cabinet response;



8. *Are there any policies (including legislation and guidance) that promote the recruitment of women in the military?*

Over the last few years there have been no special policies targeting women (military) but there have been special recruitment campaigns for women in order to try to attract more female recruits. These events are labelled “women only” events.

9. What is the number and percentage of male/female active duty military personnel in the Armed Forces? Please provide data for each service and for each rank.

The following figure gives the percentage of male/ female active duty military personnel within the Netherlands Armed Forces.

2020 : 10,7%  
 2021 : 11,5%  
 2022 : 12,1 %



10. What were the percentages and number of female personnel deployed in military operations (3 months or longer) in the last 5 years?

The number of female personnel deployed in military operations in the last 5 years is shown in the table below. Some women did more than one operation (3 months or longer) which are counted separately.

YEAR	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Number (female)	230	207	175	279	292	237
Percentage (female)	7%	7%	8%	9%	10%	9%

11. Please give percentages of women and men who received a promotion in 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022.

The percentages

2019: women: 33%, and men: 28,8%,

2020: women 28,9% and men 25,6%

2021: women 30,9% and men 25,5%

2022: women 31,3% and men 25,2%

### **Conditions of service and retention**

12. Are there differences in the average length of service of women and men? Please explain.

No, there are no differences.

13. What are the frequently recurring reasons given by women and by men for leaving the Armed Forces?

Reasons for women as well as men are **primarily** found in dissatisfaction in the way the MoD is governed and too few career possibilities and new challenges.

14. How are military equipment (e.g. tanks, aircraft, and submarines), military facilities and military uniforms adapted for women and men? Please provide details.

*Military equipment and facilities*

There is no difference in equipment (tanks, aircraft, submarines) for women and men.

*Military uniforms*

There is no special equipment for women, such as weapons, vests and helmets. Women do have different uniforms (skirt, blouse, shoes, jackets, hats). There's an ongoing development concerning combat uniforms for women.

15. Are there differences between salaries and benefits of servicemen and servicewomen?

No, there are no differences.

16. *What provisions for family-friendly work and work/life balance, such as parental leave, are in place for the military personnel?*

*Social support:*

- Pregnancy leave 6 weeks prior to date of birth of child;
- Maternity leave 10 weeks from the date of birth of child;
- Paternity leave as of 1 January 2019 changed from 2 days to 5 days;
- Parental leave 13 weeks for either parent, to be taken prior to the 8th birthday of a child;
- Calamity leave available for employees when immediate care for a direct relative (husband, wife or child) is necessary;
- Breastfeeding: the mother is entitled to facilities at the workplace to breast feed her child or to express milk. Not all locations currently provide a designated lactation facility.

Furthermore:

- Special program to support parents when both are members of the armed forces:
  - Given the operational situation and in consultation with parents, services will endeavor not to deploy both serving parents at the same time, when childcare is required.
- Support for single parents/ divorced parents, widows/widowers looking after their children:
  - Single parent with child(ren) under 5 years of age may request to postpone deployment on mission.
  - Financial allowances possible to partly compensate for the extra expenses, when on deployment.
- Childcare policy
  - Provision protecting parent from deployment
  - Extra weeks of subsidized maternity/paternity leave
  - Breast feeding breaks
  - Flexible working and service hours or variable start/ finish times of working day
  - No daycare at the MoD and military barracks.

*Additional work-life balance:*

- Flexible working hours,
- Working at home (remote logging in),
- Part-time work.

17. *Please describe the formal and informal mechanisms available for servicemen and servicewomen to complain about gender related harassment (including sexual harassment), discrimination, bullying and/ or abuse?*

*Prevention*

Code of Conduct MoD ;

1. Integrity policy Secretary General directive A 984;
2. Next to existing procedures the MoD carries out several training- and educational programs that focus on preventing misconduct in general.

*Formal mechanisms*

1. Complaints Procedure: procedure to adequately and meticulously deal with misconduct as actions carried out by MoD personnel. This procedure was recently updated;



2. The Central Organisation for Integrity Defence (COID) is the expert organization within the MoD in relation to ethics and integrity, including the prevention of and response to misconduct allegations. The COID supports managers in responding to reports and concerns, conducts investigations into reports of misconduct, and provides support in the implementation of the MoD's integrity management system through assessing risks and vulnerabilities, trainings and workshops and other activities
3. Meldpunt Integriteit Defensie (Integrity Reporting Point) (MID). The MoD has a centralized reporting structure for reporting allegations and concerns around misconduct, the MID. This reporting line is placed externally to the MoD with the Center for Labor relations for Government Personnel (CAOP). All staff members, as well as individuals outside the MoD, can contact the MID to report concerns and allegations. Allegations are then submitted through the MID to the COID for further follow-up and action. The COID also conducts investigations into reports of misconduct, when the reporter does not seek to proceed under the Complaints Procedure but rather seeks to make a report to (senior) management / in the command structure.
4. The Inspector General of the Dutch Armed Forces entertains requests for individual mediation and support.
5. Within the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (with tasks similar to Military Police) personnel is employed dedicated to investigate allegations of possible criminal conduct;
6. Throughout the organisation confidential counsellors are appointed to assess complaints and if necessary direct plaintiffs/complainers to the correct (internal or external) social service agencies. These counsellors do not act as mediators. They can support staff who consult with having conversations (for instance with their manager) if they so wish, but they do not act as mediators as such. Within the MoD we do have a specialist mediation service, the Alternative Dispute Resolution cluster (AGO), which can be called upon by both staff members and managers/commanders for formal mediation processes.

#### *Informal mechanisms*

Within the Dutch Armed Forces there are four official networks: Multicultural Network, Youth Network, Women and Defense Network and LGBTI+ network. In addition to that, there are a number of other networks/associations, but they do not hold formal status.

*18. What is the number of complaints of gender related harassment, discrimination, bullying and abuse in the Armed Forces received during 2020? Please disaggregate between anonymous and non-anonymous complaints if possible, and between complaints received from women and men. Has there been any significant change in the number of complaints in the last 5 years?*

Because cases may run for more than one year it is not possible to provide exact numbers . Some cases exist of multiple complains and multiple offenders and still be counted as one case. The MoD differentiates between 'reports' and 'complaints' . Reports are addressed by the command structure with the support of the COID, and may lead to investigations. Complaints are addressed pursuant to the Complaints Procedure and are investigated by the COG.

There's no distinction between anonymous and non-anonymous complaints, and between complaints received from women and men.

1. Regarding integrity reports 9 anonymous reports, totaling approximately 1%.
2. Regarding sexual harassment 3 anonymous reports, totaling approximately 1%.

Number of complaints:

2018: 454  
2019: 458  
2020: 314  
2021: 371  
2022: 667\*

\* The transition to a new reporting and registration system, at the end of 2021, has contributed to an increased number of reports from employees.

*19. Please describe any strategies, policies and/ or training within the Armed Forces on gender related harassment, discrimination, bullying and/ or abuse?*

The Central Organisation on Integrity and the Inspector General are both bodies within the Armed Forces where employees may be counselled. Especially the Central Organisation on Integrity provides (moral) training for students, leaders and organises symposia on different topics related to integrity and diversity & inclusion. This body may also provide (external) counselling on bullying. The Central Organisation on Integrity also provides brochures, posters and tailored information on topics such as bullying, discrimination and harassment.

*20. Is sexual harassment and gender based violence by a member of the Armed Forces against another member of the Armed Forces subject to civil or military prosecution?*

Where the reported misconduct constitutes possible criminal conduct under Dutch law (e.g. sexual assault or abuse), then this is investigated by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee and prosecuted in consultation with the Public Prosecutor. However, not all instances of misconduct also constitute crimes. Misconduct that does not constitute criminal conduct, does, however, breach internal rules and regulations such as the code of conduct. Where applicable, in such instances breaches of the code of conduct may lead to disciplinary or other action taken against the person concerned.

*21. Have you surveyed the satisfaction of servicemen and service women in the last 5 years? If so please give a brief summary of any significant differences in responses between men and women.*

Satisfaction is yearly surveyed and the results improve every year since 2015. Men and women are equally motivated to get their work done. Women are less cynical and more neutral in their expressions about their work and the interaction with others, compared to men. Women and men differ in their opinions about aspects of work: women value the content of work more highly and men tend to value the payment for work. Overall motivating aspects of the work in 2021 where:

1. Atmosphere and collegiality;
2. Work content;
3. Job and income security;
4. Work-life balance;
5. Work challenges;
6. Room for personal growth and development.

22. *What is the percentage of female medical staff (including medical doctors, nurses etc.) serving in the Armed Forces?*

The percentage of female medical staff serving in the Dutch armed forces is 52,8 %

Within the Armed Forces, the Institute Cooperation Defense and Relation Hospitals (IDR) is responsible for educating, training and preparing surgical teams for deployments. The IDR is also responsible for the exchange of (para)medical personnel between Defense and civilian hospitals.

Under a cooperation agreement, the IDR places military medical staff at relationship hospitals to gain practical experience. Several months a year, these military personnel are available to Defense for exercises or deployment, such as a deployment.

In return, relationship hospitals make (para)medics available to be trained as reservists. These reservists are available to Defense for several months a year, including for deployments.

An IDR surgical team on deployment may consist of:

- 1 surgeon;
- 1 anesthesiologist;
- 1 nurse anesthetist;
- 1 surgical assistant;
- 1 ICU nurse;
- 1 intensivist (physician specializing in intensive care);
- possibly a clinical chemical analyst or a medical imaging and radiotherapy techniques expert.

Because of this cooperation there is an increased possibility to have access to a more diverse staff.

23. *Is there any network to support women in the military (e.g. women's networking groups, female staff associations, contact points)? Please explain.*

See Q17. There is a women's network ("Women and Defense") as well as a network for LGBT+ and employees with a multicultural background.

24. *Is there a military entity that deals with the equal opportunities of men and women in the Armed Forces?*

The Central Organisation on Integrity and the Inspector General are both bodies within the Armed Forces where employees may be counselled. As of 2016 two positions responsible for improving gender equality on a political/ strategic level are dedicated to the MoD: one position in the Principal Directorate of Operations and the other at the Principal Directorate of Personnel.

25. *Are there trained gender advisors in the Armed Forces?*

From 2009 till 2020 NLD has been deploying gender advisors to the NATO mission in Afghanistan, since 2017 a military Gender advisor to UNIFIL (Lebanon) and as of 2022 a Gender Advisor to the USSC (United States Security Coordinator) in Ramallah.

All gender advisors have been trained prior to the mission. Most of them followed the Gender advisor course at the NCGM. After their deployments, the gender advisors went back to their former posts (often not related to 'gender').

Number of Gender Advisors trained at the NCGM

2020: 3

2021: 2

2022: 3

The Gender Unit currently consists of 3 Gender Advisors from which 2 are trained. Within the different services there are 4 (POC's) Point of Contacts 1325 from which 2 are trained as a GENADs.

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